VZCZCXYZ0003
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #1341 1460703
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 260703Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3444
RHMFIUU/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS MOSCOW 001341 
 
SIPDIS 
 
USDOC FOR 532/OEA/LRITTER 
USDOC FOR 3150/USFCS/OIO/CEENIS/MCOSTA 
USDOC FOR 532/OEE/MO'BRIEN 
USDOC FOR 532/BIS/OEA/TWILLIS/EHOLLAND/ANALYST 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: BEXP ETRD ETTC RS
SUBJECT: EXTRANCHECK: POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION: OPTICAL ELECTRONIC 
TECHNOLOGIES, MOSCOW, RUSSIA. 
 
REFTELS: REQUEST #207004; DATED 3/17/2009 
 
¶1. Unauthorized disclosure of the information provided below is 
prohibited by Section 12C of the Export Administration Act. 
 
¶2. Reftel requested a post-shipment verification to determine the 
legitimacy and reliability of the end-user, Optical Electronic 
Technologies, Moscow, Russia. The company is listed on BIS license 
application: D362048 as the ultimate consignee of one Bittworks 
Bundle, which includes DSP21K-SF-32-01, DSP21K-SF-RC-01, 
VDSP-SF-Target, TS LIBS full toolkits.  These items are controlled 
for national security and anti-terrorism reasons under ECCN 3D001. 
The licensee is Kazakis/Bittware, 97 Hillcrest Road, Litchfield, NH 
¶03052. 
 
¶3. On May 21, 2009, Export Control Attach Peter Liston and LES 
Natalya Shipitsina conducted the requested post-shipment 
verification of the reftel commodities purchased by Optical 
Electronic Technologies at the offices of Defense Services, 29, 
Vereyskaya Street, Moscow, Russia.  Defense Services is located in a 
building adjacent to that of Optical Electronic Technologies. The 
export control team met with Vyacheslav Shirnin, General Director 
and Chief Engineer, and Mikhail Shkuruk, Deputy General Director of 
the company Defense Services. 
 
¶4. The export control team was met at the entrance to the offices of 
Defense Systems by Shirnin and Shkuruk, and escorted to a conference 
room.  Along the hallway and inside the conference room were 
pictures and hardware displays of Russian military equipment. 
Inside the conference room, Shirnin advised the export control team 
that the meeting had to take place in Defense Systems offices 
because of access restrictions for foreigners at the offices of 
Optical Electronic Technologies.  When ECO Liston asked Shirnin and 
Shkuruk for business cards, both answered that they do not have any. 
 Neither made any attempt to find one. 
 
¶5. Once inside the conference room, the export control team was 
presented with 6 integrated circuit board platforms with Agilent 
Technologies circuits and Bittworks logo on control/serial numbers. 
They are as follows: 127634, 127627, 127633, 127632, 127626 and 
¶127631.  Shirnin was quick to point out to the export control team 
that Optical Electronic Technologies intends to follow all of the 
end user restrictions placed on the Bittworks products that the 
company had purchased.  Shirnin stated that they are only being used 
for research in its laboratory in the nearby building. 
 
¶6. Shirnin advised the export control team that Optical Electronic 
Technologies and Defense Systems were both created by 
Rosoboronexport.  Rosoboronexport is RussiaQs only arms export 
company.   When asked when the company was created Shirnin was vague 
and said around the year 2000. When asked how many are employed at 
Optical Electronic Technologies, Shirnin stated that he cannot 
answer because it is a confidential matter.  When asked what 
products Optical Electronic Technologies makes for the commercial 
market, Shirnin stated Qoptical surveillanceQ systems, without being 
specific or presenting brochures or sample items. 
 
¶7. The export control team can account for the reftel commodities; 
however, there was no way to verify that they were being used for 
the end use for which they were licensed.  There are indications of 
impropriety, from the presence of Shkuruk in the meeting; the 
meeting taking place in the offices of Defense Systems and not that 
of Optica4wQFrstQrt control team that Shirnin was 
being evasive in his answers to the team. 
 
¶8. Recommendations: Post does not/not recommend Optical Electronic 
Technologies, Moscow, Russia, as a reliable recipient of sensitive 
U.S. origin commodities. 
(FCS MOSCOW/BBLECHER/PLISTON) 
BEYRLE