VZCZCXRO8921
PP RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHPOD RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #1276/01 1401137
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 201137Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3339
INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4484
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 4253
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 2787

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 001276 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O.  12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KN RS
SUBJECT:  RUSSIAN EXPERTS OFFER VIEWS ON NORTH KOREA 
 
¶1.  (U) This message is sensitive but unclassified and is not 
intended for Internet distribution. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Summary.  Russian experts on the DPRK see Pyongyang's 
April 5 missile test and subsequent announcement of withdrawal from 
the Six-Party Talks as a ploy to obtain further concessions from the 
international community.  The need to play to the domestic audience 
on the "greatness" of North Korea's regime and conceal to the 
outside world its internal power struggles may also be factors. 
While the experts are split on the utility of a bilateral dialogue 
between the U.S. and North Korea, they strongly urge the patient 
engagement of Pyongyang and support the resumption of the Six-Party 
Talks as the only viable way to resolve the North Korean nuclear 
issue.  End Summary. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) This cable is based on a series of meetings with Russian 
academics and experts following Pyongyang's decision to withdraw 
from the Six-Party Talks, including a May 13 luncheon in honor of 
visiting Special Envoy for the Six-Party Talks Sung Kim.  The 
experts who have offered us their views include Deputy Director of 
the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) 
Vasiliy Mikheyev, IMEMO scholar Gennadiy Chufrin, Director of the 
PIR Center Anton Khlopkov, and former Russian ambassador to South 
Korea Georgiy Kunadze. 
 
Pyongyang Playing Games 
----------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) In the Russian experts' views, Pyongyang's main purpose 
for the April 5 missile test and subsequent hard-line reaction to 
the UN Security Council response was to create a crisis in order to 
force a new round of negotiations on concessions from the 
international community.  Vasiliy Mikheyev, who as early as last 
fall predicted that North Korea would manufacture a confrontation in 
2009, most likely with a missile test, asserted that Pyongyang's 
fundamental goal for the Six-Party Talks was to prolong regime 
survival.  The North Koreans, calculating that they had already 
gotten everything they could from the Bush Administration without 
irreversibly giving up their nuclear program, were playing the same 
game again with the Obama Administration by raising tensions, 
elevating the price for further negotiations, and once again 
prolonging regime life through the new concessions they hoped to 
receive.  In this regard, Mikheyev warned that we should not 
discount the latest North Korean threat to conduct another nuclear 
test, though whether the DPRK could carry it out would depend on 
"technological availability." 
 
Internal Conditions Also Playing a Role 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) The experts also suggested that domestic political 
considerations played a role in the decision to conduct the missile 
test and react harshly to the UN Security Council response.  A 
satellite launch, whose successful result was precooked for internal 
media consumption, was meant to demonstrate the "greatness" of the 
regime and divert attention from the country's dire economic 
situation.  The subsequent international condemnation of North 
Korea's actions played to the regime's portrayal of a hostile 
international environment by justifying Pyongyang's call for further 
sacrifices from the population in order to devote even more 
resources to military purposes. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Another reason for the DPRK's recent harsh rhetoric might 
have been the significant reshuffling within the top leadership, 
leading Pyongyang to demonstrate strength during a politically 
precarious time.  IMEMO's Gennadiy Chufin, while noting that it was 
uncertain whether the changes had Kim Jong-Il's consent or 
demonstrated that Kim was no longer in full control of the 
government, assessed that some elements of the North Korean 
government were looking for more isolation, fearing that real 
contact with the outside world would threaten regime survival.  The 
UN Security Council's response to the missile test thus played into 
the regime's hands, in his view, and provided an excuse for breaking 
off even the modest contacts afforded by the Six-Party Talks. 
 
U.S. Engagement is Key, as is Multilateral Diplomacy 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU) The experts were unanimous that the U.S. should engage 
North Korea to induce its return to the negotiating table, rather 
than adopt a wait-and-see approach.  Both Georgiy Kunadze and 
Chufrin pointed out that as long as the DPRK remained a reclusive 
and secretive regime, there would always be a degree of uncertainty 
about its internal decision-making process, whether its provocative 
behavior was due to brinksmanship or domestic instability, or about 
how much plutonium and nuclear technology it truly possessed.  If 
there was indeed a power struggle occurring behind closed doors, not 
engaging North Korea would only strengthen the hardliners' position 
that Pyongyang did not need the outside world, while a patient 
 
MOSCOW 00001276  002 OF 002 
 
 
engagement policy could help the more "reasonable" elements make the 
case that the Six-Party process offered advantages.  In this regard, 
Mikheyev pointed out that a number of elites around Kim Jong-Il, 
particularly those who had served in North Korean diplomatic 
missions abroad, had gotten used to and secretly enjoyed their 
privileged access to international travel and the conveniences of 
the modern world.  They would likely be the most receptive to U.S. 
engagement and might oppose overly reckless behavior that would 
threaten their way of life. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) The experts were split on the utility of a bilateral 
dialogue between the U.S. and North Korea.  Chufrin and Khlopkov 
believed that North Korea would continue to stonewall efforts to 
bring it back to the negotiating table unless it received signals 
from the U.S. on a willingness to engage in bilateral discussions. 
Kunadze, on the other hand, warned that while the bilateral format 
had advantages -- parties could talk more freely and proceed faster 
-- it could spin off parallel China-North Korea and Russia-North 
Korea dialogues, through which Pyongyang could seek to exploit 
differences between partners.  All agreed, however, that the 
resumption of the Six-Party Talks was crucial, as there was no other 
alternative to resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. 
Maintaining five-party unity was particularly key in this respect, 
hence no bilateral dialogue should replace the Six-Party's 
multilateral format. 
BEYRLE