VZCZCXRO5331
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0471/01 1351104
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 151104Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9606
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000471 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS PHUM PREF KPKO CG
SUBJECT:  EASTERN DRC NOTES - MAY 15 
 
REF: KINSHASA 465 
 
¶1.  (U) The items contained in this report consist principally of 
spot information from various sources.  This report is not 
exhaustive, nor can all the information contained therein be 
confirmed at this time. 
 
South Kivu Integration 
---------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) We followed up with several South Kivu Mai Mai contacts 
regarding the information outlined in reftel that these groups had 
declared, via a letter to Malu Malu, their intention to suspend 
their recognition of the March 23 agreement and withdraw their 
fighters from the FARDC.  While our contacts endorsed the grievances 
voiced in the letter, they stressed that their groups remain firmly 
within the process.  They complained that the authors of the letter 
cannot engage their respective movements and claimed that none of 
them had obtained the necessary buy-in from their military and/or 
political leaders. 
¶3.  (SBU) One contact pointed out that many of the signatories had 
been nominated last summer to the South Kivu provincial structures 
of the Amani Commission, which were never actually created; these 
nominees therefore believe they are owed money.  Everyone with whom 
we spoke agreed the letter was a rather weak attempt to get more 
money and positions out of the GDRC, although they also were quick 
to point out that the South Kivu integration process is not getting 
the financial and logistical support it needs. 
 
 
North Kivu Integration 
---------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Certain Mai Mai groups have fighters which have yet to 
integrate into the FARDC.  PARECO-Nande, for example, claims 
approximately 800 of their number have yet to integrate, while Mai 
Mai Kifuafua claims 1,729 (Comment:  these numbers are implausible, 
but GDRC flexibility in allowing integration after the official 
April 18 deadline is helping ease tensions with the Mai Mai.  End 
Comment). 
 
 
Killing of PNC at Kinyandoni 
---------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Two of the UN-trained, newly deployed PNC (national 
police) officers based at Kinyandoni - a few kilometers out of 
Rutshuru on the Ishasha road - were killed on May 13, while two 
others were injured.  The PNC has begun investigations and MONUC is 
also sending a mission to Kinyandoni to find out more.  The initial 
report from the commander of the unit notes that the perpetrators 
wore FARDC uniforms and assesses that they were probably FARDC 
soldiers, or possibly FDLR. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Nearly all of the newly deployed PNC are from outside the 
Kivus.  MONUC reports that the unit at Kinyandoni has been doing an 
impressive job of taking on both the FDLR and FARDC (many of the 
FARDC in that area are newly integrated CNDP) and dismantling 
illegal barriers, protecting the population from harassment, and 
escorting commercial traffic.  They have also been tackling local 
bandits.  The commander suspects that this attack was either a FARDC 
or FDLR reprisal, or organized by a local "notable" who has been 
profiting from the illegal barriers. 
 
 
Security Situation 
------------------ 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Banditry remains rife in the Poto Poto area of Ituri 
following the FARDC/MONUC operations to break up armed groups 
operating in the area (Comment:  Ituri provides a microcosm 
perspective on the consequences of incomplete 
disarmament/integration.  Armed groups with a purported political 
agenda quickly turn to banditry when their patrons are neutralized 
and their agendas discarded.  The region holds lessons for the 
Kivus.  If the integration process remains incomplete, the provinces 
will likewise remain insecure.  Armed groups will simply shift their 
objectives from political gain to criminal gain.  End Comment). 
 
¶8.  (SBU) FDLR fighters in the northern parts of South Kivu may be 
moving further south to the deep forests to the west of Minova and 
the densely populated areas along Lake Kivu, which are core FDLR 
strongholds.  At least 30 FDLR fighters have been observed moving 
south from positions along the North Kivu/South Kivu border, which 
is possibly indicative of larger movements in the forests.  Contacts 
in South Kivu have told us that South Kivu FDLR cadre have written 
 
KINSHASA 00000471  002 OF 002 
 
 
to MONUC, stating they do not wish to fight, but will retaliate if 
attacked. 
 
GARVELINK