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Viewing cable 09KINSHASA455, SCENESETTER FOR MAY 18-19 VISIT OF U.S. PERMANENT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KINSHASA455 2009-05-08 10:57 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kinshasa
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKI #0455/01 1281057
ZNR UUUUU ZZH (CCY AD6227E6 MSI2303-695)
P 081057Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0746
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9576
INFO RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 1490
RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI 4854
RUEHMV/AMEMBASSY MONROVIA 0033
UNCLAS KINSHASA 000455 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
C O R R E C T E D COPY CAPTION 
USUN FOR AMBASSADOR SUSAN RICE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC MOPS PHUM PREF CG
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR MAY 18-19 VISIT OF U.S. PERMANENT 
REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS AMBASSADOR SUSAN RICE 
 
REF: A. KINSHASA 314 
     B. STATE 35855 AND PREVIOUS 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary:  The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 
with the assistance of Great Lakes neighbors and the 
international community, achieved tangible progress in 
efforts to resolve persistent conflict and insecurity in its 
eastern provinces in late 2008 and early 2009.  However, 
despite DRC cooperation with regional and international 
partners, armed groups, including the Lords Resistance Army 
(LRA) and the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda 
(FDLR), continue to terrorize Congolese populations in the 
east.  In all sectors of concern in the DRC, the UN mission 
to the DRC (MONUC) plays a critical role, from peacekeeping 
to governance to human rights protection.  Tensions between 
the GDRC and MONUC were palpable earlier in the year when 
India announced its intention to withdraw its contingent, 
which makes up approximately 25 percent of MONUC's total 
complement, because the Congolese had asked that no more 
Indian troops be assigned to MONUC.  Although the Indians 
recently reversed their position and will remain within 
MONUC, tensions persist.   Your visit will provide a timely 
opportunity to reinforce to the GDRC themes of continued 
regional and global cooperation to resolve security and 
economic challenges, unwavering U.S. and UN Security Council 
support for MONUC, the need for greater GDRC commitment to 
Security Sector Reform (SSR), and continued Security Council 
support for democratic governance, civilian and human rights 
protection and the fight against impunity.  End summary. 
 
MONUC Security Operations in the DRC 
------------------------------------ 
 
2.   (SBU) MONUC was created by UNSC Resolution 1279 on 
November 30, 1999 and includes a 17,000 member peacekeeping 
force, a number recently augmented by 3,000 peacekeepers in 
December 2008 by the UNSC.  MONUC also deploys more than 3000 
civilian employees, who provide essential services within 
democracy and governance programs, electoral support, human 
rights protection, and judicial reform.  UN agencies 
represented in the DRC include: the Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the Office of 
the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the Joint 
United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United 
Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), the 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the United Nations 
Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA), the World Food 
Program (WFP), and the World Health Organization (WHO).  The 
SRSG for MONUC is UK citizen Alan Doss who previously headed 
the UN mission in Liberia.  The UN has a long history in the 
Congo, as exemplified by former Nigerian president and UNSG 
Special Envoy Olesegun Obasanjo, appointed by the UN 
Secretary General in 2008 to broker talks between the GDRC 
and the National Congress for the Defense of the People 
(CNDP).  Obasanjo had served as a UN peacekeeper 48 years 
earlier in the first UN mission to the Congo (ONUC) in 1960. 
 
3.  (SBU)  In direct response to insecurity in the eastern 
DRC, MONUC provides planning and logistical assistance to the 
Congolese national army (FARDC) and national police (PNC) for 
operations against illegal armed groups.  MONUC support has 
been coordinated in two operations against sources of 
insecurity in the eastern DRC: Operation Rudia targeting the 
LRA in Orientale Province, and Operations Kimia I (2008) and 
II (2009) against the FDLR in North and South Kivu. 
 
4.  (SBU) Operation Rudia, a MONUC-FARDC collaboration 
against the LRA, was followed in December 2008 by Operation 
Lightning Thunder (OLT), a joint DRC, South Sudanese, and 
Ugandan effort.  Rudia II is now underway with MONUC lending 
logistical support to the FARDC and a small residual UPDF 
force.  Results have been mixed at best, with the initial OLT 
attack on LRA headquarters scattering units into remote areas 
of northeastern DRC.  Independent groups of LRA fighters have 
stepped up retribution attacks following the launch of OLT, 
most notably, the Christmas Day massacre of hundreds of DRC 
civilians in the villages of Duru, Doruma, and Faradje. 
FARDC units continue to pursue bands of LRA fighters with 
MONUC support. 
 
5.  (SBU) In 2008, the FARDC, with MONUC support, conducted 
anti-FDLR operations in North Kivu under Operation Kimia I 
with negligible success.  MONUC is currently planning 
operations with the FARDC for Operation Kimia II in South 
Kivu.  Following a rapprochement with the GoR in late 2008, 
Rwandan army (RDF) and FARDC units launched Operation Umoja 
Wetu (Our Unity) against FDLR forces in North Kivu. 
Subsequent to its dispersal into remote areas of North Kivu 
and Maniema province by the RDF-FARDC coalition, the FDLR has 
re-emerged in some areas and there have been reprisals 
against civilians it suspects of collaborating with coalition 
forces.  RDF units departed the DRC in late February, leaving 
the FARDC, with MONUC support, to lead Kimia II. 
 
MONUC Democracy and Human Rights Components 
------------------------------------------- 
 
6.  (SBU) MONUC and UN offices are supporting the electoral 
process through assistance to the Independent Electoral 
Commission (CEI) as it prepares to revise electoral lists 
prior to local elections scheduled for 2009 and presidential 
elections in 2011.  MONUC, as does the USG, remains concerned 
about the human rights record within the DRC, especially 
offenses committed by security forces.  Sexual and gender 
based violence is a particular concern for the UN Joint Human 
Rights Office (UNJHRO), in addition to child soldiering, 
child labor, and press freedom. 
 
Anti-MONUC Sentiment 
-------------------- 
 
7.  (SBU) Following armed group activity in which civilians 
are killed and MONUC units are in the vicinity, civilians 
sometimes gather to protest what they perceive as MONUC's 
failure to protect the civilian population.  An upsurge in 
anti- MONUC sentiment, orchestrated by the former ministers 
of defense and the interior, with support from local 
politicians, was clearly in evidence in early October 2008 
when the FARDC was routed by the CNDP.  At that time 
government leaders, both national and provincial, urged 
crowds to throw stones at MONUC vehicles and otherwise harass 
Indian peacekeepers.  There have been reports of government 
officials inciting civilians against MONUC due to a desire to 
see MONUC depart the DRC and to use MONUC as a scapegoat for 
the FARDC's ineffectiveness in combating negative forces. 
 
 
GDRC-GoI Dispute 
---------------- 
 
8.  (SBU) Tensions between Congolese officials and MONUC's 
Indian contingent came to a head in 2008 when the Indian 
officer responsible for liaising with the CNDP was feted by 
CNDP leader Laurent Nkunda prior to the Indian officer's 
departure (reftels).  Unfortunately for him, the event was 
recorded by a CNDP defector and publicized.  The incident 
gave ammunition to those Congolese who had accused the 
Indians of being CNDP sympathizers and informants and thus 
responsible for the FARDC losses to Nkunda's forces.  The 
Indians tried to make amends by reassuring the GDRC that the 
officer would be disciplined for poor judgment, but the 
damage was done. 
 
9.  (SBU) This incident was one in a series of events 
contributing to poor relations between the Congolese and 
Indians assigned to MONUC.  Some MONUC Indian troops were 
implicated in 1997 in sexual abuse cases in the eastern DRC. 
Indian soldiers have also been accused of selling arms to 
rebel groups in return for gold and other precious minerals. 
 
10.  (SBU) Following this rising tide of anti-Indian 
sentiment, the GDRC intimated in late 2008 that Indian troops 
were not welcome in the DRC (Note: The GoI provides the 
majority of MONUC peacekeeping troops and the majority of its 
rotary wing assets.  End note.), and the GoI threatened to 
withdraw its contingent from MONUC in early 2009.  After 
significant USG diplomatic intervention and a letter from the 
GDRC to the GoI retracting previous ill-received statements, 
the GoI reversed its position and rescinded the threat of 
withdrawal.  The effect on the operational capacity of MONUC 
after the departure of Indian assets would have likely been 
catastrophic and resulted in a further destabilization of the 
east. 
 
U.S. - DRC Bilateral Relations 
------------------------------ 
 
11.  (SBU) Peace and Stability in the East:  The U.S. is 
engaged diplomatically within the region to promote peace and 
security.  Since November 2007, a USG representative has 
staffed an embassy office in Goma.  The officer reports on 
political events and represents the USG as part of the 
International Facilitation that assists in the implementation 
of the November 2007 GDRC-GoR Nairobi Agreement, the January 
2008 Goma Peace Accords, and subsequent agreements between 
the GDRC and armed groups.  The U.S. continues to facilitate 
the Tripartite Plus forum to address regional security and 
cooperation issues.  Frequent USG diplomatic and 
congressional travel to the DRC demonstrates the level of 
commitment and interest the USG maintains in establishing 
peace and security in the DRC. 
 
12. (SBU) Development Assistance: Overall foreign development 
assistance support from the U.S. is growing.  The United 
States provides over $700 million per year in foreign and 
peacekeeping assistance to the DRC, of which more than $200 
million is in the form of bilateral foreign assistance for 
development and humanitarian activities, with the remainder 
largely provided through contributions to multilateral 
organizations including MONUC.  The USG budget for the DRC 
for development assistance increased in FY 2008 by 
approximately 25 percent, including supplemental 
appropriations for HIV/AIDS and security assistance funding. 
USAID implements programs in the areas of health, education, 
democracy and governance, economic growth, agriculture, and 
peace and security. 
 
13.  (SBU) Security Sector Reform: The Congolese military, 
which must play a key role in solving the security challenges 
faced by the DRC, itself faces severe internal and external 
challenges.  The USG and other partners are committed to 
seeing through progress in this area, though the pace of 
reform has been slow.  The DRC is currently benefiting from a 
variety of projects through a number of different security 
assistance funds.  U.S. security assistance to the DRC aims 
first and foremost to develop the FARDC into a professional, 
well-structured and disciplined fighting force, which 
respects human rights and has the respect of the trust of the 
people.  While battlefield training is part of this program, 
it is equally important to focus on projects that provide for 
internal and long-term capacity reform (e.g. leadership 
training, command and control, human rights, etc.). 
 
14.  (SBU) Democracy and Governance: In 2009, USG assistance 
will focus on improving governance and the rule of law as the 
DRC implements an ambitious decentralization program and puts 
in place constitutionally-mandated judicial institutions. 
Further assistance will encourage civic participation in 
political processes, including planned 2009 local elections. 
 
Uncertain Economic Future 
------------------------- 
 
15.  (SBU) The DRC has been significantly and negatively 
impacted by the global financial crisis due to its heavy 
reliance on natural resources for foreign exchange and 
limited capacity to protect against external shocks.  Reduced 
demand for and lower prices of minerals have resulted in a 
significant contraction of the DRC's mining sector, the 
driver of the DRC's recent economic growth and a major source 
of formal sector employment and investment.  The IMF has 
revised projected GDP growth downward for 2009 to 2.7%, less 
than half of the IMF's projections before the global 
financial crisis.  International reserves have fallen to the 
lowest level in five years and the exchange rate has 
depreciated by more than 25 percent over the last four 
months.  At the same time, continuing conflict in the eastern 
DRC is having an adverse impact on the fiscal balance through 
public expenditures.  To help support the continuation of 
basic services and augment international reserve levels, the 
World Bank approved $100 million in emergency assistance 
under its Fast Track Assistance Program in February and the 
IMF approved $200 million in emergency assistance under its 
Exogenous Shocks Facility (ESF) in March.  The EU also plans 
to provide emergency assistance. 
 
Going Forward 
------------- 
 
16.  (SBU) The problems faced by the DRC are overwhelming, 
but your visit will reinforce the point that the USG and the 
UNSC stand ready and willing to assist the country with its 
security, economic, and governmental challenges.  At the same 
time, we have high expectations of the Kabila government and 
there will be no blank check issued to his regime.  We 
believe that it is particularly important that the following 
points be reinforced during your visit: 1) those in power 
must first and foremost truly commit to the creation of a 
modern state, focused on the rational and just delivery of 
services to all its citizens (not just individual 
constituencies), and to address the endemic corruption that 
renders progress in this area impossible; 2) the appalling 
human rights record of the government and its security 
services must be corrected - not by empty rhetoric but with 
concrete action; and 3) we expect the full engagement of the 
FARDC to fight the LRA and FDLR, in cooperation with MONUC 
and keeping in mind first and foremost the need to protect 
civilians. 
 
U.S. Ambassador to the DRC William Garvelink 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
17.  (U) William John Garvelink was nominated as Ambassador 
to the Democratic Republic of the Congo by President George 
W. Bush on May 30, 2007, confirmed by the Senate on June 28 
and sworn in on October 22, 2007.  He arrived at post with 
Mrs. Linda Garvelink on November 22, 2007.  He is a member of 
the Senior Foreign Service with the rank of Minister 
Counselor. 
 
18.  (U) Ambassador Garvelink was appointed to his last 
position in May 2001.  His responsibilities included 
oversight of USAID's worldwide humanitarian assistance and 
democracy programs.  Offices within the Bureau for Democracy, 
Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance include the Office of 
Foreign Disaster Assistance, Office of Transition 
Initiatives, Office of Food for Peace, Office of Democracy 
and Governance, Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation 
and the Office of Private and Voluntary Cooperation. 
 
19.  (U) Prior to this appointment, Mr. Garvelink served 
since 1999 as the USAID Mission Director in Eritrea.  He 
administered a development and relief program valued at more 
than $55 million. From 1988 to 1999 Mr. Garvelink served in 
OFDA first as the Assistant Director for response and then as 
the Deputy Director.  While in OFDA, he conducted assessments 
and directed relief operations in Africa, Asia, Latin 
America, the Near East, Europe, and in the former Soviet 
Union.  Mr. Garvelink led Disaster Assistance Response Teams 
to Albania, Armenia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, 
northern Iraq, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, and in Bam, Iran.  He 
chaired the USAID Task Force for the Indian Ocean Tsunami, 
the USAID Task Force for the Pakistan Earthquake and the 
USAID Lebanon Task Force. 
 
20.  (U) Prior to his work in OFDA, Mr. Garvelink served for 
two years in the Department of State's Bureau for Population, 
Refugees, and Migration (PRM) with responsibilities for 
southern Africa.  He was posted for four years to Bolivia for 
USAID and served for three years as a staff member on the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee.  He holds degrees from 
Calvin College (BA) and the University of Minnesota (MA). 
 
 
DRC Facts For Your Visit 
------------------------ 
 
21.  (U) Visa Requirements:  A valid visa is required of all 
American passport holders, whether diplomatic, official, or 
tourist. 
 
22.  (U) Security:  Goma and Kinshasa are critical threat 
crime cities.  All visitors should remain vigilant and 
cautious during their stay in Goma or Kinshasa.  The RSO 
advises that you exercise caution in all areas, and that you 
do not travel after nightfall unless accompanied by someone 
familiar with the security situation in Goma or Kinshasa. 
TDY personnel should not use any form of local transportation 
and should refrain from displaying/using a camera in public. 
 
23.  (U) Currency:  The use of dollars in the DRC is legal 
and acceptable for most transactions.  Most personnel use 
Franc Congolais only for small purchases and tips.  Travelers 
arriving in the DRC with more than $10,000 must fill out a 
currency declaration.  Travelers departing the DRC are not 
allowed to take out more than $10,000 in cash. 
 
-- Although there are some newly-installed ATM machines, the 
RSO does not yet advocate their use.  Few businesses in Goma 
or Kinshasa accept credit cards and their use outside of 
major hotels is discouraged.  Cashing traveler's checks is 
generally not advised because banks charge substantial fees 
for cashing them. 
 
24.  (U) Medical:  Malaria: The DRC is a malaria-affected 
area.  All travelers should consult with medical personnel 
and take malaria prophylactics as appropriate, before 
arriving in the DRC. 
 
-- Yellow Fever: You must have a valid yellow fever 
vaccination and your yellow vaccination card when you arrive. 
 You may be charged a fine of $50-$100 without proof of 
vaccination. 
 
25.  (U) Power Current: The DRC operates on 220 volt/50 HZ 
power utilizing a European-style two pin plug. 
GARVELINK