VZCZCXRO9564
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0454/01 1281030
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 081030Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9574
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000454 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR CG
SUBJECT: SSR IN THE DRC:  EMBASSY CONVENES GREAT LAKES 
CONTACT GROUP COUNTRIES AND ORGANIZATIONS 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary: We convened a meeting of the DCMs and 
DATTs from the Great Lakes Contact Group countries and 
organizations on May 4 to hold a discussion on the way 
forward on SSR (defined as military reform issues for the 
purposes of this meeting) and to generate field input for the 
upcoming Contact Group meetings in Brussels.  We posed two 
key questions to the group in order to generate discussion: 
how to ensure full GDRC buy-in for SSR and how can donor 
countries and organizations better coordinate between 
themselves?  On the former, considerable skepticism was 
expressed that the GDRC is intent on meaningful military 
reform.  There was inconclusive debate on the latter 
question, though a number of representatives underlined the 
importance of establishing a monitoring committee (comite de 
suivi) for the military reform process.  As this structure 
would bring together both the government and all donor 
countries, it would seemingly solve the coordination problem. 
 End summary. 
 
Representation 
-------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Present at this meeting were representatives from 
the United Kingdom, France, Netherlands, Belgium, the 
European Commission, and MONUC.  The DCM, DATT, OSC Chief, 
and PolOff represented the USG. 
 
Embassy Presentation 
-------------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) The DCM emphasized that the principal purpose of 
the meeting was to consider two questions:  how to ensure 
full GDRC buy-in for SSR (which he emphasized would be 
defined as military reform issues for the purposes of this 
meeting) and how can donor countries and organizations better 
coordinate between themselves.  He invited those present, 
after the conclusion of the meeting, to send their official 
comments to the embassy in writing, which will be synthesized 
into one document.  The DATT then delivered a powerpoint 
presentation which included an overview of current U.S. 
coordination initiatives (e.g. the liaison officer at EUSEC, 
MIST coordination with MONUC, U.S.-UK collaboration at GESM) 
and the USG philosophy for SSR efforts in the DRC.  The 
latter emphasizes a focus on specific problems, avoidance of 
duplication, being receptive to coordination with partners 
and possible preparation for future cooperation with partners. 
 
GDRC Buy-In 
----------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Meeting participants expressed considerable 
skepticism that the GDRC is intent on meaningful military 
reform.  It is not a "vote-getter" and there are many 
entrenched interests that will oppose it because it threatens 
their incomes and privileges.  The Belgian DCM noted that SSR 
is not a part of the five key reform efforts formulated by 
the Kabila administration (known as the "cinq chantiers," 
which are mostly related to economic or infrastructure 
issues) and thus is not a priority for the government.  He 
acknowledged, however, that the current MOD is at least 
better and more open than his predecessor.  He indicated that 
the Belgian Government is leaning towards focusing on the 
social needs of the FARDC, such as lodging for families.  The 
French DATT pointed out that while the FARDC "intellectually" 
favors the concept of SSR -- in the sense that it would bring 
them better lodging conditions, better equipment and 
regularly-paid salaries -- in practice many officers benefit 
from the current corrupt system and want to keep it in place. 
 The Belgian PolOff suggested that there is an unwillingness 
at senior levels of the GDRC to undertake SSR. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) The French DATT said as well that real reform will 
not even be feasible until the conflict in the east is over, 
as it is not possible to reform an army in the middle of 
major operations.  He stated that the FARDC is more concerned 
with the outcome of Kimia II than SSR.  For all of these 
reasons, most participants were of the view that the best way 
to proceed is to apply "band-aids," enacting mini-reforms as 
opportunities arise, while also continuing to press the GDRC 
for long-term SSR. 
 
Donor Coordination 
------------------ 
 
¶6.  (SBU) There was inconclusive debate about how we should 
 
KINSHASA 00000454  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
organize ourselves to help the GDRC pursue SSR.  MONUC's 
Senior PolOff pointed that the donor community needs to tread 
lightly in coordination efforts, as the Congolese political 
class is suspicious overall of the international community 
and sees "coordination" through the prism of the much 
maligned CIAT (the International Committee in Support of the 
Transition, often accused of usurping Congolese sovereignty). 
 The Dutch and French DATTs underlined the importance of 
establishing a monitoring committee (comite de suivi) for the 
military reform process.  Because such a structure would 
bring together the government and all donor countries, it 
would seemingly solve the coordination problem.  The UK DATT 
suggested that MONUC would be well-placed to coordinate 
short-term, "band-aid" efforts.  MONUC's PolOff concurred, 
but emphasized that MONUC cannot run long-term coordination 
efforts, not least of which because MONUC should not be 
around for the long-term. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Comment:  There is clearly little confidence on the 
part of donor countries and organizations here as to the 
successful prospects of long-term SSR.  While most of them 
will likely carry on nevertheless with planning for the 
long-term, this meeting and others have provided indications 
that some donors want to focus on the band-aid approach. 
MONUC, for example, is developing a "mini-SSR" plan for the 
Kivus, which aims to consolidate the integration process and 
improve the efficiency and discipline of the FARDC there by, 
for example, constructing barracks, providing basic supplies 
and equipment, and encouraging families to settle in 
proximity of the garrisons.  The UK and Netherlands are also 
geared up to address the problems of pay, food, and lodging 
for the FARDC in the Kivus, which threaten to unravel the 
whole integration process.  As for donor coordination, there 
does not seem to be much appetite in Kinshasa for 
constructing robust mechanisms that do not include government 
representatives; the meeting participants were clearly of the 
mind that it is the responsibility of the GDRC to take charge 
of this process, and that includes coordination.  End 
comment. 
GARVELINK