VZCZCXRO4793
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0695/01 1481230
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 281230Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3867
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 0059
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0316
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0131
RUEHSUN/USUN ROME IT

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KHARTOUM 000695 
 
DEPT FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A/S CARSON, AF/C 
NSC FOR MGAVIN 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
BRUSSELS FOR PBROWN 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH 
UN ROME FOR HSPANOS 
NEW YORK FOR DMERCADO 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: SUDAN - NGOS AND GOS DELIVER OPPOSING MESSAGES IN 
DISCUSSIONS WITH CODEL ISAKSON 
 
REF: A) KHARTOUM 593 
B) KHARTOUM 609 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  (SBU) On May 25, Senators  Johnny Isakson (R-Georgia) and Bob 
Corker (R-Tennessee) met with representatives from four 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and Government of National 
Unity (GNU) Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs (MHA) officials to 
discuss the humanitarian situation in Sudan.  NGOs highlighted 
insecurity, lack of access, and government restrictions on 
humanitarian programs as the key issues limiting remaining NGO work 
in Darfur.  NGOs expressed gratitude for U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan 
¶J. Scott Gration's engagement with the GNU on humanitarian 
operations in Darfur and northern Sudan's Three Areas,  noting that 
following the Special Envoy's negotiations with the National 
Congress Party in early April, the government made some efforts to 
improve the operating environment.  However, since that time, NGOs 
reported that much of the progress has dissipated, and little 
additional forward movement has occurred.  In the view of many of 
the NGO representatives, commitments made by Government of Sudan 
(GOS) senior officials to the Special Envoy may have not been 
translated as instructions to technical-level staff in Khartoum or 
Darfur.  For their part, MHA officials minimized the impact of the 
expulsions and reported that government ministries and other donors, 
such as China and the League of Arab States, are addressing gaps 
left by the 13 aid organizations expelled in early March.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Insecurity Threatens Remaining NGOs' Work 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) According to the NGOs, insecurity remains one of the most 
significant factors limiting humanitarian work in Darfur.  In 
January 2009, the UN reported that bandits hijacked approximately 
277 humanitarian vehicles in 2008, compared to 137 vehicles in 2007. 
 During the hijackings, assailants temporarily kidnapped 218 
national staff in 2008, compared to 147 national staff in 2007. 
Exacerbating the already insecure environment, a new trend of 
international staff abductions has also emerged in 2009.  Since 
March, unknown assailants have taken hostage and subsequently 
released three international staff from Medecins Sans 
Frontieres/Belgium in North Darfur and two international staff from 
Aide Medicale Internationale in South Darfur, forcing these NGOs to 
suspend programs there.  In addition, NGOs reported at least six 
kidnapping threats since March, limiting staff movement and access 
to program sites.  (Note:  Although all international staff were 
released unharmed through Sudanese government intervention, 
wide-spread suspicion exists among NGOs and other agencies that the 
government was involved or otherwise complicit in  the abductions. 
Some observers have noted that the abductions may have been an 
attempt to intimidate international aid workers and discourage them 
from operating in rural areas of Darfur.  End Note.)  Compounding 
this situation, continuing conflict between the Sudanese government 
and armed opposition groups in North Darfur and insecurity along the 
Sudan-Chad border have limited humanitarian space and led to 
additional civilian displacements. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) In addition to violence and conflict, NGOs noted the 
important role of the media in the deteriorating security conditions 
in Darfur.  Although the government's negative rhetoric towards NGOs 
decreased slightly in April, negative media messages continue to 
shape individuals' perceptions of international NGOs and erode 
humanitarian space.  (Note:  Following the expulsions, government 
officials, including Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, made 
inflammatory statements against international NGOs, describing them 
as "spies" who threatened Sudan's national security.  While positive 
reports of NGO work have not increased, since the Special Envoy's 
engagement in April, government officials have taken a more 
conciliatory tone towards NGOs.  End Note.) 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Due to continuing insecurity and the early March 
 
KHARTOUM 00000695  002 OF 004 
 
 
expulsions, the number of international staff operating outside of 
Darfur state capitals has significantly decreased.  As of May 25, 
NGOs estimated that a maximum of 30 to 40 international staff were 
working in rural areas of Darfur, compared to several hundred in 
¶2008.  Limited international presence in rural areas of Darfur 
hampers NGOs' ability to monitor and report on gaps, as well as 
possibly having an impact on "humanitarian protection by presence." 
 In the latter regard, some argue that the presence of international 
actors serves as a deterrent to violence against civilians. 
 
----------------------------- 
Addressing Gaps in Assistance 
----------------------------- 
 
--NGO Perspectives-- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) NGOs noted that remaining organizations are working to 
fill significant gaps created by the March 4 and 5 NGO expulsions. 
According to the NGOs, approximately 60 percent of the humanitarian 
capacity in Darfur and an estimated 90 percent of the humanitarian 
response capacity in the Three Areas was lost with the expulsions. 
However, the extent of the gaps in assistance in the Three Areas 
remains unclear, as the Three Areas assessment results have not yet 
been published.  NGOs further noted the impact of the expulsions on 
NGO coordination since the majority of the expelled organizations 
were those that had the capacity to advocate for NGO issues and 
concerns.  For instance, one-half of the NGO Steering Committee - 
the group that represents and coordinates with the 67-member NGO 
Forum - was expelled. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) NGOs noted concerns regarding the ability of "new" NGOs to 
quickly address gaps in assistance and uphold humanitarian 
principles.  NGOs expressed doubt that the government would expedite 
registration of these NGOs, and felt that remaining NGOs should move 
forward with addressing gaps in the interim. (Note:  This is also 
the strategy that USAID has adopted in the short-term.  End Note.) 
NGOs further expressed concern regarding the close links between the 
arrival of the "new" NGOs and U.S. political engagement with the 
GNU.  In their view, this action compromises the principle of 
neutrality, which forms the basis of humanitarian action, and could 
raise the risk of the "new" NGOs being targeted by the government 
for harassment.  NGOs also highlighted that linkages between 
politics and NGOs' presence in Sudan could be used negatively in 
other theaters, such as Iraq, Afghanistan, or Pakistan, and place 
NGO workers at risk of attack by anti-American elements.  Finally, 
NGOs stressed that the "new" NGO strategy could compromise the 
appeals process that some NGOs have initiated through the Sudanese 
legal system.  (Note:  Several NGOs appealed their early March 
expulsion; however, to date, the Sudanese government has ignored 
these appeals.  End Note.)  NGOs also noted that most of the 
expelled NGOs had worked in some way or other on sensitive issues 
such as gender-based violence or were vocal in their advocacy of 
human rights and protection issues.  "New" NGOs, having affiliations 
with expelled NGOs, would not shed this perception easily and would 
likely encounter difficulties in registering with the government. 
 
--Government Perspectives-- 
 
¶7.  (SBU) In contrast to the NGO concerns, GNU officials, including 
new State Minister for Humanitarian Affairs Dr. Abdel Bagi El 
Gilani, GNU Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) Commissioner-General 
Hassabo Mohammed Abdel Rahman, and Director of the GNU HAC NGO 
Section Ahmed Adam, conveyed the message that the UN, remaining NGOs 
and government assistance agencies are adequately addressing gaps in 
assistance and minimized the impact of the expulsions. 
Commissioner-General Hassabo stated that the sense of crisis 
immediately following the expulsions was exaggerated, and claimed 
that the joint GNU-UN assessment had found limited gaps from the 
expulsions.  For instance, Hassabo stated that out of the 908 health 
facilities in Darfur, expelled NGOs only operated 4.7 percent, or 43 
facilities.  However, USAID field staff note that this number does 
not take into account how many of the 908 health facilities were 
actually functional, and excludes mobile clinics that expelled NGOs 
operated in rural areas.  Moreover, USAID staff underscore that the 
sites managed by expelled NGOs were among some of the most densely 
 
KHARTOUM 00000695  003 OF 004 
 
 
populated and required the highest-level of service delivery. 
Hassabo noted that following the expulsions the government sent 
doctors to the areas to ensure no interruptions in service delivery. 
 (Note:  The State Ministry of Health (SMOH) in West Darfur, at the 
direction of the federal MOH, has also expressed an unwillingness to 
admit the existence of gaps in the health system created by the 
expulsions.  Per Ref B, in early May, the SMOH reported that 
government-supported initiatives, such as sending doctors from 
Khartoum and Egypt to Darfur, addressed the gaps created in the 
health sector.  However, NGOs note that the doctors have largely 
been unwilling to travel to rural areas, where medical services are 
needed, and prefer to remain in Darfur on a short-term basis, most 
for only a few months.  End Note.) 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Elaborating on this point, Hassabo reported that NGOs were 
only "pass-throughs" for food distributions and stated that local 
food relief committees had conducted the "real" distributions. 
(Note:  Hassabo's remarks do not take into account the fact that 
although local food committees have assumed food distributions since 
the expulsions, the UN World Food Program stated that it does not 
want to continue this arrangement in the longer-term, as it does not 
permit adequate monitoring.  End Note.) 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Dr. Gilani welcomed new U.S. NGOs to work in Sudan, noting 
that NGOs should isolate humanitarian work from political 
objectives.  In line with previous discussions, government officials 
further highlighted the importance of complementing humanitarian 
assistance with  recovery and development initiatives, as well as 
noted their ultimate goal of building national capacity to meet 
humanitarian needs and conducting voluntary internally displaced 
person (IDP) returns.  Hassabo suggested that prolonged relief 
assistance creates dependency in IDP camps and discourages returns. 
Hassabo reported that 900,000 IDPs have returned to 611 villages and 
stated that NGOs should provide assistance to returnees, not only 
individuals in camps.  (Note:  This number and the nature of the 
returns have not been confirmed by UN agencies or NGOs.  End Note.) 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
End of the "Honeymoon Period" for GNU Compliance? 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
--NGO Reports-- 
 
¶10.  (SBU) While expressing gratitude for the work of Special Envoy 
Gration, NGOs noted that progress on several key issues, such as the 
issuance of one-year, multiple re-entry visas, has stalled.  In 
addition, while the Special Envoy's framework included all of 
northern Sudan, GNU efforts to implement the framework, such as the 
issuance of the April 16 ministerial decree, have focused only on 
Darfur.  According to the NGOs, most of the momentum created 
following the Special Envoy's early April negotiations has been 
eroded over the past few weeks, and many details remain unresolved. 
For instance, only one of the four NGOs attending the meeting had 
all of its technical agreements (TAs) signed by the federal-level 
HAC.  NGOs noted inconsistent application of requirements for the 
TAs, with the HAC rejecting at least two USAID partner's TAs due to 
the fact that the NGOs did not have an "acceptable" national NGO 
partner.  Per Ref A, NGOs previously reported that the HAC was 
unilaterally writing the names of national NGOs into TAs and 
pressuring international NGOs to accept the local partners.  In 
previous years, NGOs were able to partner with informal, 
community-based organizations and government line ministries in 
addition to national NGOs to fulfill this requirement.  However, in 
2009, the HAC changed the requirement to include only national NGOs 
registered with the HAC as a way to expedite the process of 
"Sudanization."  (Note:  The HAC has completed TAs for some NGOs 
that do not have a national NGO partner.  It is unclear why the HAC 
is imposing more stringent restrictions on some NGOs and not others. 
 End Note.)  Lack of a valid TA has prevented NGO staff from 
obtaining multiple re-entry visas and hampered NGO staff movement to 
program sites. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) NGOs continue to report trouble receiving one-year, 
multiple re-entry or exit visas.  As of May 25, the NGOs had not 
 
KHARTOUM 00000695  004 OF 004 
 
 
heard of any NGO staff receiving one-year, multiple re-entry visas, 
and NGOs expressed doubt that the government would be able to comply 
with this commitment due to links between visa issuance and  other 
bureaucratic requirements with varying timelines, such as resident 
visas and TAs (reftel A).  At present, the government has only 
issued multiple re-entry visas for as long as permitted by the 
shortest approved timeline for the other requirements, often 
significantly less than the agreed-upon 12 months.  (Note:  At 500 
USD, multiple re-entry and exit visas cost a significant amount more 
than single entry or exit visas.  As the majority of multiple 
re-entry or exit visas have been issued for only six months, many 
NGOs find it more advantageous to use individual exit visas, which 
cost 100 USD per trip.  End Note.) 
 
¶12.  (SBU) NGO staff also reported continuing trouble traveling to 
South Darfur using only a passport and HAC identification card, as 
stipulated in the 2007 Joint Communique and reinforced in subsequent 
agreements (reftel A).  In a new trend, government officials have 
also limited the movement of national NGO staff in South Darfur. 
Although Sudanese nationals are not required to obtain permits for 
traveling within Darfur states, Sudanese security officials have 
recently detained Sudanese nationals lacking permits. 
 
--Government Reports-- 
 
¶13.  (SBU) GNU officials stressed that while the government has 
taken significant steps to facilitate NGOs' work in Darfur, the 
system is not perfect and requires additional time in order to 
function more efficiently.  Ahmed Adam, Director of the GNU HAC NGO 
Section and Head of the Joint Procedures Center (JPC), noted 
government initiatives to streamline processes, including 
fast-tracking NGO procedures; issuing 29 presidential decrees; 
establishing the JPC, which assembles 18 ministries in one place to 
expedite NGO paperwork; and creating a web-based system for NGOs to 
track paperwork.  (Note:  As of May 25, no NGOs had received the 
passwords necessary to track procedures under the new web-based 
system.  End Note.) 
 
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COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶15.  (SBU) While expressing appreciation for the positive influence 
of Special Envoy Gration's initiatives on the working environment in 
Sudan, NGOs stated that much of the forward momentum on the 
framework has stalled, and many of the government's commitments 
remain unfulfilled.  Nearly two months after negotiations with the 
Special Envoy, it appears that implementation of several key 
initiatives is not moving forward rapidly, including the 
fast-tracking of new NGO registrations (septel).  In previous 
meetings, government officials had stressed their willingness to 
comply with the Special Envoy's framework, and had invited USAID and 
the U.S. Embassy to liaise with the government to encourage 
communication and joint monitoring.  Following two weeks of 
unsuccessful telephonic requests by USAID officers for a meeting 
with HAC officials, Ahmed Adam has agreed to meet with USAID on May 
¶31.  In addition, direct communication between the Office of the 
Special Envoy and GOS Presidential Advisor Dr. Ghazi Salahudin 
(recently empowered with the leading role on the Darfur portfolio) 
has resulted in what would appear to be a renewed commitment by the 
GOS to fast track the entry of new NGOs and resolve humanitarian 
access issues in Darfur.  Post will follow up with the MFA and the 
HAC in the hope that this GOS pledge will result in concrete, 
operational improvements.  Post also plans to meet HAC 
Commissioner-General Hassabo to encourage improvement on the 
framework, as well as promote communication between the U.S. 
Government and GNU. 
 
ASQUINO