VZCZCXRO2941
OO RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0687/01 1460919
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 260919Z MAY 09 ZDK PER NUMEROUS SVCS
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3857
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000687 
 
DEPT FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A/S CARSON, AF/E 
NSC FOR MGAVIN 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PINS EAID UNSC KPKO SU
SUBJECT: DDR IN SOUTHERN SUDAN: READY OR NOT, HERE IT COMES 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY.  Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration 
(DDR) in southern Sudan, which begins June 10, is expected to reduce 
the payroll of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA).  The joint 
United Nations-Government of Southern Sudan DDR program is unlikely, 
however, to ensure that all demobilized combatants transition to 
gainful employment in civilian life, posing potential security 
risks.  These risks could be aggravated if last-minute program 
arrangements undermine the effectiveness of DDR assistance. END 
SUMMARY. 
 
LAUNCHING THE PROGRAM 
--------------------- 
 
¶2. (U) After repeated delays, the first-ever disarmament, 
demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) program in Sudan's South 
will begin June 10 with SPLA combatants stationed in Central 
Equatoria State.  This follows the launch in February and April of 
DDR programs in the Three Areas and will be followed in coming 
months by program launches in Jonglei and Eastern Equatoria States, 
continuing a staggered state-by-state schedule that donors expect 
will process approximately 108 ex-combatants per day across the 
South.  Underscoring the importance of DDR to the Government of 
Southern Sudan (GOSS), GOSS President Salva Kiir Mayardit is 
expected to speak at the kick-off in Juba. 
 
¶3. (U) Although the ultimate target for SPLA demobilization is 
90,000 participants, the focus prior to the 2011 referendum will be 
on the approximately 35,000 men and women identified by the SPLA as 
belonging to "Special Needs Groups."  These include disabled and 
elderly soldiers and women and children non-combatants affiliated 
with the SPLA.  (Note: Whether able-bodied female combatants are 
also being targeted for demobilization remains unclear.) 
 
FROM GIVING UP THE GUN TO GUIDANCE COUNSELING 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (U) Upon presenting their weapons to the SPLA, participants will 
be registered, if they are not already; receive a DDR card, medical 
screening, and possible treatment; and face a demobilization and 
reintegration briefing.  At this point, disarmed participants are 
removed from the SPLA payroll, given cash and a reinsertion voucher 
redeemable for three months' worth of food for a family of five, and 
provided UNMIS transport to the state of their reintegration. 
 
¶5. (U) Eight weeks after demobilization, participants are to meet 
with a Southern Sudan DDR Commission (SSDDRC) case officer in their 
chosen state to receive guidance on choosing a reintegration support 
package and seeking ultimate placement or starting a business.  The 
choices of six-month support packages include agricultural training, 
seeds, and tools; training in small business skills; vocational 
training; and formal education.  Only those choosing formal 
education will receive a small cash stipend, meaning that the 
reinsertion grant may be the last direct cash assistance many 
participants receive. 
 
HIGH EXPECTATIONS, LATE PREPARATION, NO JOBS 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) UNDP consultant Betsy Lippman (protect), recently hired to 
produce the UN's strategy for the reintegration ("R") component, 
stressed that unrealistic participant expectations make it crucial 
to clarify in the demobilization briefing that the scope of the 
assistance is limited.  To ensure that participants receive 
consistent messages, UNDP is developing a uniform script for its 
staff and those of the SSDDRC, as well as providing answers to 
anticipated questions based on feedback from the DDR program in the 
Three Areas. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Poor planning by UN DDR, sloth-like donor response, and 
GOSS-generated delays exacerbated by Vice President Riek Machar's 
on-again, off-again support for the DDR concept have caused many key 
provisions for the DDR program to be made at the last minute.  UNDP 
commissioned its reintegration strategy only one month before the 
disarmament and demobilization process is to begin, and it has yet 
to complete the hiring of state-level reintegration case workers. 
UNMIS has not completed the construction of the DDRC state offices 
where participants are to present themselves.  (COMMENT: The 
overarching sequencing of the DDR process will likely create further 
confusion; while the disarmament and demobilization process can be 
staggered from state to state, participants choose where they are 
reintegrated.  This in effect means that all ten states must be 
ready to receive participants only weeks after the Central Equatoria 
process begins in Juba - a virtual impossibility.)  Finally, donor 
funding is in hand for slightly fewer than half of the 35,000 
participants.  The South's DDR program costs USD 1,750 per 
 
KHARTOUM 00000687  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
ex-combatant, making this one of the most expensive DDR programs in 
Africa.  Participants will only receive some of that sum in direct 
assistance, however, well below the average USD 175 per month that 
an SPLA private receives in his pay packet. 
 
¶8. (SBU) The most formidable obstacle, though, is an expected 
shortage of gainful opportunities for participants to use their 
newly-acquired civilian skill sets.  UN agencies are currently 
conducting opportunity assessments, but Lippman and other UN DDR 
colleagues are concerned that the South's economy will be unable to 
absorb many of the participants.  Lippman expressed further concern 
that potential implementing partners -- NGOs currently in place and 
providing social services or livelihood assistance -- may not even 
have sufficient capacity to provide training to all participants in 
all areas of reintegration.  Lippman noted that mapping is ongoing 
to identify such gaps. 
 
MDTF: POTENTIAL SILVER BULLET? 
------------------------------ 
 
¶9. (SBU) COMMENT.  The Government of Southern Sudan is keen to 
reduce the burden of meeting the SPLA's payroll and to normalize its 
army by demobilizing soldiers who lack combat readiness.  It is 
unclear, though, that the South's economy offers sufficient 
reintegration opportunities to absorb DDR-assisted participants.  An 
underlying concern remains the extent to which these participants 
may become restive and pose a security threat if they are unable to 
find a reliable living after exhausting their reinsertion grant. 
Acting Consul General and USAID Deputy Director for Southern Sudan 
continue to encourage, along with the World Bank and UN Humanitarian 
Coordinator, for MDTF participants to direct a currently unspent 
US$220 million in funds to the "R" process.  MDTF donor nations 
continue to resist direct budget support to the GOSS because of its 
high military expenditure rates.  With ninety-three percent of the 
SPLA's budget going to salaries, the MDTF's European donors have a 
panacea at hand - if only they apply the creative and proactive 
means to mobilize the funds already at their disposal. END COMMENT. 
 
ASQUINO