VZCZCXRO7003
OO RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0660/01 1381415
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 181415Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3813
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 KHARTOUM 000660 
 
DEPT FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A/S CARSON, AF/E, PRM 
NSC FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU AND REGIONAL REFUGEE COORDINATOR 
KAMPALA FOR REGIONAL REFUGEE COORDINATOR 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREF PGOV PREL EAID SOCI ASEC KPKO AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT:  SOUTHERN SUDAN - HUMANITARIAN SITUATION IN LRA-AFFECTED 
AREAS 
 
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Summary 
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¶1.  Between May 7 and 14, humanitarian officers from the U.S. 
Department of State's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration 
(State/PRM) and USAID's Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance 
(USAID/OFDA) reviewed the ongoing emergency in the Lord's Resistance 
Army (LRA)-affected areas in Eastern and Western Equatoria states. 
The State/PRM officer visited refugee settlements in Lasu, Central 
Equatoria State, and Makpandu, Western Equatoria State.  State/PRM 
and USAID/OFDA met with UN agencies, local officials, refugee 
leaders, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) on the ground in 
the settlements and in Yambio, Yei, and Juba.  The team found that 
the internally displaced person (IDP) response in these settlements 
lacked a clear strategy and leadership, and was only barely getting 
humanitarian assistance to an estimated 36,000 IDPs on the ground at 
the time of the assessment.  The team found that under the 
leadership of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR),  the response was significantly better organized and on 
track to meet the basic needs of most of the estimated 17,000 
refugees, the majority of whom currently reside in three main 
settlements.  While it is difficult to predict when the IDPs and 
refugees will return home, USAID/OFDA and State/PRM recommend 
planning for a minimum 12-month humanitarian response for both 
refugees and IDPs.  USAID/OFDA and State/PRM have mobilized 
resources to support a rapid increase of the current humanitarian 
effort and are planning interventions with partners.  End Summary. 
 
------------------------------- 
LRA-AFFECTED AREAS IN EQUATORIA 
------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  Following renewed LRA attacks in northern Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC) and Southern Sudan since September 2008, more than 
17,000 Congolese refugees have fled into Central and Western 
Equatoria states in Southern Sudan and 36,000 people have been 
internally displaced in the same areas.  In addition, the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimates that the 
LRA attacks and the strain on scarce resources caused by the influx 
of IDPs and refugees have severely affected an additional 50,000 
people in host communities.  The majority of the refugee caseload 
entered Sudan in January and February 2009, following intensified 
LRA attacks in DRC by following the tri-country--Uganda, DRC, and 
Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS)--"Operation Lightning Thunder" 
military operation against LRA targets in DRC.  Relief staff noted 
that the general trend in internal displacement is population 
movement away from the Sudan-DRC border towards towns or areas with 
Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) or Southern Sudan Police 
Service (SSPS) forces present.  In contrast to the refugee 
population, IDPs continue to reside among host communities and are 
scattered across many villages.  The bulk of the IDP caseload is 
located in the Ezo-Tambura area, according to IOM. 
 
¶3.  LRA attacks continue throughout the region, creating new 
internal displacement in Southern Sudan.  Likewise, new refugees 
continue to arrive from the DRC, although at a much slower rate than 
in the beginning of the year (Note:  UNHCR reports new arrivals from 
the DRC at a rate of approximately 30 individuals per week at the 
Lasu settlement in Central Equatoria.  End Note).  The latest LRA 
attack reported in Southern Sudan occurred on May 7, in Gangura, 
Western Equatoria, triggering both secondary and tertiary IDP 
movements, according to the UN. 
 
¶4.  Continued LRA activity in Western and Central Equatoria and the 
potential targeting of refugee and IDP settlement areas remain 
significant concerns. 
Rumors of LRA activities abound throughout the Equatorias. 
USAID/OFDA and State/PRM officers saw many local community members 
armed with bows and arrows, and in some cases AK-47s, in the Yambio 
and Lasu areas for protection against LRA attacks.  (Note: During 
his travels in the district, the Southern Sudan Relief and 
Rehabilitation Commission Director for Yambio County keeps a bow in 
his car to instruct villagers on how to defend themselves, This 
exemplifies the militarized attitude among the communities in the 
affected area.  End Note.)  Continued attacks and prolonged 
insecurity have added to the difficulty of a sustained and 
comprehensive humanitarian response in an area already suffering 
from limited accessibility, poor roads, and heavy rains during six 
months of the year. 
 
¶5.  The International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC), the UN 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), and the 
UN Resident Coordinator's Support Office (RCSO) raised concerns 
 
KHARTOUM 00000660  002 OF 005 
 
 
regarding the use of armed SPLA or SPSS escorts for humanitarian 
convoys in the Equatorias with State/PRM and USAID/OFDA.  At 
present, all roads in Western Equatoria are at Security Phase III, 
requiring an armed escort, and UN agencies and NGOs pay between 25 
and 35 Sudanese pounds per soldier or police per day, with escorts 
riding in NGO and UN vehicles in the convoys.  OCHA noted that armed 
escorts who  travel with relief convoys can, at times, increase the 
risk of an LRA attack.  OCHA believes that armed escorts in the 
LRA-affected areas should not be used for relief convoys, based on 
humanitarian standards of neutrality that encourage maintaining 
independence from armed groups.  Aid staff in Yambio noted that they 
lack adequate security information or liaisons with police and 
communities, and felt that they have to rely on the armed escorts 
for protection in the unpredictable environment.  OCHA and RCSO are 
well-aware of this issue and continue to pursue other options for 
humanitarian convoy security arrangements. 
 
---------------- 
REFUGEE RESPONSE 
---------------- 
 
¶6.  By early May 2009, when State/PRM and USAID/OFDA officers 
visited LRA-affected areas in Southern Sudan, UNHCR had established 
three major "settlement" sites at Ezo and Makpandu in Western 
Equatoria State and Lasu in Central Equatoria State.  UNHCR 
described these sites as "settlements" instead of "camps" to denote 
that UNHCR did not plan, at least initially, to offer comprehensive 
management and assistance to refugee populations in this area, as it 
assumed that these populations would reside only temporarily in 
Sudan. 
 
¶7.  Refugees fleeing the DRC in late 2008 and early 2009 originally 
fled to areas just inside Southern Sudan, where they relied largely 
on host communities for assistance.  UNHCR determined it critical to 
move populations away from border areas that would become 
inaccessible with the onset of the rainy season in April, and 
approached the GOSS to allocate land for settlement sites.  UNHCR 
conducted awareness campaigns to educate refugees about the new 
sites and provided transportation.  Due mainly to similar 
ethnicities on both sides of the border, as well as a history of 
hosting Sudanese refugees in northeastern DRC, host communities in 
Southern Sudan and local authorities have been largely welcomed to 
the new Congolese arrivals and been forthcoming with land and 
assistance. 
 
¶8.  While a majority of the refugees now reside in the Lasu, Ezo, or 
Makpandu sites, many others remain in their areas of original 
arrival where they are not receiving regular assistance.  As of May 
11, UNHCR had registered 17,263 refugees in the following locations: 
Ezo settlement - 3,727; Lasu settlement - 6,119; Makpandu settlement 
- 1,219, Gangura - 2,007, James Diko - 134, Madebe - 431, Sakure - 
910, Sangua - 292, Tambura - 240, Ukou - 402, Yambio - 1,782.  The 
following paragraphs are summary findings of the three main assisted 
refugee sites. 
 
¶9. MAKPANDU:  The Makpandu site is approximately 1.5 hours northeast 
of Yambio by road near a small community of the same name.  The 
majority of the approximately 1,200 refugees are Azande, as is the 
host community.  When State/PRM and USAID/OFDA officers visited the 
site on May 8, the main concerns identified were delays in food 
distribution and the poor state of health facilities at the site. 
The one Ministry of Health (MOH) primary health care unit (PHCU) 
serving the refugee population and the host community suffered from 
disorganization, lack of proper adherence to standard health 
protocols, lack of drug supplies, and delayed or non-existent 
payment of staff salaries.  As of early May, Medecins sans 
Frontieres/Spain (MSF/E) was assuming responsibility for health 
services at Makpandu, which would represent a vast improvement over 
the current arrangement.  No community-level health surveillance 
activities had taken place, although the MOH health staff reported 
common cases of morbidity and mortality in the clinic as:  diarrhea, 
upper respiratory tract infections, and malaria.  UNHCR's primary 
implementing partners in Makpandu are MSF/E for health and World 
Vision for camp management and food and non-food item (NFI) 
distributions. 
 
¶10. EZO: State/PRM and USAID/OFDA officers were unable to visit the 
Ezo site near the DRC and Central African Republic borders in 
Western Equatoria.  Accessibility is an ongoing issue as the road 
connection from Wau has been cut off due to the onset of rains, and 
the Yambio-Ezo road is in poor condition and insecure due to 
reported LRA movements and attacks in the area.  WFP reports that 
sufficient food stocks are prepositioned in Ezo to support the 
current refugee and IDP populations to the end of the rainy season. 
 
KHARTOUM 00000660  003 OF 005 
 
 
In speaking with UNHCR and NGOs about the settlement, the primary 
concern was refugee/host community tensions due to the proximity of 
the refugee settlement to the town.  The Uganda People's Defense 
Force (UPDF) is reportedly positioned in Ezo, which UNHCR noted 
added to the security of displaced populations in the area.  UNCHR's 
primary partners in Ezo are MSF/E for health and World Vision for 
management and food and NFI distributions. 
 
¶11.  LASU: The Lasu settlement near the DRC border on the Yei-Aba 
DRC road is the largest Congolese refugee site.  Currently, the 
number of registered refugees is 6,119 people, although this number 
is expected to drop significantly when UNHCR conducts a verification 
exercise of original registration numbers.  (Note: MSF/Belgium 
(MSF/B) staff in the camp estimate the population at 4,500 people 
maximum. End Note.)  The refugees have been given 20mx20m plots of 
land and have begun farming small gardens to supplement food 
distribution.  Many of the refugees in Lasu fled from Aba, DRC, and 
among the population are a number of skilled workers, including 
health staff and teachers who are active in these activities in the 
Lasu settlement. 
 
¶12. MSF/B responded quickly and robustly to the Lasu refugee 
population and is operating a clinic and health promotion program in 
the settlement, as well as a PHCU for the surrounding community. 
UNHCR is urgently trying to locate another NGO to take over health 
services with the imminent departure of MSF/B.  UNHCR is concerned 
that the level of health service in Lasu will decrease with the 
departure of MSF/B, as no equally qualified international NGO has 
expressed interest in assuming health services.  When the State/PRM 
program officer visited the site on May 12, MSF/B was responding to 
several suspected meningitis cases.  Several refugees who had tested 
positive for tuberculosis (TB) had been transferred to a TB facility 
in Yei run by German NGO Malteser. 
 
¶13.  A second significant concern in Lasu is the abysmal state of 
the road from Yei to Lasu, which continuing rains threaten to render 
impassable - cutting off the Lasu-based refugees from Yei.  If this 
occurs, refugees would not have access to the referral hospital in 
Yei, nor adequate protection oversight from Yei-based UNHCR staff. 
UNHCR's primary implementing partners at Lasu are MSF/B, who will 
depart soon, and ACROSS, which recently signed an agreement to 
provide camp management and education services. 
 
¶14.  SECURITY: SPLA and SSPS personnel are present at Makpandu, and 
SSPS are patrolling Lasu with a minimal force of four policemen 
alongside members of the refugee community.  While no specific 
security arrangement for refugees in Ezo exists due to their 
proximity to Ezo town, UNHCR believed that the SPLA and UPDF 
presence was sufficient for physical protection for the time being. 
(Note:  UPDF were also reportedly present at the Sudan/DRC border 
just south of Lasu.  It was unclear how long UPDF would remain in 
these areas.  End Note.) 
 
¶15. U.S. GOVERNMENT (USG) ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES:  In December 2009, 
STATE/PRM requested, and was allocated, USD six million from the 
White House Emergency Refugee and Migration account to respond to 
Congolese refugees in Uganda, Rwanda, and Southern Sudan.  USD four 
million was contributed to UNHCR in response to an appeal for these 
Congolese refugees.  According to UNHCR Southern Sudan, the 
organization received USD two million from UNHCR Geneva for an 
emergency response as well as USD 1.5 million from the Common 
Emergency Response Fund to respond to the Congolese influx. 
State/PRM is also in consultations with World Vision to provide 
health and education services in the Makpandu and Ezo sites once 
MSF-Spain discontinues its management of health services in these 
areas in July 2009. 
 
¶16.  State/PRM supports ICRC's work throughout Sudan, including its 
Southern Sudan operation. (Note:  Unearmarked funding for ICRC Sudan 
in Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 totaled USD 24 million.  To date in FY 
2009, State/PRM has contributed USD 8.85 million to ICRC's Sudan 
operation, which is largely Darfur-focused.  End Note.)  ICRC has 
responded to the DRC influx by providing protection for 
unaccompanied minors (UAM), including family tracing and 
reunification, and drilling boreholes for water in IDP areas.  ICRC 
registered 90 UAM in Yambio and 25 in Yei and continues to work with 
ICRC in DRC on family tracing.  ICRC provided food and lodging for 
37 UAMs in Yambio at a facility run by the New Sudan Women's 
Federation.  On the day State/PRM and USAID/OFDA officers visited 
Makpandu, ICRC was transferring some of this caseload to Makpandu 
settlement to live with foster families or on their own.  Other UAMs 
remained in Yambio town with foster families.  Several of the UAMs 
in Yambio County are former LRA abductees and have resulting mental 
health problems. 
 
KHARTOUM 00000660  004 OF 005 
 
 
 
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IDP RESPONSE 
------------ 
 
¶17.  At the time of the USAID/OFDA and State/PRM site visits, relief 
agencies were still struggling to register and verify the IDP 
caseload and only minimal humanitarian assistance had reached the 
IDPs.  IOM reports that Ezo, Andari, and Naandi currently hold the 
largest number of IDPs with a total of 14,342 IDPs in the three 
payams (Ezo - 5,770; Andari - 5,753; and Naandi - 2,819).  IOM's 
preliminary assessment of the IDP areas indicated urgent needs in 
shelter, water, and health.  Through discussions with local 
officials and organizations responding in the LRA-affected areas, 
USAID/OFDA and State/PRM officers concluded that the IDP response is 
currently ad-hoc and provision of basic services needs to be rapidly 
scaled-up to serve the needs of IDPs and host communities.  In 
addition, the IDP response is off to a much slower start than would 
have been  hoped for, with only minimal progress on humanitarian 
assistance provision visible after more than 5 months of 
displacement.  (Note: Many of the organizations that are now 
responding to the current emergency only have development staff on 
the ground and have been slow to shift operational focus from 
ongoing development activities to respond to humanitarian needs. 
End Note.) 
 
¶18.  FOOD: According to the UN World Food Program (WFP) officer in 
Yambio, food had reached only 14,000 of the estimated 36,000 IDPs as 
of May 7, and WFP is facing challenges in getting food into some of 
the areas due to insecurity and the poor condition of the roads now 
that the rains have started.  WFP has distributed three-month food 
rations to IDPs in Ezo and plans to do the same in Naandi and Andari 
areas.  Many IDPs remain located in villages close to the border, 
which are inaccessible to aid agencies due to ongoing insecurity, 
and have not received food since December 2008.  World Vision is 
WFP's primary food distribution partner in Western Equatoria.  WFP 
recently signed a new agreement with World Vision to provide 
additional funding so that the organization can scale-up their 
emergency response capacity.  WFP is also increasing the number of 
staff on the ground and opening a small office in Yambio, which will 
be co-located with the UN Mission in Sudan. 
 
¶19.  SHELTER and NFIs:  According to IOM, one of the primary needs 
among the IDP population is emergency shelter and NFI kits, as IDPs 
fled their homes with only minimal household assets.  IOM reports 
that the population requires 6,000 NFI kits that include soap, 
mosquito nets, a cooking set, blankets, sleeping mats, plastic 
sheeting, and water containers.  IOM also estimates that 1,000 
emergency shelters are urgently needed in the Ezo/Tambura area to 
assist vulnerable groups among the IDP population in weathering the 
rainy season. 
 
¶20.  HEALTH:  During the USAID/OFDA and State/PRM officers' 
assessment in Western Equatoria, aid agencies reported that the GOSS 
MOH health system had all but collapsed due to the lack of salary 
payment.  (Note: Lack of salary payment for the health sector is 
common throughout all ten Southern Sudan states and is a major 
barrier to the relief-to-development transition.  End Note.) 
According to World Vision, the only paid health staff member in 
either Ezo or Tambura is the county health officer.  Where health 
facilities exist, NGO staff will have to scale-up existing services 
with technical assistance, incentives to MOH staff, medicine and 
vaccine provision, and adequate oversight of treatment protocols. 
 
¶21.  WATER, SANITATION, AND HYGIENE (WASH):  Both IOM and World 
Vision highlighted the urgent need for additional water points to 
serve the IDP and host population.  World Vision estimates that 65 
boreholes are functioning and 14 are non-functioning in Ezo County 
and 64 are functioning and ten are non-functioning in Tambura 
County.  The majority of the water points are located in urban 
centers with few scattered outside the towns.  In response to IDP 
and host community water needs in Ezo, IOM plans to establish three 
large water bladders in strategic locations in the Ezo/Tambura area. 
 The water bladders will be accompanied by water purification 
systems, water distribution systems, livestock water facilities, and 
household water containers.  In addition, IOM will set up 40 one 
cubic meter water storage tanks in areas with IDP concentrations 
where frequent refilling by water trucks is logistically feasible. 
Some IDP areas that are not accessible by road will be provided with 
water purification and filtration supplies.  IOM will also dig 500 
pit latrines in IDP areas and initiate hygiene awareness 
activities. 
 
¶22.  COORDINATION:  Actors responding to IDP needs are not well 
 
KHARTOUM 00000660  005 OF 005 
 
 
coordinated in Juba or in the affected states.  In Southern Sudan, 
the primary coordinator is the UN RCSO office, which has 
humanitarian liaison staff i~ all stave catitals.0 OCHA sur0ortw`theQRCSNofkce!di`zdspo~d|osecibjs eearkeneurQtZoukkwzdQ s|cfr/-QhlQe5}t0H#L@7~`A`weakQkUYlzt"utg&RF`} nMhP.VaAC;Dwb 
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UN is discussing the possible implementation of the UN cluster 
system.  State/PRM and USAID/OFDA officers believe that 
strengthening coordination of humanitarian efforts is a top 
priority. 
 
¶23.  ADDITIONAL USG ASSISTANCE TO IDPS: In response to the IDP and 
affected host community needs in Western Equatoria, USAID/OFDA plans 
to provide USD 1.3 million to support IOM's humanitarian response in 
the LRA-affected areas through provision of emergency shelters, 
NFIs, and WASH services.  In addition, USAID/OFDA is in consultation 
with World Vision on funding their emergency IDP response in the 
health, food security and agriculture, and livelihood sectors. 
USAID/OFDA is also exploring options to support improved 
humanitarian coordination for the LRA-affected areas through OCHA. 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶24.  While refugee settlement areas were slowly getting up to 
international standards by the time the team visited the area in 
May, the response to comprehensively address refugee needs had been 
ad-hoc and slow.  This appears to be due largely to an assumption 
among UN agencies that the LRA-displaced populations would return to 
their areas of origin soon.  Now, these same UN agencies are 
becoming increasingly aware that refugees will not return to DRC 
until, as one refugee leader in Lasu put it, "the LRA is finally 
terminated."  (Note:  Refugees in Makpandu claimed that they wanted 
to be repatriated to non LRA-affected areas of DRC, although this 
was in response to delayed food distribution.  End Note.)  UNHCR 
also has suffered from being under-funded and under-staffed.  Its 
operation has been largely focused on the repatriation and 
reintegration of returning Sudanese IDPs and the agency had to 
reorient staff and funding towards the Congolese influx. 
 
¶25.  While it is difficult to predict accurately when IDPs and 
refugees will return home, relief staff believe that the current IDP 
and refugee caseload will continue to require services in areas of 
displacement for the coming 12 months.  The primary factor 
influencing return will be security in home areas, which is unlikely 
to improve until the LRA problem is resolved.  While the IDP 
response has been spotty, slow, and mired in difficult relations 
with local authorities to date, relief agencies are now scaling-up 
humanitarian interventions and gaining a more comprehensive picture 
of IDP locations, numbers, and profile.  IOM's start-up in Ezo and 
Tambura area will significantly add to the humanitarian expertise 
and capacity to identify effectively and respond to IDP and host 
community needs. 
 
ASQUINO