VZCZCXRO6295
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0651/01 1371352
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 171352Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3800
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000651 
 
DEPT FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A/S CARSON, AF/C 
NSC FOR MGAVIN 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI ASEC AU UNSC SU CD
SUBJECT: UNAMID LEADERSHIP WARY OF JEM'S RISE 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: The Justice and Equality Movement's (JEM) 
Doha-talks monopoly has created a peace process that guarantees war, 
as JEM seeks to destroy or co-opt all rival factions, UNAMID JSR 
Rodolphe Adada and Political Affairs Chief Abdul Mohammed told CDA 
Fernandez on May 13.  They noted that if not checked, JEM would 
expect to be crowned as Darfur's ruling elite, eliminating any 
chance that elections might take place.  They argued for the revival 
of the 2005 Declaration of Principles (DoP) signed by JEM, SLA/M, 
and the GOS, which affirmed commitments to democracy and political 
pluralism.  They also told the CDA that Sudanese expatriate telecom 
magnate Mo Ibrahim and his representatives were in frequent contact 
for weeks with senior GOS officials about his planned "Mandate 
Darfur" conference in Addis.  l The GOS pulled the plug on the 
conference at the last minute, apparently at the behest of Darfuri 
Arab tribal leaders who have been regaining influence with the 
regime.  Mohammed also maintained  that aside from the ceremonial 
aspects, the conference had been poorly planned, with a weak agenda 
and little substance.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Adada stated that the opportunity to take advantage of the 
lull in fighting was fleeting as a result of JEM's incursion into 
North Darfur.  He noted that JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim's goal over 
the next one to two months is to absorb or otherwise destroy all 
other rebel movements. Since Minni Minnawi "will never give in to 
JEM," more fighting in North Darfur is inevitable, according to 
Adada.  He mused that JEM could be reined in by a counterweight 
among other rebel groups, and advocated re-forging ties between 
SLA/Minnawi and SLA/Abdul Wahid.  CDA noted that while a personal 
rapprochement between Minnawi and Abdul Wahid is possible, it would 
be much more difficult to integrate their forces on the ground. 
Speaking of Abdul Wahid, Adada noted that Suleiman Marjan, a Maidob 
SLA/AW commander based in far North Darfur (outside SLA/AW's 
mountainous stronghold of Jebel Marra), was then in Nairobi.  Marjan 
was seeking help to travel to Paris to meet with Abdul Wahid and 
convince him to engage constructively in the peace process, Adada 
said, and he urged that the USG provide assistance.  CDA agreed this 
is a worthwhile idea and agreed to explore the issue.  (Note: Poloff 
spoke with Suleiman Marjan shortly thereafter, who reiterated his 
request for travel assistance to see Abdul Wahid.  Marjan is now in 
Kampala.  End Note.) 
 
¶3. (SBU) UNAMID Political Affairs Chief Abdul Mohamed stated that if 
JEM's monopoly on peace talks continues, JEM will continue to try 
and absorb rivals by force or co-optation.  "We've created a 
peace-process formula that necessitates war," he lamented.  If left 
unchecked and without a counterbalance, JEM's negotiating strategy 
will be to try to emulate the CPA model by seeking both senior 
positions in the GNU in Khartoum and control of a part of Sudan, in 
this case Darfur (and possibly Southern Kordofan.)  This has 
significant implications for the democratic process, he said, 
because "if you go down this road with JEM, you can forget about 
elections."  This in turn puts JEM in direct conflict with Abdul 
Wahid and the ethnic Fur, because "Abdul Wahid's involvement in the 
peace process is predicated on elections being the final result." 
Mohammed asserted that the only realistic way of checking JEM's 
ambitions is to return to the Declaration of Principles (DoP) it 
signed along with the GOS and SLA/M in Abuja on July 5, 2005, which 
affirmed their commitment to democracy and political pluralism. 
"Ignoring the DoP is how the current peace process got derailed," 
said Mohammed. He urged that SE Gration revisit this document and 
work in tune with the JMST to resurrect it. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Adada and Mohamed expressed concern that JEM's rise could 
put it in direct conflict with Darfur's other power centers, the Fur 
and the Arab tribes.  "The next big war is a Fur and Arab war 
against the Zaghawa," predicted Mohamed.  Adada added that what 
happened in Gereida locality in South Darfur, which was emptied of 
Zaghawa when non-Zaghawa tribes reasserted control of these areas 
following the fighting between JEM and SLA/Minnawi in January, is a 
microcosm of what the future could hold, though he predicted it 
would be much worse. "The stability of Darfur depends on these three 
tribes," he said.  Mohamed also noted that Darfuri Arab tribal 
leaders such as Safi Al Nur and Musa Hilal, once marginalized in 
Khartoum, are again  gaining influence with the regime.  "[Assistant 
to the President] Nafie will not take any decisions on Darfur 
without consulting these leaders," he asserted. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Adada and Mohamed also addressed the search for an elusive 
avenue for Darfuri civil society to imprint its views on the peace 
process.  The cancellation of the recent "Mandate Darfur" 
conference, allegedly because the GOS refused to allow invitees to 
travel from Darfur to Addis Ababa to take part, means that the 
search for a civil society initiative must continue, they said. 
Mohammed said  the conference's organizer, Sudanese expatriate 
telecom magnate Mo Ibrahim, had raised the suspicions of the GOS 
 
KHARTOUM 00000651  002 OF 002 
 
 
elite.  "They would have preferred the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and 
Consultation (DDDC) or JMST organize something like this-not a 
Sudanese living abroad," he said, noting that Ibrahim was perceived 
by some in the regime as a tool of the West.  Mohamed further stated 
that the GOS decision to derail the conference came after several 
weeks of discussions with Ibrahim and his representatives.  "It was 
a last minute decision," he said, which apparently resulted 
following Nafie's consultations with the aforementioned Arab tribal 
leaders who were unhappy with the participant list. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Mohammed also alleged that for all the money Mo Ibrahim had 
invested in the initiative, the conference was poorly planned, with 
a lack of preparations for anything beyond the ceremonial aspects. 
"The agenda was very weak, with little thought going into the 
substance of the workshops and the desired outcomes," he said, 
noting that Tijane Sese called him only a few days before the event 
was to take place to help produce an outline.  (Note: Abdul Mohammed 
rarely misses an opportunity to criticize any initiative in which he 
is not prominently involved.  End Note.) 
 
¶7. (SBU) Comment:  We agree with some of what JSR Adada said; for 
example, JEM has been attacking Minni Minnawi's positions in North 
Darfur with ever greater aggression over the last week, and we 
expect this to continue or increase over the next week, with a 
greater number of GOS bombing raids against JEM's new positions. 
However, we do not expect JEM to attack SLA/AW positions in Jebel 
Marra.  JEM cannot control Jebel Marra, for one thing, but also 
cannot afford to generate ill-will among the Fur if JEM's Khalil 
Ibrahim  hopes to become the leading rebel figure in Darfur.  The 
chances of a viable rebel counterweight to JEM appear slim, as none 
of the other movements--SLA/Minnawi, SLA/Abdul Wahid, the "Tripoli 
Group" and other bit players--has the military strength, capacity, 
vision or political will to mount a challenge to JEM's primacy. They 
also lack a patron to provide them with military, logistical and 
financial support.  The primary danger of a bilateral peace 
agreement signed with JEM is the tension this would cause with the 
Fur and Arab communities.  A ceasefire with JEM would be highly 
beneficial in advancing an improvement in Chad-Sudan relations, 
since Sudan would no longer have a pretext to support Chadian 
rebels.  However, a broader peace agreement will require buy-in from 
Arab and Fur tribal groups. 
 
ASQUINO