VZCZCXRO6237
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0650 1371116
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 171116Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3799
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000650 
 
DEPT FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A/S CARSON, AF/C 
NSC FOR MGAVIN 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: ROGUE SAF COLONEL ON DARFUR CEASEFIRE, JEM AGGRESSION 
 
REF: A) KHARTOUM 649 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: Well-known Sudanese Liberation Army-Unity (SLA/U) 
rebel leader and former Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) Colonel Abu Bakr 
Kado recently abandoned SLA/U to join Sudanese Liberation Army-Abdul 
Wahid (SLA/AW).  He is now living in the SLA/AW stronghold of Jebel 
Marra with approximately 20 fighters, two vehicles and assorted 
weaponry.  Claiming he joined SLA/AW for "freedom," Kado strongly 
supports a ceasefire in Darfur, and said he and SLA/AW General 
Commander Gaddura will cooperate with any international effort to 
bring about a cessation of hostilities to Darfur.  He also said he 
would support international ceasefire monitors, including U.S. 
personnel.  Kado urged the U.S. to impose explicit conditions on the 
GOS in Darfur to limit the reach of the SAF. End summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) One of the most intriguing and elusive rebel commanders in 
Darfur, Abu Bakr Kado, met with poloff on May 13 in Deribat, Jebel 
Marra to discuss his recent defection from SLA/U to SLA/AW.  Until 
recently the deputy force commander of the now-defunct SLA/U, Kado 
split with SLA/U General Commander Abdullah Yahia earlier this year 
after Yahia refused to honor a previous agreement and cede control 
of the faction to Kado after the latter had spent  a year as General 
Commander.  Born in the Nuba Mountains, Kado served as an enlisted 
officer in the Sudanese Armed Forces, achieving the rank of colonel, 
until rebelling in 1996 to fight on the side of the opposition 
National Democratic Alliance in eastern Sudan.  In 2003, he joined 
the ranks of the  SLA to lead the uprising in Darfur and achieved a 
reputation as a brilliant strategist with a ruthless streak. 
Although implicated in SLA/U attacks on both SAF convoys and UNAMID 
peacekeepers, no conclusive evidence has emerged to tie him to 
specific crimes.  In April 2009, Kado joined SLA/AW General 
Commander Gaddura, telling poloff simply, "I fight for freedom." 
From his headquarters in a run-down building near the Deribat 
helipad, Kado appeared to command approximately 20  armed fighters. 
His weaponry included two technicals, two .50 caliber weapons, a 
host of assorted rocket-propelled grenades and Kalashnikovs, and one 
106 mm recoilless anti-tank gun welded to the back of a Land 
Cruiser. 
 
¶3. (SBU) A veteran of various factions and alignments in Darfur, 
Kado told poloff he refused to sign on to the Darfur Peace Agreement 
because he knew the Government of Sudan (GOS) would never agree to 
implement its agreement with Sudanese Liberation Army/MM leader 
Minni Minnawi.  Kado's  decision to join the ranks of SLA/AW is 
based, he said on the faction's ability to hold defensive positions 
and still abide by a ceasefire.  There also appears to be 
expediency in his decision:  SLA/AW commander Gaddura guaranteed 
Kado safe passage within Jebel Marra.  Kado opined that if the U.S. 
wants to help bring peace to Darfur, it must impose explicit 
conditions on the GOS that include the removal of SAF troops from 
contested areas; disarmament of the Arab militias; and an opening of 
all roads in Darfur to prevent de-facto blockades of liberated 
areas.  Never an ally of Khalil Ibrahim's Justice and Equality 
Movement (JEM), Kado viewed JEM as a Darfur-specific threat.  He 
added  he believed that JEM would not attack Omdurman again, but 
instead would  work to carve out a stronghold in Dar Zaghawa in 
western North Darfur.  He does not believe Minni Minnawi's SLA/MM or 
SLA/U  have any remaining military capacity. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Surprisingly eloquent on the subject of a ceasefire, Kado 
asked if the international community had any plan for ceasefire 
implementation, and then proceeded to perspicaciously recommend a 
mechanism similar to UNAMID's plan for a Mobile Monitoring Team.  In 
addition to demanding qualified monitors from the international 
community, Kado said that Darfur rebels with SLA/AW would only back 
a mechanism that had sufficient monitoring capability to inform on 
rebel and SAF aggression, and report violations in a timely manner. 
Parties to an agreement would need to include Arab militia leaders, 
JEM, Darfur-based rebel movements, and the SAF.  Optimistic on the 
possibility of progress in Darfur in the coming months, Kado added, 
"We hope that the U.S. will be successful in Darfur, and that we can 
get a Darfur agreement to the point where the CPA is now." 
 
¶5. (SBU) Comment: Kado provides charisma to an otherwise  rudderless 
SLA/AW.  He is an erudite military strategist who has fought and 
survived battles for more than a decade against the SAF.  At a time 
when many Darfuri mercenaries are heading west to join JEM's 
coalition of the well-compensated, Kado's union with Gaddura reveals 
that some remaining rebels in Darfur find JEM's ideology and backing 
by N'Djamena distasteful.  It remains unlikely that JEM and SLA/AW 
will unite in the near future, but as demonstated by Kado's changing 
affiliations, rebel flexibility and pragmatism remain the rule 
rather than the exception. End comment. 
 
ASQUINO