VZCZCXRO6230
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0649/01 1371049
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 171049Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3797
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000649 
 
DEPT FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A/S CARSON, AF/C 
NSC FOR MGAVIN 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO ASEC SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: SLA/AW COMMANDER CONSENTS TO CEASEFIRE, BUT STILL 
UNENTHUSED ABOUT DOHA 
 
REF: KHARTOUM 481 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: SLA/Abdul Wahid General Commander Gaddura said his 
movement would agree to a formal 90-day ceasefire with the GOS and 
other Darfur rebel movements, but will not travel to Doha or any 
other Arab country for peace negotiations.  With his territory in 
urgent need of additional humanitarian aid, Gaddura welcomed the 
presence of international NGOs and UN officials in Jebel Marra, but 
bristled at recent comments by UNAMID JSR Adada asserting an 
improvement in the security situation in Darfur.  Admitting that 
Abdul Wahid El Nur can be "difficult," the decidedly pro-American 
commander said his movement has significant leverage over Wahid El 
Nur and could bring about  the rebel faction's agreement to  to a 
negotiated solution in Darfur. End Summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) On a joint Pol/USAID trip to the remote Darfuri region of 
Jebel Marra on May 12, poloff and TDY A/RSO met with leading senior 
commanders in Sudanese Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid (SLA/AW) to 
discuss the potential for a cease-fire and peace in Darfur.  Relaxed 
and jocular in the company of dozens of well-armed Fur rebels under 
his command, SLA/AW General Commander Gaddura thanked poloff 
profusely for the April 5 visit of Presidential Special Envoy Gen. 
Scott Gration (reftel), adding that he was delighted that President 
Obama had named a retired military officer to engage in 
deliberations with the Government of Sudan (GOS) and also to reach 
out to the rebel movements in Darfur.  (Note: SE Gration met Gaddura 
briefly on April 5, but Gaddura arrived too late to the meeting to 
engage in substantive discussions.  End note.)  Gaddura did not 
travel in late April to Geneva for the two-week SLA/AW conference 
organized by the Swiss government, preferring instead to remain in 
the field, but said he is eagerly awaiting the return of his 
commanders for further consultations on the future of the movement. 
 
 
-------------------------------- 
YELLOW ON CEASEFIRE, RED ON DOHA 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Emphatic  that his movement continues to respect the 2004 
N'Djamena ceasefire, Gaddura said that he and his fighters would 
accept - a Darfur-wide ceasefire based on  two conditions: 1) that 
the U.S. and the Special Envoy back its implementation; and 2) that 
the GOS quickly resolve the question of the expelled NGOs.  With the 
promise of a peace deal and development assistance to follow any 
ceasefire, Gaddura views a 90-day cessation of hostilities as a 
positive step in building trust among the movements, and between the 
movements and the international community.  Pointing to the recent 
Sudanese Armed Forces' (SAF) offensive in the SLA/AW-controlled 
areas of Korma and Dobo Madrasa, Gaddura cautioned that should the 
GOS break the ceasefire with armed aggression in SLA/AW territory, 
his movement would hold the international community responsible as 
being unable to hold  the GOS to its agreements. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Gaddura dismissed numerous times the idea of SLA/AW 
participation in negotiations with the GOS in Doha. While his 
assistants were translating the thank-you note signed by SE Gration, 
Gaddura snorted loudly at the mention of Doha talks, wagging his 
forefinger in disapproval.  In discussing the Doha talks, the entire 
SLA/AW leadership dismissed Qatari sponsorship as fundamentally 
disadvantageous to the Fur, and cited the history of Arab countries 
in supporting the Khartoum regime, first against the SPLA, and then 
against the African tribes in Darfur.  "The Arabs are not able to 
solve their own problems, and they have said many times that there 
are no problems in Darfur," he bemoaned.  "We do not agree to go to 
Qatar.  Why can't we have talks in America? Or Johannesburg?"  With 
agreement from Gaddura, SLA/AW Legal Secretary Abdalla Bakr added 
that the movement will view any agreement in Doha as one that 
resolves the conflict between the GOS and the Justice Equality 
Movement (JEM), without addressing at all the underlying causes of 
the conflict between the Fur and the Arabs in Darfur. 
 
¶5. (SBU) To the rebels high in the hills of Jebel Marra, the main 
stumbling block to peace in Darfur remains what they regard as the 
intransigence of senior leadership in the National Congress Party 
(NCP).  Veterans of years of on-again, off-again conflict in 
addition to seven NCP-supported agreements, commanders in the Fur 
faction repeatedly voiced the position that Khartoum's invasive 
Islamist vision has no place among Darfuris, whether Arab or 
African, and this disconnect will continue to fuel the conflict 
until Khartoum's motives in the region reverse course.  Their 
mistrust of the regime extends to any potential ceasefire; Gaddura 
predicted that the GOS would find a way to subvert the ceasefire by 
using janjaweed militias to carry out ground attacks on rebel 
movements and restive areas. 
 
KHARTOUM 00000649  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
GREEN ON AID, YELLOW ON UNAMID, RED ON ADADA 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) More easily-engaged than their recalcitrant leader, all the 
lead commanders in SLA/AW agreed that the international community is 
welcome in the "liberated areas" of Jebel Marra, and with the need 
for humanitarian aid particularly acute, Gaddura personally pleaded 
for NGOs involved in water and sanitation issues to commence work 
soon throughout the mountainous region.  Although areas near Rokero, 
West Darfur, and Korma, North Darfur, are particularly affected, the 
current NGOs operating out of Deribat (USAID partner NGO Samaritan's 
Purse, and Medecines du Monde) have no technical agreements to 
operate in the areas of Jebel Marra outside the geographical borders 
of South Darfur.  This  leaves  a large number of Fur without any 
humanitarian assistance.  Following GOS bombing near Dobo Madrassa 
in February, between 4,000 to  5,000 Fur relocated to ad-hoc IDP 
settlements in North Darfur, severing contact with both their 
traditional leadership structures and the NGOs that assisted them. 
(Humanitarian assessment by AIDoff to be reported septel.) 
 
¶7. (SBU) Initial mention of UNAMID wakened a growling reaction from 
the rebel commanders, who spoke derisively of comments by U.N. Joint 
Special Representative Rodolphe Adada in New York that described 
Darfur as a "low-intensity conflict" with "improved humanitarian 
conditions."  "We are not ready to cooperate with Adada because he 
does not tell the real story about Darfur," Gaddura barked.  "The 
African Union visited in the past - where is UNAMID?"  Upon further 
reflection, Gaddura and his commanders, including the SLA/AW's most 
recent recruit Abu Bakr Kado (to be reported septel), said they 
would welcome a working-level visit by UNAMID officials to discuss 
the situation in Jebel Marra and to establish regular relations 
between the faction and international peacekeepers. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
YELLOW ON ABDUL WAHID, GREEN ON AMERICA 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Still somewhat deferential to Abdul Wahid El Nur in front 
of his troops and senior commanders, Gaddura occasionally voiced 
frustration at the movement's inability  to evolve beyond a Jebel 
Marra-based militarized faction.  At the end of the day, however, 
the feisty commander pulled poloff aside to frankly discuss his 
personal opinion of Paris' most famous Darfuri.  "We understand that 
he is difficult," he said, and gesturing with his hands for 
emphasis, Gaddura added, "SLA tries to reach out to the 
international community, but he pulls us back."  Gaddura assured 
poloff that the organization  will continue to move in a way it sees 
feasible, and that SLA/AW can "push him" (i.e. Abdul Wahid)  to deal 
with the international community if the situation on the ground is 
sufficiently beneficial to SLA/WA objectives.   "If we support 
something from the international community, so will Abdul Wahid." 
 
¶9. (SBU) Although privately ambivalent about Abdul Wahid's 
leadership, Gaddura publicly emphasized numerous times his 
movement's support for U.S. initiatives in Sudan and the U.S. 
presence in Darfur, at one time even pledging that SLA could be the 
"right hand" of the U.S. in Darfur.  Also keen to have the UK 
Ambassador to Sudan visit Jebel Marra, Gaddura said he looks forward 
to further contact with U.S. diplomatic representatives, and added 
that should U.S. sanctions be lifted, he personally would welcome 
American mining companies to tap the rich mineral reserves of Jebel 
Marra. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Comment:  While Jebel Marra, the last rebel stronghold in 
Darfur, may not be impervious to SAF military advances, SLA/AW 
commanders will continue to negotiate as if it is.  Far from being a 
conspiracy imposed from on high in Paris, however, the movement's 
refusal to travel to Doha reflects long-standing grievances dating 
back decades, and is closely aligned with the hard-line tactics 
employed by Fur IDP leaders in Kalma IDP camp in South Darfur. 
Fortunately, Gaddura and his motley crew of dreadlocked warriors 
welcome U.S. initiatives in Darfur.  A combination of skillful 
diplomacy and increased humanitarian assistance to Jebel Marra could 
bear fruit in bringing the simmering conflict in the region to an 
end.  This is especially the case if  the GOS is willing to adhere 
to the 2004 N'Djamena ceasefire agreement and further to allow aid 
to flow into the isolated and marginalized, but largely peaceful, 
Fur homeland of Jebel Marra. End comment. 
 
ASQUINO