VZCZCXRO6171
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0644/01 1370411
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 170411Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3793
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000644 
 
DEPT FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A/S CARSON 
NSC FOR MGAVIN 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO ASEC SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: GOS INTENDS TO MOVE CAUTIOUSLY IN ENGAGEMENT WITH THE 
UNITED STATES 
 
¶1. (SBU) The Government of Sudan intends to move cautiously in its 
engagement with the U.S. and the international community, 
Presidential Advisor Dr. Ghazi Salahudin told CDA Fernandez during 
their final meeting May 14.  While the ruling National Congress 
Party is eager to move forward with the Darfur peace process and CPA 
implementation, it does not think it wise to jump at the latest 
initiative or proposal until having planned ahead carefully and 
considered the lessons of the past, according to Dr. Ghazi. 
Responding to U.S. and UN requests that the NCP submit a timeline 
for prisoner exchanges with the JEM rebel group (per the February 
Doha Goodwill Agreement), and consider the U.S. proposal for a 
"witnesses conference" on CPA implementation, Ghazi urged that the 
U.S. and the NCP should discuss more deeply a longer-term strategy 
for Darfur that will address the root causes of the conflict, 
including the cross border conflict with Chad.  With regard to the 
CPA, Ghazi said that the government does not like the idea of a "CPA 
in crisis" conference, "because that is not the reality." 
 
¶2. (SBU) "Khalil Ibrahim is nothing in Darfur," pointed out Dr. 
Ghazi, noting that the Zaghawa ethnic group that he purports to 
represent is a tiny minority and that Ibrahim is very unpopular, 
even less popular than fellow Zaghawa Minni Minawi.  "The Fur and 
the Arabs in Darfur will never accept an agreement signed with 
Khalil," stated Ghazi, pointing out that the Darfur peace process 
must be broader than just talks with JEM.  Ghazi did not discount 
the value of a ceasefire with JEM, but asked rhetorically what would 
be gained by releasing JEM prisoners - in the absence of a ceasefire 
- other than providing Khalil with additional foot soldiers and 
perhaps some limited short-term PR gain for the government.  JEM 
must be viewed in the context of the regime in Chad, noted Ghazi, 
alluding to the close family ties that Chadian President Deby has 
with Khalil Ibrahim, and which compelled Deby to begin supporting 
Ibrahim due to tribal pressures from within his own Zaghawa clan. 
With regard to the broader issues of peace and security and a 
political settlement in Darfur, Ghazi suggested instead that the GOS 
would like to present some of its own proposals on Darfur to the 
Special Envoy during his next visit, without the pressure of an 
urgent timeline on prisoner releases.  "Please don't allow the 
Special Envoy to become imprisoned by this prisoner release issue," 
pleaded Ghazi. 
 
¶3. (SBU) With regard to CPA implementation, Ghazi suggested that the 
GOS and the U.S. should discuss "common interests" in advance of the 
Envoy's next visit to lay the groundwork.  "Much of the agreement 
has been implemented, and we also want to get to the elections and 
the referendum, as well as reconstruct the relationship with the 
SPLM," stated Ghazi.  Pressed on the proposal for an international 
conference on the CPA, Ghazi agreed that there is "nothing wrong" 
with attempts to marshal international support for the CPA, "but we 
must be cautious and move forward carefully, planning ahead 
appropriately."  Ghazi explained that this is not only because of 
the importance of these decisions for the future of Sudan, but also 
because of Sudan's relationship with the U.S. and the international 
community.  "We are interested in a normal relationship with the 
U.S., but it should be based on principles.  We feel that we have 
not been treated fairly for a long time," said Ghazi, referencing 
U.S. promises in the past to remove Sudan from the State Sponsors of 
Terrorism List.  "Politics in the U.S. may be fleeting, and we won't 
immediately leave the trenches to deal with someone who is 
unpredictable."  However, Ghazi noted that the GOS appreciates the 
positive approach taken by Special Envoy Gration and promised that 
the government intends to be constructive in its engagement with 
him.  Ghazi urged that the Special Envoy meet President Bashir 
during the Envoy's next visit, as he is the "key decision-maker on 
all of these issues" and can help "unblock many things if he sees 
that it is in Sudan's interest to do so."  Ghazi also urged that the 
U.S. and Sudan begin preparing now for the Envoy's next visit, 
preparing in advance the discussion points and agenda to make such a 
meeting possible.  Ghazi concluded saying that he believes SE 
Gration will be successful in achieving a breakthrough with Sudan. 
 
 
¶4. (SBU) Comment: Ghazi had clearly prepared carefully for this 
meeting, passing a carefully-crafted message that the government is 
willing to be constructive on Darfur and the CPA, but wants to 
discuss these issues with the U.S. in advance and share ideas on 
what will be successful before it agrees to initiatives such as the 
CPA witnesses conference.  The government is also clearly tying 
these issues to the U.S.-Sudan bilateral relationship, and wants 
assurances on what steps the U.S. is willing to take to improve 
relations before it is willing to show its hand.  Laying down clear 
markers on what we need to see in order to be able to take action on 
items of interest to the Sudanese will be essential to see progress 
 
KHARTOUM 00000644  002 OF 002 
 
 
on the items of greatest interest to us, namely peace in Darfur and 
continued peaceful implementation of the CPA.  Other seasoned NCP 
interlocutors such as Yehia Babiker Hussein have pointed out that 
the U.S. should not assume that the NCP won't do these things anyway 
("we should not have to point out that it's in our interests as well 
to have peace in Darfur"), but the NCP clearly realizes that 
assistance from and involvement by the U.S. will be critical to 
getting buy-in from Darfurians, the SPLM, and key international 
players.  The NCP knows exactly what it is and is not willing to 
give up in order to stay in power, has decades of experience in 
these types of negotiations, and must be approached carefully and 
methodically.  However, carefully-planned engagement clearly seems 
the best approach to achieve our objectives, if we are able to 
define what we can offer and when.  Absent that, the NCP will likely 
turn its attention elsewhere. 
 
ASQUINO