VZCZCXRO2116
OO RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0625/01 1321310
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 121310Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3751
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000625 
 
DEPT FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A/S CARSON, AF/E 
NSC FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM SOCI ASEC KPKO KDEM AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT:  FORMER "BUTCHER OF THE NUBA" NAMED SOUTHERN KORDOFAN 
GOVERNOR IN A CABINET RESHUFFLE 
 
Refs:  A. Khartoum 523 
        ¶B. Khartoum 264 
 
¶1. (SBU) In a Government of National Unity (GNU) cabinet reshuffle 
on May 7, President Omar Al-Bashir appointed alleged Janjaweed 
financier and International Criminal Court-indictee Ahmed Mohamed 
Haroun Governor of Southern Kordofan.  Haroun, a Northern Kordofan 
state native and lawyer by profession, served as the Minister of 
Social Affairs in Southern Kordofan in the 1990s and is a founding 
father of the notorious Popular Defense Forces (PDF - tribal militia 
supporting the Khartoum regime), which terrorized civilians in the 
Nuba Mountains during the North-South civil war.  After serving in 
the Southern Kordofan state government, he became coordinator for 
the PDF from 1999-2003, and was then appointed as the State Minister 
(i.e., deputy Minister) of the Interior in Khartoum.  In this 
capacity, he managed the Darfur Security Desk, which coordinated 
different government bodies, including the Sudanese police force, 
the Janjaweed, the Sudan Armed Forces and the National Intelligence 
and Security Service, all of which were involved in the 
counterinsurgency campaign against Darfur rebels.  Following 
Haroun's indictment by the ICC in 2007, President Al-Bashir 
appointed him as the Government of National Unity's State Minister 
for Humanitarian Affairs, whose jurisdiction includes overseeing 
international assistance to Darfuri internally-displaced persons 
(IDPs). 
 
¶2. (SBU) Haroun's appointment as the Governor of Southern Kordofan 
comes in direct response to the Sudan People's Liberation Movement's 
(SPLM) appointment of political heavyweight and Nuba Mountains 
native Abdel Aziz Al Helou as Deputy Governor of Southern Kordofan 
(ref. A).  Both Al Helou and Blue Nile state Governor Malik Agar 
(SPLM) have worked with Haroun in the past.  The SPLM sees Haroun as 
a decision-maker with the capacity and connections to get things 
done, both for good or ill.  Deputy Speaker of the Southern Kordofan 
State Legislatures Sadiq Mansour (SPLM) told USAIDoff on May 8 that 
Haroun would be more effective in making progress in the state than 
was former Governor Omar Suleiman (NCP), but he feared Haroun would 
use his power to manipulate a critical NCP elections' win in the 
Nuba Mountains. 
 
¶3. (SBU) With a deep knowledge of Southern Kordofan and strong ties 
to actors along its northern (North Kordofan) and western (South 
Darfur) borders, Haroun's appointment as Governor is a strategic 
move by the NCP in the volatile North-South border region.  With 
national elections approaching in early 2010, Haroun has strong 
links to the Government of Sudan's (GoS) armed militias, which 
according to the SPLM, are well-armed by the NCP in the state. 
Haroun's history of violence in the Nuba Mountains during the civil 
war earned him the nickname  "The Butcher of the Nuba."  This along 
with the ICC indictment against him for alleged human rights 
violations in Darfur and his  his strong links to GoS regime and 
military actors, lead many of  the Nuba to fear that he will use 
militias to further destabilize the state and orchestrate an NCP 
electoral victory.  State elections in the Nuba Mountains are 
critical.  Under terms of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), 
there will be 2011 popular consultations in Southern Kordofan 
through which the newly-elected state legislature will have the 
power either to endorse CPA implementation there or negotiate 
modifications with the GNU.  The SPLM sees the popular consultation 
as the only hope for Southern Kordofan to reach a final status more 
acceptable than the one it was granted in the CPA.  [Note:  The CPA 
deems both Southern Kordofan and Southern Blue Nile part of the 
North.  Therefore, they are not permitted a referendum vote to opt 
to join the South if the South secedes from the North in 2011. 
Instead, both states are rather authorized the right to conduct 
ill-defined "popular consultations" on their final status.  End 
Note.] 
 
¶4. (SBU) Comment:  Both the SPLM and the NCP clearly are sending 
their "heavy hitters" to this volatile border state prior to 2010 
national elections and the 2011 popular consultation that will 
determine Southern Kordofan's post-2011 trajectory.  Southern 
Kordofan is rife with feelings of deep frustration over  CPA 
implementation, due to the lack of benefits its people believe they 
have received in terms of development and integration of SPLM cadres 
into the state's administration.  It is also a region of great 
insecurity, given its location along the militarized (and yet to be 
demarcated) North-South border and SPLM allegations of increased 
arming by the NCP of Arab tribes against the Nuba.  The new 
governance arrangement in the Nuba Mountains with Haroun and Helou 
at the helm can go one of two ways.  Since both leaders are known to 
be able to get things done and have been intimately involved in 
Southern Kordofan politics (including the 2002 Nuba Mountains 
cease-fire agreement and CPA negotiations on the State's protocol), 
 
KHARTOUM 00000625  002 OF 002 
 
 
they might be able to make progress together in a state previously 
orphaned by the parties and underserved by the CPA.  On the other 
hand, Haroun could be [and we suspect is] part of the GoS campaign 
to divide and conquer the region through the NCP's use of armed Arab 
tribes prior to elections. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Comment continued:  The USG needs to begin thinking now 
about best-case scenarios for Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states 
in the likely event that southerners vote to secede in 2011.  We 
should move to work with local-government officials (including 
Haroun and Al Helou) and with the SPLM and NCP at a higher level, as 
well as local tribes on the ground, to try and arrive at an 
acceptable governance solution for these states post-2011 if peace 
is to be preserved along the fragile border area. 
 
FERNANDEZ