VZCZCXRO1979
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0621/01 1321020
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 121020Z MAY 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3747
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000621 
 
DEPT FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A/S CARSON, AF/C 
NSC FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS ASEC SOCI KPKO AU UNSC SU CD
SUBJECT: DARFUR ROUNDUP: FIGHTING IN DAR ZAGHAWA; JANJAWEED RUN WILD 
IN EL FASHER; ARMING OF ARAB TRIBES IN KABKABIYA 
 
REFS:  A. KHARTOUM 583 
   ¶B. NDJAMENA 162 
 
KHARTOUM 00000621  001.3 OF 003 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) forces 
clashed with those of SLA/Minnawi near Umm Barro on May 9, according 
to rebel and UNAMID sources.  Independent verification was not 
available, and both sides offered competing claims to victory. 
According to an SLA/M rep, five of his movement's fighters were 
killed and several dozen injured.  UNAMID confirmed it medevaced 16 
injured SLA/M fighters from Umm Barro to El Fasher on May 10. 
Meanwhile, the North Darfur capital of El Fasher was tense on May 
8-9 following several shootouts between the SAF and Arab militiamen 
from the Border Intelligence Forces (BIF) in the town's main market. 
 In Kabkabiya, stronghold of notorious Janjaweed leader Musa Hilal, 
the GOS is providing Arab tribal groups with significant financial 
and logistical support, according to a recently returned civil 
society activist.  Tribal elders there lament the increase in drug 
and alcohol use among Arab youth, and worry that the latter  will be 
used in future military operations, possibly across the border in 
Chad.  End Summary. 
 
JEM CLASHES WITH SLA/MINNAWI NEAR UM BARRO 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) UNAMID sources told poloff that on May 8 an SAF Antonov 
aircraft was observed dropping bombs in the vicinity of a place 
called Orchi, between Um Barro and Furawiya in far North Darfur. 
The local population reported that they saw JEM forces moving 
northward through Orchi that morning, and alleged that JEM captured 
the Minnawi commander in Furawiya (Minnawi's hometown).  On May 9, a 
convoy of approximately 40 JEM vehicles reportedly was seen at Um 
Barro moving northeast.  Soon after, about 160 local residents 
(mostly women and children) sought protection at the UNAMID camp in 
Umm Barro, alleging that fighting was ongoing between JEM and SLA/M. 
 The clashes stopped after an hour, and locals started moving back 
to their homes. 
 
¶3. (SBU) UNAMID planned to send a patrol to Furawiya and Orchi on 
May 10 to investigate, but cancelled it after reports of renewed 
fighting there.  However, on May 10 a UNAMID security assessment 
patrol to Umm Barro town did observe an Antonov bombing in the 
vicinity of Furawiya.  (Note:  Sudanese Armed Forces SAF Spokesman 
Osman al-Aghbash denied SAF involvement in the clashes, stating that 
the fighting was between JEM and SLM/M.  End Note.)  Unconfirmed 
reports allege that on the morning of May 10 JEM forces attacked 
SLA/M positions and sporadic fighting lasted for six hours. 
 
BOTH SIDES CLAIM VICTORY 
------------------------ 
 
¶4. (SBU) Without independent verification of the clashes, JEM and 
SLA/M traded accusations in the media.  In a statement on JEM's 
website on May 9, JEM Military Spokesman Ali Al Wafi asserted that 
on May 10 JEM troops, along with a number of political figures, 
moved in a "logistical convoy to support the people of Darfur, to 
discuss their problems and to brief them about the current 
situation" when they were allegedly attacked by SLA/M forces.  Al 
Wafi claimed that JEM repelled the attack and seized weapons and 
equipment. 
 
¶5. (SBU) SLA/Minnawi Spokesman Zunoon Suliman, meanwhile, told Al 
Wifaq newspaper that JEM troops attacked SLA/M positions near Muzbad 
with several hundred vehicles mounted with artillery weapons.  He 
alleged the involvement of former Minnawi commander Arko Suleiman 
Dahia, reportedly responsible for JEM's January-February 2009 sneak 
attack on SLA/M forces in Muhajeriya, and newly- recruited former 
SLA/Unity Commander Salih Jarbo, along with several others.  Suliman 
stated that JEM's intent was to attack and destroy SLA/M completely, 
but that SLA/M troops successfully repelled the attack and pursued 
JEM back to the Chadian border. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Former SLA/M Ceasefire Commission (CFC) Representative Adam 
Ali Ware told poloff on May 11 that SLA/M suffered some losses as a 
result of the clashes, including five dead and over 20 wounded, 
although most injuries were slight. UNAMID medevaced 16 of the 
injured SLA/M fighters, whom along with 14 escorts were flown from 
Umm Barro to El Fasher for treatment at a GOS military hospital.  It 
was unclear how many casualties were suffered by JEM, said Ware, but 
he reported rumors that JEM's newly- recruited, former SLA/Unity 
Commander Salih Jarbo was killed in the fighting.  Jarbo, the 
right-hand man of Suleiman Jamous, allegedly was involved in the 
skirmish between JEM forces and SLA/Unity forces near Um Rai in 
April (ref. A). Ware said he believed JEM's aggression was part of 
"an implicit agreement it has with the GOS to destroy all other 
 
KHARTOUM 00000621  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
movements in Darfur" so it can be the only rebel party to peace 
talks in Doha.  According to a UNAMID source, although not 
confirmed, JEM is now believed to be present at Birmaza, Birdik and 
Um Rai, extending its military positions to areas recently 
controlled by SLA/Minnawi and SLA/Unity.  NISS Director General 
Salah Ghosh told CDA Fernandez at lunch on May 7 that he expected 
JEM to make an attempt on one of Darfur's main towns soon while it 
seeks to crush the remaining independent rebel groups and co-opt the 
regime's Arab tribal allies. 
 
JANJAWEED RUN WILD IN EL FASHER TOWN 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶7. (SBU) In El Fasher, the security situation has deteriorated 
rapidly following clashes between SAF soldiers and Arab militiamen 
now part of the Border Intelligence Force (BIF).  According to 
UNDSS, on the afternoon of May 8 a quarrel between militiamen and a 
SAF officer in El Fasher's main market area resulted in the SAF 
officer being shot and rushed in serious condition to El Fasher 
Military Hospital.   After the incident, the GOS Military Commander 
dispatched several dozen soldiers to "calm" the situation 
(apparently by shooting randomly in the air.)  In the ensuing chaos, 
a number of shops left unattended by fleeing shopkeepers were 
looted.  The militiamen reportedly escaped with six assault rifles 
taken from the SAF.  On May 9, a group of militiamen again exchanged 
fire with SAF soldiers in El Fasher market, killing at least one 
soldier and four civilians, according to UNDSS. 
 
¶8. (SBU) In the wake of the market melee, GOS Minister of Defense 
Abdelrahim Hussein visited El Fasher on May 10, reportedly to 
address the growing SAF-BIF tensions.  However, a well-placed civil 
society figure in El Fasher told FSN Political Assistant (polasst) 
that this was not the case.  "[Hussein] wouldn't care if all of El 
Fasher was set on fire," he said, noting that Hussein instead had 
come to personally supervise the re-arming of defeated Chadian rebel 
forces.  UNDSS sources confirmed the presence of a truck convoy 
moving north through Habila town on El Geneina road on May 8 
consisting of large commercial vehicles loaded with Chadian rebels 
carrying light machine gun-type weapons.  The column appeared to be 
moving toward the border, rather than returning from the recent 
failed offensive in eastern Chad.  (Note:  A May 12 headline in 
pro-government Khartoum daily Akbar Al Youm proclaimed that the 
Chadian rebels from Union des Forces de la Rsistance (UFR) will 
resume the march on N'Djamena in 24 hours.  End Note.) 
 
ARAB MILITIA REARMING IN KABKABIYA 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) On May 7, polasst spoke with Ahmed Adam Yousif, a civil 
society leader who runs a respected NGO focusing on grassroots peace 
and reconciliation in Darfur.  Having just returned from the town of 
Kabkabiya (stronghold of prominent Janjaweed leader Musa Hilal) 
where he conducted workshops in reconciliation for traditional 
native administration leaders, Yousif reported that Abbala (camel 
herding) Rizeigat Arab tribal groups (including Mahariya, Mahamid 
and Awlad Rashid) are receiving significant new financial and 
logistical support from the GOS. Each group possesses new Toyota 
Landcruisers mounted with advanced weapons, communications 
equipment, cash, and apparent permission to cross borders into 
neighboring countries.  Yousif reported that Arab elders worry that 
the GOS will enlist their youth in future military operations across 
the border in Chad, noting that six thousand militiamen have been 
sent to the Chadian border.  They also lamented that the government 
has corrupted Arab youth, noting the increase in the drug and 
alcohol trade within these marginalized  Arab nomadic communities. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) JEM's actions in North Darfur demonstrate not only its 
desire to establish itself as the sole rebel military power by 
eliminating weaker rivals, but also its drive for territory; as long 
as JEM remains based in Chad, it cannot credibly claim to represent 
the Darfur cause at the Doha talks.  By attempting to crush or 
absorb SLA/Minnawi and SLA/Unity commanders over the past several 
months, JEM has made inroads into territory held (or formerly held) 
by those groups.  This is most certainly not the last foray into 
Darfur we will see as JEM tries to stake its claim.  With the 
Antonov bombings that will inevitably follow every JEM border 
incursion, this bodes ill for innocent North Darfur civilians caught 
between equally ruthless rebels and government forces.  In terms of 
developments in Kabkabiya, the GOS arming of the so-called Janjaweed 
is certainly not new. However, the events in El Fasher market show 
how difficult it is for these unruly and ill-disciplined militiamen 
 
KHARTOUM 00000621  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
to be controlled, even when incorporated into the larger GOS 
military apparatus (although the BIF and other paramilitary groups 
that have absorbed former Janjaweed are not under SAF control, but 
rather that of the National Intelligence and Security Service 
(NISS)and/or the Ministry of Interior.)  Even if a comprehensive 
ceasefire is eventually reached between the GOS and the myriad rebel 
factions, until the Janjaweed are reined-in there will be little 
hope for a secure passage home for Darfur's internally displaced 
persons. The Khartoum regime seeks to use Janjaweed as shock troops 
or cannon fodder in Darfur's many conflicts but they are wary of 
central control and are just as likely to switch sides and turn on 
their masters if Khartoum's largesse ever dries up and potential new 
patrons emerge. . 
 
FERNANDEZ