VZCZCXRO0590
OO RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0607/01 1301438
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 101438Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3723
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000607 
 
DEPT FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A A/S CARTER, AF/E 
NSC FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL EAID KPKO SOCI ASEC AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: CHARGE DISCUSSES ABYEI BOUNDARY ARBITRATION DECISION 
COMPLICATIONS WITH AEC CHAIR 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY.  CDA Fernandez and AEC Chairman Plumbly compared 
reports on the oral arguments before the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration on the Abyei boundary dispute and discussed the outlines 
of a possible political agreement between the NCP and SPLM that 
might avert another crisis when the court announces its verdict. 
The potential agreement would provide for oil-revenue sharing, 
security arrangements, and would guarantee the rights of the Ngok 
Dinka and Misseriya whatever the boundary decision and would 
continue after the 2011 southern and Abyei referenda.  The idea has 
received the cautious support of both sides.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Oral Arguments to the Court of Arbitration 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶2.  (SBU) On April 30, Assessment and Evaluation Commission (AEC) 
Chairman Derek Plumbly called on CDA Fernandez  to compare separate 
reports they had received about the oral arguments made to the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in the Hague on April 18-23 
about the Abyei boundary dispute.  The two reports accorded closely 
in their analysis, and both indicated that the PCA faces two 
questions:  1) whether the Abyei Boundary Commission (ABC) had 
exceeded its mandate in determining the northern boundaries of the 
Abyei region, and, if so, 2) where the boundary in fact should be. 
 
 
¶3.  (SBU) The reports from the two observers at the PCA agreed that 
neither the GoS nor the SPLM had scored a decisive victory in oral 
arguments, and that the Court's decision could go either way.  They 
also agreed, however, that the GoS had made a plausible case that 
ABC did overstep its mandate.  Were the Court to agree (and both 
reports indicated that two of the five arbitrators appeared to be 
leaning that way,) it then will seek to make its own definitive 
determination of where the boundary should be, based on what the 
colonial territorial boundaries of Abyei were.  This likely would 
lead the CourT to"find$either the!rivep Kiir (Balr0a @ra), suvh 
k(A}dY"town(aop`the.Ragn(e(Yap&i'ree~,(nn@"Nz "QnE uOu ""euQQgft!+iQ`opmQsQao4neQTPcHa"gkFm by+t|"Aqk,jQ7'-9&pmQQ{^[b~NP_rPR{e@Q+cQ 
the north as well. 
 
Elements of a Possible Political Compromise 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶4.  (SBU) Chairman Plumbly presented Charge Fernandez with a draft 
"suggested elements to settle aspects of the Abyei issue," a concept 
that they had discussed previously.  (Note: A copy of this document 
has been provided to S/USSES. End note.) The "elements" provides a 
blueprint for a political agreement between the two sides to resolve 
key issues regarding security, wealth sharing, and safeguarding the 
rights of the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya in the region.  This will be 
needed  regardless of the  outcome of the boundary dispute and for 
the period  after the 2011 southern self-determination and Abyei 
referenda. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Under the "suggested elements," the two sides would 
continue to share equally revenues from existing oil fields in the 
region (newly discovered fields would be developed exclusively by 
the government gaining sovereignty over that territory.)  Security 
within the Roadmap area would continue to be the responsibility of 
the Joint Integrated Unit until the 2011 referenda.  The parties 
also would commit to honor the 1991 Convention on Indigenous 
Peoples, and specifically to permit permanent inhabitants of the 
region (i.e., the Ngok Dinka) to return home, while protecting the 
right of those who historically have migrated to or through the area 
for part of the year to graze their cattle (i.e., the Misseriya) to 
continue to do so. 
 
¶6. (SBU) The "suggested elements" document has been shared with 
Government of National Unity Foreign Minister Deng Alor and 
Government of Southern Sudan Presidential Affairs Minister Luka 
Biong Deng for the SPLM, and with GNU Humanitarian Affairs Minister 
Ahmed Haroun and NCP senior negotiator Said al-Khatib for the NCP. 
Both sides have given a cautious green light to pursuing the idea. 
 
 
Comment 
- - - - 
¶7. (SBU) Expectations and anxiety over the PCA decision, expected in 
July, are running high.  Many in the SPLM are convinced that their 
side scored a decisive victory in the oral presentations.  They will 
be shocked and angry if the Court does not hand down what they 
regard as a favorable decision, as the reports of the two observers 
indicate that it well may not.  On the other hand, Misseriya 
 
KHARTOUM 00000607  002 OF 002 
 
 
herdsmen in the region are under the false impression (strongly 
encouraged by the NCP) that the decision will draw an impermeable 
boundary that  they will not be permitted to cross during  their 
annual cattle migrations.  All this has the potential for one side 
or the other to simply reject the PCA decision, as the NCP rejected 
the ABC's earlier finding, or worse, for another explosion of tribal 
violence in the Abyei region.  The "suggested elements to settle 
aspects of the Abyei issue" provides a possible opportunity to 
resolve key issues of contention separately from the boundary 
dispute and significantly reduce the stakes for both sides in the 
PCA decision.  Although the initiative may well fail, it provides 
the most promising opportunity to head-off another crisis when the 
Court announces its decision. 
 
FERNANDEZ