VZCZCXRO0497
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0604/01 1300621
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 100621Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3718
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000604 
 
DEPT FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A A/S CARTER, AF/C, CA/OCS/ACS/AF 
NSC FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
CAIRO FOR CHRIS ROWAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL CASC KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: HOSTAGES RELEASED, MANY FRENCH NGO WORKERS LEAVE DARFUR 
 
REF: A) KHARTOUM 476 B) Khartoum 371 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: After being held for 26 days in western Darfur, 
two Aide Medicale Internationale (AMI) aid workers (one Canadian, 
one French) were released by their abductors on April 29. As the 
French Embassy believes that its nationals and NGOs may be targeted 
for kidnapping, they have asked all French NGO workers to 
temporarily leave Darfur and remain in Khartoum for present. The 
Government of Sudan has shown few signs that it will pursue the 
abductors responsible for either this or a previous kidnapping of 
international aid workers.   While the French NGO, French/Canadian 
Embassies, and Government of Sudan (GoS) all deny that any ransom 
was paid, rumors to the contrary are circulating in Darfur and could 
embolden kidnappers to continue to pursue western hostages. END 
SUMMARY 
 
¶2. (SBU) The motives and identities of the abductors of the 
now-released AMI employees (French nurse, Canadian Administrator) 
remain murky. The group variously identified itself as "Liberation 
of Sudan from Foreigners" and "Falcons for the Liberation of Africa" 
(an earlier group of kidnappers initially used a similar name 
"Falcons of Bashir"). Their public statements to the media conveyed 
that they oppose France's policies in the region, but their 
communication to their AMI, GoS, and French/Canadian Embassy 
interlocutors signaled that their primary if not exclusive motive 
was a cash ransom. One week after the abduction, the Canadian conoff 
informed the abductors that Canada, the US, Australia, and the UK 
have a common policy not to pay cash ransom to kidnappers. The 
abductors ceased contacting the Canadians after this call. The 
French, likewise, informed the abductors that their policy is not to 
pay ransom, and the abductors ceased contacting the French Embassy. 
 
 
¶3. (SBU) After the abductors felt that they had reached a dead-end 
with the Canadian and French Embassies vis-`-vis ransom payment, 
they contacted media outlets with a threat to kill the hostages 
unless the French aid workers involved in the 2007 Zoe's Arc "child 
abduction" case in Chad were re-tried in France. They also attempted 
to pursue negotiation with the Chadian government, but the latter 
refused to respond.   The Canadian Consul believes that the 
abductors were likely casting out lines to whomever they believed 
would pay the highest ransom. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The Canadian and French governments both flew in 
negotiators, who were issued Sudanese visas within 24-hours, to 
advise and liaise with AMI and the GoS as they conducted negations 
with the abductors. AMI was reticent to cooperate with the Canadian 
Embassy and ceased participating in the Embassy's daily conference 
calls after four days. The abductors appear to have been relative 
amateurs as they interchangeably demanded dollars and Euros in 
different sums with nearly every phone call. The cash ransoms 
demanded by the abductors ranged from four million to half a million 
dollars. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The abductors told the two AMI employees, both women, that 
they had been conducting surveillance on their NGO for some time, 
including photographing the compound. The aid workers developed a 
good rapport with the abductors, who provided them with three meals 
per day and cigarettes. They report that they were not physically 
abused and, contrary to media reports, did not experience any health 
issues during the ordeal. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Approximately one week before the hostages were released, a 
GOS National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) team arrived 
in Nyala and took over direct communication with the abductors from 
AMI. NISS negotiated the hostage release in Nyala on April 29. All 
parties involved deny that a ransom was involved, but rumors are 
circulating in Darfur that a ransom was indeed paid. The aid workers 
report that during the handoff when they were released by the 
abductors to NISS, the hostage-takers and GoS security personnel 
greeted each other warmly and embraced.  (Note: Warm greetings with 
an embrace are customary in Sudanese society, and the fact that the 
abductors embraced the GOS officials does not necessarily mean they 
knew them. End note.) 
 
¶7. (SBU) In order to stage-manage the presentation of the hostages 
to the media, GoS officials gave the Canadians and French false 
information regarding the details of the release.  The French and 
Canadians were informed by several officials that the freed aid 
workers would stay the night of the 29th in El Fasher.  The Canadian 
Consul, however, received word from a source that the aid workers 
were being flown that evening to Khartoum. The Consul finally 
received confirmation from MFA Protocol Chief Ali Youssif that this 
was the case. Nevertheless, the MFA denied the French and Canadians 
 
KHARTOUM 00000604  002 OF 002 
 
 
access to the aid workers when they arrived in Khartoum. 
 
¶8. (SBU) On April 30, the French and Canadians were summoned to NISS 
Director Salah Ghosh's office to discuss the case. Ghosh told them 
that the GoS would only allow the aid workers to depart after the 
arrival of "the French and Canadian delegations." Later that day, 
French Presidential Adviser for African affairs Bruno Jouber arrived 
and the GoS held a press conference, which included the freed aid 
workers, French/Canadian diplomats, and GoS officials, to trumpet 
the GoS efforts in securing the release. Only after the press 
conference the aid workers were told they were free to depart. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Pro-government media outlets reporting on the press 
conference touted the GoS role in the release, as in excerpts from 
this typical article in Sudan Vision: "The French envoy delivered 
the appreciation of the French President Nicolas Sarkozi, to 
President Al-Bashir and his government for the role and concerted 
efforts they made to release and ensure the safety of the hostages. 
He expressed hope that the relations between the two countries will 
develop in various fields.  Sudan's State Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Ali Karti, affirmed the responsible role that the 
government authorities have been playing which demonstrates the 
conventions, values and the manners of the Sudanese nations, 
pointing out that the release process was conducted in wisdom 
necessitated by ensuring safety and health of the hostages." 
 
¶10. (SBU) The French DCM believes it is not coincidental that French 
nationals were held in both of the recent kidnapping incidents (the 
first involving Medicens sans Frontiers (MSF) Belgium in March). In 
his view, French nationals are in danger of future kidnapping due to 
France's statements in support of the International Criminal Court's 
March 4 indictment of President Bashir.  In a possibly related 
incident in April, the AMI Nyala compound was robbed and two of 
their vehicles were stolen. The French Embassy has asked that all 
French assistance workers temporarily leave Darfur and come to 
Khartoum. Some 10-12 have done so.  However, French nationals of 
three NGOs that primarily provide medical care to children have said 
they do not feel they can leave Darfur. The Canadian Embassy has not 
issued similar guidance to its nationals. 
 
¶11. (SBU) COMMENT: The Government of Sudan has given no indication 
that it will pursue the kidnappers in either the AMI or MSF 
abductions. Indeed, MSF local staff has reportedly seen several 
individuals who are suspected of involvement in the MSF kidnapping 
walking openly in public. Also troubling is the GoS's refusal to 
allow Consuls to access the released aid workers or allow the aid 
workers to depart Sudan before they were displayed at a press 
conference.  The GOS also appears to have used the release of the 
aid workers as a way to demand a high- level delegation from France 
- an obvious ploy to coerce official engagement from the French 
government. While the perpetrators of the kidnapping may have been 
local opportunists rather than GoS agents, the GoS at the very least 
may have encouraged the most recent kidnapping by its continuing 
rhetoric against foreign NGOs and its refusal to apprehend the MSF 
Belgium kidnappers.   For NGOs to continue to operate in Darfur with 
any degree of security, the GoS must make it clear that those who 
target NGOS will be pursued and punished. Unfortunately, it has done 
just the opposite, so it is quite possible there will be additional 
hostage takings in Darfur. We continue to believe that an informal 
government connection to the kidnapping is likely, with the 
possibility that the perpetrators were current or former armed Arab 
militia (janjaweed) loosely tied to the regime who saw the open 
season on NGOs declared by the regime on March 4 as an opportunity 
to make some money.  For now, none of the NGO workers has been 
harmed and NISS and local officials been able to control the 
situation, but there is no guarantee that this will always be the 
case. END COMMENT 
 
FERNANDEZ