VZCZCXRO7851
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0597/01 1261449
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 061449Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3709
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KHARTOUM 000597 
 
DEPT FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A A/S CARTER, AF/C 
NSC FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: DARFUR REBEL UPDATE, SPRING 2009 
 
REF: A) KHARTOUM 583 
B) LONDON 953 
C) 2008 KHARTOUM 1614 
D) KHARTOUM 220 
E) KHARTOUM 507 
F) KHARTOUM 481 
G) KHARTOUM 372 
H) KHARTOUM 425 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: Although holding no territory in Darfur, JEM 
continues to pick up detritus from other Darfur rebel movements. Its 
incursion into the SLA/Minnawi stronghold of Dar Zaghawa on May 4-5 
in far north Darfur indicates that it will continue to flex its 
muscles as it seeks to position itself as the dominant military 
force in Darfur. Meanwhile, SLA/Unity has been crippled by 
defections, and the "Tripoli Group," cobbled together from other 
factions, exists largely in name only. SLA/Minnawi holds limited 
territory south of El Fasher and in its traditional stronghold of 
Dar Zaghawa but has no significant military capacity.  SLA/Abdul 
Wahid holds defensive positions throughout Jebel Marra and has no 
interest in striking GOS or rebel positions at lower elevations. 
Numerous rebel actors exist on the periphery with no effect on the 
situation on the ground, and Darfur remains a violent and tragic 
region. End Summary. 
 
------------------------- 
JEM: A FISTFUL OF DOLLARS 
------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Previously  one of the lesser Darfuri rebel movements, 
Khalil Ibrahim's Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) has matured 
significantly in the last several months by integrating key rebel 
commanders and fighters from rival factions. In addition to the 
high-profile poaching of Suleiman Jamous from SLA/Unity (reftel A), 
JEM has also recruited key figures from the fractured URF coalition 
(Adam Ali Shogar and Mansour Arbab Younis) and SLA/Minni Minnawi 
(Arko Suleiman Dahiya and Bakhit Karima) and other groups as it 
seeks to cement its position as Darfur's dominant military power and 
broaden its ethnic base and popular appeal. JEM continues to reach 
out to other disillusioned commanders with promises of money and 
power, according to one defector from SLA/Minnawi to whom Ibrahim 
offered a high position in the movement in March. Another rebel 
source told poloff that for the most recent wave of recruitments, a 
Chadian army general named Omar Baher (phonetic) was responsible for 
distribution of cash "signing bonuses" for new recruits. Jamous was 
said to have received 300,000 Sudanese pounds (approximately 130,000 
USD) in return for joining JEM, while commanders were being paid the 
equivalent of between 10,000 and 50,000 USD. The going rate for 
individual soldiers was the equivalent of 2,000 USD. (Note: While 
not always reliable, rebel sources have quoted figures similar to 
these since February 2009. End note.) Despite the success of its 
recruitment drive, however, sources in the UQd non-governmental 
organizations in Darfur stressed that, contrary to claims by JEM 
leadership (reftel B), it is unlikely that JEM has acquired any 
significant territory in Darfur, and still remains based in Um 
Jaras, Chad. 
 
¶3. (SBU) On the evening of May 4, UNAMID military officials received 
information from a Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) commander at the Minnawi 
stronghold of Umm Baro indicating the presence of JEM combatants in 
nearby Shegeg Karo. On May 5 at 18:30 the same SAF commander 
informed UNAMID that JEM had taken Shegeg Karo and Muzbet, two small 
towns at the far northern edge of inhabitable land in Darfur. A 
SLA/Minnawi Commander confirmed to UNAMID fighting between 
SLA/Minnawi and JEM in Furawiya and the presence of JEM in the 
vicinity of Muzbat. (Note: Minnawi called CDA Fernandez the 
afternoon of May 5 to report that JEM had attacked Muzbat and 
Furawiya. These areas constitute the traditional lands of Minnawi's 
Ila Digen clan of Zaghawa. End Note.) 
 
¶4. (SBU) Since autumn 2008, several conflicts have weakened JEM's 
ability to operate within Darfur, including clashes against SAF in 
September 2008; an internal purge directed against JEM-aligned 
Meidob fighters in December 2008; and JEM's disastrous escapade to 
Muhajeriya and subsequent retreat to Chad in January/February 2009. 
Besides racking up an embarrassing list of defeats in Darfur, JEM's 
capacity to strike Khartoum, as it did a  year ago (May 2008), would 
likely be limited by SAF consolidation of its hold over the desert 
territory in far north North Darfur (reftel C).  One well-connected 
source in El Fasher told poloff in April that the SAF has initiated 
plans to construct a military airport in Malha, approximately 200 km 
northeast of El Fasher.  While some marginalized rebel actors do 
operate in the deserted region positioned along ancient caravan 
routes, SAF air assets in the area and increased SAF control north 
of El Fasher would mount a challenge against any JEM convoy en route 
 
KHARTOUM 00000597  002 OF 004 
 
 
to Omdurman. 
 
--------------------------- 
SLA/UNITY: 3:10 TO UM JARAS 
--------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Once a well-respected fighting force with significant 
resources and mobility on the ground in North Darfur (but with 
little political vision or coherence), SLA/Unity has withered to a 
shadow of its former self.  The defection of Suleiman Jamous to JEM 
and the departure of Ali Karbino has undone the faction's control 
over key areas in Kafod, North Darfur, and Khor Apache, in East 
Jebel Marra (Note: SLA/U was rumored to have conducted negotiations 
with Karbino for his return to the movement as Chief of Staff, but 
the result is unknown. End Note.) SLA/U's most notable commander, 
the SAF-trained non-Darfuri Abu Bakar Kado, told Embassy Political 
Assistant in April that he has switched allegiances and joined Fur 
rebels in Jebel Marra, aligning with SLA/AW commander Mustafa Ruko. 
Although JEM continues to claim that Abdulla Yahia, chairman of 
SLA/U, will defect to JEM, Yahia has denied any connection to JEM. 
And while it remains to be seen whether international 
representatives of SLA/Unity, including Mahgoub Hussein (London), 
Osman Bushra (Tripoli) and Sharif Harir (N'Djamena), will continue 
to act in concert with the isolated members of the faction, without 
key commanders SLA/U's influence on the ground in Darfur will likely 
be minimal. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Despite the gradual dissolution of the movement since the 
start of the year, former SLA/U elements still remain a 
destabilizing force in North Darfur, continuing their cooperation 
with armed bandits to attack SAF military convoys en route from El 
Fasher to West Darfur or Feina, on the Chad-Sudan border in North 
Darfur.  In March near Korma, North Darfur, SLA/U (or bandits 
claiming alliance with SLA/U) attacked a SAF convoy and successfully 
raided its shipment of weapons, vehicles and fuel.  According to the 
UN in April, the GOS still has not solidified control over the road 
connecting El Fasher to West Darfur, as SAF soldiers guarding the 
convoy during the March attack fled at its start, abandoning the SAF 
military booty into the hands of the attackers. 
 
----------------------- 
SLA/MINNAWI: UNFORGIVEN 
----------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) UN observers, rebel sources and Darfuri experts continue to 
doubt whether Minni Minnawi and his movement have any significant 
strength left in the field.  Currently, Minnawi and his associates 
claim undisputed territory in two scattered locations in North 
Darfur: Umm Barro and Karnoi, near the Chadian border; and a 
triangle of territory south of El Fasher, from Zam Zam IDP camp at 
its apex, south to the towns of Dar Es Salaam and Shangil Tobay. 
SLA/MM lost significant territory in South Darfur in January and 
February 2009 following clashes with JEM and SAF, and the movement's 
presence in the restive province remains only a titular office in 
Nyala.  In a further humiliation for the Darfur Peace Agreement 
(DPA) signatory faction, an attempt to take back territory in the 
North Darfur market town of Wadaa backfired in February 2009, as 
Mima tribesmen unhappy with SLA/MM administration of the area 
executed their brethren who had cooperated with the Zaghawa 
movement, and relied on GOS protection in a two-day battle that 
drove SLA/MM forces back towards Dar Es Salaam (reftel D). 
 
¶8. (SBU) During an April visit by Special Envoy Scott Gration to Zam 
Zam IDP camp (reftel E), a facility  swollen with tens of thousands 
of new arrivals displaced by the fighting in Muhajeriya, SLA/MM 
managed to muster up less than a dozen armed movement security 
officers, uniformed in desert camouflage and new red berets. 
Although several technicals packed with armed gunmen supported the 
visit and provided protection for Minnawi, their ranks were dwarfed 
by the numbers of GOS police and security officers who had recently 
established a GOS "forward operating base" of sorts next to Zam Zam. 
 Speaking with poloff in April, a former SLA/MM commander who had 
recently defected from the movement said that Minnawi's commanders 
in the field are not united, and while they have yet to come into 
conflict with one another, he believed that Minnawi's command over 
them was functionally ineffective.  One senior SLM/MM official 
admitted as much in April in a conversation with poloff on the 
status of the DPA. "Now we must stay in Khartoum," he said.  "We are 
too weak in the field." 
 
------------------------------------- 
SLA/ABDUL WAHID: HIGH PLAINS DRIFTERS 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Geographically the most advantageous territory in Darfur, 
 
KHARTOUM 00000597  003 OF 004 
 
 
Jebel Marra remains safely in the hands of the Fur rebels of 
SLA/Abdul Wahid who base their operations in the mountainous towns 
of Feina, Deribat and Rokoro.  Currently not threatened by any 
ongoing SAF military operations, SLA/AW enjoys a relatively 
centralized and compact command structure, and their territory 
stretches west near Zalingei and north to Tawila without controlling 
either of those cities.  Suleiman Marjan is the one SLA/AW commander 
who controls land outside of the Jebel Marra region, basing a 
miniscule contingent of the faction near Jebel Eisa, approximately 
250 km north of El Fasher. 
 
¶10. (SBU) During a visit of SE Gration and delegation to Deribat on 
April 5 (reftel F), SLA/AW commander Terrada estimated that his 
movement possesses about 100 technicals throughout Jebel Marra, 
though sources at UNAMID estimate that the number might be as low as 
10-15. A senior UN military official who joined the delegation noted 
that the rebels who accompanied Commanders Terrada and Gaddura were 
well-armed, drove vehicles pilfered from GOS sources, and consisted 
of seasoned soldiers, a picture in stark contrast to other rebel 
movements that rely on younger fighters and Land Cruisers pilfered 
from international organizations. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Unlike the rest of Darfur's rebel movements, it is worth 
noting that SLA/Abdul Wahid continues to enjoy substantial political 
support among the Fur and IDPs. As a political entity, however, the 
group remains subject to the whims of its mercurial leader with no 
apparent organizational structure. To rectify this, the Swiss 
Government has initiated a series of capacity building workshops for 
SLA/AW in Switzerland attended by Abdul Wahid, his commanders and 
political representatives of various overseas satellite offices. 
Speaking to poloff from the most recent workshop in Bern on May 3, 
SLA/AW Commander Ibrahim Al Helou asserted that SLA/AW has no plans 
to attend peace talks (in any location) unless its demand for 
security is met, but noted that the movement has agreed to broaden 
its external relations and reach out to other rebel factions and 
constituents, including the SPLM. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
OTHER DARFURI FACTIONS: BLAZING SADDLES 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) Numerous marginal factions and disconnected leaders 
compete for attention on the sidelines of the conflict in various 
African capitals.  The signing of the March 15 Tripoli Agreement 
(reftel G) has had no measurable impact on the ground in Darfur. 
Besides the remnants of SLA/Unity, the so-called "Tripoli Group" is 
composed of factions that remain inert parties to the conflict. 
SLA/Khamis Abdallah retains popular support among the Masalit but 
has little to no presence on the ground; Khamis himself is said to 
remain in Nairobi.  The SLA/Juba faction headed by Mohamed Saleh 
Haraba is said to have no military presence on the ground, nor does 
the Maidob-based JEM/Idris Azrag faction.  Very little is known 
about the Tripoli Group's other component, the Arab-led URFF, 
outside of its Asmara-based spokesman Al Hadi Agabeldour. 
 
¶13. (SBU) JEM/Collective Leadership, the driving force behind the 
fractured URF coalition, maintains a marginal presence in Darfur. 
(Note: JEM/CL leaders travelled to Tripoli in March but are not 
formally part of the March 15 Tripoli Agreement. End Note.)  Its 
chairman, Bahar Abu Gharda, is perhaps best known for his alleged 
role in the September 2007 attack on an AMIS Camp at Haskanita, and 
has at various times been claimed as an ally by both SLA/MM and 
SLA/U.  The faction's loquacious spokesman, Tadjadine Bechir Niam, 
shuttles between N'Djamena, Tripoli and London.  UNAMID sources 
estimate that JEM/CL does maintain some presence on the ground, with 
between one and two dozen vehicles roaming the lawless corridor 
along the border between North and South Darfur up to East Jebel 
Marra, but it is not considered a significant military force. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Other factions include SLA/Ahmed Abdelshafie, whose leader 
lives a nomadic existence between Juba and Kampala.  He has 
reportedly been provided 15 vehicles by the SPLM but his force 
remains very weak militarily.  According to one of Shafi's close 
associates in Khartoum, Shafi has no plans to return to the field. 
The defiant, young Darfuri Arab leader Anwar Khater, who claims to 
have his own faction and was jailed numerous times by GOS 
authorities at the height of the conflict, moved to Cairo at the 
beginning of this year and has similarly indicated no interest in 
returning to Darfur.  The Revolutionary Democratic Forces Front 
(RDFF) of Salah Abu Surra in West Darfur is static and rumored to be 
suffering from financial difficulties.  Little is known about 
additional non-aligned Darfuri Arab factions, mostly due to their 
irrelevance.  The Sudanese Federal Democratic Alliance (SFDA) of 
Ahmed Ibrahim Diriege is no longer an active movement, though as a 
respected former Governor of Darfur, the London-based Diraige was 
 
KHARTOUM 00000597  004 OF 004 
 
 
once seen as a potential unifier of the divergent rebel groups.  His 
interests appear to lie elsewhere, apparently, as he spent most of 
April 2009 far afield in Botswana. 
 
¶15. (SBU) Comment: The reach and capacity of Darfur's rebel 
movements have descended to a nadir not seen since the start of the 
conflict.  Although well-armed and organized, SLA/AW suffers from 
poor executive leadership and if not challenged, surely plans to 
wait out the conflict in the remote reaches of Jebel Marra.  Holding 
less territory than at the start of the year, SLA/MM poses no 
military threat, and has few choices but to continue calling for DPA 
implementation.  The disintegration of SLA/U was long in coming, and 
JEM's ability to profit greatly from the "disunity" of the movement 
is a sign that the Ibrahim brothers are a cut above their Darfuri 
brethren.  But we hesitate to conclude that Darfuri IDPs and civil 
society will automatically benefit from the current situation, as 
despite the weakening of the rebel factions, Darfur remains a 
violent and tragic region.  Since none of the rebel movements except 
SLA/AW has any popular legitimacy, it will be important to include 
civil society, tribal, and political representatives in later rounds 
of peace talks, so that the people of Darfur are part of the peace 
process and support the political agreements that are reached on 
resolving the conflict. 
 
¶16. (SBU) Comment, cont'd: Ongoing instability, particularly Arab 
tribal clashes in South Darfur (reftel H), reveal that the GOS 
similarly has little ability to capitalize on the rebels' 
weaknesses.  Unsecured roads, ungovernable tribal areas and an 
overall leadership vacuum in Darfur indicate that conditions are 
ripe for another JEM incursion into Sudanese territory.  A repeat of 
JEM's assault on Muhajeriya, and the subsequent displacement of tens 
of thousands of Darfuris, could spell disaster with fewer 
humanitarian agencies on the ground to respond to any mass movement 
of civilians.  Hope for providing  UNAMID peacekeepers with a "peace 
to keep" rests with the GOS and the extended leadership of JEM, and 
their willingness to engage in constructive talks at Doha on the 
future of Darfur.  A unilateral announcement by the GOS to formalize 
its de facto ceasefire with SLA/AW would also be a welcome next step 
in the peace process.  End comment. 
 
FERNANDEZ