VZCZCXRO7870
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0593/01 1251413
ZNR UUUUU ZZH ZDK CTG NUMEROUS SERVICES
O 051413Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3699
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 0048
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0127
RUEHSUN/USUN ROME IT
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0312

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KHARTOUM 000593 
 
DEPT FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A A/S CARTER, AF/C 
NSC FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
BRUSSELS FOR PBROWN 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH 
UN ROME FOR HSPANOS 
NEW YORK FOR DMERCADO 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: GOS CONTINUES TO PUSH FORWARD ON NGO FRAMEWORK 
 
REF: A) KHARTOUM 589 
B) KHARTOUM 577 
 
KHARTOUM 00000593  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  (SBU) On May 4, USAID field staff met with Ahmed Adam, the 
Director of the Government of National Unity (GNU) Humanitarian Aid 
Commission (HAC) NGO Section, to discuss progress on the early April 
framework achieved by U.S. Special Envoy Gration.  According to 
Adam, the government has taken additional positive steps in 
implementing the framework, including approving 90 percent of 
technical agreements (TAs) as of May 3.  However, NGOs note that 
bureaucratic obstacles continue to impede actual progress, including 
the issuance of one-year, multiple re-entry visas.  While Adam noted 
that the government had established policies to implement the 
framework and is fully committed to seeing its success, he 
highlighted lack of government capacity and communication 
difficulties with lower-level officials as challenges to significant 
progress.  As the government works to improve the operating 
environment in Sudan, NGOs, the UN, and government ministries 
continue to address gaps in humanitarian assistance.  Despite these 
efforts, significant gaps remain, particularly in meeting 
longer-term needs.  END SUMMARY 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
Government Official Responds to Reports of Shortcomings 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) On May 4, USAID field staff met with Ahmed Adam, the 
Director of the GNU HAC NGO Section, to discuss progress on the 
implementation of the Special Envoy's framework.  Adam is also the 
NGO registrar and the head of the Joint Procedures Center (JPC), the 
agency that manages all NGO bureaucratic processes.  Adam reported 
that the government plans to issue a ministerial decree on May 5 or 
6 on the expanded High Level Committee as well as possible changes 
in the Tripartite Joint Technical Committees (TJTCs) in Darfur state 
capitals.  According to Adam, the government has established strong 
policies and is willing to meet its commitment to the framework; 
however, lack of government capacity and challenges in communication 
with ministries and states have hindered progress.  Adam noted that 
the process for federal decisions to trickle down into the Darfur 
states takes time and for new procedures to begin to function 
efficiently.  Adam expressed frustration regarding the perceived 
unilateral monitoring of the government's commitments by the U.S. 
Government (USG), stating that he had not been instructed to work 
with the USG on monitoring and reporting on the framework.  (Note: 
During the meeting, USAID shared the stop-light chart--the document 
tracking the government's implementation of the framework--with 
Adam.  Adam recommended that during the first formal US-GNU meeting 
to discuss the framework, both parties start with a blank tracking 
chart rather than one already filled in by one party.  End Note) 
 
¶3.  (SBU) According to Adam, as of May 3, the GNU HAC had signed 90 
percent of submitted TAs, with four or five agreements pending.  On 
April 30, NGOs reported that the GNU HAC had refused to sign several 
NGOs TAs for Darfur on the basis that the organizations did not have 
an acceptable national NGO partner.  According to NGOs, the GNU HAC 
was unilaterally writing the names of national NGOs into TAs and 
pressuring international NGOs to accept the local  partners.  (Note: 
 During a meeting with USAID field staff, at least one NGO stated 
that the organization would not sign a TA if the GNU HAC forced the 
NGO to accept an inappropriate national NGO partner, stating it 
would wait to see how the second round of discussions between the 
Special Envoy and the government proceeded before  signing an 
agreement.  End note.)  In previous years, NGOs were able to partner 
with informal, community-based organizations (CBOs) and government 
line ministries in addition to national NGOs to fulfill the national 
organization requirements.  However, in 2009, the GNU HAC changed 
this requirement to include only national NGOs registered with the 
GNU HAC as a way to expedite the process of "Sudanization."  While 
expressing their desire to build national capacity, international 
NGO staff note that national NGOs often lack the capacity, 
experience, and/or presence in the area of operation.  On April 30, 
NGOs expressed concern that the government would not count NGO TAs 
 
KHARTOUM 00000593  002.3 OF 004 
 
 
denied by state-level HACs due to lack of a national NGO partner in 
its reporting. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Despite previous NGO reports, Adam reported that he was 
unaware of any difficulties in clearing imported project materials 
through federal customs.  Adam stated that the government had issued 
approximately 750 NGO customs exemptions in 2008 and was unaware of 
any complaints about delays.  During an April 30 meeting with USAID 
field staff, NGOs reported--but did not quantify--significant delays 
with federal customs clearances and in transferring supplies from 
Darfur warehouses to the final point of use.  In one example, an NGO 
reported that medical supplies purchased in Khartoum took three 
months to clear for transport to Darfur.  NGOs also reported delays 
of up to eight months in transferring imported project assets and 
materials to the Three Areas.  However, Adam stated that NGOs have 
not reported delays to his office and indicated that most assets and 
materials clear customs within the agreed seven days.  Adam noted, 
however, that "Darfur is at war" and therefore has special controls 
to ensure that goods and materials do not fall into the hands of 
armed opposition groups.  Adam noted examples of NGO materials being 
diverted by armed opposition groups and stated that some people in 
the government suspect that NGOs and armed opposition group 
"pre-arrange" hijackings in Darfur. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Adam clarified that under the General Directory of 
Procedures (GDP), travel within Sudan using a GNU HAC identification 
card applies to all of Sudan, not only Darfur.  Adam noted that the 
GNU HAC identification card lists the NGO's areas of operation and 
travel outside of these areas requires formal notification.  In late 
April and early May, NGOs reported that resident international NGO 
staff were unable to travel to Nyala, South Darfur, using only a 
passport and GNU HAC identification card.  While state officials are 
complying with the streamlined approach in El Fasher, North Darfur, 
NGOs report inconsistent application in El Geneina, West Darfur.  In 
an April 30 meeting with NGOs (Ref A), Sudanese Presidential Advisor 
Dr. Ghazi Salahudin noted that full state compliance would take time 
due to significant distances and difficulties in communication with 
Darfur officials. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Adam noted that the government has taken measures to 
improve reporting and establish a better accountability and 
monitoring system to review implementation of the 2007 Joint 
Communique.  Despite these "good intentions," Adam reported that 
lack of sufficient government capacity has limited efforts to date. 
Adam reported that the JPC had launched the electronic database 
system, which tracks NGO procedures, in January 2009, and has been 
producing reports on quantity of actions and timeframes.  However, 
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) staff 
reported in late April that OCHA has not yet received any reports. 
Adam reiterated that the GNU HAC is diligently working to streamline 
NGO procedures, noting that he had personally communicated 
frequently through phone calls and emails and conducted daily 
meetings with NGOs, regular meetings with the NGO Steering 
Committee, and weekly TJTC meetings to discuss issues.  During the 
week of April 27, Adam also traveled to the three Darfur states with 
military, police, and security representatives so that the officials 
could liaise with state-level counterparts to ensure the full 
implementation of the framework and the April 16 decree. 
 
¶7.  (U) On May 7, Minister of Humanitarian Affairs Dr. Haroun Lual 
Ruun and U.N. Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and 
Emergency Relief Coordinator John Holmes plan to chair the first 
expanded High Level Committee meeting, which includes permanent 
seats for the U.S., European Union (EU), and United Kingdom, as well 
as additional relevant government ministries and countries of 
influence.  Among the issues for discussion, participants--including 
U.S. Special Envoy Gration and senior representatives from the EU 
and United Kingdom--plan to discuss the April 16 ministerial decree, 
the cluster approach, and security conditions in Darfur, as well as 
monitoring mechanisms and support for national initiatives. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
Bureaucratic Constraints Continue to Pose Problems 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶8.  (SBU) While recent statements appear to signal the government's 
 
KHARTOUM 00000593  003.4 OF 004 
 
 
intention to comply with the Special Envoy's framework, NGOs report 
continuing bureaucratic impediments and Darfur state obstruction to 
actual implementation.  On April 30, NGOs reported that Sudanese 
Embassies are processing the majority of Darfur visa applications 
quickly; however, delays have occurred in some countries for certain 
nationalities and for non-resident applicants. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Due to links between visa issuance and many  other 
bureaucratic requirements with varying timelines, NGOs expressed 
concerns that the GNU HAC will likely not be able to issue the 
agreed one-year, multiple re-entry visas.  NGOs are subject to other 
procedural approvals with differing timelines, such as employment 
contracts, resident visas, work permits, TAs, NGO annual 
registration, and the Moratorium on Restrictions (MOR), which 
expires on January 31, 2010.  NGOs fear that the GNU HAC will issue 
the multiple re-entry visas only for as long as permitted by the 
shortest approved timeline for the other requirements, often 
significantly less than the agreed upon 12 months.  (Note:  While 
NGOs praised the multiple re-entry visa initiative and noted its 
potentially positive impact on NGO staff morale, some NGOs expressed 
hesitancy in purchasing the more expensive multiple re-entry visas 
if they are only valid for six months.  End Note.)  However, Adam 
stated that  he had advised NGOs not to submit applications for 
one-year, multiple re-entry visas until the GNU HAC approved the 
organization's TA.  Adam stated that the visa length is governed by 
the duration of TAs, which are valid for one year. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) During the week of April 27, the TJTC revised the GDP, a 
manual that includes all procedures and approvals required for NGOs 
to operate in Sudan.  The revised version includes the provision for 
one-year, multiple re-entry visas, as well as steps for NGO 
close-out procedures, including references to severance issues. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) In late April, international NGOs reported that the GNU 
HAC has urged some organizations to employ national staff in 
positions already approved for international staff in the GDP. 
Forcing NGOs to accept national staff in place of international 
staff contravenes the government's commitment under the Special 
Envoy's framework to allow international NGOs to recruit and deploy 
international staff according to NGO-specified criteria.  NGOs 
working in Darfur note the challenges of employing national NGO 
staff with suitable qualifications for some positions. 
 
----------------------------- 
Continuing Gaps in Assistance 
----------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (SBU) As of May 4, the registration of new NGOs as agreed under 
the Special Envoy's framework remained pending, with USAID working 
to expedite potential future registration processes.  Meanwhile, 
remaining NGOs, the UN, and GNU ministries continue to expand areas 
of operation and programs to address immediate gaps in health, 
nutrition, and water, sanitation, and hygiene assistance, as well as 
in the provision of food aid resulting from the early March NGO 
expulsions.  Despite these actions, significant gaps in assistance 
remain, particularly in meeting longer-term needs.  According to an 
April U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization report, more than 
32,000 households in Darfur are not expected to receive previously 
planned diversified food security and livelihood support due to NGO 
expulsions. 
 
¶13.  (U) On April 30, the UN reported that the UN World Food Program 
(WFP) is planning to launch a Special Operation appeal for Darfur 
that would assist WFP and its partners in providing continued food 
assistance beyond June to all beneficiaries previously served by 
expelled NGOs.  WFP's new Special Operation is designed to 
restructure WFP's, and possibly other UN agencies and NGOs', field 
operations by establishing office and accommodation facilities in 
remote locations that currently have limited or no NGO coverage. 
The operation is also envisaged to support more direct WFP 
involvement in management, or co-management with its partners, of 
food aid distributions in Darfur.  Though not yet finalized, this 
new Special Operation, as described by WFP, would help compensate 
for capacity gaps left by expelled NGOs and provide operational 
support to partner NGOs expanding into gap areas, as well as act as 
an operational contingency should some areas remain without NGO 
 
KHARTOUM 00000593  004.3 OF 004 
 
 
coverage.  The Special Operation contains three main components, 
including establishment of new infrastructure, deployment of 
additional WFP staff to Darfur, and rollout of an intensive training 
program to increase capacity building. 
 
¶14.  (SBU) According the U.N Joint Logistics Center, the Non-Food 
Item (NFI) Common Pipeline is expected to have sufficient stocks to 
meet upcoming needs during the May/June to September rainy season. 
However, humanitarian agencies note that the Sudanese government's 
ongoing seizure of formerly CARE-managed NFI warehouses in El 
Fasher, North Darfur, continues to hamper critical relief commodity 
distributions in response to displacement in North Darfur, 
particularly in overcrowded Zam Zam internally displaced person 
camp.  In March and April, the government handed over NFI warehouses 
to UNJLC in El Geneina, West Darfur; Nyala, South Darfur; El Obeid, 
Northern Kordofan State; and Khartoum.  According to UNJLC, the 
government refuses to hand over the El Fasher warehouse due to the 
fact that it is full of assets seized from expelled NGOs.  Despite 
this issue, UNJLC expects the GNU HAC to turn over the remaining El 
Fasher warehouses in the coming days. 
 
¶15.  (U) The early March expulsions have also significantly affected 
USAID democracy and governance programs in the Three Areas, 
including USAID partner Mercy Corps' Localizing Institutional 
Capacity in Sudan (LINCS) program.  According to USAID, the seizure 
of Mercy Corps' assets in two offices and the temporary closure of 
two other offices in the Three Areas have jeopardized continued 
support to civil society organizations, as well as plans to build 
community radio stations in Abyei and in Damazinein Blue Nile State. 
 In the absence of independent media in Southern Sudan and the Three 
Areas, community radio stations serve as an important venue for 
community dialogue and education. 
 
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COMMENTS 
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¶16.  (SBU) While government officials continually indicate the 
government's commitment to the Special Envoy's framework, a 
significant amount of work remains.  The duplicitous Adam and 
senior-level GNU officials appear to be sending the message that the 
government requires time to strengthen the necessary mechanisms, 
build internal capacity, and ensure compliance within the Darfur 
states.  During the meeting, Adam echoed other officials' concerns, 
stating "do not doubt our good intentions."  However, to truly 
inspire confidence in the government's commitment, real progress is 
necessary given the regime's truly horrific track record.  Although 
the completion of 90 percent of TAs represents a significant 
improvement from previous weeks, NGOs caution that many of the 
government's commitments hinge on multiple procedural issues that 
the government has not yet clarified.  Despite recent positive 
steps, the government's previous underhanded approach to commitments 
and humanitarian operations means that it will take a significant 
amount of time for the government to build lasting trust among NGOs 
and international community regarding its commitment to the Special 
Envoy's framework. 
 
FERNANDEZ