VZCZCXRO2373
OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #1321/01 1460647
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 260647Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9094
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 001321 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM, H 
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM EAID AF
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR CODEL LANGEVIN 
 
¶1. (SBU) Congressmen: We warmly welcome your visit to 
Afghanistan 
 
¶2. (SBU) The government and the public here have welcomed the 
United States' new strategic purpose to defeat al Qaeda and 
its supporters and to prevent their return to Afghanistan and 
Pakistan.  To accomplish this, President Obama's strategy 
rests on three operational lines: strengthening security, 
building access to justice and broader governance capacity at 
both the national and local levels, and developing the 
economy.  To meet these challenges, we are expanding the U.S. 
military presence (both to protect the Afghan people and to 
train Afghan security forces to assume that full burden in 
future), and the number of U.S. civilians working in a range 
of disciplines throughout Afghanistan, with concentration in 
the most sensitive Southern and Eastern regions.  The most 
immediate political objective, which we share with the 
Afghans and our Coalition partners, is to ensure the 
legitimacy and transparency of the August 20 presidential and 
provincial council elections. 
 
Elections 
--------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) The August elections influence nearly everything 
political here.  Presidential candidate registration closed 
May 8, and at least 44 candidates turned in completed 
registration forms.  President Karzai appears to hold a 
significant advantage over his nearest competitors: 
ex-Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah, ex-Finance Minister 
Ashraf Ghani, and Deputy Speaker of the Lower House Mirwais 
Yaseni.  In the end, only those three of the half-dozen 
rumored top-tier challengers registered, alongside relatively 
obscure running mates, signaling a lack of broad-based 
support for their campaigns among Afghanistan's political 
powerbrokers.  Other registered candidates of note include 
two women who are as unknown nationally as the other 
candidates.  Karzai is confident that he will win 
re-election. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Sensing the popular mood, both Karzai and opposition 
candidates alike claim to welcome international support for a 
level playing field and free and transparent elections.  The 
Independent Election Commission (IEC), with strong 
international backing and technical support from UNDP, has 
worked to even the odds somewhat and to foster at least 
theoretical opportunity for real competition.  The IEC 
resisted Karzai's ploys to advance the election date to 
Spring 2009, which would have cut off the opposition's 
nascent attempts at organization.  It issued a decree in May 
spelling out government officials' duty of impartiality.  A 
key part of its mission is to ensure that government media 
provide equal access to candidates.  The IEC will fund some 
$2 million in private air time for candidates - money that 
comes from our $40 million contribution to the $224 million 
election budget.  We are stepping up our own voter education 
work with women, youth, media, and other civil society 
groups, adding an extra $700,000 in State Department 
democracy program funding in May.  We and others in the 
international community are pressing the government to issue 
its own Hatch Act-like regulations, and urging it to finalize 
a media law strengthening protections for freedom of 
expression, including in political campaigns. 
 
Complex Security Situation 
--------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) The Afghan people and their government regard 
civilian casualties resulting from coalition operations as 
the most sensitive security issue.  You will arrive following 
a recent joint Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) and 
Coalition investigation, examining events surrounding a 
complex series of Taliban attacks on civilians, ANSF and 
Coalition forces in Farah province.  The joint investigation 
team has confirmed that some number of civilians were killed 
in the course of the fighting, but has been unable to 
determine with certainty which of those casualties were 
Taliban fighters and which were non-combatants.  The 
challenge of how to balance security operations and 
non-combatant protection continues.  ISAF Commander General 
McKiernan directed in December substantial changes to 
coalition tactics, techniques and procedures to minimize 
civilian casualties.  If confirmed by the Senate, General 
Stanley McChrystal will succeed General McKiernan as 
Commander of U.S. Forces and of ISAF (International Security 
Assistance Force in Afghanistan). 
 
¶6. (SBU) Afghanistan will remain short of security personnel 
for at least several years.  There are about 80,000 Afghan 
army, about 87,000 Afghan police, and about 58,000 
 
KABUL 00001321  002 OF 004 
 
 
international military personnel to maintain security.  The 
Afghan army is growing by more than 2,500 personnel per month 
and should reach 134,000 in 2011.  U.S forces are expected to 
top 68,000 in 2010; there are approximately 32,000 non-U.S. 
international forces in Afghanistan.  We are working with 
Interior Minister Atmar to accelerate police reform and 
training, reduce corruption, and create vetted, specialized 
police units. 
 
Developing Governance Abilities 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) Karzai's state and government suffer from inability 
to deliver essential services, compounded by endemic 
corruption, poverty, criminality, insurgency and ethno-tribal 
politics, all exacerbated by three decades of war and misrule 
since the Russian invasion of 1979.  Electoral dynamics are 
further complicating the problem, leading Karzai to make 
expedient decisions on one hand, but also to appoint 
top-flight leaders like Minister Atmar to deliver police 
services.  Nonetheless, rapid transformation is underway in 
Afghanistan and there is much to work with.  Atmar is only 
one among a solid group of impressively capable and clean 
technocratic leaders.  What the state and civil society lack 
in broad institutional capacity is offset by the striking 
dedication, energy and patriotism of many Afghans, including 
many who have returned from comfortable lives abroad to 
rebuild their country.  The energy and ambition of Afghan 
youth are particularly striking at the burgeoning university 
campuses. 
 
¶8. (U) In order to accelerate improved responsiveness in 
Afghan institutions and local capacity, our new strategy 
requires an increase in the U.S. civilian presence alongside 
the increases in U.S. military personnel.  New positions in 
Afghanistan under consideration in the FY-09 supplemental 
request from all agencies would total 421.  There are many 
more positions with separate funding mechanisms.  Of the 421, 
we will fill 56 by July 2009, 49 in the field and 7 in Kabul. 
 The remaining 365, split between 224 in the field and 141 in 
Kabul, will arrive between August 2009 and March 2010, phased 
in coordination with arrival of military units and 
establishment of safer operating environments.  The new 
civilians will join various State Department and USAID 
elements, the Department of Justice (DOJ) prosecutors and the 
FBI (Legal Attache), the Departments of Agriculture, 
Treasury, Homeland Security (DHS), Transportation (DOT), and 
Health and Human Services (HHS/CDC), as well as the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) and the Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA). 
 
¶9. (SBU) In Kabul, the focus is on Afghans creating a 
merit-based, professional bureaucracy; and building its 
capacity to deliver services to the public.  Strong 
ministries include Foreign Affairs, Defense, Public Health, 
Education, Finance, Communications, Rural Development, and 
Counternarcotics.  Interior and Agriculture stand out among 
ministries for strong leadership.  We also work effectively 
with the other ministries, although mixed agendas or a legacy 
of weakness slow progress.  For instance, the Supreme Court 
and the Ministry of Justice suffer from the acute lack of 
qualified professionals, a legal system that combines 
elements of Sharia, tribal, and Western law, and a lack of 
national consensus on the way forward. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Outside Kabul, U.S. civilian and military efforts 
aim to strengthen local government at all levels, through 
Brigade Task Forces, PRTs, and (with the upcoming civilian 
increase) District Support Teams.  We work with traditional 
leadership structures as well as those who gained power 
through force or wealth during the days of conflict, but who 
have proven ready to cooperate with constitutional government 
and rule of law.  Lack of local consensus, traditionally weak 
connections between the capital and provinces, long-standing 
personal, ethnic, and tribal rivalries and distrust, and the 
presence of insurgents or criminals complicate our task.  The 
goal is to support and help develop responsive, reliable 
leadership in local communities, reciprocally bound to the 
capital. 
 
Little Momentum on Taliban reconciliation 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶11. (SBU) President Obama stated U.S. policy on 
reconciliation March 27: "There will be no peace without 
reconciliation among former enemies... That's why we will 
work with local leaders, the Afghan government, and 
international partners to have a reconciliation process in 
every province."  Afghans broadly welcomed that U.S. policy. 
Nonetheless, reconciliation with Taliban or other insurgent 
 
KABUL 00001321  003 OF 004 
 
 
leaders remains controversial.  Many welcome the possibility 
of reduced violence and instability, while others (mainly 
non-Pashtuns, women, and certain civil society groups) fear 
an intra-Pashtun deal could come at the expense of their 
interests.  So far, government reconciliation efforts have 
been premised on respect for the constitution.  Although the 
Fall 2008 Saudi attempt to begin talks generated much 
interest, it has yielded no visible progress.  Karzai credits 
Egypt's Sheikh al-Azhar with a substantial helpful role, and 
hopes for further support from al-Azhar for the 
reconciliation process. 
 
Economy 
--------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) Recovery in agricultural production, following 
severe drought in 2008, is expected to boost real economic 
growth to about nine percent in 2009-10.  Governor Fitrat 
leads the Central Bank well.  Inflation is virtually flat, 
and the Afghan currency is stable.  The pre-election period 
is not conducive to implementing economic reforms to support 
private sector development.  That said, relatively young, 
dynamic and reformist ministers of Finance, Commerce and 
Agriculture are taking positive steps to improve the business 
climate.  Afghanistan's key economic challenge is to 
establish conditions for self-sustaining growth and 
strengthen fiscal sustainability so that it can reduce 
dependence on foreign aid over time.  It remains one of the 
poorest countries in the world and far from meeting this goal. 
 
¶13. (SBU) In our economic assistance programs, the U.S. is 
gradually channeling more aid through the Afghan government, 
and urging other donors to do the same, while ensuring proper 
transparency and accountability.  Our motto is: "Afghan 
leadership, Afghan capacity, Afghan sustainability."  The 
U.S. is also placing renewed emphasis in its assistance 
programs supporting agriculture, both as a basis for 
sustainable growth and to create licit economic alternatives 
to the insurgency and poppy cultivation.  U.S. assistance 
will focus on agriculture programs that create jobs, develop 
roads and water systems supporting farm production and trade, 
and expand farm credit opportunities.  We are also 
encouraging greater Af-Pak cooperation, for example to enable 
transshipment of Afghan agricultural exports across Pakistan 
to the massive Indian market. 
 
Human Rights Work Ahead 
------------------------ 
 
¶14. (SBU)  Civil society activists and the Ministry of 
Women's Affairs drafted a progressive domestic violence bill, 
currently under review by the Ministry of Justice.  More 
generally, a thin but outspoken stratum of Afghan society 
increasingly is giving voice to a desire for positive 
political reform and social change -- reflecting the outlooks 
of an extremely young demographic in this conservative 
society.  Nonetheless, other aspects of Afghanistan's human 
rights record remain poor, including violence and 
discrimination against women, lack of due process and weak 
rule of law, and intimidation restricting the exercise of 
free speech.  In the face of powerful conservative religious 
and tribal patriarchal traditions, the Afghan government has 
shown a lack of sustained will to press forward a systematic 
campaign to promote and protect human rights, particularly 
women's rights. 
 
¶15. (SBU) We, and others, are tracking two high profile cases 
involving freedom of religious expression.  In October 2008, 
the Afghan Supreme Court upheld a local court's conviction 
and 20-year prison sentence for student Sayed Pervez 
Kambakhsh, for distributing an article over the internet 
about women's rights that allegedly defamed Islam.  The 
international community is pushing for a presidential pardon, 
and we would ask you to do the same with Karzai.  Also, Ghows 
Zalmai and Mullah Qari Mushtaq are challenging their 20-year 
sentences, handed down by a Kabul Appeals Court in February, 
for publishing and distributing a Dari translation of the 
Koran that did not include the original Arabic text - an act 
considered sacrilegious by extremely doctrinaire Muslims. 
 
¶16. (SBU) In March President Karzai signed a Shia Family Law 
with provisions that would violate women's constitutional 
guarantee to equal rights.  Pressure from the USG, the 
international community, and Afghan human rights activists 
has blocked its enactment, pending a constitutional review by 
the Ministry of Justice.  We continue to raise our concerns 
with the law and our expectation of a transparent review 
process inclusive of women and civil society. 
 
Narcotics: Positive Trends, Challenge in the South 
 
KABUL 00001321  004 OF 004 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶17. (SBU) The narcotics challenge continues in the south, 
where seven provinces now account for 98 percent of the 
country's opium, and narcotics trafficking and the insurgency 
have become mutually sustaining.  To support the Government 
of Afghanistan and local people in confronting it, we have 
organized a civilian-military Combined Joint Inter-Agency 
Task Force (CJIATF) with U.K. and Canadian participation. 
Its anti-narcotics operations invariably occur with 
substantial Afghan police and/or participation, as we aim to 
build Afghan security force capacities in counternarcotics 
(CN) as well as counter-insurgency (COIN).  CJIATF has begun 
comprehensive counter-narcotics planning for 2009-2010 
combining the full range of civilian and military resources. 
We are now increasing our focus on boosting licit 
agriculture, improving local governance, and increasing 
interdiction of drug traffickers to disrupt the link between 
narcotics trafficking and the insurgency.  We will continue 
poppy eradication efforts, but will shift emphasis and 
resources more towards the former objectives. 
 
¶18. (SBU) Poppy cultivation remains extensive, and costly 
eradication efforts can yield mixed results in COIN terms. 
Hence we are de-emphasizing eradication while increasing 
interdiction efforts via CJIATF and providing alter nations 
rural livelihoods through agricultural development. 
Nevertheless, there is some promising news.  Poppy 
cultivation dropped by 19 percent in 2008, the first 
reduction since 2005.  Just as notably, poppy-free provinces 
grew from 13 to 18, or more than half of all provinces. 
Governors in three formerly major poppy cultivating provinces 
- Badakhshan, Balkh, and Nangarhar - have succeeded in 
eliminating or nearly eliminating poppy cultivation. Poppy 
cultivation has died away by itself in other parts of the 
north and east of the country.  This year, Helmand Governor 
Gulabuddin Mangal, whose province produces more than half of 
Afghanistan's opium poppy, conducted a comprehensive 
multi-season campaign against poppy cultivation in a 
100-square mile area of central Helmand.  Mangal's campaign 
combined public information, agricultural assistance, and law 
enforcement, including eradication by Afghan police with 
force protection from the Afghan army.  The UN Office for 
Drugs and Crime believes poppy cultivation has dropped 
substantially in Helmand and predicts more poppy-free 
provinces in other parts of the country. 
 
International Community and Afghanistan 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶19. (SBU) Relations between the government and the 
international community are uneven.  The UN presence is 
strong; SRSG Kai Eide plays a key coordination role, but 
suffers from insufficient budgetary and personnel commitment 
from New York.  President Obama, Secretary Clinton, and 
Special Representative Holbrooke have rallied world attention 
and increased resources for the Afghan-Pakistan complex of 
threats to regional stability.  International support is 
holding as demonstrated at recent conferences, including the 
March 31 Hague Conference where more than 80 countries and 
international organizations reaffirmed their long-term 
commitment to Afghanistan and the April 2009 JCMB where 
donors committed to providing funding for an almost 5,000 
member increase in the Kabul police force in time for August 
elections. 
EIKENBERRY