VZCZCXRO9931
PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #1297/01 1411157
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 211157Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9018
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY 0065

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 001297 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM AF
SUBJECT: POLITICAL PARTIES A NEAR NO-SHOW ON PROVINCIAL 
COUNCIL BALLOTS 
 
REF: KABUL 1224 
 
¶1. (SBU)  SUMMARY.  Some 88 percent of the more than 3,300 
candidates who registered for this summer's provincial 
council elections chose to identify as independent candidates 
rather than associate with one of Afghanistan's 100-plus 
political parties.  The near no-show by political parties on 
the ballots reveals their weak status in Afghanistan 
vis-a-vis the traditional power centers of tribal elders and 
mujahideen networks.  Political party identification was 
strongest in the north, but not across the board.  Only a 
handful of the 32 parties that did register candidates appear 
to have made a multi-province organized effort to prepare for 
the election, despite four years to learn from the 2005 
elections, when political parties suffered disappointing 
results in provincial council and parliamentary elections. 
End Summary. 
 
Candidates Prefer Independent Label 
---------- 
 
¶2. (SBU)  Some 2,925 of the 3,328 candidates (88 percent) who 
appear on the preliminary ballots for Afghanistan's 34 
provincial council elections registered as independents 
(reftel).  Khost, Nuristan, Panjshir, Uruzgan, and Zabol will 
have no political party candidates on their ballots.  Balkh 
has the highest rate of party identification with 61 of its 
142 candidates (43 percent) registering with their 
organization's name on the ballot.  The Uzbek-majority 
Junbesh-e-Milli led the 32 parties that did register 
candidates with 82 nominees.  Mujahideen-era parties 
Wahdat-e-Mardum (52), Jamiat-e-Milli (48), Wahdat-e-Milli 
(44), and Hezb-e-Islami Afghanistan (41) had the next highest 
number of candidates.  The Afghan Republican Party, with 13, 
had the most candidates among new democratic parties. 
Hezb-e-Islami Afghanistan (HIA), which registered candidates 
in 14 provinces, is the most geographically diverse party. 
 
¶3. (SBU)  Political party leaders have long complained that 
Afghanistan's history and electoral system disadvantage 
political parties.  Many Afghans associate parties with the 
unpopular Soviet era, and are especially suspicious of those 
that use "democratic" in their names.  Moreover, the Single 
Non-Transferable Voting (SNTV) system used to elect 
provincial council members and Parliament's Lower House from 
multi-member constituencies (the provinces themselves) does 
not reward party membership. 
 
¶4. (SBU)  However, more than 100 political parties have 
registered with the Ministry of Justice since 2004, and 
attendance at party rallies in major cities can be 
significant.  Several parties have offices in numerous 
provinces, while major parties like HIA boast of dozens of 
district- and provincial-level shuras reporting to a central 
party structure.  HIA Chairman Abdul Hadi Arghandewal 
contends that many of the so-called independent candidates 
registered in southern and eastern provinces are HIA members 
or sympathizers who chose not to publicly identify with the 
party so as not to draw retribution from HIA's rivals. 
 
Flaws in the System 
--------- 
 
¶5. (SBU)  This stunningly low registration effort by 
democratic groups is a severe blow to Afghanistan's attempts 
to develop a political party system.  Some fault lies with 
the parties themselves, who failed to take advantage of only 
perfunctory registration requirements and had several years 
to plan their campaigns.  Traditional Afghan misgivings about 
political parties, especially in the south, may also stand in 
the way of greater acceptance.  President Karzai's rejection 
of political parties has set the tone for most major 
political leaders to downplay the importance of parties.  But 
the sheer number of parties demonstrates a growing interest 
by many Afghans to participate in party development, and we 
believe most Afghans are willing to experiment with political 
parties in order to achieve a more transparent government, 
rather than continue to elect so-called independent 
representatives who sell their votes and influence to the 
highest bidder. 
 
¶6. (SBU)  However, the present electoral system does not 
reward political party membership and will continue to hinder 
democracy's development here.  With huge candidate fields and 
the SNTV, provincial councils and Parliament are rife with 
independent candidates who often received less than 1 percent 
of the popular vote.  Warlords, drug dealers, and other 
unsavory characters win legitimacy for their political 
careers even if rejected by the vast majority of the 
population.  The current system is an obstacle to the 
 
KABUL 00001297  002 OF 003 
 
 
formation of a healthy, competitive opposition to the 
government, while laws better regulating the electoral system 
and political parties lay dormant in Parliament.  Without 
political parties to serve as the nucleus of collective 
politics, voters will be hard pressed to hold incumbents 
accountable and empower local councils or the national 
Parliament to carry out effective oversight of the executive 
branch. 
 
Some Parties Attempt to Game the System ... 
---------- 
 
¶7. (SBU)  Three parties ) Junbesh, HIA, and the Republicans 
) came through on promises to organize "realistic" 
strategies to win seats on the councils.  Junbesh Deputy 
Chairman Faizullah Zaki told PolOff the party organized 
candidates in four of its six strongest provinces in the 
north, vetting hopefuls and choosing nominees based on their 
regional appeal.  Junbesh will instruct its supporters to 
vote for the candidate assigned to their district or village, 
creating de-facto single-member constituencies and maximizing 
the number of candidates they can elect.  Provincial party 
chairmen in two provinces were unable to orchestrate such 
"invisible primaries" and allowed more Junbesh candidates to 
register than there are seats on the councils, likely 
ensuring that the party will win fewer seats than its 
proportion of the popular vote would suggest. 
 
¶8. (SBU)  HIA and the Republicans have adapted a similar 
strategy, though their support is spread thinner and wider 
than Junbesh's concentrated support among Uzbeks and Turkmen 
in the north.  HIA has 41 candidates on the ballot in 14 
provinces, but is only trying for a majority of seats in 
Nangarhar.  Elsewhere, HIA hopes to win two seats and convert 
independent winners into party members after the new councils 
form.  Republican Party Chairman Sebghatullah Sanjar admits 
to running a disorganized effort in the 2005 provincial 
council and parliamentary elections, overestimating the 
party's strength and refusing to merge efforts with similarly 
minded parties (the party subsequently failed to win any 
seats).  This time around, the Republicans are hoping to win 
seats in just a handful of provinces, usually by running only 
one male and one female candidate. 
 
¶9. (SBU)  Hazara-populated provinces look to have the most 
competitive elections, with Wahdat-e-Mardum, Wahdat-e-Milli, 
Wahdat-e-Millat, Harakat, Eqtadar-e-Milli, and 
Ensejam-e-Milli all registering multiple candidates in 
Bamyan, Daikundi, Ghazni, Wardak, and other provinces.  For 
the most part, these parties clamped down on supporters 
excessively registering as candidates and are running in one 
of the few regions where party identification can be a 
definite advantage, due to the competitive rivalry among 
various Hazara mujahideen commanders. 
 
... While Others Fail to Understand the Game 
--------- 
 
¶10. (SBU)  Most parties significantly underperformed on their 
promises to register large, pan-regional candidate fields. 
The Tajik-majority Jamiat party, one of the country's largest 
and oldest political organizations, failed to register any 
candidates in strongholds like Panjshir, Badakhshan (home 
province of party chairman and former president Burhanuddin 
Rabbani), and Herat.  However, the party did register 28 
candidates in Balkh, whose council only has 19 seats. 
Candidates probably vied for the favor of local Jamiat 
powerbroker Gov. Mohammed Noor Atta, with several registering 
as Jamiat members without the consent of any provincial party 
structure.  According to election regulations, candidates may 
declare party affiliation on the ballot without confirmation 
from the party that the candidate is indeed a party nominee. 
 
¶11. (SBU)  Other supposedly influential political parties 
failed to put candidates on the ballots.  Pashtun-nationalist 
party Afghan Millat registered just 12 candidates, and Tanzim 
Dawat-e-Islami, founded by former warlord Abdul Rassoul 
Sayyaf, enlisted only nine.  Leaders of those two parties had 
said earlier this year that they would nominate a robust 
field for this summer's campaign.  Candidates may have chosen 
not to associate with parties that have strong ethnic 
identities in order to improve their chances of serving in 
the Upper House.  Each provincial council selects one member 
to serve in the Upper House every four years ) councils in 
ethnically diverse provinces have typically promoted members 
who do not have strong ethnic identities. 
 
New Democratic Parties Falter 
--------- 
 
 
KABUL 00001297  003 OF 003 
 
 
¶12. (SBU)  Other than the Republican Party, no new democratic 
organization fielded more than one candidate.  Many 
democratic leaders had earlier vowed to improve on their 
dismal performance in 2005, when they suffered nation-wide 
defeats.  After this year's May 8 registration deadline 
passed with minimal democratic party candidates registered, 
PolOff pressed democratic leaders to explain their failure to 
get on the ballot.  Some party chiefs complained that it was 
too difficult to orchestrate registration efforts in distant 
provinces from Kabul, even though registration requirements 
for council candidates only called for 200 voter signatures 
and a nominal fee.  Other party leaders claimed they did not 
have sufficient support from Western countries to balance the 
financial aid mujahideen parties receive from foreign 
governments. 
 
¶13. (SBU)  Only one pro-democratic party leader put the blame 
on the parties themselves, saying that a dozen or more 
organizations had wasted the last four years with "frivolous 
coalitions" that only provoked discussions, and never 
promoted merging efforts and supporting single candidates. 
Instead, minor party leaders' egos blocked efforts to combine 
party structures and create a unified pro-democracy, 
reformist party.  This party leader guessed most democratic 
organizations had fewer than 100 active members each and 
would never be able to win elections on their own. 
EIKENBERRY