VZCZCXRO5428
RR RUEHDBU RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #1234/01 1351232
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 151232Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8901
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 001234 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS TO AID FOR ASIA/SCAA 
USFOR-A FOR POLAD 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM PGOV AF
SUBJECT: CORRUPTION AND STRUGGLE FOR LEGITIMACY UNDERMINING SECURITY 
GAINS IN SOUTHERN KAPISA 
 
REF: KABUL 1233 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  Now that military operations have compelled 
insurgents to withdraw, at least for now, from much of southern 
Kapisa, and GIRoA authority has been reasserted, corruption and a 
struggle for political legitimacy have emerged as obstacles to 
enduring stability.  The uneasy balance between traditional 
community structures, which reserve power and influence for malek 
tribal members and village elders, and the need to incorporate 
former jehadi fighters and commanders into a new model has 
splintered communities, polarized political rivals and created 
opportunities for the abuse of political status.  These broader 
questions will not be resolved by the creation of "unified" shuras 
or even elections but will have to be adequately addressed before 
lasting peace and stability can be realized.  GIRoA must also begin 
tackling corruption in order to build community trust and the 
authority to engage leaders in frank dialogue regarding the roles 
and responsibilities of various community leaders.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Tagab 
----- 
 
¶2. (SBU) With a significantly increased and sustained ANSF presence 
over the past two years, security in Tagab district has improved 
markedly.  The local population appears to trust the Afghan National 
Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) to keep the peace, and 
their focus has for now shifted from security concerns to governance 
and development.  Problematically, as the security situation has 
stabilized, the political situation has become increasingly 
fractured, illustrated by the breakdown of the main community body, 
the shura, into five individual shuras competing for power.  Their 
struggle highlights a deeper issue that is likely to be further 
exacerbated as reconciliation efforts proceed in previously 
contested areas:  communities no longer agree on where legitimate 
authority lies. 
 
¶3. (SBU) In Tagab, former commanders who were heavily involved in 
the conflicts of the past 30 years do not feel their contributions 
are adequately recognized by traditional structures and so have 
refused to participate in efforts to establish a unified shura 
unless they are given significant leadership roles.  This runs 
contrary to the local, traditional shura structure, dominated by 
maleks and village elders who believe their role in creating the 
conditions for improved security and GIRoA support firmly 
establishes them as today's legitimate local leaders. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Competition for power has exacerbated an already serious 
corruption problem, as no one has sufficient community backing to 
oppose it.  Those government officials who should be stamping out 
corruption are often believed to be the perpetrators of abuse. 
Reports of illegal transfers of government lands by the former Tagab 
district administrator to political allies of the governor; 
Hezb-i-Islami (HIG)-led contractor "mafias" that do not allow 
outsiders to bid on development projects; and political intimidation 
by the governor and HIG networks are all common.  Residents of Tagab 
routinely cite corruption and legal impunity as the issues that 
separate the government from the people.  When asked who could break 
the cycle of corruption, especially considering the alleged role 
GIRoA officials often play, residents offer little more than a 
frustrated sigh, indicating they do not know who, if anyone, has the 
authority to do so. 
 
Alasai 
------ 
 
¶5. (SBU) In neighboring Alasai, where military operations in March 
helped reestablish the GIRoA presence, residents seem generally 
satisfied with their new district administrator.  However, while 
community bodies like the traditional shura and the District 
Development Assembly (DDA) continue to function, divisions are 
developing.  The deputy DDA chief, with support from GIRoA-backed 
HIG associates, is currently attempting to either remove or sideline 
the DDA chief in violation of procedures.  Competing claims to power 
have encouraged the polarization of the populace, with the governor, 
district administrator and their HIG associates on one side and the 
National Directorate of Security (NDS), DDA and Jemiat-i-Islami 
supporters on the other.  (NOTE: As there are few Tajiks living in 
southern Kapisa, these political power struggles do not generally 
have an ethnic component but rather play out within Pashaie and 
Pashtun communities. END NOTE).  While the Jemiat side accuses the 
government of corruption, the HIG side accuses Jemiat of ineptitude 
- an inability to deliver services to the people and lack of 
community support and recognition. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Under these circumstances, ongoing reconciliation efforts 
in Alasai are likely to produce yet another crop of individuals 
demanding a seat at the table.  Factions already are struggling for 
the limited space available, and further competition will strain the 
 
KABUL 00001234  002 OF 002 
 
 
already tense political environment.  The situation is all the more 
worrying because of the guns held by political leaders and the armed 
groups allied to them.  This applies to both HIG and Jemiat, but HIG 
is stronger and better equipped.   Even granting that HIG the 
political party is an accepted political player, in Kapisa the 
distinction between the party and HIG the armed faction is not 
always clear. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) Tagab and Alasai districts appear to be suffering a 
"perfect storm" of problems.  What makes their saga relevant is that 
the elements making for that storm are present in many other places 
in the country -- if not always in this particularly destructive 
combination.  First, the central government institution responsible 
for trying to ensure good governance is being undercut by the direct 
access by the chief government figure in the province, the governor, 
to President Karzai, whose interaction with the governor appears 
influenced by the President's re-election strategy.  A second 
problem is the failure of the traditional power structure in these 
districts to find a way to come to terms with the demands of 
powerful non-traditional power-holders, leading to a splintering of 
groups claiming power and authority.  Here again the national 
election appears to be exacerbating the situation.  Added to the mix 
is the underlying, longstanding rivalry between two major political 
factions in the area, Hezb-e Islami and Jamiat.  The two sides' 
links to armed groups make their rivalry all the more concerning. 
Finally, the absence of either formal or informal authority seen as 
legitimate leaves corruption unchecked.  That corruption works like 
a cancer on even the best of GIRoA intentions to link the people to 
Kabul. 
 
¶8. (SBU) The upcoming Provincial Council elections in Kapisa are 
unlikely to settle these broader conflicts.  Beyond the 
disillusionment with executive branch GIRoA officials, there is also 
widespread recognition that the only elected officials within the 
province, namely members of the Provincial Council (PC), have little 
power or authority to challenge non-elected officials like Governor 
Abu Baker.  People do not see these elected officials as capable of 
addressing their problems.  PC members themselves admit they are 
unable to help constituents or deliver projects, as they have little 
influence over the governor or line ministry directors.  Given their 
irrelevance and lack of authority, not surprisingly they are not 
direct participants in the power struggles in southern Kapisa, 
struggles which will continue to play out regardless of who wins the 
election.  This has not, however, prevented the murder in recent 
days of a Provincial Council candidate. 
 
¶9. (SBU) The cautionary tale of southern Kapisa is just a repeat of 
one we have heard before -- that hard-won security gains by military 
means are unlikely to be decisive unless underlying power struggles 
are addressed, legitimate authority at both the formal and informal 
levels are established, and corrosive corruption is stemmed. 
 
EIKENBERRY