VZCZCXRO0993
RR RUEHDBU RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #1208/01 1311059
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 111059Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8831
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC 0801
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHRC/USDA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 001208 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM, INL/AP 
STATE PASS TO AID FOR ASIA/SCAA 
USFOR-A FOR POLAD 
COMISAF FOR POLAD 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SNAR KCRM PREL PINS PTER
 
SUBJECT: Resourcing a Comprehensive Counter-Narcotics 
Strategy 
 
REF: KABUL 1064 
 
   ¶1. Summary: The U.S. Embassy hosted a one-day workshop on 
counter-narcotics (CN) to elaborate an overall US and UK action plan 
to disrupt the nexus of insurgents-narcotics-criminality-corruption 
and support the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 
(GIRoA) in its counter-drug efforts.  Aiming to support and develop 
Afghan leadership wherever possible and to build the 
counter-narcotics coalition beyond the U.S. and UK, workshop 
participants proposed adopting the eight pillars of the Afghan 
National Drug Control Strategy (ANDCS) as an overall construct. The 
eight pillars identified in the GIROA strategy are: 1) Alternative 
Livelihoods; 2) Building Institutions; 
3) Public Awareness; 4) Interdiction and Law Enforcement; 5) 
Justice Sector reform; 6) Elimination and Eradication; 7) Drug 
Demand Reduction and Treatment of Drug Addicts; and 8) International 
and Regional Cooperation. 
 
¶2. We also identified specific resource and authority requirements, 
including: 
- Alternative and agricultural development funds; 
- Transition initiative funds; 
- Resources and personnel to stand up the Combined Joint Interagency 
Task Force (CJIATF); 
- Establishment of a comprehensive "nexus" database; 
- Additional personnel to address the broad illicit finance 
problem-set; 
- Funding for USDA field officers; 
- Expansion of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF); 
- Expansion of coalition training programs on evidence collection; 
- Additional ANSF capacity for effective partnering; and 
- Lodging, transportation, and a Washington office to support the 
deployment of additional USG civilians to the field, including those 
without substantial direct participation in the broader CN effort. 
End Summary. 
 
Counter-Narcotics Workshop 
------------------------------- 
 
¶3. On April 29, 2009, the U.S. Embassy hosted an interagency, 
civil-military US-UK workshop on counter-narcotics. Forty 
participants, drawn from over 25 U.S., ISAF, and UK structures and 
offices, discussed overall CN goals for one, three, and five years, 
campaign synchronization, resource requirements, and steps to 
establish a flexible USG interagency (and ultimately international) 
organizational architecture for unity of effort against the nexus of 
narco-trafficking, terrorism and insurgency in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan. The desired result is the fusion of civilian capabilities 
-- in economics, diplomacy, public communications, intelligence and 
law enforcement -- with military resources and operational 
capabilities. 
 
Adopting the 8-Pillar International 
and GIRoA Construct 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶4. Given the policy intent to build up the coalition of nations 
comprehensively supporting GIRoA counter-drug efforts, participants 
discussed and accepted the value of transitioning to the 8-pillar 
Afghan National Drug 
Control Policy (ANDCP) construct to organize the plan.  The Joint 
Coordination Monitoring Board's (JCMB) endorsement of the Afghan 
policy on April 19 confirms the international community's broad 
acceptance of the ANDCP. 
 
¶5. The 8-pillar approach adds three pillars - international and 
regional cooperation, institution building, and demand reduction - 
to the existing 5-pillar U.S. approach - public awareness, 
alternative livelihoods, interdiction (called "law enforcement" 
under the 8-pillars), justice sector reform (called "criminal 
justice" under the 8-pillars), and elimination/eradication (in 
support of governance/stability objectives, the shift to licit 
economy, and support for interdiction operations). 
 
¶6. Switching to the 8-pillar construct will make coordination easier 
(existing GIRoA, UN, and coalition coordination structures are 
already based on the construct) and diminish the political 
inhibitions of prospective international partners who shun military 
leadership of inherently civilian programs and operations. This 
change also provides a foundation for additional diplomatic efforts 
to pull more coalition civilian resources (in law enforcement, 
diplomacy, economics and intelligence) into the CN effort. Adding 
 
KABUL 00001208  002 OF 003 
 
 
the regional and international cooperation pillar recognizes the 
critical importance of the role of Pakistan, among others, in 
coalition CN efforts in Afghanistan. While elimination/eradication 
of opium poppy, particularly governor-led efforts, remains a pillar 
of the Afghan approach, we will de-emphasize activities in this area 
and closely coordinate residual eradication programs to support 
interdiction operations, in addition to other governance and 
stability objectives including providing disincentives to future 
cultivation.  The aim is a CN effort that will directly support the 
COIN effort, or at least avoid fratricidal effects of CN on COIN. 
 
Resource Requirements 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶6. Participants identified USG resource requirements for 
implementation of the CN action plan, while continuing conversations 
with other key donors on their participation. These requirements are 
grouped and summarized below. 
 
¶7. Program funding: ten-fold increase in Alternative and 
Agricultural Development funds (currently in consideration for 
FY2009 supplemental request); $350 million additional Transition 
Initiatives funds over the next three years; and Commander 's 
Emergency Response Program (CERP) and USAID funding for core 
enabling economic infrastructure (roads, power, water); as well as 
continuing support for the "Good Performers Initiative, " including 
increased international donor contributions in response to 
UNAMA/GIROA appeals. 
 
¶8. Personnel: 45+ interagency personnel for the CJIATF (reftel) 
(including DEA, DOS/INL, OGA, NSA, NGA, Treasury, and 5 IOCC 
analysts); up to 40 USDA positions across Afghanistan to support 
agriculture development; specific technical experts in agriculture 
to support planning and program implementation; three additional 
U.S. Department of Justice attorneys to provide increased support to 
CN police investigators, prosecutors and judges of the 
Counter-Narcotics Justice Task Force, and to assist with improvement 
of CN and other criminal justice-related legislation; additional 
counternarcotics and rule of law efforts at the provincial level to 
support PRT and task force operations; U.S. Marshals Service 
personnel and programs to establish capacity to provide personal 
protection for CJTF judges and prosecutors, court security, witness 
protection, and operations for the apprehension of fugitives; as 
well as ten additional analysts and financial experts supporting 
"soft" intelligence on power-brokers, agricultural potential, 
economic and financial underpinnings of the Afghan economy, and 
financial flows in Afghanistan and the broader region. 
 
¶9. Establishment of an intelligence fusion system: $12 million to 
establish initial operating capability of the CJIATF as well as 
funding for a searchable "nexus" database and other appropriate 
information management tools. 
 
¶10. Training and partnering: Establishment of a MOI/MOD joint 
Security Assistance Force (SAF) to deploy to secure areas; support 
to GIRoA to fill existing tashkeel (ANSF, especially 
Counter-Narcotics Police Afghanistan (CNPA) and the new Security 
Assistance Force) and expand these capabilities (with proportional 
growth in mentor/partner programs, such as PMTs); funding, training, 
and support for the CNPA to transport prisoners from the outer 
provinces to Kabul; doubling ANP/ABP quantity and capacity into 
border areas of Southern Helmand, Kandahar, and Nimruz;  funding and 
personnel to conduct 
GIRoA (CNPA and other law enforcement and ministry personnel) 
training to improve operations, intelligence reporting, and evidence 
collection; training for ISAF personnel on CN evidence collection 
and preservation; additional funding to conduct CN criminal justice 
training for officers, prosecutors and judges of the CJTF and 
nationwide; support for proactive CJTF investigations into 
CN/corruption cases; and support to the Afghan national penal system 
by improving prison construction/renovation as well as enhanced 
training for 
corrections sector officials. 
 
¶11. Civilian field support: lodging and transportation (air and 
road) assets for field civilian personnel; establishment of a field 
support office in Washington to assist in recruiting and training 
highly qualified individuals, not only for our CN programs but also 
across the full range of increased USG civilian-led development, 
governance, and security programs. 
 
Authority Requirements 
 
KABUL 00001208  003 OF 003 
 
 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶12. Participants identified the requirement for expansion of law 
enforcement reporting policies to allow dissemination to military 
intelligence analysts, expansion of the Interagency Operations 
Coordination Cell (IOCC) mandate to support the CJIATF, and 
additional flexibility in USAID contracting requirements to enable 
close planning and implementation synchronization with military 
operations in the clear-hold-build construct. 
 
Preconditions for Success 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶13. Underpinning the CN strategy are several key dynamics and 
requirements including: road security for commercial truck transport 
to and from major centers of production and border crossing points 
to enable competitive alternatives to poppy; a much better 
intelligence-driven understanding of the nexus of poppy cultivation 
and the opium trade to the insurgency; additional political will and 
capability on the part of GIRoA to aggressively and successfully 
prosecute politically connected individuals; the need to anticipate 
and mitigate the "balloon effect" of poppy transitioning to other 
provinces as the main effort of security and CN efforts proceed in 
Helmand province; and the need to establish clear connections among 
USG, GIRoA, and third-country organizations working on all 
components of this complicated problem to maintain unity of effort. 
 
 
EIKENBERRY