VZCZCXRO0578
PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #1195/01 1301309
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 101309Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8813
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY 0043

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 001195 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL AF
SUBJECT: INSIDE KARZAI CAMPAIGN HEADQUARTERS 
 
¶1. (SBU)  SUMMARY.  President Karzai officially launched his 
re-election campaign last week, relying on an unusual mix of 
powerful commanders from Afghanistan's 30 years of conflict 
and a small group of younger volunteers from newer 
pro-democracy organizations.  To date, former mujahideen 
commanders like First Vice President nominee Marshall Fahim 
and Lower House MP Abdul Rassoul Sayyaf have focused mainly 
on raising money and engaging other high-profile Afghan 
leaders for support, leaving the logistical operations of 
campaign work to the younger crowd.  Karzai himself has 
concentrated on locking up support from old-guard leaders, 
causing some reformist supporters to question their 
commitments to a campaign that rewards the leaders of the 
past and ignores the support of democratic groups.  End 
Summary. 
 
A Glimpse At Karzai Campaign HQ 
---------- 
 
¶2. (SBU)  Karzai opened his campaign headquarters last month 
in a busy neighborhood near the Palace and the U.S. Embassy. 
PolOff dropped by the office recently and spoke with the 
three campaign staffers who were present.  The staffers were 
young, energetic, and computer literate, though insistent 
that any conversations be "off the record" in case their 
bosses heard they had spoken to a Westerner.  The rented 
three-story home has separate offices reserved for the 
campaign's top lieutenants:  VP nominees Fahim and Karim 
Khalili, Lower House MP Sayyaf, Palace policy chief 
Sebghatullah Sanjar, and Kabul Governor Haji Din Mohammad. 
Campaign staff said Mohammad will play the lead coordinating 
role for the campaign once he resigns his governor post. 
Much like a U.S.-style campaign office, phone banks, office 
equipment, and conference rooms occupy the remaining space. 
 
¶3. (SBU)  Most of the top lieutenants' offices looked empty 
and unused.  Campaign staff explained that Fahim and Sayyaf 
preferred to work out of their homes, while Khalili, Sanjar, 
and Mohammad were still weighing how to balance their 
government positions with their campaign duties.  Campaign 
aides said they were completely focused on Karzai's campaign 
and were not working for pro-Karzai provincial council 
candidates.  As PolOff arrived for his visit, one staffer was 
posting a BBC Persian article on Nangarhar Gov. Gul Aga 
Sherzai's withdrawal from the presidential race and 
subsequent endorsement of Karzai on a bulletin board.  The 
other two aides were reviewing media reports on Karzai's trip 
to Washington. 
 
¶4. (U)  Campaign staff said they expected activity at the 
office to increase after the June 12 publication of the final 
candidate list.  Until then, they will be busy with 
renovations and early-stage campaign preparations.  Inside 
the "media room," staff had hung dozens of posters and 
T-shirt samples with pictures of Karzai.  Staff had digitally 
altered Karzai's clothes, headwear, and an adjoining campaign 
slogan in each image to appeal to various ethnic and 
linguistic constituencies.  Following the start of the 
official campaign period, aides will distribute the specially 
designed campaign materials to Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, 
Uzbeks, Baluchs, and Nuristanis. 
 
Old-Style Afghan Politics And Modern Election Regulations 
---------- 
 
¶5. (SBU)  Campaign lieutenant Sanjar, one of the only members 
of the campaign's leadership with experience in democratic 
politics, told PolOff he and other reformers in the Karzai 
campaign occasionally feel Karzai and other top aides do not 
appreciate the contributions democratic groups have made to 
the campaign, especially in light of the low workloads taken 
on by supposedly influential lieutenants.  Sanjar expects 
volunteers from democratic parties, and not Sayyaf and Fahim 
loyalists, will staff satellite campaign offices in the 
provinces when they open later this month. 
 
¶6. (SBU)  In late April, Karzai tasked Fahim, Sayyaf, 
Mohammed, Khalili, and Sanjar to collect the 10,000 
signatures and copies of voter registration cards needed to 
qualify for the ballot.  Sanjar utilized his party network to 
collect 2,000 signatures.  However, Sanjar said Sayyaf, who 
leads his own political party, brought in just 100 voter 
registration cards.  Fahim, nominated for the vice presidency 
in part because of a supposed influence in Tajik communities, 
brought in just 15.  Khalili, who heads a faction of the 
majority-Hazara Hezb-e-Wahdat party, asked 100 people to show 
up at the campaign office, but only 15 of those were 
registered voters.  Frustrated, Palace officials asked Sanjar 
to extend his efforts to the provinces and work with local 
officials to collect the necessary signatures.  In the end, 
the campaign collected 15,000 signatures and qualified for 
 
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the ballot on time ) though Sanjar wished Karzai would have 
acknowledged the role of democratic groups in his 
registration. 
 
A Modest, Though Probably Sufficient Effort 
----------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) Just three months before the election, Karzai's 
campaign headquarters still has the feel and resources of a 
sleepy mayoral election-level campaign office in the US. 
Still, its scope and budget far exceed the efforts of the 
other campaigns we have seen ) we believe fewer than 10 of 
the more than 40 presidential candidates even have campaign 
offices outside of their private residences.  The lack of a 
truly strong challenger in this year's election and Karzai's 
apparent preference for negotiations with mujahideen leaders 
over grassroots political campaigning will probably mean a 
continued lack of attention for his young, democratic 
supporters.  For the long-term though, we hope these young 
activists gain valuable experience in political campaigning 
that they will be able to put to good use in next year's 
parliamentary elections and future presidential elections. 
This experience should benefit reformist, democratic 
candidates who run campaigns based around ideas and political 
parties, rather than personalities from the mujahideen era. 
RICCIARDONE