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Viewing cable 09KABUL1148, UNDERSTANDING ELECTORAL SAFEGUARDS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KABUL1148 2009-05-06 02:52 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO7253
PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #1148/01 1260252
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 060252Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8746
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY 0031
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 001148 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KDEM PGOV AF
SUBJECT: UNDERSTANDING ELECTORAL SAFEGUARDS 
 
REF: KABUL 1140 
 
1.  (SBU) As candidate registration nears a close, and 
political campaigns begin, questions about irregularities in 
the voter registration process are eating away at public 
confidence.  Anecdotal reports raise concerns about female 
participation and fraud.  If it persists, a perception of 
fraud among Afghans and the international community poses a 
greater threat to the legitimacy of the results than the 
fraud is likely to have on the vote tally. The Independent 
Election Commission (IEC), the UN, the international 
community, and Afghan government institutions are 
implementing significant electoral safeguards (ref A) to 
protect the actual results, and now must address public 
confidence in them. 
 
2.  (SBU) During the voter registration period, the following 
types of fraud and procedural flaws were reported, in 
descending frequency: registration of voters under 18; 
multiple registrations; distribution of blank registration 
forms; and issuance of cards intended for women to their 
husbands or male relatives.  The observed and reported 
registration fraud in itself will have little or no impact on 
the results because the safeguards will minimize fraudulent 
voting. 
 
HOW AFGHANS WILL VOTE 
---------------------- 
 
3.  (U) At 7AM on August 20, polling will begin for the 
presidential and provincial council elections at the roughly 
6,950 polling centers hosting approximately 25,000 polling 
stations.  Each polling station can accommodate up to 600 
voters on election day.  Outside the polling center, a site 
controller will check each voter registration card and 
individual's fingers to confirm that each arrival has not yet 
voted.  Once confirmed, the voter will move to another IEC 
official, who will check that the card matches with the 
individual, ink the voter's finger, punch the card with a 
triangular hole to prevent reuse in this election, and record 
the card number on the list of voters. 
 
4.  (U) A ballot issuer will present the voter with two 
ballots; one presidential and one provincial council.  If 
voting outside the province named on the voter's registration 
card, the voter will receive only the presidential ballot. 
To differentiate, one ballot is green and one is yellow and 
each race is associated with a different symbol.  The voter 
will enter the polling station, vote, fold the ballot in half 
to hide the vote, and exit the booth.  The ballot box 
controller will stamp the ballot and check that each voter 
has only one ballot per race.  The voter then places the 
ballot into the appropriate ballot box.  Once finished, the 
voter must leave the polling center. 
 
ONE AFGHAN, ONE VOTE 
--------------------- 
 
5.  (U) The key safeguards against multiple voting - the 
fraud most Afghan critics raise - are the integrity of 
polling center staff and the use of indelible ink.  The IEC 
knows the importance of quality indelible ink and has engaged 
with UNDP to ensure the procurement meets the highest 
standards.  IEC staff will also perform quality control 
checks on the ink in voting center kits to ensure it matches 
the procurement order and quality standards. 
 
6.  (SBU) For a voter to use multiple cards as a tool to cast 
multiple votes, as occurred in 2005, polling center staff 
must consciously participate in a conspiracy to allow 
multiple voting.  The division of labor among polling center 
staff helps protect against this.  The presence of candidate 
agents, party agents and domestic observers in the polling 
centers will also deter multiple voting. 
 
7.  (SBU) Article four of the Afghan electoral law stipulates 
that each voter shall have only one vote and is prohibited 
from voting on the behalf of another voter.  Public debates 
raise that men may try to assert their political will on 
female relatives by engaging in illegal proxy voting. 
However, proxy voting for women faces the same obstacles of 
multiple voting.  The integrity of the polling center 
officials and the observers and agents present in the polling 
center will prevent a man who has already voted from voting 
for female relatives.  Voter registration cards list the 
holder's gender.  A man attempting to vote with a woman's 
card - even if he has not yet voted - should be prevented 
from receiving a ballot when the polling official notes the 
discrepancy.  Only a stand-in female, otherwise ineligible to 
vote could function as a proxy without detection. 
 
 
KABUL 00001148  002 OF 002 
 
 
NO FUDGE IN THE RESULTS 
------------------------ 
 
8. (SBU)  Manipulating results will be difficult, given the 
IEC's decision to count votes at polling stations, providing 
detailed results data from the field.  Ballots are numbered 
and the IEC will track them throughout the voting process. 
At the end of polling, officials will seal ballot boxes. 
When counting begins, the polling station manager will break 
the ballot box seals and remove the ballots; presidential 
counts will occur first. 
 
9.  (SBU) Officials will reconcile the number of ballots in 
the box with the total ballots handed out at the polling 
station - the number of listed voter registration cards 
should match.  Counters will tally votes and post results in 
the polling station, as well as provide them to observers and 
agents and securing a copy in the ballot box with the tallied 
ballots.  The manager will then reseal the ballot box and 
place the original tally form in a tamper evident, numbered 
bag for transfer to the national tally center in Kabul.  The 
polling station manager and security forces will accompany 
the sealed ballot box to the provincial capital.  No official 
should have access to more than 600 votes, should the 
safeguards fail.  The IEC will be able to detect substantial 
use of fraudulent voter registration cards when the voting 
lists arrive in Kabul. 
RICCIARDONE