David A Fabrycky  05/31/2009 01:11:25 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  PE

Cable 
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UNCLAS        DOHA 00354
CXDOHA:
    ACTION: P/E
    INFO:   DAO PAO OMC RAO DCM FCS AMB

DISSEMINATION: P/E /2
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: AMB:JELEBARON
DRAFTED: PAO:JRHOOD
CLEARED: ADCM:SRICE

VZCZCDOI124
PP RUEHC RUEHEE RUCNFUR RUEHBJ RUEHBS RUEHKA
DE RUEHDO #0354/01 1510921
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 310921Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY DOHA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9094
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0358
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 0208

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DOHA 000354 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
FOR AF/SPG AND NEA/ARP 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL SU CD QA
SUBJECT: DOHA DARFUR TALKS SITREP ONE (AL-MAHMOUD, BASSOLE) 
 
---------------- 
(SBU) KEY POINTS 
---------------- 
 
-- Special Envoy Gration met separately with Qatari Minister of 
State for Foreign Affairs Ahmed al-Mahmoud and AU/UN Joint Mediator 
Djibrill Bassole, who told him that the Doha process was the "only 
way forward" and it was essential to pressure the Government of 
Sudan (GOS) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) to get beyond 
the issue of prisoner exchanges. 
 
-- Both men reported that the GOS would not release JEM prisoners 
before a cessation of hostilities, whereas JEM would not cease 
hostilities without at least a partial release. 
 
-- They also agreed that pressure was needed on Chadian President 
Idriss Deby to reduce his support to JEM and reconcile with the GOS. 
 
 
-- Al-Mahmoud and Bassole viewed the Darfur peace process as an 
important part of efforts to fully implement the North-South 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and to stabilize all of Sudan. 
 
-- Bassole suggested including rebel leader Abdulwahid Nur in the 
talks as a "counterbalance to JEM." 
 
End Key Points. 
 
Special Envoy's Meeting with Al-Mahmoud 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) The President's Special Envoy for Sudan, Gen. Scott 
Gration, met on May 26 in Doha with Qatari Minister of State for 
Foreign Affairs Ahmed Al-Mahmoud, and discussed the need for the GOS 
and JEM to get beyond differences over the sequencing of a cessation 
of hostilities agreement and a prisoner exchange as envisioned in 
the Goodwill Agreement signed in Doha earlier this year.  Al-Mahmoud 
reported that the JEM was willing to initiate prisoner exchanges, 
but the GOS was insistent that no prisoners would be released until 
a cessation of hostilities agreement had been reached. 
 
¶2. (SBU) The Special Envoy said it was important to urge the GOS to 
agree to release a percentage of its JEM prisoners - perhaps 10 
percent - in the first stage.  These could be the least combat-ready 
prisoners, who would not pose a threat to the GOS even if a 
cessation of hostilities agreement were not in place or respected. 
In the second phase, the GOS could release the bulk of prisoners - 
perhaps 80 percent - and then the final release of high-value 
prisoners, including Khalil's brother, could take place once 
hostilities have totally stopped.  This entire process need not take 
long, Gration suggested. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Al-Mahmoud supported this approach, as well as the Special 
Envoy's proposal for a Declaration of Principles.  In terms of 
re-starting the talks in Doha, Al-Mahmoud said it was essential to 
"get moving again," because he agreed with what the Sudanese had 
told him:  if the Qatari initiative does not succeed, no initiative 
will succeed, and all-out war will come. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Turning to his strategy for the current round of talks in 
Doha, Al-Mahmoud handed Gen. Gration a draft P5 statement 
emphasizing their support for the process, and urging all parties to 
the conflict in Darfur to cease hostilities and return to the Doha 
process.  The statement cites the positive efforts of the USG -- 
specifically the Special Envoy -- twice. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Al-Mahmoud said that he had conferred with both the 
Sudanese and Chadian President Idriss Deby, who claims to have less 
influence over the JEM than before.  The Sudanese, Al-Mahmoud said, 
underestimate JEM and believe that if their links with Deby were 
cut, they would not survive as a movement.  Al-Mahmoud agreed with 
the Special Envoy's assessment that addressing the situation between 
Chad and Sudan was vital to bringing peace to Darfur and noted that 
he would be travelling to Libya and Egypt soon to continue to push 
this message. 
 
¶6. (SBU) While he did not want to engage in the "endless story" of 
trying to fix every problem in Sudan, Al-Mahmoud acknowledged the 
importance of addressing Darfur in the context of CPA implementation 
and problems elsewhere in the country. 
 
Special Envoy's Meeting with AU/UN Mediator Bassole 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) Gen. Gration met separately with AU/UN Joint Mediator 
Djibril Bassole, who enunciated the same support as Al-Mahmoud for 
the Doha process; for pressuring the JEM, GOS, and Chad; and for 
viewing the Darfur talks within the context of greater Sudan. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Bassole added that recent developments in Darfur may 
ironically be "clearing the path to a cessation of hostilities and 
peace," because JEM was establishing a base of operations within 
Darfur.  The "JEM-Deby link is clear" and must be reduced to give 
JEM a greater sense of urgency in talking seriously. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Another way to pressure JEM into making concessions was to 
invite Fur rebel leader Abdulwahid Nur to Doha, Bassole suggested. 
"If Abdulwahid is here, Khalil will agree to a cessation of 
hostilities, a Declaration of Principles and resettlement," Bassole 
opined.  Abdulwahid's participation would "create another dynamic." 
 
¶10. (SBU) Bassole asked that the USG continue its support for the 
Doha process, press other movements to join the talks, and "make a 
strong initiative to improve relations between Chad and Sudan." 
¶11. (U) SE Gration's delegation has cleared this cable. 
 
LEBARON