VZCZCXRO4756
PP RUEHDE RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHDJ #0569/01 1481155
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 281156Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0442
INFO IGAD COLLECTIVE
SOMALIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI
RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH NH

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 DJIBOUTI 000569 
 
SIPDIS 
DEPARTMENT FOR KCC WILLIAMSBURG KY 
DEPARTMENT FOR CA/FPP 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC DJ ET ER SO XA
SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY - DJIBOUTI 
 
REF: STATE 74840; 08 DJIBOUTI 687 
 
¶1. Country Conditions: The Republic of Djibouti is a developing and 
stable African country in the Horn of Africa.  Although exact 
statistics are unavailable, unemployment is estimated in excess of 50 
percent of the working-age population.  Over two-thirds of the 
country's estimated 650,000 residents live in the capital, also 
called Djibouti.  Djibouti attracts numerous economic migrants and 
refugees from neighboring Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia. 
 
 
¶2. The level of consular fraud in Djibouti continues to be low, but 
increasing. 
 
--------- 
NIV FRAUD 
--------- 
 
¶3. NIV fraud has become increasingly sophisticated.  Lying continues 
to be a method; document fraud has evolved as the interest to travel 
to the U.S. has become ever more popular with the increasing American 
presence in Djibouti. 
 
¶4. In the past, the suspension of all visa operations at Embassy 
Asmara had shifted the bulk of Eritrean visa applicants to Djibouti. 
However, in February, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed Post 
that the Djiboutian Embassy in Sudan will no longer issue visas to 
Eritreans.  This decision hinders Eritreans from traveling to 
Djibouti to apply for U.S. visas, and has therefore reduced the NIV 
workload that had shifted to Post from Embassy Eritrea in 2007 and 
¶2008. 
¶5. Tourism: Young applicants ages 22-35 -- including couples going on 
their 'honeymoon', wanting to visit family, or planning to visit the 
U.S. for tourism -- produce fraudulent documents to prove ties to 
Djibouti.  False documents are computer-generated to show stable 
employment and sufficient finances to support self and family. 
Fraudulent bank statements are also included in the package with an 
official stamp and signature.  Spot checks by Post's consular fraud 
prevention unit (FPU) have helped identify such fraud; recurring 
transaction numbers and incorrect balances can be fraud indicators. 
Applicants also commonly obtain a new passport as an attempt to 
conceal prior travel to what are considered as possibly 'undesirable' 
locations (i.e., to other predominantly Muslim countries). 
 
¶6. Post has recognized a new fraud trend involving middle-class 
Djiboutians with stable ties to Djibouti.  They visit the U.S. with 
valid B1/B2 tourist visas, but once they arrive in the U.S., they 
throw away their Djiboutian passports and attempt to cross the 
Canadian border with a Somali passport in order to request asylum 
posing as Somali refugees (Somali passports are easily purchased on 
the black market in both Djibouti and Somalia).  Or, they simply 
arrive at the Canadian border with no documents, believing that if 
they are stateless, then Canada would have no option but to accept 
their asylum claim.  Customs and Border Protection reports all cases 
of these failed attempts to Post.  Discussion of this topic with 
Djiboutians, including one who failed at his attempt to claim asylum 
in Canada, suggest that Canada's generous welfare provisions, as well 
as common language and family ties, make Canada a more appealing 
destination than the United States for Djiboutians.  However, as it 
is difficult to obtain a visa to enter Canada, transit via the U.S. 
is becoming more common.  Many Djiboutian NIV applicants also have 
family members in Canada, who can provide them with instructions on 
how to claim asylum in Canada. 
 
¶7. Students: The few Djiboutian student visa applicants received are 
typically children of government ministers or of other government 
officials.  These applicants are legitimate.  Other student 
applicants are those attending English language programs for three to 
four months.  According to the 2008 validation study, these visa 
applicants have returned to Djibouti. 
 
¶8. Post conducted a validation study in April 2009 on 2008 Djiboutian 
NIV applicants, which confirmed the return of approximately 60 per 
cent of the applicants, a 5 per cent decrease from the 2007 
validation study.  The study also showed that more than half of the 
Eritrean student visa applicants overstayed or changed their visa 
status. 
 
¶9. However, Post believes that future validation studies will 
continue to show a lower return rate for both Eritrean F1 and 
Djiboutian B1/B2 applicants.  The Ministry of Finance's Director of 
Economy concurred with Post's observation that an increasing number 
of lower middle-class B1/B2 applicants do not find the Djiboutian job 
market attractive, and therefore tend to falsify supporting documents 
 
DJIBOUTI 00000569  002 OF 005 
 
 
(i.e., employment letters or bank statements) in hopes of appearing 
stable to qualify for a U.S. non-immigrant visa. 
 
¶10. Djibouti possesses porous borders, and Post continues to be 
concerned about possible terrorists entering the country seeking to 
travel to the U.S.  Post continues to be diligent in processing SAOs 
to curb the possibility of issuing a visa to a wanted terrorist.  In 
addition, we work with the regional LEGATT 
team for additional spot checks. 
 
¶11. To deter duplication of Djiboutian passports, the Government of 
Djibouti (GoDJ) has worked diligently at creating a new 
machine-readable passport.  The GoDJ began distributing the new 
passports in May 2009.  Post has not received information regarding 
the security features of the passports.  The old Djiboutian passports 
are still valid, but are no longer produced.  Both the new and old 
passports hold a 5-year validity. 
 
¶12. In 2008, Djibouti-American contacts and French authorities 
informed Post that Djiboutian passports had been purchased by 
Somalis.  Djiboutian authorities neither denied nor confirmed this 
claim.  If true, these passports would still be in circulation and 
would be valid for at least the next 4-5 years. 
 
¶13. Some of the visa recipients from Djibouti who attempted to claim 
asylum in Canada as Somalis, reported to the Customs and Border 
Protection Officer that they were actually Somalis, but had purchased 
their passports in Djibouti.  Post has been unable to confirm this 
claim, but that various sources have reported similar information. 
-------- 
IV FRAUD 
-------- 
 
¶14. Most Djiboutian IV applicants are bona fide.  However, the 
majority of immigrant petitions received in Djibouti are family 
reunification petitions for Somali citizens.  Post has a high rate of 
fraud in this area since there is no competent civil authority in 
Somalia.  All civil documents from Somalia can be easily purchased 
and falsified. 
 
¶15. The applicants typically have little to no evidence of a 
relationship to the petitioner.  Photos are almost never produced. 
When photos do exist, they are clearly staged.  (Note: Staged does 
not necessarily mean fraud.  Staged can also mean photographs by a 
paid studio portrait with fake backdrop.)  Additionally, the majority 
of applicants are illiterate, and so there are no letters exchanged 
between petitioner and applicant.  Phone calls are expensive and 
usually are made through prepaid cards, which leave no usable 
records.  Money transfer receipts are often offered as proof of 
relationship.  However, they tend to be handwritten on scraps of torn 
notebook paper, and often do not indicate the name of either 
petitioner or applicant, but rather use the name of a neighbor, 
relative, etc., in a position to send or collect the money. 
 
¶16. In addition to fraudulent marriages, an egregious number of 
unrelated and overage children are added to petitions.  Children are 
often stated to be significantly younger than they are.  To ensure 
that all the children in a family will be younger than 21 at the time 
of petitioning, some or all of their ages may be significantly 
regressed.  On many occasions, the panel physician has informed the 
ConOff that children are either suspected to be over 21, or are 
unrelated applicants. 
 
¶17. With the establishment and the expansion of Camp Lemonier in 
Djibouti -- headquarters for approximately 2,200 U.S. military forces 
-- Post has seen an increase in K1 visas.  Some beneficiaries are 
female prostitutes working in local bars.  Rudimentary English skills 
make them unable to answer simple questions about their fiances. 
 
-------- 
DV FRAUD 
-------- 
 
¶18. Post began processing Diversity Visas (DVs) in 2007.  Most of the 
winners are Somalis, who present the same documents and at times have 
the same sponsor.  This is a concern for Post, considering the lack 
of competent government authorities to issue police records, civil 
documents, school records, etc. in Somalia.  It is therefore very 
difficult for Post to verify the compliance of Somali DV applicants. 
 
---------------------- 
ACS AND PASSPORT FRAUD 
---------------------- 
 
¶19. The same factors that influence IV fraud also affect passport and 
 
DJIBOUTI 00000569  003 OF 005 
 
 
citizenship fraud.  Post is sometimes forced to rely on voluntary DNA 
testing to adjudicate CRBA cases for children born in Somalia. 
¶20. Another problematic and questionable factor is the ability of 
parentsto transfer citizenship to their child.  Some parents have 
lived out of the United States for so long it is difficult for them 
to prove at least 3 years physical presence in the United States. 
 
¶21. Due to the high number of U.S. military servicemen in Djibouti, 
Post continues to receive an increasing number of CRBA cases from 
them and their Djiboutian or Ethiopian girlfriends.  To protect the 
servicemen from prostitutes who may target them, and to prevent 
citizenship fraud, Post suggests DNA exams from the serviceman and 
the alleged child to prove relationship. 
 
¶22. Post continues to experience an increasing number of cases where 
Somali-Americans have lost their passports during their visit to 
Somalia.  Post believes there is a possibility that Somali-Americans 
return to Somalia upon receiving nationality, and give their 
passports to family members (such as their brother, sister or cousin) 
who have similar physical features to the AmCit.  The family member 
then travels to the U.S. with the passport.  Once the family member 
arrives in the U.S., the AmCit reports his or her passport lost or 
stolen.  Since Post now has access to the DSH, we use this tool to 
track the entry and exits of AmCits who report their passports lost 
or stolen.  We also have the regional LEGATT office at Embassy Sanaa 
conduct namechecks. 
 
¶23. Post has experienced an increasing number of repatriation claims 
from Somali-Americans.  An applicant typically arrives at the Embassy 
after having visited friends or family in Somaliland or Somalia for 
several months (even years).  Having overstayed the return ticket 
validity, he or she then requests financial assistance.  Another 
scenario is that the AmCit either claims to have become ill or to 
have run out of money and needs to return to the U.S.  As a result, 
numersou Somali-Americans have arrived at the consular window in 
Djibouti requesting a free plane ticket to return to the U.S., but 
are reluctant to provide contact persons for financial support.  When 
the ConOff calls the AmCit's contacts to request financial support 
for the AmCit, in many cases the individuals respond as if the plane 
ticket should be free.  In each case, Post corresponds with 
CA/OCS/ACS before approving repatriation loans for Somali-Americans. 
 
 
¶24. Many new Lawful Permanent Residents (LPRs) visiting their 
countries of origin for vacation also report their travel documents 
or green cards lost.  Post relies on authority from the DHS Regional 
Office to provide a travel letter. 
 
-------------- 
ADOPTION FRAUD 
-------------- 
 
¶25. Foreign adoption is extremely difficult in Djibouti.  By law, 
only non-Djiboutian children (e.g., a baby born to an Ethiopian 
mother and unknown father) are eligible for foreign adoption.  The 
difficulty in completing an adoption here deters all but the most 
determined would-be parents.  It is not unusual for the process to 
take up to a year to complete.  We therefore believe adoption fraud 
is negligible. 
 
---- 
DNA 
---- 
 
¶26. Post has frequently found that the only usable evidence of 
relationship is DNA.  We have found a decreasing number of cases with 
negative DNA results.  However, approximately 40 per cent of cases 
where we suggest DNA testing never follow through with such testing. 
We believe that word is spreading that DNA cannot be 'fooled', and 
abandoned cases know that they will be caught if they attempt to do 
DNA testing.  Many of the negative DNA tests come back close, but do 
not meet the required threshold for proof.  We suspect identify fraud 
in these cases; for example, an aunt or a sister claiming to be the 
mother. 
 
¶27. Post also finds a significant number of legitimate families will 
slip-in additional children.  Where more than one child is DNA 
tested, one may come back legitimate while another returns as no 
relation. 
 
¶28. Marriages where no children are available to DNA test are 
particularly difficult to prove.  Often, there is no relationship 
between the two spouses, because the marriage was arranged and the 
spouses knew each other for only a matter of days.  While the vast 
majority of the marriage arrangements involved payment to the AmCit 
 
DJIBOUTI 00000569  004 OF 005 
 
 
or LPR, the applicants still appear to take the arrangement 
seriously, and consider it to be a valid marriage. 
 
------------- 
V92s and V93s 
------------- 
 
¶29. All the issues detailed in IVs above apply to Visas 92s (V92s) 
and Visas 93s (V93s).  However, we find a significantly higher 
percentage of relationship fraud in V92s and V93s.  For V93s, in 
cases of spouses without children, the vast majority were married 
well after the I-590 was approved, usually only weeks or in some 
cases just hours prior to departure for the U.S.  During the 
interview, they frequently claim that they were living together as 
spouses for several months prior to the filing the I-590, but only 
decided to marry when departure was imminent.  Post believes that 
many unmarried refugees accept the highest financial bidder for a 
spouse after they receive their travel date. 
 
--------------- 
ALIEN SMUGGLING 
--------------- 
 
¶30. While Post has not identified any alien smuggling trends, it 
cannot discount the possibility of alien smuggling in IV cases, 
particularly when Post must rely on DNA testing to determine 
relationship.  Djibouti is a transit country for economic and 
political migrants from Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia heading to the 
Middle East.  In a desperate attempt to reach their destination, the 
migrants become targets for traffickers and smugglers. 
 
------------------------------- 
DS CRIMINAL FRAUD INVESTIGATION 
------------------------------- 
 
¶31. The RSO and ARSO support the Consular Section fraud 
investigations.  They also provide information regarding possible 
visa fraud we may encounter due to the evolving dynamics of 
Djibouti's economy.  One of the three FSNs in the Consular Section is 
dedicated to fraud investigation, but has not taken any formal fraud 
detection training.  The RSO FSN Investigator (FSNI), who assists the 
Consular Section with fraud investigations, is an experienced 
investigator who has received field investigation training.  This 
partnership between the RSO and Consular Section has strengthened 
Post's fraud prevention. All investigations results are reported in 
writing. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
HOST COUNTRY CRIMINAL FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶32. Citizenship is not automatically conferred to anyone by birth in 
Djibouti; to inherit citizenship, at least one parent must be a 
documented Djiboutian.  The Government issues birth certificates for 
non-Djiboutians; however, the document clearly states "Servie A 
L'occasion De La Naissance," meaning "Only for the Occasion of the 
Birth".   Most Djiboutians are documented, and those documents are 
well organized and maintained by the government.  Upon gaining 
independence from France in 1977, Djibouti launched a campaign to 
document its citizens. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶33. The host government cooperates with Post and is willing to assist 
us with combating visa fraud.  There is robust cooperation between 
host country security services and the USG. 
 
--------------------------- 
AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN 
--------------------------- 
 
¶34. As detailed above, a key concern is insufficient ability to 
authenticate documents presented by the many Somali applicants who 
appear at Embassy Djibouti.  As a result, it is difficult to 
establish with satisfaction the bona fides of Somali travelers, many 
of whose applications are thus denied, in the absence of guidance to 
the contrary from the Department. 
 
¶35. Long delays in responding to requests for Security Advisory 
Opinions (SAOs) are another concern.  Djibouti's predominantly Muslim 
and ethnic Somali society means a large number of applicants must 
wait for further administrative processing.  Lack of specific date or 
place of birth information for many CLASS hits has required Post to 
 
DJIBOUTI 00000569  005 OF 005 
 
 
submit numerous SAO requests--the vast majority of which are cleared, 
albeit weeks later (if not longer). 
 
¶36. ConOff works closely with the French and other Consulates to 
share and receive information on fraud trends in Djibouti.  In order 
to combat fraud from applicants from Eritrea, Yemen and Somalia, Post 
also works closely with regional posts to verify documents. 
 
---------------- 
PERSONNEL ISSUES 
---------------- 
 
¶37. Post has only one ConOff (Civil Service on excursion) and a 
back-up ConOff (untenured JO).  ConOff has taken PC541 (Fraud 
Prevention for Consular Managers) at FSI and acts as the Fraud 
Prevention Manager.  The Senior FSN in Post's Consular Section serves 
as the Fraud and ACS assistant.  No formal fraud detection training 
has been provided. Post had nominated the Senior FSN for past LES 
Fraud Prevention Workshop training, but she had not been accepted by 
FSI.  Current ConOff will leave post in August 2009, to be replaced 
by a first-tour officer. 
SWAN