VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHLM #0572/01 1490850
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 290850Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0051
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU PRIORITY 6957
RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY 3866
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 3089
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 8723
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 1711
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 3567
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1223
INFO RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI//J3/J332/J52//
RHMFIUU/CDRUSARPAC FT SHAFTER HI//APCW/APOP//

UNCLAS COLOMBO 000572 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INSB, PRM, PM/WRA 
STATE ALSO PASS TO USAID 
AID/W FOR ANE/SCA 
AID/W FOR DCHA/FFP FOR JDWORKEN, JBORNS 
AID/W FOR DCHA/OFDA FOR ACONVERY, RTHAYER AND RKERR 
BANGKOK FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA WBERGER 
KATHMANDU FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA MROGERS AND POL SBERRY 
USMISSION GENEVA FOR NKYLOH 
USUN FOR ECOSOC DMERCADO 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREF PGOV PHUM CE
SUBJECT: DEMINNG SRI LANKA'S NORTH - IMPRESSIONS FROM THE FIELD 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY: The Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) recently 
decided to begin de-mining operations in the Manthai West Division 
of Mannar District, one of five districts in the Northern Province 
and the scene of heavy fighting last year, when Government forces 
pushed the LTTE northward into the Vanni.  Manthai West Division 
includes the Rice Bowl - an area of more than 120 square kilometers 
that, because of its fertility and extensive irrigation system, has 
traditionally been a major rice producer.  For the Rice Bowl, in 
April, the GSL's Ministry of Nation Building issued de-mining task 
orders to the Sri Lankan Army (SLA), which has a de-mining unit, and 
to four international NGOs - Horizon (Indian), Sarvatra (Indian), 
Mine Action Group (MAG--British), and Fondation Suisse de Deminage 
(FSD--Swiss).  On May 18-22, a USAID/Sri Lanka official traveled to 
Mannar District to observe the commencement of Rice Bowl operations 
by MAG and FSD.  He also traveled to another division in Mannar - 
Musalli - to see ongoing de-mining operations of FSD and to talk to 
the first group of returnees in Sri Lanka's North, since the winding 
down of the conflict.  End SUMMARY. 
 
The Rice Bowl 
------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Mannar District's Manthai West Division once had over 90 
villages and hamlets, sprinkled over an area covering approximately 
500 square kilometers.  It is an area of fertile paddy fields, 
irrigated by a system of 153 major and minor tanks (reservoirs) and 
canals.  Fishing is the second most important livelihood.  According 
to provincial government records, over 26,000 people lived in the 
division in 2007. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) For many years, a forward defense line bifurcated the 
division, separating government and LTTE forces.  The forward 
defense line was heavily mined by the SLA.  The LTTE also mined a 
series of defensive earthworks.  In late 2007 and 2008, the SLA and 
LTTE engaged in fierce battles, as Government forces slowly pushed 
the rebels northward through the Manthai Division of Mannar 
District.  As Government forces moved north and eventually eastward, 
civilians fled their villages, withdrawing with the LTTE until, by 
2009, they were amassed in a final conflict zone along the coast of 
the District of Mullaitivu.  Completely depopulated except for 
soldiers of the SLA, no livelihood activities have taken place in 
Manthai West and the Rice Bowl for more than one year.  Paddy fields 
are overgrown with weeds, and there is extensive infrastructure 
destruction, including damaged tank bunds (earthen dams)and canals. 
FSD estimates that, until initial assessments are conducted, 86 
square kilometers of Manthai West - including large sections of the 
Rice Bowl, the main north-south road in the division, and areas in 
the eastern sector -- should be considered high risk for mine 
contamination. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) As the conflict entered its final phase in April along the 
northeastern coast of the country (Mullaitivu District), the GSL 
decided to begin returning displaced persons to their homes along 
the northwestern coast (Mannar District), once security and other 
conditions permitted.  A small number of families returned to Mannar 
District's Musalli Division at the end of April, after three 
de-mining NGOs completed task orders for 13 of 15 coastal villages. 
Apparently eager to show the international community that it is 
serious about returns, the GSL next issued task orders for de-mining 
to take place in Manthai West, which is an area of economic 
importance and home to approximately ten percent of the current IDP 
population from the Vanni.  According to plans, half the Rice Bowl 
area is to be de-mined by the SLA, with de-mining NGOs ("agencies") 
given the other half. 
 
Lack of Information on Minefields 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) The SLA has cleared some access roads into Manthai West, 
but many remain un-cleared and are therefore "no-go."  Neither MAG 
nor FSD have been able to see any SLA minefield maps.  Since the SLA 
rotates soldiers every six months out of assigned areas, the current 
army contingent assigned to the Rice Bowl has no first-hand 
knowledge of SLA mining.  Nonetheless, some minefields are known, or 
easily deducible (for example, along the northern side of the 
forward defense line).  When it comes to LTTE minefields, 
information is provided by soldiers who have come across mines, but 
otherwise little is known.  Over the past year, tens of soldiers 
have been injured in Manthai West, making them reluctant to stray 
off known cleared paths.  Besides strategically placing mines to 
slow advancing troops, the LTTE is known to have randomly laid small 
clusters of "nuisance mines," making minefield detection all the 
more difficult.  To assist with the initial assessment process, 
de-mining agencies hope eventually to have access to IDPs -- now in 
camps -- who used to live in former LTTE-controlled territory. 
Otherwise, the only information about the location of LTTE mines 
appears anecdotal, supplied by soldiers who find UXO or come across 
mines during their patrols. 
 
MAG and FSD Operations 
----------------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Without special permission from the Ministry of Defense 
and army commanders on the ground, civilians are not allowed beyond 
a checkpoint just north of the former forward defense line.  This is 
due to the presence of mines, as well as to concerns by the GSL that 
remnants of terrorist cells remain. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) On May 18 -22, a USAID/Sri Lanka official visited two 
de-mining agencies' operations in Mannar District - those of MAG and 
FSD.  Of the four agencies issued task orders for the Rice Bowl, 
only MAG has commenced operations, having been on the ground for 
nine days at the time of the USAID visit.  FSD will have its 
demining team in place by the end of May. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) After a safety briefing on site, the USAID official walked 
and drove the perimeter of much of the ten-square kilometer sector 
allocated by task order to MAG.  He observed use of MAG's flail 
machine, which loosens the terrain to a depth of fifteen 
centimeters, followed by manual deminers who inspect the churned-up 
trail.  He also observed manual de-mining - a painstaking task 
whereby each deminer clips vegetation and meticulously rakes and 
inspects the soil. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) With the MAG field operations manager, he visited the 
village of Palaikulai, containing 385 houses where 1,540 people once 
lived.  This area was primarily for paddy cultivation and livestock. 
 At present, there is evidence of old paddy fields, but no 
livestock.  Houses and public buildings are mostly destroyed. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) In its first nine days of operations in the Rice Bowl, 
MAG had covered 5,314 square meters by machine and a ten-man manual 
demining team, finding one Claymore mine, one 8 mm mine, and various 
UXO.  MAG is using one flail machine alongside a ten-man team.  At 
its current asset level (73 employees split between Rice Bowl and 
ongoing tasks in Batticaloa District), MAG will need several weeks 
to clear part of Palaikulai village.  If additional funding and work 
is forthcoming, MAG is ready to work up estimates for expanding 
operations by hiring more deminers and rocuring additional flail 
machines (estimated at$400,000 new). 
 
¶11.  (SBU) The following day, th USAID official returned to the 
Rice Bowl, this ime with the FSD field operations manager.  They 
walked and drove the perimeter of much of the six-kilometer square 
area tasked to FSD.  Using an expensive ($25,000 each) laser-guided 
binocular, they were able to spot a mine at the edge of a rice 
paddy, along a former LTTE defensive bund, and see how MAG uses 
high-tech to map important landmarks of the area assessed.  As part 
of its standard, demining dossier, MAG uses GPS mapping to plot the 
location and condition of roads, wells, tank bunds, houses, schools, 
hospitals, and other infrastructure.  This mapping should prove 
invaluable to Government and donor organizations as they assess the 
need for reconstruction and rehabilitation of infrastructure, in 
support of a GSL returns/resettlement strategy. 
 
Visit to Musalli Division 
-------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (SBU) After visiting the Rice Bowl, the USAID official and FSD 
field operations manager visited the Musalli Division to see 
first-hand ongoing de-mining operations and to get a sense of the 
progress made by the 107 families that had been returned to 
Saverurpuram Village with fanfare on April 30th.  FSD, under great 
pressure from the Mannar Government Agent, hopes to have its last 
Musalli Division village de-mined by the end of July.  FSD de-mining 
operations followed strict protocols, with a focus on houses and 
other landowner property (latrines, wells).  FSD's de-mining 
operation for Saverurpuram village covers three sectors, including a 
former LTTE Sea Tigers launching base that will provide access for 
this fishing village to the sea. 
 
¶13.  (SBU) With no evidence of fighting (as opposed to heavy 
fighting and destruction in the Rice Bowl), the general condition of 
houses and public buildings in Musalli Division is good.  The USAID 
official was able to talk with a number of officials and resettled 
IDPs about the challenges they face, including potable water, health 
issues (scabies and respiratory illness), malnutrition, the need for 
teachers and school furniture and supplies, and limited access (for 
security reasons) by fishermen to the sea. 
 
De-Mining and the Way Forward 
------------------------------ 
 
¶14.  (SBU) The GSL has not released a de-mining strategy for the 
North.  Rather, de-mining tasks have been issued in a piecemeal 
fashion.  After three de-mining agencies were issued task orders for 
15 coastal villages (only two of which were found to be 
contaminated) in Musalli Division, the GSL decided to issue task 
orders for the Rice Bowl of Manthai West Division. 
 
¶15.  (SBU) De-mining agencies prefer to have enough work so that 
they can work in areas simultaneously in multiple stages.  In the 
first stage, they do a general mine action assessment -- with the 
help of the local population -- to determine areas that can be 
declared "low risk" and safe for re-settlement/returns.  If there is 
evidence of possible mine or UXO contamination, the agencies conduct 
a technical survey that enables them to narrow down and demarcate 
the presence of minefields and UXO.  The demarcated areas can then 
be cleared, or put aside for later clearance, while the agencies 
continue the assessment and technical survey stages in other 
locations, thereby identifying and certifying additional area as low 
risk for re-settlement. 
 
¶16.  (SBU) A de-mining strategy for the North should actually be a 
sub-set of an overall returns strategy for the North.  However, the 
GSL has so far been reluctant to disclose its plans concerning the 
locations, timing, and numbers of IDPs it expects to return. 
Without a returns strategy, and a concurrent de-mining strategy, 
progress will continue to be piecemeal.  Without a strategy, it is 
harder for donors to program resources and impossible for demining 
agencies to work faster and more efficiently (hiring more staff, 
obtaining more capital assets). 
 
One Possible Scenario for the Rice Bowl 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶17.  (SBU) As an exercise to support resettlement/returns, FSD 
developed a rough estimate of the time and cost to de-mine the 
entire Manthai West Division.  Using assumptions of increased 
manpower (demining teams) and capital equipment (more flail machines 
and other customized equipment that would expedite the technical 
survey process), FSD estimates that it would take 12 months to cover 
the entire division.  Depending on the level of contamination 
discovered, one scenario (2.5 percent contamination) would cost 
approximately $9 million, and a second scenario (5 percent 
contamination) would cost approximately $15 million. 
 
¶18.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
-- Both MAG and FSD would like to expand their de-mining operations 
to be able to increase productivity and to "work ahead" by 
conducting assessments and technical surveys to identify low-risk 
areas where people can return immediately, even as the much slower 
mine clearing operations are taking place in other areas. 
 
--  To expand operations will require better planning, including a 
returns strategy and a supporting de-mining strategy on the part of 
the GSL, as well as significant donor resources. 
 
--  Given the random mining by the LTTE in the North and the overall 
lack of information about minefields, well-funded de-mining 
operations may still take 3 - 5 years before most IDPs are able to 
return home.  This makes it all the more imperative that the 
Government articulate a returns/resettlement policy/strategy, 
against which de-mining agencies can prepare work plans and donors 
can justify funding levels. 
 
--  If the Rice Bowl is an indicator, much of the infrastructure of 
the North appears to have been destroyed.  With their first access 
to restricted areas, de-mining agencies have an excellent 
perspective on reconstruction needs, which planners and funders can 
use to develop localized returns activities and to allocate 
resources.  As part of its de-mining task order dossiers, FSD 
already constructs accurate maps of roads, houses and public 
building, as well as paddy fields, tanks, and other livelihoods 
locations.  MAG is willing to do the same. 
 
--  De-mining operations will be expensive.  However, the 
opportunity cost of not accelerating de-mining and investing more 
funds is the ongoing provision of costly relief assistance (such as 
food aid) to IDPs in camps. 
 
MOORE