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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 CHENNAI 000145 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O.  12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PTER PHUM KDEM IN
SUBJECT: BHARAT BALLOT 09:  UPA FACES SETBACK IN TAMIL NADU 
 
REF:  A) CHENNAI 144 B) CHENNAI 107 C) CHENNAI 59 D) CHENNAI 011 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:   Tamil Nadu has played a crucial role in the 
formation of India's recent coalition governments.  In 2004, a 
DMK-led alliance swept the polls, contributing all of the state's 
parliamentary seats to the United Progressive Alliance (UPA).  But 
the tables have turned, with the DMK and Congress having lost a 
majority of their allies.  Anti-incumbency and anger over India's 
failure to intervene to stop Tamil civilian casualties in the ongoing 
war in Sri Lanka further darken the UPA's prospects in Tamil Nadu. 
Analysts believe Jayalalithaa's AIADMK and its allies will win a 
substantial majority of the 40 parliamentary seats from Tamil Nadu 
and the Union Territory of Pondicherry.   End summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) On May 13, the south Indian state Tamil Nadu, along with 
the nearby Union Territory of Pondicherry, go to the polls in the 
final round of India's rolling national election.  Tamil Nadu's 
population of over 66 million earns it 39 representatives in the Lok 
Sabha (the lower house of India's Parliament), giving the state the 
sixth largest number of seats in the Parliament.  Pondicherry elects 
one Lok Sabha member.  In the last election, Tamil Nadu's DMK and 
Congress, along with several other Tamil Nadu-based parties, played a 
pivotal role in bringing the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) to 
power by sweeping all 40 seats from Tamil Nadu and Pondicherry. 
 
Tamil Nadu at a glance 
--------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Tamil Nadu is prosperous, stable, and one of India's best 
governed states.  It generally scores high on human development 
indices, and enjoys the eighth-highest per capita income (USD 595). 
The majority of Tamils are farmers, but agriculture's part in the GDP 
has dropped by 10% in the last decade, while manufacturing and IT 
have surged, with annual growth of 40%.  Tamil Nadu's capital 
Chennai, known as Madras until 1996, has long been South India's 
administrative and economic center of gravity, with a 400-year 
history of business and trade.  The state has drawn a steady flow of 
huge investments by major global players in and around Chennai.  It 
is unique in South India in the diversity of its economic base.  Like 
its neighbors in Bangalore and Hyderabad, Tamil Nadu has a thriving 
IT sector.  Tamil Nadu's software companies employ over 200,000 
people.   But unlike Bangalore and Hyderabad, Tamil Nadu and Chennai 
are also home to major manufacturing industries and a booming 
automotive sector anchored. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) After Indian Independence the states of South India were 
arranged on linguistic lines.  The Tamil language has provided a 
continual source of local pride and political organization since 
then.  Cultural and political life are dominated by the people's 
great pride that the Tamil language is one of the few "classical 
languages" in the world still spoken today.   Linguistic pride is 
also at the core of what is known as the "Dravidian" (Tamil 
nationalist) political movement.  Dravidian politics repudiates the 
Congress party, is historically anti-Brahmin, and staunchly holds to 
its Tamil language in the face of Hindi-speaking North India.  In an 
era of coalition politics in India, Tamil Nadu's prominent Dravidian 
parties have learned to leverage their parliamentary votes and play 
an outsized role in New Delhi. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) The DMK, led by five-time Chief Minister M.K. Karunanidhi, 
is the original Dravidian party.  The AIADMK, led by the enigmatic J. 
Jayalalithaa, broke away from the parent DMK under the leadership of 
Jayalalithaa's mentor, M.G. Ramachandran.  The parties revolve around 
personality cults and offer few policy differences:  both support the 
state's welfare programs and its pro-business policies.  They have 
regularly alternated in power, leaving the national parties as bit 
players in the state.  Congress maintains a respectable enough vote 
share to make it an attractive alliance partner; the Bharatiya Janata 
Party (BJP) exists on the margins, often finding itself at a loss for 
allies in the state.  In an era of coalition politics throughout 
India, winning in Tamil Nadu's political environment requires parties 
to form strong alliances.  Although the DMK and AIADMK are the 
strongest players, both need partners from among the smaller Tamil 
Nadu-based parties and the local branches of the national parties. 
Heading into voting on May 13, the AIADMK has put together a 
formidable alliance against which the DMK and Congress find 
themselves virtually alone. 
 
 
CHENNAI 00000145  002 OF 004 
 
 
Alliance arithmetic favors Jayalalithaa 
--------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU) The AIADMK's principal advantage is the strong alliance 
that Jayalalithaa has assembled (ref B).  The AIADMK formed a 
pre-poll alliance which includes the Tamil Nadu-based PMK and MDMK 
parties, as well as the Tamil Nadu branches of the Communist Party of 
India (CPI) and Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPM).  The 
turning point was the defection of the PMK over to the AIADMK side. 
Although the PMK is a small, caste-based party confined to the 
northern districts of Tamil Nadu, it has a reputation of making 
shrewd, though unprincipled last-minute switches, always in favor of 
the winning combination.  The decision of the PMK to throw its lot 
with Jayalalithaa after lasting almost a full-term as part of the UPA 
led people to believe that the AIADMK and its allies had the edge 
over the DMK/Congress combination.  Jayalalithaa clearly banked on 
psychological impact of drawing in "the wily PMK" and wooed them by 
offering the party an unprecedented seven Lok Sabha seats. 
 
PMK bolsters Jayalalithaa's credibility on Sri Lanka 
--------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Signing up the PMK also bolstered the AIADMK's credibility 
on the signal issue of the election:  the war in Sri Lanka.  The 
bloody images of Tamil civilian casualties in Sri Lanka's 
increasingly intense campaign against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE) dominating the state's newspapers and television news 
broadcasts have caused anxiety amongst the state's voters. 
Jayalalithaa, for her part, had long taken a stern anti-LTTE line 
which included often calling her rival Karunanidhi soft on terrorism. 
 But sensing changing political winds in favor of a more "pro-Tamil" 
position, Jayalalithaa pulled in the PMK and made a full about face. 
She ratcheted up the rhetoric by calling for an independent homeland 
of Tamils in Sri Lanka, Tamil Eelam, as the only solution for the 
conflict, which is the LTTE's demand.  In the final days before the 
voting, Jayalalithaa even declared that she would send the Indian 
army to Sri Lanka to carve out Tamil Eelam, drawing a parallel with 
Indira Gandhi's support of an independent Bangladesh.  The presence 
in her coalition of the consistently proQil PMK, as well as the 
less influential butQn more militant MDMK, lent credibility to 
Jayalalithaa's turnaround on the Sri Lanka issue. 
 
Sri Lanka:  light but no heat? 
--------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU) The headlines gave the impression that the Sri Lankan war 
was the single dominant issue in the state's Lok Sabha election. 
News reports presented the average Tamil voter as seething with anger 
at the central government and the ruling Congress party for not 
intervening on the island.  Voters we spoke with, however, tended to 
downplay the issue focusing instead on local issues of concern -- 
particularly the power cuts that have affected the state for almost a 
year.  Congress and DMK leaders argue that except for young, educated 
urban voters, Sri Lanka is not a major issue.  Karti Chidambaram, son 
and campaign manager of Home Minister P. Chidambaram, told us that 
the Sri Lankan issue will not be a major issue unless LTTE leader 
Prabhakaran is killed before the voters go to the polls in Tamil 
Nadu.  On the other hand, Chidambaram said, Congress will be wiped 
out in a "tsunami" of sympathy if Prabhakaran dies before May 13. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Although Sri Lanka does not seem foremost in the minds of 
the average voter, the issue has damaged the chemistry of Q 
DMK-Congress alliance.  Grassroots workers from both the Congress and 
the DMK told us that the other party has mishandled the issue. 
Mayura Jayakumar, President of the Tamil Nadu Youth Congress, told us 
that Karunanidhi's repeated "dramas" have angered the electorate. 
"First he threatened that Tamil Nadu's MPs would resign from the Lok 
Sabha if there was no cease-fire in Sri Lanka.  Then he went on a 
fast for a few hours knowing well that some announcement would come 
from Sri Lanka," Jayakumar said.  The DMK rank and file, on the other 
hand, believes its alliance with the Congress has forced them to 
defend against AIADMK claims that the UPA is "sending arms to the Sri 
Lankan government" to aid and abet a "genocidal war" against the 
Tamils.  Karunanidhi had to publicly chide his party members for not 
displaying the Congress party's election symbol at some DMK events. 
 
Double-edged anti-incumbency 
------------- 
 
CHENNAI 00000145  003 OF 004 
 
 
 
¶10. (SBU) The DMK's position as Tamil Nadu's ruling party and a major 
constituent of the UPA in New Delhi makes for double anti-incumbency 
sentiment against it.  Anti-incumbency towards the UPA and the 
central government focuses on Sri Lanka.  Closer to home in Tamil 
Nadu, there is widespread resentment against DMK corruption, which 
many believe exceeds the "ordinary" corruption expected of Indian 
politicians.  Power outages, which last several hours a day outside 
of Chennai, are another source of public anger at the government. 
The blackouts are new to Tamil Nadu, which for many years had a power 
surplus.  Power outages affect industry, of course, but more 
troublingly for the DMK's prospects is the impact on the common man. 
As residents of one of India's more advanced states, Tamil Nadu's 
citizens are more dependent on their fans, air-conditioners, lights, 
and, most of all, televisions.  "More than lost jobs, people are 
angry because they cannot watch their favorite TV programs," a voter 
told us in Madurai's suburbs. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) DMK campaigners do have an array of successfully 
implemented populist programs to tout.  Widely circulated government 
advertisements ask, "Where else in India can you get 1 kg rice for 1 
rupee...Free color TVs to all families, Free gas stoves with LPG 
connection to poor families?"  Congress and DMK candidates also cite 
the National Rural Employment Guarantee Program as an example of the 
government's "people-friendly" programs.  But it is doubtful that 
these programs overcome the electorate's suspicions that the DMK has 
been lining its pockets for the almost ten years it has been part of 
the ruling coalition in New Delhi (first with the BJP-led National 
Democratic Alliance from 1999-2004 and with the UPA since 2004). 
 
Politics as family business irritates voters 
------------ 
 
¶12.  (SBU) The DMK's "family politics" are another source of voter 
anger.  Karunanidhi has brought two more of his children onto the 
political scene since taking power in the state in 2006.  His 
daughter Kanimozhi was nominated to the Rajya Sabha (upper house of 
Parliament) in 2007.  Karunanidhi's older son, M.K. Azhagiri, is the 
DMK's candidate for the Madurai Lok Sabha seat.  In addition, 
Karunanidhi's younger son, M.K. Stalin, continues to rise in the 
party; he was recently made party treasurer and is acting as its 
principal election campaigner.  But Azhagiri's elevation is the 
biggest drag on the party, as the Madurai-based strongman's history 
of political violence makes him a villain in the eyes of all but the 
most committed DMK voters. 
 
Lonely and ailing at the top 
----------- 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Even at 85, Karunanidhi is the DMK's only star campaigner. 
 His recent surgery and subsequent hospitalization during the 
campaign dealt another blow to the alliance's prospects in the state. 
 While Karunanidhi was limited to a small number of campaign events 
outside Chennai, Jayalalithaa addressed large, enthusiastic 
gatherings throughout the entire state, using a helicopter to 
maximize the ground she covered.  Several interlocutors noted that 
Jayalalithaa's strong campaign throughout the state contrasted with 
the weakened Karunanidhi's limited presence to the detriment of the 
DMK. 
 
Can DMK stem the tide by bribing voters? 
----------- 
 
¶14.  (SBU) The AIADMK and its allies are feeling confident going into 
the voting.  But they have one concern:  that the DMK might be able 
to win a number of seats through large-scale bribing of voters (ref 
A).   One AIADMK candidate told us that the party's only fear is the 
"Thirumangalam style" victory the DMK engineered in a January 
by-election, which was widely credited to a massive cash-for-votes 
program (ref D).  Journalists noted that virtually all of Tamil 
Nadu's parties pay bribes to voters, but that the DMK has the largest 
war chest and is likely to spend it to try to stave off defeat.  Ref 
A reports on the details of voter bribery in Tamil Nadu. 
 
BJP could win a seat; Chidambaram in trouble 
----------- 
 
¶15.  (SBU) The BJP, which has only won parliamentary seats in Tamil 
 
CHENNAI 00000145  004 OF 004 
 
 
Nadu through pre-poll alliances with other parties, might actually 
win a seat on its own.  Several contacts said that the division of 
Christian votes between the DMK, several smaller parties, and 
independent candidates in Kanyakumari, the southernmost constituency 
in India, might allow the BJP to win the seat.  Though the BJP is 
generally weak in Tamil Nadu, Kanyakumari is one of its best 
constituencies due to a history of tension between Christian and 
Hindu groups there.  Home Minister P. Chidambaram is contesting in 
south Tamil Nadu's Sivaganga constituency.  Several credible 
interlocutors told us that he is in danger of losing the election. 
 
Potential impact of smaller parties is the wildcard 
----------- 
 
¶16.  (SBU) The DMK and the Congress are hoping that unaligned parties 
will help them by drawing more votes from their opponents and 
splitting the anti-incumbency votes.  Vijayakanth's DMDK, launched in 
2005, has steadily increased its vote share and may command as much 
as ten percent of the vote in some districts.  The DMDK is running 
candidates in all parliamentary constituencies, making the Tamil Nadu 
races a three-way affair (at minimum).  In western Tamil Nadu, 
contacts pointed to the emergence of a new caste-based party -- the 
Kongu Nadu Munnetra Peravai (KNMP) -- as a major factor, with some 
predicting that KNMP candidates might come in second place in several 
constituencies.  Analysts told us that parties like the KNMP and DMDK 
make Tamil Nadu difficult to predict because it is impossible to know 
from which of the major parties these new entrants will pull votes. 
 
Gloomy outlook for DMK/Congress 
----------- 
 
¶17.  (SBU) "We are in bad shape here," said a senior Congress leader 
from a neighboring state who was sent to Tamil Nadu to conduct an 
independent assessment of the party's prospects less than two weeks 
before voting.  "If elections are held today, it will be 30 (for the 
AIADMK and its allies) to 10 (for DMK and Congress)."   The official 
went on to say the best case for Congress and the DMK is a 20-20 
split.  (Note:  These figures include the single seat for 
Pondicherry.  End note.)  Analysts generally concurred with the 
Congress leader's glum assessment, though they largely feel the best 
case scenario for the Congress/DMK alliance is 15 seats. 
 
¶18.  (SBU) Comment:  The glum assessments of the DMK and Congress's 
prospects seem reasonable.  Most of their alliance partners have 
abandoned them to join the AIADMK.  Anti-incumbency and the Sri 
Lankan war further weigh them down.  The inability of the 
still-charismatic Karunanidhi to vigorously campaign might have been 
the final straw.  If the AIADMK alliance picks up 30 or more seats as 
predicted, the mercurial Jayalalithaa could be a major player in the 
post-poll jockeying to form a government in New Delhi.  Her history 
of unpredictability and brinkmanship would add even more uncertainty 
to an already complicated post-poll scenario.  End comment. 
 
KAPLAN