Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 64621 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 09BRASILIA605, IAEA ELECTIONS: BRAZIL APPEARS POISED TO THROW ITS HAT IN

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09BRASILIA605.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BRASILIA605 2009-05-13 13:28 2011-07-11 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Brasilia
VZCZCXRO3305
RR RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #0605/01 1331328
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 131328Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4284
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0145
INFO RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 0664
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 9520
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 7717
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 4028
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 6204
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1268
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RUEANFA/NRC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 000605 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE DEPT FOR D(S), P, T, IO, ISN 
PARIS ALSO FOR USOECD 
DOE FOR NA-20 
NSC FOR CONNERY 
NRC FOR DOANE, SCHWARTZMAN 
UNVIE FOR IAEA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/06/2019 
TAGS: AORC PREL KNNP IAEA ENRG ETTC JA SF BR
SUBJECT: IAEA ELECTIONS:  BRAZIL APPEARS POISED TO THROW ITS HAT IN 
THE RING, IN THE MEANTIME - SUPPORTING MINTY 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Lisa Kubiske, Reasons 1.4 (b) 
and (d) 
 
REF: A) STATE 46302, B) UNVIE 189 AND PREVIOUS, 
C) BRASILIA 599 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY.  Post delivered demarche (REFTEL A) about USG 
support for the Japanese candidate Amano to become the new Director 
General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and reasons 
why Brazil should do so too.  Nonetheless, Brazil will support the 
South African candidate Minty.  The Brazilian Ministry of Exterior 
Relations (MRE) sees the two leading candidates (Amano and South 
African Minty) as unlikely to gather the 24 votes needed.  In that 
situation, the Post see signals that the Brazilian Minister of 
Exterior Relations (MRE) Celso Amorim is poised to step in and 
present himself as a consensus candidate.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C) Per REFTEL A, Post's Environment, Science and Technology 
(EST) Counselor delivered on May 11 to MRE's Deputy Director of the 
Division for Disarmament and Sensitive Technologies, Fabio Abud 
Antibas, the demarche about USG support for the Japanese candidate 
Yukiya Amano to become the new Director General of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the reasons why Brazil should do so 
too.  Antibas replied that Brazil will support the South African 
candidate Abdul Minty.  Recently, MRE's Director of the Division for 
Disarmament and Sensitive Technologies, Minister Santiago Mourao, 
told EST Counselor that Brazil did not see either of the two leading 
candidate - Amano or Minty - as being able to attract the 24 votes 
needed to gain the position as the next IAEA Director General. 
Mourao stressed that it was important to look not at only those 
voting for a candidate but also the determination and strength of 
those opposed (rather than just not in favor).  With Amano, Mourao 
thought he had already peaked and would only see his votes dribble 
away.  He added that the opposition to Amano was hardening and would 
grow.  On the other hand, he thought Minty could see some small 
increase in his votes without much stiffening of the opposition 
against him.  He opined that this was because neither Brazil nor 
other countries think Minty has a chance of getting close to the 
required votes.  If there was a serious possibility for Minty, then 
the opposition would become stronger in a hurry. 
 
3.  (C) Mourao reiterated the position that Brazil is supporting 
Minty.  He explained that this was out of South-South solidarity and 
not because it opposes Amano or the other possible candidates. 
 
4.  (C) Mourao was clear that he did not see Minty winning.  So, if 
neither Minty nor Amano are going to win, who would Brazil support to 
be the next Director General?  Mourao did not think much of the 
chances for the other candidates mentioned so far (REFTEL B).  When 
pressed about who Brazil would favor if Minty drops out, Mourao 
offered a curious story.  He said that recently he and other MRE 
staff members were having an informal meeting to discuss a fall back 
position.  The MRE front office heard about this internal meeting and 
immediately and emphatically squashed any discussion by staff about 
Brazil supporting candidates other than Minty. 
 
5.  (C) Subsequently, a report appeared in the May 1 edition of a 
major newspaper (O Estado de Sao Paulo) which laid out a plan to 
submit MRE Minister Celso Amorim as a consensus candidate should 
Minty and Amano fail to get the necessary votes.  This rumor had 
appeared in the press several months ago and MRE emphatically denied 
it.  In a May 4 lunch with former President Jimmy Carter, Amorim 
emphatically denied any interest in the position, saying that the 
scenario laid out in the article was "plausible," but simply not 
accurate.  He reiterated his lack of interest in public on May 6, 
saying that he would like to remain in place through the end of 
Lula's government. 
 
6.  (C) COMMENT: Amorim's denials do not ring true.  The article, 
which plays up Amorim's qualifications, leaves little doubt that it 
was sourced from MRE.  Moreover, if Mourao's analysis is accurate 
that Minty and Amano will not win, an opening may indeed exist for 
Amorim to step in as a consensus candidate -- one with good ties to 
the developed countries and to the G-77 members.  In addition, Brazil 
 
BRASILIA 00000605  002 OF 002 
 
 
is seeking a bigger role among the international organizations and it 
has not pursued the top job at UNESCO, which increases pressure to 
seek a leadership position in some other UN bodies, such as the IAEA. 
 
7.  (C) Given Amorim's close relations with Iran, his candidacy may 
seem like a longshot.  Further, Brazil's reluctance to embrace the 
Additional Protocol and other non-proliferation measures (REFTEL C), 
would likely undercut support for Amorim among countries that want a 
Director General who can effectively advocate for universal adherence 
to the Additional Protocol.  Still, assuming the interest is real, it 
provides incentive for the Brazilians to engage with us on issues 
that would align them more with the IAEA mainstream.  END COMMENT. 
 
SOBEL