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DE RUEHBR #0599/01 1312119
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R 112119Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4277
INFO RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0142
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 9514
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 7711
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 4022
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 6201
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1265
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RUEANFA/NRC WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 000599 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN/MNSA 
UNVIE FOR IAEA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2019 
TAGS: ENRG KNNP TRGY ETTC IAEA BR AR
SUBJECT: NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION: BRAZIL MAY SOFTEN ON IAEA 
INTERVIEW REQUEST, BUT ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL NOT LIKELY 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Lisa Kubiske, Reasons 1.4 (b) 
and (d) 
 
REF:  A) STATE 18646, B) BRASILIA 201, 
C) UNVIE VIENNA 29, D) 2008 RIO 295, 
E) 2008 BRASILIA 1529 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY.  It appears that an internal turf battle between 
Brazil's Defense and External Relations Ministries led to Defense 
Minister Nelson Jobim's refusal to cooperate with the IAEA's request 
to interview a Brazilian scientist over his book on nuclear weapons. 
Minister Jobim now recognizes that refusing IAEA access to Brazilian 
personnel and facilities risks creating an impression that the 
Government of Brazil (GOB) does not support global non-proliferation 
goals, and has expressed a willingness to find a way forward on the 
book matter. 
 
¶2. (C) The idea of Brazil signing an International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol is dead for now, according to 
Ministry of Exterior Relations (MRE) officials.  President Luiz 
Inacio Lula da Silva's administration has always been a reluctant 
supporter of existing non-proliferation measures and remains wary of 
new ones.  Defense Minister Jobim has now emerged as the strongest 
voice in defense of Brazil's traditional opposition to an Additional 
Protocol.  The environment is unlikely to change until a new 
president enters office in 2011.  See para 9 for Embassy suggestions 
on how to lay the groundwork bilaterally and multilaterally for the 
incoming Brazilian government to engage in a constructive way on 
non-proliferation.  An upcoming visit to Washington by Minister 
Jobim, scheduled for May 22, presents an excellent opportunity for 
high-level engagement with this key player. Furthermore, an informal 
visit by a few high-level USG non-proliferation officials in the near 
term could be helpful to increase our understanding of Brazilian 
views and lay the foundation for future advances on 
non-proliferation.  END SUMMARY. 
 
OBSTACLES TO A GOOD IDEA 
 
¶3.  (C) The proposal for Brazil to sign an IAEA Additional Protocol 
has been rejected by the Brazilian Government.  President Lula made 
that decision based on advice from Defense Minister Jobim, MRE's 
Director of the Division for Disarmament and Sensitive Technologies, 
Minister Santiago Mourao (strictly protect) told Post's Environment, 
Science and Technology, and Health (ESTH) Counselor at a meeting on 
April 24.  Mourao acknowledged the recent conversation between 
President Obama and President Lula on nuclear non-proliferation, but 
this has not caused Brazil to alter its position.  In a meeting with 
Ambassador Sobel May 8, MRE Under Secretary for Political Affairs 
Vera Machado confirmed that Brazil is not open to discussion on 
signing an Additional Protocol, citing language in the December 2008 
National Defense Strategy prepared by the Ministry of Defense. 
 
¶4. (C) The Lula Administration has been a reluctant supporter of 
existing non-proliferation measures and remains wary of new ones.  In 
his initial campaign for the Presidency, Lula stated that if he had 
been President he would not have signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty. 
 Defense Minister Jobim has now emerged as the strongest defender of 
Brazil's tradition opposition to an Additional Protocol.  According 
to Mourao, there are other (unnamed) supporters of this position, as 
well, both within the Presidency and MRE.  Mourao has been the 
strongest proponent of signing, but now says that he will back off. 
He joked, "I would deserve your Medal of Honor if I were to raise the 
issue again" in the current environment.  In 2008, Mourao and 
representatives of other Brazilian nuclear technical bodies had 
concluded that there was no technical obstacle to Brazil signing and 
complying with an Additional Protocol (REFTEL D).  In February 2009, 
Othon Pinheiro, the Director-President of Eletrobras Termonuclear 
S.A., had floated his personal idea -- one that had not been raised 
elsewhere within the government -- of an alternative inspection 
arrangement that fell short of an Additional Protocol (REFTEL B), 
which Washington rejected as an unacceptable substitute (REFTEL C). 
 
¶5.  (C) The Defense Ministry's resistance stems from concerns about 
possible inspections of the Navy's enrichment facility in Aramar, 
State of Rio de Janeiro, and of the propulsion unit for a planned 
nuclear powered submarine.  Minister Jobim pointed to these concerns 
in a press interview in Gazeta Mercantil in March.  Pinheiro, a 
former admiral, also acknowledged the military's sensitivity to 
outside inspections.  (COMMENT: Post has long noticed a sharp 
contrast between the openness of the civilian nuclear energy sector 
 
BRASILIA 00000599  002 OF 003 
 
 
and the research and enrichment work of the Brazilian military.  END 
COMMENT.) 
 
¶6.  (C) An internal turf battle over who has the lead in determining 
Brazil's stance on multilateral nuclear obligations appears to 
underlie Minister Jobim's decision to block efforts by the IAEA to 
meet with a Brazilian researcher (Dalton Barrosa), who wrote a 
doctoral thesis and a book relating to nuclear weapons (REFTEL B). 
The turf battle arose because MRE had seemed prepared -- without 
prior consultation with the Defense Ministry -- to allow IAEA 
officials to interview a Defense Ministry scientist.  Jobim told 
Ambassador Sobel on May 3 that he would not let MRE speak for the 
Defense Ministry.    Nonetheless, Jobim told the Ambassador that he 
is aware that the Brazilian decision has now generated controversy 
and undermined Brazil's standing as a supporter of non-proliferation 
standards.  He is now looking for a way to cooperate with the IAEA 
that does not undermine what he views as his authority on nuclear 
issues. 
 
¶7. (C) COMMENT.  Although MRE insists that it has the lead on 
Additional Protocol issues and that the Defense Ministry does not 
play, it is our view that, after President Lula, Minister Jobim has 
the most clout on nuclear issues.  As a result, although he will not 
agree with us on all aspects of the nuclear issues, he is the 
principal GOB player we need to engage.  Minister Jobim's May 22 
visit to Washington provides an excellent opportunity to make 
progress toward a satisfactory resolution of the book matter.  Post 
encourages meetings with him at the highest levels, in which this 
issue, as well as the importance of the universal application of an 
Additional Protocol, are raised with him in a non-confrontational 
manner.  END COMMENT. 
 
POSSIBLE NEXT STEPS FORWARD 
 
¶8.  (C) With under 20 months remaining, the Lula Administration 
appears unlikely to reconsider the issue of an Additional Protocol. 
Post believes that direct pressure to do so would not be successful 
and could be counterproductive as the government might react even 
more strongly, making it difficult for the incoming government to 
walk back a hardline position.  As Under Secretary Machado indicated, 
the National Defense Strategy has language that can be read to mean 
Brazil won't accept an Additional Protocol or other inspection 
regimes while the nuclear weapon states have not made substantial 
progress in disarming.  However, Brazil was very late to the party on 
joining the Non-Proliferation Treaty, but eventually did so.  We can 
envision a similar pattern taking place with the Additional Protocol. 
 As a matter of policy, Brazil wants to uphold all international 
obligations, particularly those from the United Nations.  This leaves 
the Brazilians in a difficult position balancing support for 
non-proliferation standards with a strong domestic political 
constituency that believes Brazil's nuclear program should be free of 
any outside oversight, as articulated in the National Defense 
Strategy. 
 
¶9.  (C) Post offers the following three-prong approach for laying the 
groundwork for Brazil's eventual acceptance of an Additional 
Protocol.  The goal would be to look toward the new Brazilian 
administration taking up the issue when it comes to power in 2011. 
 
- BILATERALLY.  Post suggests that the USG directly and through 
friends and allies educate Brazilians likely to play key roles in the 
new government about the non-proliferation regime, how an Additional 
Protocol works, and how it does not impose an unacceptable burden on 
a country's nuclear program.  These Brazilians would include likely 
presidential candidates Governor Jose Serra and Civilian Household 
(Prime) Minister Dilma Rousseff and their likely foreign affairs 
advisors (Sergio Amaral for Serra and Luciano Coutinhos, President of 
BNDES, in the Presidency).  Also, leaders in the civilian nuclear 
field, such as Pinheiro, key officials at the National Commission on 
Nuclear Energy (CNEN), the General Institutional Security (GSI), and 
the electric and nuclear energy companies (Electrobras, 
Electronuclear, and Industrias Nucleares Brasileiras).  Moreover, 
Navy and other Defense Ministry officials who are willing should be 
provided with opportunities to see how inspections are carried out 
elsewhere, so as to reduce their concerns about excessive 
intrusiveness.  Finally, legislators, journalists, and NGOs could be 
briefed and/or brought to the United States to learn about the 
Additional Protocol.  This educational campaign would need to disarm 
the concerns about an Additional Protocol posing a real threat to 
national security and to create a more positive view on an Additional 
 
BRASILIA 00000599  003 OF 003 
 
 
Protocol. 
 
- An informal visit by a few senior USG non-proliferation officials 
could be helpful to keep a dialogue on non-proliferation going.  This 
would avoid having the current differences with the Lula 
Administration over the Additional Protocol and the release of 
Barrosa's book (and the subsequent denial of permission for an IAEA 
team to interview him) undercut the rest of our non-proliferation 
agenda.  According to MRE Under Secretary Vera Machado, the GOB is 
close to internal agreement on language that would allow Brazil to 
agree on using the Argentine-Brazilian Agency for Accounting and 
Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) to meet requirements in the 
Nuclear Suppliers Group.  She thought this would be finalized in the 
latter half of June, making July a good date for a team to visit.  If 
such a team comes to Brazil we suggest that they meet with Civilian 
Household (Prime) Minister Dilma Rousseff, Defense Minister Jobim, 
Minister of Mines and Energy Edson Lobao, Minister of Science and 
Technology Sergio Resende, National Security Advisor Marco Aurelio 
Garcia, and MRE Under Secretaries for Political Affairs Machado and 
for Energy Andre Amado. 
 
- MULTILATERALLY.  Brazil does not like to be isolated 
internationally.  This is one of the most powerful reasons why it 
eventually joined the NPT.  The greater the number of other countries 
that sign an Additional Protocol and multilateral bodies that endorse 
it, the greater the pressure on Brazil.  Furthermore, the more the 
IAEA, the UN General Assembly and other multilateral bodies speak 
positively towards universal use of Additional Protocols, the more 
likely that Brazil will eventually come around. 
 
- ARGENTINA.  Argentina will play a pivotal role in moving Brazil 
forward, and any USG team that visits Brazil to discuss this issue 
should visit Argentina afterward.  Currently, Argentina has not 
pushed Brazil very hard on signing an Additional Protocol, and we 
should encourage it to do so.  Argentina has accepted the view that, 
because both Brazil and Argentina concluded their Quadpartite 
Agreement with the IAEA in 1997 under the umbrella of the 1991 the 
Argentine-Brazilian Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear 
Materials (ABACC), Argentina cannot agree to an Additional Protocol 
without Brazil doing so too.  If a way could be found for Argentina 
to sign an Additional Protocol without Brazil having to do so, it 
would place enormous pressure on Brazil to follow suit. 
 
SOBEL