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R 051945Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
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RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 7501
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RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0930
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 9446
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RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 3952
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 000551 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/04/2019 
TAGS: PREL ENRG PINR SCUL BR IR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: AHMADINEJAD'S VISIT OFF, THEN ON, AND 
FINALLY OFF 
 
REF: BRASILIA 000477 
 
BRASILIA 00000551  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Clifford Sobel, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
Brazil: Ahmadinejad's visit off, then on, and finally off 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: One day before Iranian President 
Ahmadinejad was scheduled to arrive in Brasilia leading a 
delegation of more than 100 government and industry 
officials, Brasilia was awash in contradictory news reports 
and rumors of whether the visit would or would not be 
postponed.  It was not until 5:00 pm May 4 that the Brazilian 
Ministry of External Relations (MRE) finally confirmed the 
postponement of the visit until after the Iranian elections. 
According to both press and Embassy contacts, the Iranians 
were concerned about an insufficiently high profile for the 
visit, negative press in advance of the visit, what they 
considered an inadequate response to press attacks by the 
GOB, and an MRE statement critical of Ahmadinejad's remarks 
at the Durban Review conference.  The fairly late 
cancellation and the bungled manner in which it was 
communicated to the Brazilian government likely bothered the 
Brazilians, but it will probably not affect Brazil's interest 
in pursuing closer ties with Iran or the prospect for a 
future visit after the Iranian elections.  End summary. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
On, then off, then on, and finally off 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶2. (C) In light of reports from Iranian news sources over the 
weekend indicating that Ahmadinejad was postponing his visit 
to Brasilia, poloff contacted Minister Rodrigo do Amaral, 
chief of Staff to Undersecretary for MRE Political Affairs 
Roberto Jaguaribe, in the morning of May 4 to request 
confirmation of the postponement of the visit.  Hearing of 
the news reports for the first time, Amaral asked poloff to 
forward links to the news stories, but added that at that 
very moment Iran's Ambassador to Brazil was meeting with 
Jaguaribe to finalize details of Ahmadinejad's agenda.  He 
further noted that at 4:00 pm that day, Jaguaribe would hold 
a press conference to discuss the visit. 
 
¶3. (C) Several hours later, during lunch with former 
President Carter, Foreign Minister Celso Amorim was asked 
about Ahmadinejad's visit and confirmed that it was in 
question.  He noted that the Iranians were not happy about 
press criticism of Ahmadinejad and his visit and what Iran 
saw as the GOB's lackluster defense of Iran (Note: On Sunday, 
May 3, hundreds of people in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo 
protested against Ahmadinejad's visit.  End note).  According 
to Amorim, the GOB had been very clear in discussing the 
visit with press that Brazil seeks a policy of engagement 
with Iran, and that Iran is a major and influential power in 
the region that should have a role in the Middle East peace 
process.  But, he told the Iranians, Brazil has a free press 
and the GOB can do nothing about what they decide to write. 
Cancellation of the visit would be "a mistake", Amorim told 
the Iranians, but added that "Brazil would not beg."  Amorim 
ascribed the Iranian sensitivity to the upcoming election. 
 
¶4. (C) Subsequent to the Amorim's comments, and after 
Brazilian news reports had picked up Iranian reports about 
the cancellation of the visit, at 1:30, Brazilian media 
reported that the Iranian Embassy in Brazil was indicating 
that the visit would take place.  An hour later, Amaral again 
confirmed to Poloff that, while there had been some 
protocol-related hiccups with the visit, "at no time" had the 
visit been postponed. 
 
¶5. (U) Finally, at around 5:00 pm, press began reporting that 
Itamaraty had confirmed that the visit had been postponed 
until after the Iranian elections.  The reports also noted 
that the rest of the delegation, composed of Iranian business 
leaders, would continue with the rest of the agenda, which 
included meetings in Sao Paulo with Brazilian business 
 
BRASILIA 00000551  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
leaders in the areas of oil and gas, mining, and electric 
energy.   Folha de Sao Paulo quoted the message Ahmadinejad 
sent President Lula postponing the visit: "In expressing my 
greetings to Your Excellence, your government, and to the 
Brazilian nation, I'm grateful for the cordial invitation to 
visit Brazil.  Bilateral relations between our two countries 
accelerated in pace in terms of increasing cooperation.  I am 
very interested in making the visit, based in the political 
will to develop bilateral relations in all fields.  I ask 
Your Excellency to accept postponement of my official visit 
until an opportunity after the presidential elections in Ira, 
until a convenient date which can be arranged through our 
Foreign Ministries.  I beg God for the prosperity and 
well-being of the Brazilian nation and for the success of 
Your Excellency." 
 
------------------- 
Excuses, excuses 
------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) During a dinner in honor of former President Carter, 
Brazilian guests told Ambassador Sobel that several factors 
were at play in the postponement.  One was Iranian 
unhappiness with protocol-related arrangements Itamaraty had 
proposed.  The Iranians apparently wanted the standard 
official and public ceremony for heads of state, which was 
too difficult to pull off in the temporary makeshift offices 
where President Lula is currently working from (Note: 
Planalto Palace is currently undergoing renovations and the 
President is working out of the Bank of Brazil Cultural 
Center, an isolated building away from downtime Brasilia. 
End note.) In addition, the Iranians were unhappy that there 
would be no parade in honor of Ahmadinejad.  Up to Monday 
afternoon, there remained disagreement with the wording of 
the communiqu that would be issued by the two countries. 
Finally, news reports are also citing Iranian unhappiness 
with Itamaraty's statement in reaction to Ahmadinejad's 
Durban II speech, which was slightly critical of 
Ahmadinejad's remarks, and noted that Brazil would use 
Ahmadinejad's visit to share Brazil's views that such 
comments "damage the climate of dialogue and understanding 
necessary for the international treatment of the issue of 
discrimination."   According to Estado de Sao Paulo, Iranian 
diplomat Hussein Rezvani, in reaction to Brazil's criticism 
of Ahmadinejad's Durban remarks, said they were not a "good 
sign in light of (Ahmadinejad's) visit." 
 
---------------------------------- 
Some relief...and embarrassment 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) According to contacts at the Ministry of Finance and 
Itamaraty, reactions to the postponement ranged from relief 
to embarrassment.  According to the Ministry of Finance's 
Luis Mellin, there was reluctance within the Brazilian 
government to extend export credits to Iran, and as a result 
the postponement was actually welcomed in some GOB circles. 
Reaction at Itamaraty was one of embarrassment.  After 
Itamaraty had announced the postponement Amaral called poloff 
to make sure poloff knew that this had been a last minute 
cancellation and that his previous statements reflected what 
his office knew them at the time.  He noted that the official 
message to postpone the visit was communicated to Itamaraty 
around 4:00 by the Iranian Ambassador, which caused the delay 
in Jaguaribe's press conference. 
 
---------- 
Comment: 
---------- 
 
¶8. (C) It seems clear that the postponement caught the 
Brazilians by surprise and that Iran handling of it probably 
ruffling a few feathers in the process.  If, however, the 
Iranian cancellation was based on a calculation that the 
visit by Ahmadinejad might do his campaign more harm than 
good, the May 5 press seems to have confirmed the fears: the 
 
BRASILIA 00000551  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
op-eds prepared to run on the day of the visit were 
overwhelmingly negative, and stories would almost certainly 
have focused on planned protests.  Nonetheless, amidst the 
opposition to Ahmadinejad lies fairly consistent support for 
expanding relations with Iran, and we expect that this 
aborted visit will not affect Brazil's interest in continue 
to pursue closer ties with Iran or the prospects for a future 
visit at some point after the Iranian elections. 
SOBEL