VZCZCXYZ0009
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBO #1582/01 1392145
ZNR UUUUU ZZH (CCY ADX0069228F MSI3389 614)
P 192145Z MAY 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8756
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 8899
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 2251
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 7554
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA PRIORITY 3650
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO PRIORITY 8260
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAWJC/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNFB/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY

UNCLAS BOGOTA 001582 
 
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ADDED CAPTION) 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MARR MASS MOPS PREL PGOV PTER OIIP SNAR CO
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF USNS COMFORT TO COLOMBIA 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) Post warmly welcomes the visit of the USNS Comfort 
and her crew to Colombia from June 6-17.  The humanitarian 
and medical services you will provide will be welcomed by the 
Government of Colombia (GOC) and by the people of Tumaco, 
Narino -- one of the poorest areas of Colombia.  Your visit 
comes at a key time in the U.S.-Colombia bilateral 
relationship.  In ten years, Colombia has progressed from a 
near failed state to an economic, political, and social 
leader in Latin America.  Colombia has made major progress in 
its fight against illegal armed groups and set records in the 
eradication and interdiction of drugs.  Murder and kidnapping 
rates have dropped dramatically, while rule of law is 
strengthened through major judicial reforms.  Improved 
security has grown the economy, reduced poverty, and 
attracted record levels of investment.  The GOC has looked to 
leverage these successes beyond its borders by offering 
troops to NATO in Afghanistan and by providing 
counterterrorism and counternarcotics training to Mexican, 
Panamanian and other law enforcement agencies in the region. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Still, significant challenges remain.  Terrorist 
organizations, drug traffickers and illegal armed groups 
continue to operate in large parts of the country, including 
Narino department.  Colombia has over three million 
internally displaced persons, and deep social divides still 
prevent millions of citizens, especially in rural areas, from 
benefiting fully from security and economic gains.  Despite 
progress on human rights, some elements of the security 
forces continue to violate human rights, and the military has 
been accused of numerous exrajudicial killings of innocents. 
Violence against trade unionists continues even as the GOC 
has stepped up prosecutions and boosted its protection 
programs for unionists, human rights activists, and other 
vulnerable individuals.  USG support is critical to help the 
GOC confront these persistent challenges, even as we continue 
our dialogue on how best to transfer key security tasks from 
the USG to the GOC.  End Summary. 
 
Narino and Tumaco: A Major Challenge 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶3. (SBU) Consolidating security and increasing development in 
Narino department represents a major challenge.  Narino is 
one of Colombia's poorest departments, and is plagued by an 
active drug trade, numerous illegal armed groups and 
widespread violence.  Narino has historically received 
limited support from the national government.  The population 
of western Narino, which includes the port-city of Tumaco, is 
roughly ninety percent Afro-Colombian and six percent 
indigenous.  Tumaco is Narino's second-largest city, with a 
population of approximately 170,000.  Tumaco's economy is 
largely agricultural, including palm oil, cacao, banana, 
coconut, fishery, forestry and cattle.  There is only one 
major road in Western Narino -- a two-laned paved highway 
that connects Tumaco with the departmental capital of Pasto, 
in the interior of the department. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The United Nations reported in 2007 that 20% of all 
coca in Colombia is cultivated in Narino, and that Tumaco is 
second on the national list of municipalities with the most 
coca cultivation.  Due to its geographic location, Narino is 
also a transit route for narcotics destined for the United 
States and for incoming precursor chemicals from Ecuador. 
The emergence of semi-submersible vessels, which are 
difficult to detect in open water, pose a serious challenge 
for Colombian interdiction operations.  The Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army 
(ELN) and several criminal groups involved in 
narcotrafficking are active in Narino, and frequently fight 
for control of the drug trade in the area.  The homicide rate 
in Tumaco is roughly four times the national average.  In 
2008, there were 270 homicides in Tumaco, and there have been 
more than 100 so far in 2009. 
 
Democratic Security Advances 
---------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) The GOC has achieved successes in its fight against 
the FARC, National Liberation Army (ELN) and emerging 
criminal groups.  The rescue of 15 high-profile FARC hostages 
in July 2008, including three Americans, and the deaths of 
key FARC leaders highlight Colombia's progress in security. 
Colombian security forces captured or killed a number of 
mid-level FARC leaders, and reduced the space in which 
terrorists can operate freely.  A record number of FARC 
members deserted in 2008--including high-level commanders. 
Total demobilizations of illegal armed groups reached 3461 in 
2008--primarily from the FARC--making it the highest level of 
individual demobilizations in Colombia's history. 
 
¶6. (SBU) With USG help, Colombia again set records in 
eradication and interdiction of drugs in 2008, while further 
reducing murder and kidnapping rates.  Colombia extradited a 
record 208 criminals, narcotraffickers and terrorists to the 
United States in 2008, including 15 senior ex-paramilitary 
leaders; Colombia has already extradited 20 criminals in 
¶2009.  The number of homicides fell for the sixth consecutive 
year, dropping to 16,140 (or 33 for every 100,000 habitants), 
45 percent lower than 2002 levels. 
 
Regional Context 
---------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) Colombia sees itself as a key U.S. ally in an Andean 
region increasingly hostile to U.S. values and goals. 
Ecuador broke diplomatic relations with Colombia after a 
military strike in March 2008 against FARC Commander Raul 
Reyes's camp just across the border in Ecuador.  The GOC 
maintains a moderate tone with Ecuadorian President Correa, 
despite his often angry rhetoric.  Ecuador imposed strict 
requirements on Colombians wishing to travel to their 
southern neighbor. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Relations with Venezuela are now more stable, and 
have improved since Venezuela recalled its ambassador 
following the Reyes attack.  Presidents Uribe and Chavez met 
in late January in Cartagena, signing several economic 
cooperation agreements.  However, Colombia remains wary of 
Venezuelan ties to the FARC, as evidenced in the computers 
found in the Raul Reyes camp.  Beyond the Andes, Colombia is 
helping Mexico to combat terrorism, narcotrafficking and 
other criminal activity.  Colombia is also working with 
Mexico, Chile, Peru and Brazil to promote economic 
integration and strengthen democratic institutions in Latin 
America.  Colombia has also offered to send engineering and 
special forces to Afghanistan under NATO auspices, and 
contributes troops to the Multi-National Observer Forces in 
the Sinai. 
 
Economic Growth and Free Trade 
------------------------------ 
 
¶9. (U) After several years of strong economic growth, 
Colombia has begun to feel the pinch of the global economic 
crisis.  Growth slowed to 2.5 percent in 2008 after record 
growth of 7.5 percent in 2007.  Recent growth projections for 
2009 hover around zero percent.  Colombia remains highly 
dependent on commodity exports (petroleum, coal, flowers, 
coffee), making it vulnerable to price drops.  Colombia cut 
unemployment and poverty during the past six years, but those 
gains have stalled due to international crisis.  The 
financial sector remains solid -- cushioned to date against 
the global credit crunch by conservative lending practices. 
The slowing economy has led to growing popular concern over 
pocketbook issues, and a pyramid scandal in 2008 cost 
Colombians an estimated $1 billion in savings.  The GOC inked 
trade deals with Canada, Chile, Central America and smaller 
European countries in the last year.  The GOC is now 
negotiating an agreement with the EU.  The U.S.-Colombia 
Trade Promotion Agreement (CPTA) remains a bilateral priority 
for the Colombian government and private sector. 
 
Serious Challenges Ahead 
------------------------ 
 
¶10. (SBU) Despite advances in security and development, 
challenges related to violence, narcotrafficking, 
displacement, human rights, labor rights, and minority groups 
remain.  We estimate the FARC has around 9,000 armed fighters 
in the field, and organized narcotrafficking groups continue 
to cause violence.  Internal displacement due to the armed 
conflict remains serious, with three million displaced by 
violence since 1995.  Deep historical social divides make it 
difficult for millions from the Afro-Colombian and indigenous 
populations to benefit fully from security and economic 
gains.  These minority groups suffer from limited education, 
health care, and employment opportunities, and 
disproportionate forced displacement in the mostly isolated 
rural areas where they reside. 
 
¶11. (U) Colombia has publicly committed to improving its 
human rights performance.  Eighty Colombian military officers 
were dismissed due to alleged involvement in extrajudicial 
killings.  We are working with the Ministry of Defense to 
improve rules of engagement, and make sure that soldiers 
accused of human rights abuses are investigated by civilian 
prosecutors.  Labor unionists and homicides declined 76 
percent between 2001-2008, yet in 2008 the number of labor 
homicides (for all causes) increased from 39 to 46--largely 
due to a spike in the first quarter--although still well 
below the national homicide rate. 
 
¶12. (U) Through the Center for Coordinated and Integrated 
Action (CCAI), the GOC is recovering territory previously 
held by illegal armed groups and establishing government, 
state services and securing vulnerable communities.  In 2008, 
the GOC reestablished a government presence in all 1098 
municipalities and all the country's mayors once again 
resided within their municipalities.  A coordination plan for 
Macarena in Meta department--the historic heartland of the 
FARC--aims to establish a permanent military, police and 
civilian presence in post-conflict areas--some of which have 
never seen a viable GOC presence.  Challenges remain, as 
resource, security and staffing shortfalls continue to limit 
the initiative.  The United States, through USAID, MILGRP and 
NAS, provides assistance to CCAI. 
 
USAID: Aiding Communities At Risk 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶13. (U) Under Plan Colombia, the USG has provided more than 
$950 million in economic and social assistance via USAID. 
USAID's initiatives have delivered legal jobs, social 
services, and development in narcotrafficking and conflict 
zones.  We are reintegrating thousands of Colombians who have 
demobilized, abating child recruitment into armed groups, and 
increasing social services for victims of conflict.  We are 
restoring citizen confidence in governance, improving the 
criminal justice system and institutions, increasing the 
poor's access to justice, and promoting human rights through 
investigation and prosecution of human rights and 
labor-related cases.  These programs focus on communities at 
high-risk of violence, provide legal and psycho-social 
assistance, and strengthen key government oversight and 
judicial institutions. 
 
14.(U) USAID's alternative development program is a key 
component of our counter-narcotics efforts.  It promotes 
sustainable economic opportunities in regions vulnerable to 
drug production and conflict.  These programs create jobs and 
economic opportunities in areas recently retaken from illegal 
armed groups and build the social infrastructure to mitigate 
future conflict.  USAID is expanding social and economic 
opportunities and improving livelihoods for Afro-Colombians 
and indigenous communities disproportionately affected by 
conflict.  These programs provide jobs, education, health 
care, housing, and social services for these vulnerable 
populations. 
 
DOJ: Providing Justice Reform 
----------------------------- 
 
¶15. (U) The Department of Justice coordinates a multifaceted 
program focused on strengthening the Colombian criminal 
justice system, its institutions, processes and personnel. 
This program involves six major areas: implementation of an 
accusatory system; human rights investigations and 
prosecutions; Justice and Peace investigations and 
prosecutions; complex areas of criminal law; improved 
forensics capability; and witness protection.  The bulk of 
the assistance is provided through training and technical 
assistance to the Prosecutor General's Office. 
 
NAS: Eradicating, Training, Nationalizing 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶16. (U) We made real strides in battling narcoterrorism in 
Colombia in 2008.  The most recent U.S. figures for cocaine 
production in Colombia show a 24% reduction in production 
since the peak year 2001.  In 2008, Colombian security forces 
seized 245 metric tons of cocaine and coca paste, eradicated 
230,000 hectares of coca and destroyed 3667 drug labs.  We 
kept hundreds of metric tons out of the United States.  We 
have reduced the funds available to the FARC and other 
criminal groups for the purchase of weapons and explosives, 
corruption of public officials, and coercion of local 
populations. 
 
¶17. (U) We have made progress in eradication, as evidenced by 
a decrease of 25% in potential cocaine productivity since the 
peak of 2001.  Increased coordination between manual and 
aerial eradication improves our ability to deal with 
replanting.  Much of the success in battling narcotrafficking 
and terrorism is due to air mobility capabilities provided by 
the United States.  Without helicopters, the GOC could not 
project force or provide government presence in a country the 
size of Texas and California combined.  Colombia is 
nationalizing our aviation assets, but still needs some U.S. 
support.  In the last two years, more than 50 aircraft have 
been turned over to the GOC to fund, maintain, and control. 
Colombia's ability to confront narcotics and terrorism 
depends in large part on its air mobility. 
 
MILGRP: Aiming for Irreversibility 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶18. (U) The Military Group (MILGRP) has focused its support 
to the Colombian military based upon a three phased approach. 
 The first focused on building Colombian military forces, 
projecting those forces into ungoverned spaces and securing 
those spaces.  It also supported offensive operations against 
illegal armed groups on a scale never seen before.  The 
second phase, currently being executed, focuses on securing, 
consolidating and sustaining those gains, increasing 
offensive operations against illegal armed groups, and 
ensuring the irreversibility of those gains.  The third 
phase, to be initiated in 2011, is to promote a strategic 
partnership to sustain key Colombian military capabilities. 
 
¶19. (U) The MILGRP currently supports eight program areas: 
joint rotary wing, ground operations, riverine operations, 
governability, airpower, maritime interdiction, joint 
intelligence and communications, and joint force initiatives. 
 Support to these programs is vital in both the short- and 
long-terms.  In the short-term, we will assist Colombia in 
controlling illegal armed groups and bringing peace and rule 
of law to the Colombian population.  In the long-term, we 
will focus on building a strategic partnership with 
Colombian, and develop key Colombian military capabilities 
that can support U.S. national security objectives worldwide. 
 
 
New Initiatives 
---------------- 
 
¶20. (SBU) We are working with the GOC, other governments, and 
international organizations to develop an initiative to 
consolidate the gains made to date in key conflict areas. 
The initiative builds on current and past USG and GOC 
programs, and involves close coordination of security, 
eradication, alternative development, and institutional 
development programs.  The initiative's primary goal is to 
provide incentives for Colombian citizens to join the licit 
economy in the conflict zones plagued by coca cultivation, 
narcotrafficking and illegal armed groups.  These targeted 
regions produce roughly 80 percent of the coca in Colombia 
and serve as major trafficking hubs, with a high incidence of 
violence and displacement. 
Nichols