VZCZCXRO2831
RR RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHTRO
DE RUEHAN #0370/01 1461321
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 261321Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY ANTANANARIVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2456
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ANTANANARIVO 000370 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/E-MBEYZEROV 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MA
SUBJECT: MADAGASCAR: BRINKMANSHIP AS NEGOTIATIONS PROCEED 
 
REF:  ANTANANARIVO 364 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Contrary to media reports on the faltering 
negotiations between Madagascar's four main political movements, UN 
and AU mediators remain confident that talks will continue, that 
last week's negotiated gains will not be lost, and that the 
increasingly loud rhetoric emanating from the TIM and AREMA 
movements will not derail their slow advance towards a political 
solution.  Moving into a third phase of negotiations, the key 
unresolved issues will be the distribution of positions in the 
executive and legislative institutions of the transitional 
government, and the exact wording of the amnesty covering political 
leaders since 2002.  In the meantime, the High Transitional 
Authority (HAT) is pressing ahead with government appointments and 
even an independent electoral commission, in an attempt to 
demonstrate their independence and ability to govern despite the 
deadlock. END SUMMARY. 
 
RAVALOMANANA AND RATSIRAKA STEP BACK . . . FOR NOW 
------------------------------------ 
¶2. (SBU) Following instructions from their leaders abroad, 
representatives of former Presidents Didier Ratsiraka and Marc 
Ravalomanana have pulled out of negotiations hosted jointly by the 
African Union, SADC, the Francophonie, and the United Nations. 
Press reports have noisily seized on the moves as indicators of 
failure in the negotiations, but contacts familiar with the 
negotiations have a more nuanced view. They maintain that all four 
parties still stand behind last week's gains, and this week's 
belligerent stances are a ploy to control at least two of the 
remaining issues: who will preside over the HAT (of great concern 
primarily to Ratsiraka) and what will be the terms of the amnesty 
(which has become primarily a Ravalomanana issue - at this stage, 
all parties are already in agreement on Ratsiraka's demands 
pertaining to the "cancellation" of his charges from 2001/02).  For 
the international mediators, this is merely a "technical pause 
between phase two (May 20-22 at the Carlton Hotel) and phase three 
(which hasn't begun yet)" of the negotiations; they recognize that 
the remaining issues will be the most contentious, but are generally 
pleased with the results from phase two. 
 
MEDIATORS TALLY THEIR WINS AND PREPARE FOR THE NEXT ROUND 
--------------------------- 
¶3. (SBU) On Saturday, May 23, the mediators released a statement 
summarizing what had been accomplished in phase two, and outlining 
the remaining difficulties.  Per the statement, all agreed that the 
transition must be neutral, peaceful, and consensual; that the 
former heads of state, and the current President of the HAT, will be 
permitted to run in the next election; that the elections would be 
held as soon as possible within a period of 14 months; and that all 
former heads of state would benefit from a special statute ensuring 
their dignity and security.  In addition, UN contacts maintain that 
the four parties remain committed to eight transitional 
institutions, mostly unchanged from previous drafts of the 
Transition Charter that UN Senior Mediator Tiebiele Drame worked on 
before the Carlton negotiations.  As of Tuesday, May 26, no parties 
had yet indicated they would renege on these points. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The document also outlined two key points for the next 
round of talks: the composition and formula for the proportional 
distribution of seats among executive and legislative institutions, 
and the terms of a general amnesty.  While Ratsiraka claims to 
demand the complete cancellation of all legal complaints against him 
and his colleagues (including military) dating from the 2001/02 
conflict, embassy contacts believe that this is a figleaf for his 
real demand: that Andry Rajoelina give up the presidency of the HAT. 
 Strengthening this argument is the fact that the other movements 
have already agreed to such a "cancellation", and that the "terms of 
a general amnesty" in the statement actually refer to an argument 
between Rajoelina's HAT and Ravalomanana's TIM: the HAT wants the 
amnesty to extend only to December 31, 2008 (thus leaving 
Ravalomanana open for judgment on everything that happened since), 
while the TIM negotiators demand that the amnesty extend up to the 
date of signature of an eventual "Transition Charter". 
 
BRINKMANSHIP, INTRIGUE, AND SHIFTING LOYALTIES 
------------------------------------ 
¶5. (SBU) In light of Ratsiraka's statement, his team simply did not 
show up on Monday, May 25, for the latest round of negotiations. 
Ravalomanana's "Legalist" supporters did come, but then left since 
Ratsiraka's team was absent; regardless, they were under orders from 
Ravalomanana to boycott, so the appearance was little more than a 
means of blaming Ratsiraka for allowing the negotiations to falter. 
Publicly, Ravalomanana has announced three additional preconditions: 
he must be allowed to return (and his security must be assured); the 
"hostages" (the imprisoned political leaders of his "Legalist" 
movement, including his appointed Prime Minister Manandafy 
Rakotonirina) must be released unconditionally; and there must be 
better guarantees for the protection of the people and property 
associated with his former government and current political 
movement.  Support for a 48-hour "ultimatum" for the release of 
 
ANTANANARI 00000370  002 OF 002 
 
 
these political prisoners, set to expire today, appears to have 
waned; by 1600, there has been no abnormal activity outside the 
small, controlled, daily demonstrations north of city center. 
¶6. (SBU) With supporters of Ratsiraka and Ravalomanana momentarily 
stepping away from the negotiating table, others are eyeing the 
empty chairs.  On May 25, three of the "political prisoners" 
released in April 2009 announced their willingness to serve as a 
fifth movement in the negotiations, although their agenda is largely 
identical to that of the HAT.  Speculation is rife that the split 
between Pierrot Rajoanarivelo and Ratsiraka may be widening, and 
that he may make a bid to join the discussion.  There is also the 
possibility that a faction of the Legalist camp may split off from 
those loyal to Ravalomanana; TIM was never monolithic, and his 
refusal to negotiate may encourage others to fill the gap.  For the 
moment, however, it remains unlikely that any of the four movements 
(of Ratsiraka, Ravalomanana, Rajoelina, and Zafy) will permit any 
additions.  This issue was tentatively dealt with last week by 
expanding the movements' delegations from five members to seven, to 
accommodate newly emerging players.  No single group outside the 
four main movements has enough support to force their way in at this 
time. 
TGV STEAMS AHEAD 
---------------- 
¶7. (SBU) At the moment, Rajoelina's HAT has the least to gain from 
the status quo: their role at the helm of the country means they are 
being associated with ongoing increases in urban crime, political 
protests, economic decline, and international isolation. 
Ravalomanana and Ratsiraka, watching from abroad, have nothing to 
lose by dragging out the negotiations, so the HAT remains on the 
offensive: in a cabinet meeting on May 25, the HAT named five more 
Regional Chiefs (only one out of 22 now remains un-named, that of 
Analamange Region, where Antananarivo is located), and unilaterally 
declared the creation of an Independent Electoral Commmission via 
Decree 2009-721.  They have rescheduled the "Assises Regionales" 
(Regional Meetings) for June 8-13 in advance of a National 
Conference before June 26 which, entirely outside of the ongoing 
negotiations, will determine the course of the transition 
government, barring agreement at the negotiating table.  In 
addition, the HAT is hosting a two-day "Military Conference" this 
week, purportedly to discuss military living conditions and respect 
for social and military hierarchies.  (NOTE: Per sources familiar 
with the HAT, the biggest fear of Rajoelina and his team is that the 
others won't agree to anything, and are simply trying to wear them 
down by attrition.  These attempts to simply "move on", misguided 
though they may be, are meant to demonstrate that the HAT does have 
an alternative to the international mediation process. END NOTE) 
 
COMMENT: STILL MOVING FORWARD SLOWLY 
------------------------------ 
¶8. (SBU) COMMENT: Last Friday's apparent progress on an agreement, 
followed by setbacks over the weekend, represents a challenge for 
the international mediators on the scene, but does not likely pose 
an existential threat to the negotiations.  Ratsiraka and 
Ravalomanana are jockeying for position on key issues, but their 
supporters in country will only stand for so much - which will in 
turn pressure them to stay engaged, if only so that they aren't 
replaced at the negotiating table.  Media outlets have been 
expressing a certain amount of discontent with the international 
mediation effort, but Post is frequently contacted by concerned 
partisans of all sides that clearly find the international community 
an indispensable piece of the puzzle. 
 
¶9. (SBU) A comprehensive political solution remains distant, and the 
boycott of Ravalomanana and Ratsiraka is an incremental step back 
from the apparent progress made through last Friday.   However, 
there is no sign that any movement intends to return to the street 
in any serious way now that the real stakes are to be found in the 
negotiating room.  UN contacts remain confident that another 
"interim" phase of shuttle diplomacy between the parties will push 
things forward, and the SADC envoy will have an opportunity to work 
on Ravalomanana's position when he returns to Swaziland tomorrow 
(May 27).  The International Contact Group on Madagascar will meet 
again on May 27, and a third phase of negotiations, focusing on the 
key points raised in paragraph four, should begin shortly 
thereafter. END COMMENT. 
 
STROMAYER