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Viewing cable 09AITTAIPEI628, MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-TAIWAN RELATIONS, NORTH KOREA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09AITTAIPEI628 2009-05-26 09:39 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIN #0628/01 1460939
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 260939Z MAY 09
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1649
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 9209
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 0640
UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 000628 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - NIDA EMMONS 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-TAIWAN RELATIONS, NORTH KOREA 
 
1. Summary:  Taiwan's major Chinese-language dailies focused their 
May 23-26 news coverage on the H1N1 influenza epidemic in Taiwan; on 
former South KoreaN President Roh Moo-hyun's suicide; on the junior 
high school students' exams for entering senior high schools; and on 
developments in cross-Strait relations. 
 
2. In terms of editorials and commentaries, an op-ed in the 
mass-circulation "Apple Daily" discussed the U.S.-Taiwan arms deals 
and the visit to Washington by Taiwan's National Security Council 
Secretary-General Su Chi in late May.  The article said the Ma 
Ying-jeou Administration needs to state firmly and clearly its 
interest in purchasing arms from the United States so as to assure 
the Obama Administration that Taiwan wants to deepen its strategic 
cooperation with Washington while improving its relations with 
Beijing.  With regard to North Korea, an op-ed in the 
pro-unification "United Daily News" said Pyongyang's second nuclear 
test was aimed at showing its force to the United States, expressing 
its discontent to China and, in the meantime, putting pressure on 
"chaotic" South Korea.  A "United Daily News" news analysis said 
North Korea's latest nuclear move is not surprising at all, because 
Kim Jong-il and the Obama Administration are testing each other in 
an attempt to find out where both sides' bottom lines are. A column 
in the centrist, KMT-leaning "China Times" discussed how the United 
States, Japan and South Korea will deal with North Korea in the wake 
of its second underground nuclear test.  The column said that if the 
United States decides to recognize North Korea as a nuclear power 
eventually, it had better bargain with Pyongyang now, so as to 
prevent the latter from expanding its nuclear technology and 
facilities.  End summary. 
 
3. U.S.-Taiwan Relations 
 
"Taiwan-U.S. Strategic Cooperation Is up to Now" 
 
Fu S. Mei, Director of the electronic journal "Taiwan Defense 
Review," opined in the mass-circulation "Apple Daily" [circulation: 
520,000] (5/23): 
 
"... What impressed the outside world most was nothing except that 
during the question and answer session of a digital video conference 
with the U.S. think tank "Center for Strategic and International 
Studies" on April 22, President Ma urged the United States to sell 
Taiwan F-16 C/D fighter jets and submarines.  The significance of 
[Ma's remarks] can be interpreted in two ways.  First, [he] targeted 
those strategists and scholars in Washington as his main audience, 
proposing a policy direction (continuous arms sales [to Taiwan]) as 
a subject that he believes the United States will be interested in 
hearing, in an attempt to resolve the doubts of some Americans that 
Ma may be too weak toward Beijing.  In the meantime, he also openly 
announced his interest in arms procurements, which can serve as an 
overture urging the U.S. government to 'beckon to Taiwan to act' in 
terms of the two major arms deals. ... 
 
"High-ranking U.S. officials recently said in private that the Obama 
Administration will not 'beckon to Taiwan to act' on arms sales. 
Should Washington take the initiative to make the first move, it 
will surely cause trouble for its relations with Beijing, and the 
United States will certainly have to pay for it.  The U.S. attitude 
is that Taipei must make its request proactively, in a concrete 
manner and via a formal channel, so that the U.S. side can act upon 
it. ...  As a result, if Taiwan's high-ranking officials can 
formally put forward its request to the Obama Administration in a 
clear, powerful and firm manner, it will become the key as to 
whether these arms procurements will be carried out. 
 
"After Taiwan makes its requests and reaches a consensus with the 
United States, Washington still needs to ponder the timing to handle 
[such a request].  Currently the U.S. strategists all maintain that 
[Washington] lengthens the time between its decision to accept 
Taiwan's letter of request for the F-16 fighter jets and the planned 
trip by the U.S. president to China in fall, or even to handle 
Taiwan's letter of request after the U.S. president's trip to China, 
so as to alleviate the political impact.  The time for President 
Obama's planned trip to China remains to be decided, but it is 
generally believed that it will happen either before or after the 
APEC summit in mid-November. ...  The challenge for the Ma 
Administration is to expand, consolidate and deepen Taiwan's 
strategic cooperation with the United States (including, but not 
limited to, the military arena) while it seeks to improve relations 
with Beijing.  It is up to the message that will be delivered by 
[National Security Council] Secretary-General Su Chi to Washington 
[in late May] as to whether President Ma will assure the Obama 
Administration about Taiwan's interest and determination in this 
aspect." 
 
4. North Korea 
 
A) "North Korea:  in Possession of Nuclear Weapons but Asking for 
Sunshine" 
 
 
Lai I-chung, assistant professor at the Mackay Medicine, Nursing & 
Management College, opined in the pro-unification "United Daily 
News" [circulation: 400,000] (5/26): 
 
"... The second nuclear test launched by North Korea indicated that 
it intends to show its force to the United States, to express its 
discontent to China, and in the meantime, to exercise pressure on 
Seoul while the latter is now in turbulence.  Pyongyang's purpose is 
to demand that the world recognize North Korea's status of 
[possessing] nuclear weapons and await a chance to break through the 
framework of the Six Party Talks, in the hope that other countries 
will adopt a sunshine policy and improve their relations with 
Pyongyang. ... 
 
"In short, Pyongyang's second nuclear test indicates that it has no 
intention of abandoning nuclear weapons, and it is tantamount to an 
announcement that it will no longer participate in the Six Party 
Talks, whose objective is a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. 
Pyongyang wants to follow the pattern of India and Pakistan to not 
just showcase its nuclear weapons but to take advantage of bilateral 
meetings to cause other countries to change their policies toward 
North Korea.  In particular, it hopes that the sunshine policy with 
the South Korean government, which is similar to that of the talks 
that helped to resolve the Berlin crisis, will be re-started.  It is 
up to the answers of [U.S. President Barack] Obama and [South Korean 
President] Lee Myung-bak as to whether Pyongyang will be able to get 
sunshine against the background of its possession of nuclear 
weapons." 
 
B) "North Korea Contends with the United States; a Competition in 
Endurance and an All-Out Game" 
 
Liou To-hai, a professor of the Department of Diplomacy at the 
National Chengchi University, wrote in the pro-unification "United 
Daily News" [circulation: 400,000] (5/26): 
 
"... The nuclear test this time was also one of a series of 
provocative moves that North Korea has taken since [Barack] Obama 
assumed the United States presidency this January. ...  The Obama 
Administration and Kim Jong-il are testing each other's patience, 
national power and wisdom and waiting to see which side will yield 
first.  This is exactly the same as when [former United States] 
President George W. Bush just took office.  In contrast to the 
[former] Bush Administration, however, neither side is conducting 'a 
game of chicken.'  Instead, it is a game of wisdom and endurance, as 
well as a game of moving and stasis. 
 
"North Korea apparently has grown discontent with the United States' 
current strategy of keeping still so as to restrain [North Korea 
from] taking any moves.  If the United States continues undertaking 
hostile policies, it is likely that Pyongyang will repeatedly create 
crises or military conflicts to force the United States' hand. 
Under such circumstances, it is likely that the Obama Administration 
will do what the former Bush Administration did by cooperating with 
Beijing to restrain North Korea." 
 
C) "How Should the United States, Japan and South Korea Deal with 
North Korea's Nuclear Test?" 
 
The "International Lookout" column in the centrist, KMT-leaning 
"China Times" [circulation: 130,000] (5/26): 
 
"North Korea claims that it has conducted its second underground 
nuclear test.  There is no need to make a fuss about nothing.  It is 
because North Korea has been steady and firm in developing nuclear 
weapons and can only move forward, not retreat.  The problem lies in 
how the United States deals with it. ... 
 
"This column has already provided analyses [to the effect that] that 
the United States has only two approaches.  The first is to destroy 
North Korea's nuclear armaments.   The second is to recognize North 
Korea's possession of nuclear weapons with conditions.  Other than 
that, the United States has nowhere to go.  If the United States 
does not take the first approach, it is absolutely impossible to 
prevent North Korea from possessing nuclear weapons.  If the United 
States takes the second approach, it might as well bargain with 
North Korea by rigorously restricting North Korea from proliferating 
nuclear weapons and nuclear equipment.  In fact, the United States' 
[former] Bush Administration and the Obama Administration have been 
preparing the second approach, only not admitting to it on the 
surface.  What a pity the 'Six-Party Talks' are thereby affected, 
merely endorsing the United States' and North Korea's future 
compromise. ..." 
 
YOUNG