VZCZCXRO6483
PP RUEHDE RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHDS #1149/01 1380449
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 180449Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4771
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 001149 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL MOPS KPKO SO SU ET
SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER MELES AND THE UNSC DISCUSS SOMALIA, 
SUDAN, AND ERITREA 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  Summary.  Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles on May 16 
provided visiting Ambassador Susan Rice and delegates from 
the United Nations Security Council his analysis of ongoing 
issues of mutual interest regarding Somalia, Sudan, and 
Eritrea.  On Somalia, Meles assessed that the Transitional 
Federal Government (TFG) was wasting valuable time by failing 
to capitalize on the good will of the Somali people which was 
creating opportunities for al-Shabaab and other opposition 
groups to exploit.  Meles suggested that the international 
community, if it had the political will, could stem the flow 
of weapons and foreign fighters to Somalia.  On Sudan, Meles 
said action was needed now to ensure that the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement (CPA) would be implemented by 2011, but he 
believed that the ICC indictment against President Bashir 
only made a political solution in Darfur more difficult to 
find.  Meles was also worried that southern Sudan was 
becoming increasingly unstable.  Meles advised the UNSC to 
take action against Eritrea only if they had the political 
will to follow through, otherwise they should ignore 
Eritrea's provocations.  Meles told the UNSC that instead 
they had taken the worst of all possible paths by threatening 
to take action, and then failing to act, showing President 
Isaias that there were no international repercussions to his 
destabilizing activities.  End Summary. 
 
The TFG Wasting Opportunities, but Support Needed 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  Regarding Somalia, Prime Minister Meles assessed 
that the TFG under President Sheikh Sharif had more 
legitimacy and support from Somalis, particularly in 
Mogadishu, than the previous government of Abdallahi Yusuf. 
Unfortunately, he said, the TFG was wasting its initial 
support by failing "to get its act together."  He thought 
that the recent violence in Mogadishu had demonstrated how 
little the government had done the in previous three months 
to establish its institutions and security apparatus.  This 
failure, he said, had created an opening for al-Shabaab and 
the other opposition groups to exploit.  Meles did not think 
that "all was lost," but he warned that significant support 
from the international community was needed if the TFG was to 
survive.  Meles stated that the African Union Mission in 
Somalia (AMISOM) had proved its mettle by standing firm 
against attacks, but he hoped that AMISOM would be 
strengthened in the coming weeks. 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  In response to the question of what the UNSC could 
do to improve the situation, Meles responded that the 
international community, if it had the political will, could 
stop the flow of weapons and foreign fighters into Somalia. 
He suggested that the UNSC "knew where the support to 
al-Shabaab was coming from," and that actions could be taken 
to interdict those flows.  Meles added that because of the 
increased naval presence off the coast of Somalia to combat 
piracy, most of the support was moving by air.  He suggested 
that those powers with the capabilities track the support 
flights. 
 
CPA Lagging, South Sudan Unstable, ICC Unhelpful 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  "Unless action is taken now, it is unlikely that 
all of the elements of the CPA will be implemented by 2011," 
Meles said.  He thought that both parties, the North and 
South, were postponing key issues.  Part of the problem, 
according to Meles, was that both sides feared what would 
happen after 2011.  Meles advised the UNSC to take a closer 
look at the destabilization of South Sudan, noting that this 
issue would also jeopardize implementation of the CPA. 
Referring to recent fighting in the south where hundreds of 
people had been killed, he said former enemies were proving 
unable to live together peacefully.  He stated that groups in 
the north were unsure what was going to happen after 2011 and 
were using ties with former allies in the south to cause 
problems for the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement 
(SPLM).  He anticipated that support to anti-SPLM factions 
would only increase as 2011 approached.  Meles criticized the 
SPLM for failing utilize its resources adequately to improve 
the lives of the people, but he added that the south had not 
received all the resources it should have from the North. 
Meles judged that neither the North nor the South had done 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00001149  002 OF 002 
 
 
enough to make unity attractive to the people of southern 
Sudan. 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  Meles said Ethiopia's position on the ICC 
indictment against President Bashir was in step with the 
African Union's position that the indictment would only make 
a political solution to Darfur more difficult to find.  He 
noted that Darfur was a Sudanese problem requiring a 
political solution before "legal issues" could be addressed. 
On the broader issue of peace in Darfur, Meles questioned 
whether the parties involved, particularly the rebels, were 
genuinely interested in peace.  Meles emphasized that the 
problems in Sudan had regional implications as well that 
should be factored in, most obviously with Chad, but also 
"with other countries, in a clear reference to Ethiopia. 
 
Meles Critical of the UNSC on Eritrea 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  On the question of how Meles saw Eritrea's role in 
the region, Meles responded that the source of the problem in 
Eritrea was a conflict between the people of Eritrea and 
their leadership.  He said Eritrean President Isaias blamed 
the Eritrean youth and the international community for 
Eritrea's problems.  Meles thought that Isaias viewed today's 
Eritrean youth as "soft and spineless" unable to "stoically" 
suffer as the older generation had.  Because of this, Isaias 
sought to "shape" the youth in a certain way, but the youth 
were resisting "being shaped" and were fleeing Eritrea. 
According to Meles, the flight of the youth only reinforced 
Isaias' view that the youth were unwilling "to endure 
hardship."  Isaias, Meles said, blamed the international 
community, and particularly the United States, for failing to 
shape Ethiopia following the end of the 1998-2000 Border war 
with Eritrea.  As a result, Isaias was "punishing" the youth, 
Ethiopia, and the international community by causing as much 
pain and irritation as he could, Meles concluded. 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  Meles' advice to the UNSC for dealing with Eritrea 
was to take one of two responses.  He stated that if the 
international community had the power and political will to 
force change in Eritrea, then "do it."  If not, then Eritrea 
should simply be ignored and "put up with the pain." 
Ethiopia, he made clear, had chosen to follow the latter 
course.  But, Meles insisted, the UNSC had taken the worst of 
all possible actions.  Using the recent border dispute 
between Eritrea and Djibouti as an example, he said the UNSC 
had issued an ultimatum to Eritrea that it did not follow 
through on.  He stated that both Asmara and Addis Ababa saw 
the ultimatum as "toothless," and a demonstration to other 
nations in the region that one can defy the UNSC without any 
repercussions.  Meles underscored that if the UNSC sought to 
take action against Eritrea for its destabilizing role in 
Somalia, the UNSC must do so only if they have the political 
will to follow through.  Meles assessed that Isaias was a 
"rational, sober, and logical" leader who was "playing 
another game," with a very high threshold for pain.  He 
advised that Isaias did have a threshold, and if pressured 
hard enough, Isaias would modify his actions. 
 
¶8.  (U)  Ambassador Rice cleared this cable. 
YAMAMOTO