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Viewing cable 09ADDISABABA1139, AFRICAN UNION DOWNPLAYS SOMALIA DESPITE IMMINENT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ADDISABABA1139 2009-05-14 13:59 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Addis Ababa
VZCZCXRO4424
PP RUEHDE RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHDS #1139 1341359
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 141359Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4761
INFO RUCNSOM/SOMALIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 7810
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEPADJ/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEWMFD/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
UNCLAS ADDIS ABABA 001139 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL MOPS KPKO SO ET
SUBJECT: AFRICAN UNION DOWNPLAYS SOMALIA DESPITE IMMINENT 
CRISIS 
 
REF: ADDIS ABABA 1063 
 
AU: Nothing to See Here, Move Along, but Keep Up the Support 
--------------------------------------------- ---------------- 
 
1.  (SBU)  During the May 13 Consultative Meeting of the 
African Union (AU), Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs), and 
International Partners, AU Peace and Security Commissioner 
Ramtane Lamamra, supported by the Ugandan and Burundian 
Ministers of Defense, asserted that there was no serious 
crisis in Mogadishu, and that there was no threat to the 
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).  Lamamra insisted 
that the TFG was solid, and that this crisis was blown out of 
proportion by the media.  He said AMISOM had no plans to 
evacuate Mogadishu, rather the third Burundi battalion was 
preparing to deploy, and he announced that Sierra Leone had 
pledged to provide a battalion.  Both Lamamra and AU Special 
Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission for 
Somalia Nicholas Bwakira urged the donor community to "make 
good" on their promises of additional support at the recent 
Brussels pledging conference.  (Comment: Lamamra's position 
is irresponsible and stands in opposition to the fact an 
evacuation of AMISOM may be required within a short period of 
time.  End Comment.)  USAU emailed the AU Communique to 
Washington on May 13. 
 
AU-UN Rift Goes Public 
---------------------- 
 
2.  (SBU)  More significantly, the growing dispute between 
the AU and UN over the UN's support to AMISOM (Reftel) went 
public during the closed morning session and again during the 
open afternoon session with the international partners. In 
the morning session, Lamamra blasted UN Special Envoy for 
Somalia Amedou Ould-Abdallah for the failure of the UN to 
consult with the AU in preparing the most recent Secretary 
General's report on Somalia which Lamamra considered to be 
critical of the AU and AMISOM while irresponsibly assessing 
that a UN PKO in Somalia would be counterproductive.  In the 
afternoon session, the Ugandan MinDef proposed expressing the 
AU's displeasure with the UN in the text of the communique, 
but Lamamra resisted noting that it was better if the issue 
was handled "diplomatically" rather than putting it into a 
formal document.  Lamamra went on to comment again that he 
was dissatisfied with the comments of Ould-Abdallah in 
"prejudging" that a UN PKO in Somalia now would only make the 
situation worse.  Lamamra reminded the assembly that the 
African Union was on the ground in Somalia, risking their 
lives, while the UN was not.  He again made it clear that he 
was displeased that the UN had made these assertions without 
any consultation with "their partners" the AU. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
3.  (SBU)  Lamamra's motivation for painting an 
unrealistically rosy picture of the current situation in 
Somalia is almost certainly to prevent the donors from 
walking away from AMISOM.  He may underestimate the degree to 
which the international community understands the events now 
unfolding in Mogadishu.  In the past, he has consistently 
repressed any notion that the AU is engaged in contingency 
planning lest the donors get the idea that AMSIOM is ending 
and not worth continued funding.  In our view, the failure of 
the AU to adequately address contingency planning is 
irresponsible, and puts the lives of the troops on the ground 
in further risk. 
 
4.  (SBU)  Comment continued.  This was the first AU meeting 
where the AU-UN disagreement over support to AMISOM broke out 
into the open and became a public feud.  The growing discord 
between the two bodies has serious ramifications for the 
future of AMISOM as well as for the future AU-UN peacekeeping 
efforts, and by extension, US conflict resolution efforts in 
Africa.  We encourage Washington to examine this issue 
closely because the AU is pushing for the United States to 
take a position, and Washington's response will have a 
decided impact on its future relationship with the African 
Union.  End Comment. 
YAMAMOTO