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O 011446Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY WARSAW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8108
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 01 OF 02 WARSAW 000351 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
PLEASE PASS TO H FOR CONGRESSMAN MIKE ROGERS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR OREP ENRG MARR RS PL
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR CODEL ROGERS VISIT TO WARSAW, 
APRIL 5-7, 2009 
 
Classified By: DCM Quanrud by reason 1.4 (b, d) 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  Mission Poland warmly welcomes your upcoming visit 
to Warsaw.  Your meetings will occur one day after President 
Obama meets with the Polish leadership on the margins of the 
U.S.-EU Summit in Prague, which will likely be with both 
Prime Minister Donald Tusk and President Lech Kaczynski.  The 
two leaders are putting aside a long-standing rivalry to hold 
what will be their first joint meeting with a foreign head of 
state.  Though rivals, together they have a good story to 
tell:  Poland is time-tested ally of America and has stood 
with our soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan, supported our 
efforts in the Former Soviet space, and shares our faith in 
freedom and democracy.  Prime Minister Tusk's government has 
welcomed President Obama's new emphasis on soft power and 
outreach to rivals.  President Kaczynski is less 
enthusiastic, but is nevertheless an ardent fan of America. 
However, in the midst of an otherwise solid bilateral 
relationship, Poland's ongoing exclusion from the Visa Waiver 
Program grates badly, and resentment among the population is 
steadily eroding our popularity here. 
 
¶2. (SBU) The fate of Missile Defense is first and foremost on 
the minds of Poland's government and public.  Last August, 
Prime Minister Tusk agreed to locate U.S. missile 
interceptors in Poland under the auspices of a Ballistic 
Missile Defense Agreement (BMDA).  He did so largely to 
accommodate a direct request from us, their longtime ally. 
The Poles now patiently await our decision on the future of 
European Missile Defense.  At the same time they are pressing 
ahead for implementation of our bilateral Strategic 
Declaration of Cooperation, issued side-by-side with BMDA 
last summer.  The Declaration operates separately from the 
BMDA and promises U.S. defense modernization aid, a 
high-level Strategic Dialogue and a Patriot battery rotation 
starting in 2009 (contingent on ratification of a 
Supplemental Status of Forces Agreement). The Patriot 
rotation puts U.S. boots on Polish soil, something Poles 
think will inherently improve their security situation. The 
Strategic Dialogue is also important to many here who suspect 
Eastern Europe has fallen off the U.S. radar. 
 
¶3. (SBU) The Polish Government is being assiduously patient 
on Missile Defense.  It does so in the face of prevalent 
public concern that Washington might sacrifice Missile 
Defense on the altar of improved relations with Moscow.  For 
deep-seeded historical reasons, Russian posturing on Missile 
Defense carries much greater weight in Poland than concerns 
about the Iranian nuclear threat.  If the U.S. decides not to 
pursue Missile Defense, Poles will be disappointed if it 
appears the decision was made either over their heads or at 
Russia's behest. President Kaczynski has warned publicly that 
a U.S. decision not to pursue Missile Defense, if taken to 
satisfy Russia, would negatively impact bilateral relations. 
 
¶4. (SBU) On Russia in general, the current government has 
taken a less-confrontational, more-constructive tack, 
recognizing the need for dialogue with Russia, not just to 
advance common interests, but also to work through difficult 
issues.  This doesn't mean Russia gets a pass, however -- 
Warsaw will be the first to insist that the EU and NATO press 
Moscow to play by the rules.  The Poles also favor a EUR 600 
million Polish-Swedish Eastern Partnership initiative, which 
seeks to draw countries on Europe's eastern border, 
especially Ukraine and Georgia, closer to Western 
institutions.  By offering former Soviet republics the 
prospect of free trade and visa-free travel to the EU, the 
Eastern Partnership aims to spur reforms needed for eventual 
EU membership and to bolster their independence. 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  Given its historically tense relations with 
Russia, Poland views regional energy dependence on Russian 
resources as a threat to its sovereignty and to European 
integration.  Unlike many of its neighbors, Poland's reliance 
on coal somewhat insulates it from the use of energy as an 
economic weapon.  Poland still feels squeezed, however, by 
dependence on imported Russian gas and by emissions 
constraints that favor imported gas over domestic coal.  The 
current government is looking to nuclear power, 
diversification of gas supplies, and European integration as 
solutions, and seeks stronger EU solidarity on energy 
security. 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  Prime Minister Tusk's strong polling numbers 
(holding above 50 percent) after 16 months in office are 
virtually unprecedented in post-Communist Polish history.  He 
faces no viable challenge from the opposition, since the left 
is divided and the main center-right opposition party, Law 
and Justice (PiS), is widely faulted for harsh tactics and an 
 
WARSAW 00000351  002 OF 002 
 
 
overly skeptical view of the EU, which has benefited Poland 
greatly.  In contrast to the previous government, Prime 
Minister Tusk has made mending fences with the EU (especially 
Germany) a priority.  This marks an important shift.  His 
government is overtly more attuned to the EU than to the 
United States, in part because Poland receives significant 
inflows of funds from the EU, and because younger Poles are 
less attached to the United States than their forbears. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Poles are concerned that their contributions in Iraq 
(2003-2008) and Afghanistan (ongoing) are under-appreciated, 
but they continue to be solid allies of American.  Although 
defense spending has been cut because of financial 
crisis-related shortfalls in tax revenues, Poland's 
commitment to Afghanistan remains steady. Poland currently 
has 1600 soldiers in Afghanistan and recently assumed sole 
military responsibility for Ghazni province.  A further 
plus-up of 400 troops is coming.  On the downside, Poland 
remains uncertain about how it will manage the civilian 
aspects of its Afghan deployment in Ghazni. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Poland's financial system has survived the global 
crisis relatively unscathed, but it suffers from weakness in 
its European trade and investment partners.  Poland will see 
some growth this year, albeit barely in the positive range, 
and with rising unemployment.  The government is not pursuing 
significant economic stimulus, but is working to draw on EU 
funds that were part of Poland's accession process, at a rate 
of roughly EUR 10 billion/year for 7 years.  They believe 
that fiscal prudence is shielding Poland from the financial 
market downturn, and are in tune with other U.S. goals for 
the London Summit like restraining protectionism, increasing 
the IMF's resources, and revisiting euro adoption procedures. 
ASHE