VZCZCXYZ0007
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0195 1200839
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 300839Z APR 09
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9376
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1619
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHNA/DEA WASHDC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0287
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0093

UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000195 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED 
 
DOD PASS CINCCENT, KABUL PASS C-JTF BAGRAM 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SNAR NATO UN AF
SUBJECT:  Debriefing UNODC on ISAF Counternarcotics Activities -- 
ACTION REQUEST 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST:   The UN Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC) has requested to be debriefed on NATO-ISAF 
counternarcotics activities so that UNODC can factor these 
activities into its ongoing analysis of Afghan opium cultivation and 
trafficking.  UNVIE supports this request and asks that the 
Department work with appropriate U.S. military and NATO authorities 
to establish a formal mechanism for this purpose.  END SUMMARY AND 
ACTION REQUEST. 
 
¶2.  (U) The analysis of UNODC and the advocacy of its Executive 
Director Antonio Costa were crucial to the October 2008 decision by 
NATO Defense Ministers in Budapest for NATO-ISAF to play an enhanced 
role in counternarcotics efforts.   In March 2009, the White House 
White Paper on our new AfPak strategy reaffirmed this role, stating 
that: "The NATO/International Security Assistance Forces and U.S. 
forces should use their authorities to directly support Afghan 
counternarcotics units during the interdiction of narco-traffickers. 
The new authorities permit the destruction of labs, drug storage 
facilities, drug processing equipment, and drug caches and should 
contribute to breaking the drug-insurgency funding nexus and the 
corruption associated with the opium/heroin trade." 
 
¶3.  (SBU) At a meeting with Ambassador Schulte on April 2, Costa 
requested that a mechanism be established to pass information on 
ISAF operations involving counter-drug dimensions to UNODC so that 
it can factor these operations into its ongoing analysis of opium 
cultivation and trafficking.  He told Ambassador that he heard, on 
the margins of the March 31 The Hague Conference on Afghanistan, 
about four military operations that included the bombing of drug 
markets.  Reportedly, he said, one of them, Operation Visa, involved 
several U.S. soldiers.  At a meeting of the "Friends of Afghanistan" 
on April 28, Costa noted press reports on such operations (The 
Scotsman on April 24 reported UK Marines seizing drugs worth 50 
million Pounds Sterling from a Taliban base), and reiterated his 
outstanding request. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) UNVIE supports Costa's request because UNODC analysis and 
advice provide important input for shaping U.S. and international 
counternarcotics strategy and evaluating its results.   UNODC opium 
surveys have become the international metric for evaluating the 
impact of counternarcotics efforts.  U.S. and NATO decision-makers 
would benefit by UNODC analysis, for example, showing the 
longer-term impact of ISAF operations by province on planting 
decisions and trafficking trends. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Details on NATO and national operations (e.g. date, 
location, purpose, results) could be provided in theater to the 
UNODC field office in Kabul following each operation or on a monthly 
basis.  We would also appreciate more general information on NATO 
(or U.S.) operations that we could periodically provide to Costa or 
brief to the "Friends of Afghanistan."  UNODC is not/not requesting 
advance information on operations. 
 
¶6.  (U) Mission would appreciate being able to reply to Costa on the 
response to his request by the end of May. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Costa will go to Kabul May 4.  Mission recommends US/NATO 
military authorities in Kabul meet Costa to discuss the possibility 
of setting up such a mechanism. 
 
SCHULTE