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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 TOKYO 000893 
 
SIPDIS 
 
MOSCOW PASS VLADIVOSTOK 
HELSINKI PASS ST. PETERSBURG 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2017 
TAGS: PREL PINR PGOV ECON JA RS
SUBJECT: ASO-PUTIN MEETING UNLIKELY TO LEAD TO CHANGES IN 
JAPAN-RUSSIA RELATIONS (C-AL8-02662) 
 
REF: A. TOKYO 00663 
     ¶B. 07 TOKYO 0163 
     ¶C. 08 TOKYO 1074 
     ¶D. 08 TOKYO 0643 
     ¶E. 08 TOKYO 3333 
     ¶F. 07 TOKYO 0697 
     ¶G. TOKYO 0667 
     ¶H. 07 TOKYO 2690 
     ¶I. 06 TOKYO 4665 
     ¶J. STATE 135278 
 
TOKYO 00000893  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
Classified By: Charge d' Affaires, a.i. James P. Zumwalt.  Reasons 1.4 
(B) (D) 
 
¶1. (S) Summary.  As Tokyo and Moscow prepare for a possible 
mid-May visit by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin to Japan, 
Embassy Tokyo assesses as small the chances for a dramatic 
breakthrough in the Northern Territories dispute.   A 
resigned acceptance of the status quo, combined with a lack 
of leadership on the issue, will prevent the two nations from 
either reaching any substantive new accommodation to improve 
bilateral relations or, conversely, to risk increased 
tensions by raising contentious issues.  End Summary. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Status Quo Generally Acceptable 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (S) Japan-Russia relations over the past several months 
have been marked by a series of events that seem to portend a 
shake-up in bilateral ties.  Those recent events include 
Russia's January 28 capture (of yet another) Japanese fishing 
boat near the disputed Northern Territories, a January 28-29 
dispute regarding Moscow's insistence that Japanese citizens 
submit disembarkation cards as they attempted to deliver 
humanitarian aid to the Northern Territories, ex-PM Junichiro 
Koizumi's February 14-20 visit to Moscow, and the February 18 
Medvedev-Aso summit on Sakhalin Island.  However, while 
newsworthy, these events do not signify a major change in 
bilateral relations.   For better or worse, the status quo is 
generally acceptable (and even profitable), and no one wants 
to rock the boat by seking major changes in the relationship. 
 
¶3. (S) The February 18 start of liquified natural gas 
shipments between Japan and Russia - energy supplies which 
Japan desperately needs much more than it needs an immediate 
resolution of the Northern Territories issue - will basically 
ensure that neither side will risk disrupting the 
Japan-Russia relationship.  Japanese officials tell Embassy 
Tokyo they envision no major changes in Japan's energy 
security policy, which they describe as part of a broader 
diversification strategy aimed at reducing Tokyo's dependence 
on oil and gas from the Middle East while avoiding 
over-reliance on Russian energy (Ref A).  There are 
substantial profits to be made by both countries - the 
Japanese energy business community finds the Sakhalin I and 
II energy arrangements profitable and enjoys a good working 
relationship with Gazprom (Ref B ).  Additionally, the 
Russians have yet to guarantee Siberian reserves will be 
piped out through Siberia (vis--vis China) to the Pacific, 
though the Russians claim to have begun work on the terminal 
at Koz'mino near Vladivostok (Ref C ) - yet another energy 
source Tokyo cannot afford to pass up.  The Japanese also 
want to be involved in Siberian development ) especially as 
the Russians eye Japanese rail and energy technology.  While 
the January 28, 2009 fishing boat incident was unfortunate, 
it nonetheless has to be seen in the context of the hugely 
 
TOKYO 00000893  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
profitable and active fishing industry that most residents of 
the Northern Territories are happy about.  In short, Tokyo 
and Moscow have enormous economic interests at stake and 
there is little to gain from shaking up Japan-Russia 
relations. 
 
¶4. (S) Furthermore, domestic public opinion in Japan (and 
according to our Russian Embassy contacts, also in Russia) 
would not tolerate any type of compromise by a political 
leader.  In that regard, Prime Minister Taro Aso has much 
less room for maneuver, given his low poll numbers and 
leadership of a ruling Liberal Democratic Party that is on 
the edge of an historic loss of control of the Diet.  As a 
result, no ruling-party politician in Hokkaido would 
jeopardize a very popular visa-waiver program used by locals 
transiting between Hokkaido and the Northern Territories ) 
something a hard-pressed LDP would have to take into account 
as the party fights for its electoral life. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
HIstory, Public Opinion, Aso Factors 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (S) Our Russian Embassy contacts tell us flat out World 
War Two plays a gigantic role in Moscow's thinking on the 
Northern Territories.  Specifically, the Kremlin considers 
the Northern Territories to be the price Japan paid for what 
the Russians believe was Tokyo,s treachery in backing Hitler 
) and partial compensation for the millions of lives Moscow 
lost to Berlin during the war (Ref D).  MOFA Russia Division 
representatives also confirmed media reports (Ref E ) that 
related how the Russians literally laughed in PM Aso,s face 
when the Japanese leader complained the Russians were 
dragging their feet on Northern Territories discussions. 
Despite such setbacks, MOFA officials consistently tell 
Embassy Tokyo, with confidence, they believe President 
Medvedev has the political will to resolve the Northern 
Territories issue and is eager to address the problem. 
However, the Foreign Ministry assesses, perhaps naively, the 
Russian President is not being adequately briefed by 
subordinates on working-level talks carried out to support 
Medvedev's initiatives, and that the Russian leader often 
appears to be ill-informed about developments (Ref E). 
 
¶6. (S) PM Aso would be loath to forge ahead in any new 
directions after the opposition Democratic Party of Japan 
(DPJ), media, academics, and public opinion excoriated him 
during his turn as FM for making remarks some interpreted as 
a proposal to return only half the land area contained in the 
four islands.  (Comment: Foreign Ministry contacts told 
Embassy Tokyo at the time that then-FM Aso's remarks, 
provided in response to DPJ quetioning that caught Aso 
off-guard during a Diet session, were mis-interpreted and 
that the FM never meant to imply Tokyo would settle for 
partial return of the four islands - Ref F). 
 
¶7. (S) Leading academics from Keio and Aoyama Universities 
confirm to Embassy Tokyo that public opinion, while still not 
allowing for any dramatic concessions, is placing less value 
on the need for a quick resolution to the Northern 
Territories issue. Interestingly, Russia's July 2008 invasion 
of Georgia does not appear to have played any part ) 
positive or negative - in Tokyo,s thinking about whether the 
Russians can be convinced to return the Northern Territories. 
 
--------------------------------- 
 Policy/Leadership Vacuum 
 
TOKYO 00000893  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (S) Japan's policy toward Russia is delineated by two 
agreements.  The Japan-Russia Action Plan, the culmination of 
then-President Putin's 2000 Tokyo visit and former FM 
Koizumi's 2003 trip to Moscow, outlines a series of agreed 
upon future actions in the fields of political dialogue, 
advancing peace treaty negotiations, international 
cooperation, trade and economic assistance, defense and 
security arrangements, and cultural exchanges.  A second 
document, titled ""Initiative for Strengthening Japan-Russia 
Cooperation in the Russian Far East and Eastern Siberia,"" 
which former PM Shinzo Abe proposed on the margins of the 
2007 Heiligendamm G-8 Summit, calls for private and public 
sector cooperation in the fields of energy, transportation, 
information and communication, environment, security, health 
and medicine, trade and investment, and cultural/tourism 
exchanges.  Tokyo and Moscow have achieved limited success in 
meeting the goals set forth in both documents, including 
negotiations on an agreement on the peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy (Ref G).  However, with neither side willing or able 
to achieve a significant breakthrough on the Northern 
Territories issue, bilateral summits invariable conclude with 
vapidly-worded joint statemnets noting Tokyo and Moscow have 
agreed to ""accelerate""  negotiations or to ""raise talks to a 
higher level"" - boilerplate language designed to appease 
constituencies in both countries. 
 
¶9. (S) Unofficially, Japan lacks a plan to negotiate the 
return of the Northern Territories and a leader to step up 
and see the plan through.  A number of our contacts note that 
Aso has few credible advisors on Northern Territories policy 
and his leadership style precludes him from listening to 
anyone about the problem.  Few Japanese organizations, think 
tanks, or other entities are developing any policy direction 
for him ) including the Foreign Ministry.  This policy 
vacuum extends to the main opposition DPJ, which Embassy 
Tokyo academic experts confirm has not developed a detailed 
and serious policy position on Russia or the Northern 
Territories.    Unfortunaely, most Japanese academic debate 
about the Northern Territories is mired in tired, decades-old 
debates about the nuance that exists between the 1956 and 
1993 declarations ) ""angels on the head of a pin""-type 
arguments which have no practical application to finding a 
solution to the Northern Territories problem today. 
 
¶10. (S) One noteworthy exception to the stagnant thinking 
which permeates the academic community's approach to Russia 
comes from the Policy Council of the Japan Forum on 
International Relations, a policy formulation group headed by 
Kenichi Ito.  In February 2008, a Policy Council sub-team led 
by Keio University Professor Shigeki Hakamada drafted a set 
of policy recommendations which, while relying on several 
well-worn arguments about history and sovereignty, 
nevertheless called on Japan to monitor divergences in the 
Russia-PRC relationship, particularly with regard to energy 
resources, trade, and Central Asia, for opportunities to 
advance Tokyo's relations vis-a-vis Moscow.  (Comment: 
Attempts to drive a wedge between Russia and China play an 
important role in Japan's offical policy to Moscow - Ref H.) 
The Council report also called on Tokyo to re-examine the 
types of assistance Japan supplies to Russia, including 
humanitarian aid which, according to the study, Moscow no 
longer requires. 
 
¶11. (S) Several Japanese opinion-leaders could be in a 
position to exert influence if they chose to do so: former PM 
 
TOKYO 00000893  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
Yoshiro Mori, who himself negotiated the 2001 Irkutsk 
statement with then-President Putin and who now heads a 
Japan-Russia parliamentary friendship league; former VFM 
Shotaro Yachi, designated as Japan's special trouble-shooting 
envoy for various diplomatic problems; and newly-appointed 
Ambassador to Russia Masaharu Kono.  However, few Japanese 
politicians or analysts have any new ideas about how to 
resolve the Northern Territories problem.  Those who might 
would be severely hobbled by domestic political 
considerations or the lingering stigma arising from the 2002 
Muneo Suzuki scandal.  (Comment: Suzuki, an influential Diet 
member who also served as Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary to 
former PM Keizo Obuchi, reportedly played a key 
behind-the-scenes role in pressuring the Foreign Ministry to 
modify Japan's policy toward Russia.  In 2002, police 
arrested Suzuki for accepting bribes from two Hokkaido 
companies which held construction contracts in Russia - a 
crime for which he was later convicted and sentenced to two 
years in prison.) 
 
 
------------- 
Conclusion 
------------- 
 
¶12. (S) Despite some occasional public posturing, the 
Japanese and Russians maintain a healthy, diverse, and 
profitable range of contacts across the military, political, 
and economic spectrum and are content to leave things pretty 
much the way they are.  What both sides need, and have so far 
succeeded in working toward, is a routine mechanism for 
managing the random small-scale crises (e.g. fishing boat 
violations, military aircraft incursions) that might, if not 
handled correctly, turn into the large-scale diplomatic 
incident neither side wants.  Witness the quietly effective 
way both sides handled the 2006 incident where the Russian 
Coast Guard killed a crew member of a  fishing boat that 
allegedly crossed the Northern Territories demarcation line 
(Ref I), or the way Russia dialed back its public rhetoric on 
U.S.-Japan BMD cooperation (Ref C).  Japan and Russia will 
usually quietly find ways to resolve minor festering issues 
and continue with business as usual. 
ZUMWALT