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Viewing cable 09TOKYO887, DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 04/17/09

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09TOKYO887 2009-04-17 07:52 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tokyo
VZCZCXRO2280
PP RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #0887/01 1070752
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 170752Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2384
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/USDOJ WASHDC PRIORITY
RULSDMK/USDOT WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5//
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHMHBA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RHMFIUU/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//CC/PA//
RHMFIUU/USFJ //J5/JO21//
RUYNAAC/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
RUAYJAA/CTF 72
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 5909
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 3570
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 7371
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 1259
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 4106
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 8851
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 4873
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4691
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 13 TOKYO 000887 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA; 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 04/17/09 
 
INDEX: 
 
(1) Guam relocation pact: Japan to reinforce roadmap with U.S. 
[Mainichi] 
 
(2) "Impossible to envisage" feasibility of Ozawa proposal, says 
Okinawa governor [Sankei] 
 
(3) Editorial: Futenma relocation plan will not move forward with 
the Guam agreement alone [Asahi] 
 
(4) North Korea's brinkmanship diplomacy: U.S. has yet to come up 
with specific measures [Tokyo Shimbun] 
 
(5) Interview on Japan-U.S. alliance with Shotaro Yachi, former vice 
foreign minister and now government representative: Japan should 
fulfill responsibility as global citizen [Mainichi] 
 
(6) Poll on Aso cabinet, political parties [Mainichi] 
 
(7) Scope column: Stormy developments expected in drafting manifesto 
to include some of Aso's policy imprint [Tokyo Shimbun] 
 
(8) Japan should take lead in "anti-piracy PKO" off Somalia [Sankei] 
 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) Guam relocation pact: Japan to reinforce roadmap with U.S. 
 
MAINICHI (Page 2) (Full) 
April 15, 2009 
 
The Diet, in its current session, is expected to approve the 
intergovernmental agreement reached between Japan and the United 
States on the planned relocation of U.S. Marines in Okinawa to Guam. 
The Diet's de facto approval of the Guam relocation pact will 
reinforce the 2006 roadmap for the realignment of U.S. forces in 
Japan. However, it is unclear how many Marines will actually be 
relocated to Guam. Moreover, the government reportedly plans to take 
on a funding share of up to 2.8 billion dollars (approx. 280 billion 
yen) for the Guam relocation. Its estimation for the cost, however, 
is also unclear. Futenma airfield is to be relocated in a package 
with the Guam relocation, but a settlement on the Futenma relocation 
issue is still beyond the horizon. There is still no knowing what is 
in store for the planned relocation of U.S. forces in Japan. 
 
Grounds for estimated spending invisible 
 
The relocation of Okinawa-based U.S. Marines to Guam is linked to 
the U.S. military's global transformation. This Guam relocation is 
one of the pillars of the U.S. military's realignment in Japan, and 
it is intended to mitigate Okinawa Prefecture's base-hosting burden. 
The roadmap says 8,000 Marines and 9,000 family members will be 
moved to Guam. 
 
Japan's share of the burden of the Guam relocation was set by the 
government at 2.8 billion dollars (approx. 280 billion yen) in the 
pact. This was meant to dissolve the Japanese government's fear of 
having to bear a further burden. At the same time, the government 
wanted to send the pact to the Diet for approval so that it could 
not be easily abrogated. 
 
TOKYO 00000887  002 OF 013 
 
 
 
The Foreign Ministry repeatedly gives this official explanation: 
"Since we are spreading out the large cost over many years, we will 
able to obtain the public's understanding through Diet 
deliberations." However, one high-ranking official of the government 
revealed: "We kept in mind that there might be a possible change of 
government to the DPJ (Democratic Party of Japan), which is opposed 
to the Guam pact." 
 
The total relocation cost is estimated at 10.27 billion dollars 
(approx. 1.027 trillion yen). Of this, Japan will take on a total of 
6.09 billion dollars (approx. 609 billion yen). The Japanese 
government will directly spend up to 2.8 billion dollars from its 
state coffers for the construction of such facilities as a 
headquarters and billets on Guam. In addition, the Japanese 
government will fund the Japan Bank for International Cooperation 
(JBIC), which will finance or provide loans for the projects to 
construct such infrastructure as housing and water supply and 
sewerage systems. 
 
Construction work in Guam will start this fiscal year. The 
government has earmarked 68.9 billion yen in its initial budget for 
U.S. force realignment, an increase of 3.6 times over the preceding 
fiscal year. This amount includes 34.6 billion yen for the Guam 
projects, including land development in the Finegayan district of 
Guam for housing construction for noncommissioned officers. 
 
The Japanese and U.S. governments are currently in the process of 
consulting on specific projects down the road. However, Japan will 
still have to provide nearly 250 billion yen in outlays over five 
fiscal years, 2010 through 2014, the target year to complete the 
realignment of U.S. forces in Japan. Some Japanese government 
officials are growing concerned about Japan's burden sharing. "I 
wonder if we can continue such huge spending in this economic 
crisis," said a senior official of the Defense Ministry. The 
government will not specify in detail the grounds for estimating the 
spending of 2.8 billion dollars, leaving everything murky. 
 
The government first said the U.S. Marine Corps would move 8,000 
troops from Okinawa to Guam. In a House of Representatives 
deliberation on the Guam pact, however, the government changed its 
previous explanation, saying the figure is not the actual number but 
is the regular number of Marines. In his Diet reply, Prime Minister 
Aso stated that the Okinawa-based Marines numbered about 12,000 as 
of the end of 2008, but at the same time he also explained that the 
regular number of Marines remaining in Okinawa after the Guam 
relocation would be about 10,000. To calculate simply, it is also 
likely that only 2,000 will be relocated to Guam. However, the 
government did not specify anything in detail about this likelihood. 
An opposition party lawmaker criticized the government's account, 
saying: "The question is how many will actually be moved to Guam. 
That's unclear." 
 
Futenma deadlock to result in delaying realignment 
 
The roadmap worked out by the Japanese and U.S. governments features 
the transferral of Marines to Guam and the relocation of Futenma 
airfield to the coastal area of Camp Schwab. When President Obama 
and Prime Minister Aso met in February, they agreed to the 
implementation of the roadmap in a steady way. 
 
However, the Diet's approval of the Guam relocation pact is a far 
 
TOKYO 00000887  003 OF 013 
 
 
cry from giving momentum to completing the realignment of U.S. 
forces in Japan by 2014. The relocation of Futenma airfield still 
remains deadlocked among the government, Okinawa, and the United 
States. The Guam relocation pact also says the Guam move depends on 
progress achieved in the Futenma relocation. But the Futenma 
relocation is falling behind schedule, which could mean a delay in 
the Guam relocation. 
 
Some government officials are therefore exploring ways to settle the 
pending issue of relocating Futenma airfield. The government is in a 
hurry to have the issue settled at an early date, while Okinawa 
Prefecture and its base-hosting municipalities are strongly calling 
for moving the Futenma alternative's construction site to an 
offshore area. "There should be no problem even if we move the 
construction site just a little," said a senior official of the 
Defense Ministry. 
 
Futenma airfield will be relocated to the Henoko district of Nago 
City in Okinawa Prefecture, and the Defense Ministry conducted a 
field survey there to assess the potential impact of the newly 
planned facility's construction site on its environs. The Defense 
Ministry has now presented Okinawa Prefecture with its preliminary 
report of findings from the environmental assessment. The report 
concludes that the government plan is optimum. Even so, it also 
shows flexibility with room being left for revisions to the 
government plan for the alternative facility's offshore siting. 
 
The question, however, is whether Japan can make the United States 
give way to Okinawa's call. The United States has so far insisted on 
relocating Futenma airfield "as agreed." In point of fact, Prime 
Minister Aso and other government officials cannot be sure of it. A 
solution has yet to come into sight. 
 
In addition, the Japanese and U.S. governments have other plans in a 
package to realign the U.S. military presence in Japan and alleviate 
the burden of base-hosting localities through such measure as 
returning the sites of U.S. military facilities located south of 
Kadena Air Base in Okinawa Prefecture and redeploying U.S. 
carrier-borne fighter jets from Atsugi Naval Air Station in Kanagawa 
Prefecture to Iwakuni Marine Air Station in Yamaguchi Prefecture. 
 
(2) "Impossible to envisage" feasibility of Ozawa proposal, says 
Okinawa governor 
 
SANKEI ON LINE (Full) 
12:20, April 17, 2009 
 
Referring to the plan to relocate U.S. forces Futenma Air Station to 
the coastal area of Camp Schwab, located in Nago City, Okinawa 
Prefecture, Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) President Ichiro Ozawa 
said, "There are plenty other alternative sites." Concerning this 
remark, Okinawa Governor Hirokazu Nakaima during a press conference 
on April 17 said, "It is impossible to envisage how to make such an 
idea Japan's real policy and undertake coordination (with the U.S. 
side)." 
 
Concerning a case in which power shift is realized in the next Lower 
House election, Nakaima noted, "I find it difficult to envisage how 
the relocation issue will develop, when a different party takes the 
reins of government." 
 
(3) Editorial: Futenma relocation plan will not move forward with 
 
TOKYO 00000887  004 OF 013 
 
 
the Guam agreement alone 
 
ASAHI (Page 3) (Full) 
April 17, 2009 
 
The House of Representatives has approved the agreement between 
Japan and the United States to relocate U.S. Marines from Okinawa to 
Guam. The pact is now likely to clear the Diet in the current 
session. 
 
The agreement specifies the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps' 
Futenma Air Station in Ginowan to the Henoko district in Nago and 
the shift of 8,000 Marines and their approximately 9,000 dependents 
to Guam at the same time. The pact also stipulates the provision of 
approximately 6 billion dollars by the Japanese government. 
 
Reducing the base burden is the top priority for Okinawa, which 
hosts 70% of U.S. bases in Japan. The relocation of Futenma Air 
Station that sits right in the middle of the residential area will 
be a symbolic event. It could be an epoch-making event, as well. 
Nevertheless, many questions have emerged from Diet deliberations on 
the pact. 
 
One of them is the number of Marines to be moved to Guam. The 
recently released 2009 Diplomatic Blue Book also notes that 8,000 
Marines and their 9,000 dependents are scheduled to be moved to Guam 
by 2014. But it has become clear that 8,000 will be slashed from the 
number of troops assigned to Okinawa, which is different from the 
actual number of troops stationed in the prefecture. 
 
The number of Marines assigned to Okinawa stands at 18,000, but 
because some of them have been dispatched to various parts of the 
world, there are only 13,000 troops in the prefecture at any given 
time on average. The number of their dependents comes to 8,000, 
which is fewer than the planned reduction figure. 
 
Asked about the actual size of reduction, Prime Minister Aso said: 
"We don't know." This means the government does not know the size of 
the burden on the local residents after the reduction. 
 
The Japanese government is to contribute up to 2.8 billion dollars 
to the construction of the new Marine headquarters and barracks on 
Guam. But the number of barracks to be built is unknown. Grounds for 
the 2.8 billion dollars have not been explained either. 
 
Ginowan Mayor Yoichi Iha criticized the government's response, 
telling a Lower House committee: "Japan and the United States have 
agreed to alleviate the burden on Okinawa, but how they will 
actually reduce the burden remains unclear. We cannot sense the 
government's eagerness." The mayor's reaction is natural. 
 
We must not forget, however, that even if the agreement is approved 
by the Diet, it does not mean the issue is settled. The matter will 
not move forward until after Okinawa and Nago approve the relocation 
of Futenma Air Station to the Henoko district. 
To build the new airport, authorization for landfill work must be 
obtained from the Okinawa governor. Local residents have been 
opposing the plan, citing the noise issue and other factors, and 
Governor Hirokazu Nakaima has been requesting the alternative 
facility be located further offshore than the current plan. 
 
The government has indicated that it will discuss options with local 
 
TOKYO 00000887  005 OF 013 
 
 
municipalities, including the possibility of partially altering the 
plan, but full-fledged discussions have yet to take place. Making 
changes requires the concurrence of the United States. There are 
many hurdles that need to be cleared. A general election will take 
place by the fall, and the future of the Aso administration remains 
unclear. 
 
Postponement might end up returning the relocation plan to square 
one. It has already been 13 years since the leaders of the two 
countries agreed to relocate the airfield. The Guam International 
Agreement clearly specifies Japan's financial contribution to the 
relocation. But will the two countries be able to accomplish the 
major goal of lessening the burden on Okinawa? 
 
(4) North Korea's brinkmanship diplomacy: U.S. has yet to come up 
with specific measures 
 
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 3) (Full) 
April 17, 2009 
 
Eiji Tsukiyama, Kaname Fukuda 
 
Following the adoption of the UN Security Council (UNSC) president's 
statement condemning its launch of a long-range ballistic missile, 
North Korea expelled monitors of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency from the nuclear facilities in Yongbyon. It appears that the 
North is trying to realize direct talks with the Obama 
administration, practicing brinkmanship diplomacy with the aim of 
putting on a show of crisis. Chances are, however, that the North 
may toughen its hard-line stance, depending on what response the 
U.S. makes. 
 
The North is really talking to China 
 
The DPRK Foreign Ministry issued a statement at an unprecedentedly 
fast speed right after the adoption of the UNSC chairman's 
statement. The statement noted that it would never return to the 
Six-Party Talks, thus declaring its secession from the framework 
using very strong terms. 
 
A South Korean expert on the North said, "The UNSC has adopted the 
president's statement, but given the specifics, it is a de facto 
sanction. The strong wording used in the declaration is a reflection 
of North Korea's anger at China for its failure to prevent the 
adoption of such a statement." The expert pointed out that North 
Korea was really talking to China by adopting such strong terms in 
the declaration. 
 
The Six-Party Talks were started during the former Bush 
administration. A South Korean daily analyzed the reason North Korea 
is rejecting the Six-Party Talks this way: "It is a message that the 
North wants to nullify the U.S.-North Korea relations of the Bush 
administration and return to the relations of the Clinton 
administration, which adopted a policy of engaging it." 
 
Similar case in 2002 
 
The declaration to restart the nuclear facilities and the expulsion 
of IAEA monitors are, in fact, quite similar to the "second nuclear 
crisis," which started in 2002. 
 
At that time, the U.S. raised the issue of suspected nuclear 
 
TOKYO 00000887  006 OF 013 
 
 
development by North Korea. Strongly opposing the U.S. move, North 
Korea, which had expected to see ties with the U.S. normalized, 
declared it would restart its nuclear facilities, and expelled IAEA 
monitors. It declared that it would opt out of the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in January 2003. In February, North 
Korea restarted operations at the Yongbyon nuclear facilities and 
extracted plutonium, a raw material for nuclear arms. The Six-Party 
Talks were launched in August of that year in order to find a 
solution to the crisis. 
 
What is more complicated this time, compared with the crisis that 
stated in 2002, is that the North Korean Foreign Ministry's 
statement noted that it would independently build a light water 
reactor, which uses low-enriched uranium. An expert on North Korea 
viewed this as an indication of North Korea's determination to 
acquire the technology to manufacture enriched uranium. The 
obstacles to conducting talks with the North are growing. 
 
Future image 
 
According to the South Korean government, the North removed about 
6,500 of the 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods from its Yongbyon reactor 
when it disabled the plant. This process will be suspended. To begin 
with, North Korea is expected to go ahead with the restoration of 
the reprocessing plant. It would then move on to the process of 
extracting plutonium, which is a raw material for nuclear bombs. 
 
Dongguk University Professor Ko Yu Hwan said, "The Obama 
administration has yet to come up with a specific policy for North 
Korea." The professor said that it is vital for the U.S. to indicate 
an image for the future of its approach to North Korea like the 
Perry Process during the Clinton administration, in which the U.S. 
tried to improve relations with the North by urging it to change in 
stages. 
 
A source connected with the South Korean government stressed that 
Japan, the U.S. and South Korea will deal with North Korea calmly 
and in unison, while noting that it is premature to talk about a 
second Perry Process when IAEA monitors are now being expelled from 
the North. 
 
There is, however, concern that if the U.S. stumbles in dealing with 
the North, it might carry out a nuclear test. 
 
(5) Interview on Japan-U.S. alliance with Shotaro Yachi, former vice 
foreign minister and now government representative: Japan should 
fulfill responsibility as global citizen 
 
MAINICHI (Page 9) (Full) 
April 17, 2009 
 
Yoshiaki Nakagawa 
 
-- What effect do you think North Korea's recent missile launch will 
have on security in East Asia? 
 
When looked at from the viewpoint of peace and safety in East Asia, 
China (which holds the key to regional security) prefers the status 
quo. There is no major power trying to change the present situation. 
But if North Korea accrues more nuclear weapons and missiles and 
becomes a big power, it will become a destabilizing factor in the 
region. It is necessary for Japan and other major countries to 
 
TOKYO 00000887  007 OF 013 
 
 
consider how they should jointly prevent such a situation. The 
Six-Party Talks have made steady efforts but failed to realize the 
desired result. On the contrary, the talks resulted in making the 
situation more unstable and making it more difficult to deal with 
North Korea. 
 
-- The previous Bush administration took a tough stance toward the 
North in the first half but a reconciliatory stance in the latter 
half. Attention is now being focused on the Obama administration's 
North Korea policy. 
 
The Obama administration has placed importance on international 
cooperation and dialogue. I guess senior diplomatic officers in the 
U.S. government will soon start efforts to establish relations with 
North Korea. In its latter half, the Bush administration tried to 
elicit results by compromising with North Korea. But the 
administration gained little while offering much. 
 
-- What prospect do you have about the future of the Japan-U.S. 
alliance? 
 
The Japan-U.S. alliance contains a variety of elements. In the 
international community, the two countries need to respect universal 
values and arrange a forum for international debate and 
international order. The Obama administration is cautious about 
using armed force, so Japan will surely find it easier to cooperate 
with the U.S. Countries aim at securing their national interests in 
negotiations with other countries. Japan must adjust its national 
interests to international interests. It is necessary for Japan to 
indicate a willingness to join international peacekeeping operations 
and anti-piracy operations. Canada has dispatched to Afghanistan 
2,800 troops, suffering about 100 casualties. New Zealand has 
dispatched 150 out of its total 10,000 troops. I think Canada and 
New Zealand have set their minds on the need to fulfill their 
responsibility as global citizens. 
 
-- Has Japan satisfactorily played its role in the international 
economic area? 
 
Japan calls itself the second largest economic power, but it is 
gradually finding its status in jeopardy. Although Prime Minister 
Taro Aso expressed a positive stance in overcoming the ongoing 
financial crisis, Japan has performed no role in the new round of 
World Trade Organization (WTO) global trade talks (Doha Round) and 
has been left out of its core group. In my view, the U.S. has asked 
for opinions from Britain but has not sought Japan's opinion. Japan 
is not recognized as a responsible big power. The blame belongs with 
Japan. 
 
-- Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin is scheduled to visit Japan 
in May. Is there any plan to break the impasse in negotiations on 
the Northern Territory issue? What does a "creative approach" [as 
said by President Dmitry Medvedev] mean? 
 
In the latest Japan-Russia summit meeting in Sakhalin, the two 
leaders confirmed the need for "a new, creative and unconventional" 
approach. I think that an outcome that can convince the peoples of 
the two countries will never be produced as long as Japan insists on 
returning the four islands (the Habomais, Shikota, Kunashiri, and 
Etorofu) or two islands (the Habomais and Shikotan), while Russia 
refuses to return any of them. Both countries should draw up a grand 
strategic scheme, involving such challenges as energy, the 
 
TOKYO 00000887  008 OF 013 
 
 
environment, and development of Northeast Siberia. In it, the 
dispute over the four northern islands must be positioned in it. 
That is an unconventional approach. Some suggest that Japan and 
Russia should agree to designate the four northern islands after 
returned to Japan as non-military areas. 
 
I personally back the idea of advocating the return of 3.5 islands 
so as not to leave the territorial row as a stumbling block to 
bilateral ties. The areas of the two islands account for only 7%. 
The reversion of half of Etorofu Island, the biggest of the four, 
and the three other islands is enough in terms of acreage, 
equivalent to the return of the four islands in effect. 
 
(6) Poll on Aso cabinet, political parties 
 
MAINICHI (Page 3) (Full) 
April 12, 2009 
 
Questions & Answers 
(T = total; P = previous; M = male; F = female) 
 
Q: Do you support the Aso cabinet? 
 
 T P M F 
Yes 24 (16) 25 24 
No 56 (66) 64 51 
Not interested 18 (17) 11 24 
 
Q: (Only for those who answered "yes" to the above question) Why? 
 
 T P M F 
Because the prime minister is from the Liberal Democratic Party 31 
(38) 28 34 
Because something can be expected of the prime minister's leadership 
11 (3) 9 13 
Because there's something friendly about the prime minister 21 (23) 
23 19 
Because something can be expected of the prime minister's policy 
measures 32 (22) 35 29 
 
Q: (Only for those who answered "no" to the above question) Why? 
 
 T P M F 
Because the prime minister is from the Liberal Democratic Party 7 
(5) 10 4 
Because nothing can be expected of the prime minister's leadership 
32 (38) 28 (36) 
Because there's something imprudent about the prime minister 19 (19) 
20 18 
Because nothing can be expected of the prime minister's policy 
measures 41 (36) 41 42 
 
Q: Which political party do you support? 
 
 T P M F 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 23 (22) 24 21 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ or Minshuto) 24 (22) 31 19 
New Komeito (NK) 5 (3) 4 6 
Japanese Communist Party (JCP) 3 (3) 3 3 
Social Democratic Party (SDP or Shaminto) 2 (2) 2 1 
People's New Party (PNP or Kokumin Shinto) 1 (1) 1 1 
Reform Club (RC or Kaikaku Kurabu) -- (--) -- -- 
 
TOKYO 00000887  009 OF 013 
 
 
New Party Nippon (NPN or Shinto Nippon) 0 (0) -- 0 
Other political parties 1 (2) 0 2 
None 40 (43) 34 44 
 
Q: North Korea launched a long-range ballistic missile, claiming it 
to be an artificial satellite. Do you think North Korea's missiles 
threaten Japan? 
 
 T P M F 
Yes 79  76 81 
No 19  22 17 
 
Q: Concerning the North Korean missile launch, the Japanese 
government is insisting on severe actions, such as adopting a new 
resolution at the United Nations and taking additional economic 
sanctions against North Korea. Do you appreciate this diplomatic 
stance of Japan? 
 
 T P M F 
Yes 76  76 76 
No 20  21 19 
 
Q: DPJ President Ozawa has clarified his intention to stay on as his 
party's head while his state-funded secretary is now facing charges 
for a violation of the Political Funds Control Law. What do you 
think he should do ahead of the next election for the House of 
Representatives? 
 
 T P M F 
Stay on for the election 23  28 20 
Resign before the election 33  29 35 
Quit right away 39  38 39 
 
Q: The DPJ has approved its President Ozawa's decision to stay on. 
Is this convincing? 
 
 T P M F 
Yes 30  34 28 
No 66  62 68 
 
Q: Prime Minister Aso has indicated that he would prioritize the 
supplementary budget's passage over dissolving the House of 
Representatives for a general election. When do you think the House 
of Representatives should be dissolved for a general election? 
 
 T P M F 
Right away 32  36 29 
After the extra budget's passage 47  48 46 
No need until the current term's expiry 16  12 18 
 
Q: Who do you think is more appropriate for prime minister between 
Prime Minister Aso and DPJ President Ozawa? 
 
 T P M F 
Prime Minister Aso 21 (10) 21 21 
DPJ President Ozawa 12 (13) 17 9 
Neither is appropriate 62 (73) 58 66 
 
Q: Which party between the LDP and the DPJ would you like to see win 
in the next election for the House of Representatives? 
 
 T P M F 
 
TOKYO 00000887  010 OF 013 
 
 
LDP 32 (29) 30 33 
DPJ 42 (40) 51 35 
Other political parties 19 (23) 14 33 
 
Q: Some municipalities have now begun to pay out a per capita cash 
benefit of 12,000 yen. Do you appreciate this cash benefit handout? 
 
 T P M F 
Yes 39  34 43 
No 56  63 52 
 
Q: The government has basically lowered the Saturday and Sunday 
expressway tolls to the upper limit of 1,000 yen for passenger cars 
equipped with the electronic toll collection (ETC) system and for 
some other vehicles. Do you appreciate this? 
 
 T P M F 
Yes 51  49 52 
No 44  47 42 
 
(Note) Figures shown in percentage, rounded off. "0" indicates that 
the figure was below 0.5%. "--" denotes that no respondents 
answered. "No answer" omitted. Figures in parentheses denote the 
results of the last survey conducted March 6-7. 
 
Polling methodology: The survey was conducted April 10-11 over the 
telephone across the nation on a computer-aided random digit 
sampling (RDS) basis. A total of 1,903 households with one or more 
eligible voters were sampled. Answers were obtained from 1,150 
persons (60%). 
 
(7) Scope column: Stormy developments expected in drafting manifesto 
to include some of Aso's policy imprint 
 
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 2) (Full) 
April 17, 2009 
 
Yuji Shinogase 
 
The ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) is now preparing to draft 
a manifesto (set of campaign pledges) for the next general election 
that will come after the dissolution of the House of 
Representatives. A special team responsible for drafting a manifesto 
will likely be made up of junior and mid-level lawmakers. It will 
come under the direct supervision of Prime Minister Taro Aso. In 
order to reflect some of Aso's political identity in a manifesto, 
the team will be led by LDP Election Strategy Council Deputy 
Chairman Yoshihide Suga, a close aide to Aso. However, a consumption 
tax hike after economic recovery, which Aso has asserted, and a plan 
to reduce the number of Diet members will likely become new sources 
of contention, eliciting a strong reaction from within the LDP. 
 
The LDP is not good at coming up with bold manifestos, since it is 
shackled politically to the various ministries and agencies, as well 
as to certain industrial associations. 
 
Therefore, about 10 junior and mid-level lawmakers, who have few 
links with specific business interests or government agencies and 
who are not swayed by the views of factions they belong to, will be 
picked. The team will aim to draft a manifesto that will have 
contents different from the requests of party elements that are 
prone to comply with the wishes of industrial associations. 
 
TOKYO 00000887  011 OF 013 
 
 
 
The outlook is that a program compiled by the party's Strategic 
Council for Revitalization of the Japanese Economy will become the 
basis for economic measures to be included in a manifesto. The 
question, however, is how to achieve agreement on areas other than 
fiscal resources and the economy. 
 
The program includes a large-scale economic package worth 40 
trillion yen, excluding fiscal measures, to be spread out over three 
years. It is safe to say that fierce debate over a future tax hike 
and the timing of it will take place in the process of drafting a 
manifesto. 
 
A person close to Aso said: "The prime minister is enthusiastic 
about including the consumption tax issue in a manifesto." There is 
a possibility that the conflict over the consumption tax hike issue 
will likely flare up again in the LDP. 
 
Suga is actively calling for including in the manifesto a promise to 
reduce the number of Diet members and to place restrictions on 
candidates running for Diet seats held by their parents, 
grandparents or uncles and aunts. Suga has insisted that if a 
consumption tax hike is included in the manifesto, lawmakers will 
need to make sacrifices. However, many in the LDP are cautious about 
decreasing the number of Diet seats. The team will likely have 
trouble ironing out differences of opinions on this within the 
party. 
If the team tries to cut through to the center in drafting a 
manifesto, there is a possibility that their efforts will spark a 
dispute in the party. 
 
(8) Japan should take lead in "anti-piracy PKO" off Somalia 
 
SANKEI (Page 7) (Slightly abridged) 
April 16, 2009 
 
By Yohei Sasakawa, chairman of the Nippon Foundation 
 
Piracy cases reported this year have already exceeded half of those 
reported last year 
 
The two Maritime Self-Defense Force's (MSDF) warships now deployed 
in the Gulf of Aden off Somalia began in late March their mission of 
guarding Japan-related ships from possible attacks by pirates. Of 
the some 20,000 ships traveling through those waters each year, 
Japan-related vessels account for 10%. Given this, it stands to 
reason for Japan to dispatch MSDF vessels to the scene. 
 
Japan dispatched the warships by invoking a provision for maritime 
patrols in the Self-Defense Forces Law. But under the provision, the 
MSDF is not allowed to protect ships unrelated to Japan. This 
distortion must be corrected first. Other countries will not be 
convinced by Japan's explanation that it cannot protect foreign 
vessels due to legal restrictions. Some persons have voiced their 
opposition [to the government's anti-piracy bill], insisting that 
the Japan Coast Guard should be responsible for all such operations. 
But to enable Japanese troops to take joint action with other 
countries' troops, the anti-piracy bill now on the Diet table must 
be urgently enacted. 
 
Dozens of pirate groups have been rampant in waters near the Gulf of 
Aden. A mother ship carrying a small high-speed boat first chases a 
 
TOKYO 00000887  012 OF 013 
 
 
targeted ship first and then the boat attacks the target in an 
attempt to hijack it. Pirates on board a ship equipped with such 
weapons as a rocket launcher are fierce. They demand and receive 
millions of yen as ransom. Since this is a low-risk but high-return 
crime, piracy is unlikely to decrease for the time being. 
 
In the pirate-infested waters, 20 countries have deployed warships 
on a patrol mission, but 61 pirate-attack cases, more than half of 
the number of incidents last year, have already been reported since 
January. Each nation's patrol operations might run out of steam for 
cost and other reasons if the current situation lasts long. It will 
become necessary sooner or later for each nation to establish a 
long-term patrolling system covering several years from now. 
 
To deal with such a situation, I hope, the government will make 
diplomatic efforts to have the UN designate anti-piracy operations 
off Somalia as peacekeeping operations (PKO). Given that long-term 
cooperation among UN member countries is imperative to eliminate 
piracy, I think it is desirable for anti-piracy operations to be 
categorized as UN PKO. Such efforts will surely enable Japan to play 
up its presence in the international community and pave the way for 
Japan to become a permanent UNSC member. 
 
Use leprosy case as lesson 
 
There should first be a crackdown on weapons onboard unidentified 
ships moored off Somalia beaches. Meanwhile, surveillance from the 
sky should be promoted and warships dispatched by various countries 
should be effectively deployed. If an unidentified ship is spotted, 
the naval vessel that receives the information should inspect the 
ship and seize weapons. I think this process would work effectively 
to prevent piracy. 
 
The government is urged to take the initiative in prompting the UN 
Security Council (UNSC) to make arrangements for this process. As 
seen from different responses made by countries to North Korea's 
recent missile launch, it is difficult for UNSC members, which have 
different systems and interests, to take joint steps. On the piracy 
issue, however, Russia, China and other countries have deployed 
warships to the waters off Somalia in order to fight their common 
enemy. About 40 countries are expected to participate in the 
anti-piracy mission in the end. It is unprecedented for this number 
of countries to take concerted action over a common issue. 
 
Last year, the Japanese government presented to the UN Human Rights 
Council an antidiscrimination resolution for leprosy patients, 
recuperators, and their families. The resolution was presented 
jointly by 59 countries, including Cuba and China, which were 
opposed to a human rights resolution criticizing North Korea for its 
past abductions of Japanese nationals, and was unanimously adopted. 
Focusing on this experience and the fact that pirates are a common 
enemy for all UNSC members, I think it is fully possible for Japan 
to obtain approval from other members for its plan to construct a 
piracy PKO system. Somalia is in a state of anarchy, but a 
provisional government has been established there. 
 
Japan should show guts as marine country 
 
In a bid for a permanent seat on the UNSC, Japan has stressed it 
bears 16% of the operating costs of the UN, following the U.S. But 
this assertion is not enough to convince other members. In the 
international community, a country that bears both operating costs 
 
TOKYO 00000887  013 OF 013 
 
 
and risks can have a say. 
 
"What will Japan do if it becomes a permanent UNSC member?" "What 
kind of contribution is Japan going to make?" We are often asked 
such questions by key foreign figures. Some countries criticize 
Japan for using its pacifist Constitution as a good excuse for 
avoiding the risk of sending troops to battlegrounds, and they see 
such as nothing more than a symbol of one-country pacifism. We, 
Japanese, must be aware that we are now in such an age. Over the 
past 60 years, the international community underwent a significant 
change. 
 
Our nation is aiming to change "Japan being protected by the sea" 
into "Japan protecting the sea." In transporting goods across the 
world, 90% depends on maritime transportation. There are also a host 
of problems linked to the sea, such as environmental contamination. 
Meanwhile, Japan has abundant experiences and knowledge regarding 
the sea. 
 
If Japan can take the initiative over anti-piracy PKO, Japan will 
naturally have a stronger voice in the international community. 
Incidents of piracy also occurred frequently in the Straits of 
Malacca in the 1990s. But the number of attacks by pirates in the 
waters has significantly decreased as a result of enhanced marine 
security capabilities owning to desperate efforts made by Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Singapore, all of which face the straits, as well as 
Nippon Foundation's cooperation. Japan, as a maritime country, is 
now urged to have the guts to contribute to ensuring that the seas 
are safe and in forming a oceanic order. 
 
ZUMWALT