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DE RUEHKO #0837/01 1030753
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P 130753Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
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INFO RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 4777
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RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
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RUALSFJ/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
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S E C R E T TOKYO 000837 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/J, EAP/K 
DOD FOR OSD/APSA - SEDNEY/HELVEY/BASALLA/ARAKELIAN 
PACOM FOR J00/J01/J5 
USFJ FOR J00/J01/J5 
USFK FOR J00/J01/J5 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: AFTER KOREAN REUNIFICATION 
TAGS: PREL PARM MARR KN KS JA
SUBJECT: JAPANESE, ROK OFFICIALS' AND ACADEMICS' VIEWS ON 
U.S.-JAPAN-ROK TRILATERAL SECURITY COOPERATION 
 
REF: 08 SECDEF 8291 
 
Classified By: James P. Zumwalt, Charge d'Affaires, a.i.; reasons 1.4 ( 
b/d) 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (S) Japanese government officials and academics express 
strong interest in pursuing U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral 
security dialogues at all levels, partly to augment Japan's 
defense posture and international peace activities, but 
mainly to improve bilateral defense cooperation between Japan 
and the ROK.  They believe that progress in trilateral 
dialogue with the United States can lead eventually to 
bilateral dialogue between Japan and the ROK on contingency 
planning with respect to North Korea, so long as both 
governments put history and territorial issues behind them. 
However, South Korean contacts in Japan point out that: the 
ROK only participated reluctantly in trilateral dialogue 
involving the United States; most ROK government officials 
remain wary of security and defense cooperation with Japan; 
and the fundamental issue of mutual trust in terms of 
security and defense issues cannot be resolved simply by 
""moving beyond"" history and territorial disputes. 
 
¶2. (S) COMMENT: Trilateral security and defense dialogue with 
the Japan and ROK will require close U.S. supervision and 
proactive engagement with both governments.  The U.S. 
Government needs to use the opportunity provided by the 
current positive atmosphere between Tokyo and Seoul to help 
the two allies strengthen mutual trust, both in trilateral 
and bilateral settings.  The close coordination demonstrated 
by the Japanese and ROK governments in the events leading up 
to, and following the recent Taepodong-II ballistic missile 
launch by the DPRK is an indication that some of the barrier 
between the two neighbors can be broken down.  Trilateral 
dialogue in all its various forms -- especially the 
trilateral J-5 strategy talks -- can be helpful in this 
process.  End Comment and Summary. 
 
---------- 
BACKGROUND 
---------- 
 
¶3. (C) The complicated bilateral relationship between Japan 
and the Republic of Korea (ROK) presents a challenge to U.S. 
goals of enhancing trilateral defense and security 
cooperation with the two allies.  Despite recent improvements 
in Japan-ROK relations since the change in South Korea's 
administration in 2008, the scope of bilateral security 
dialogue between the two neighbors remains modest, while 
trilateral security talks with the United States continue to 
require active leadership by the U.S. Government.  Embassy 
Tokyo surveyed the views of several Japanese and South Korean 
interlocutors from government and academia on the prospects 
for trilateral defense and security cooperation among the 
United States, Japan, and the ROK. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
JAPAN SEEKS SECURITY DIALOGUE WITH ROK 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (S) Japanese government officials and academics expressed 
broad support for trilateral defense and security dialogue 
with the United States and the ROK.  Enhancing Japan's 
defense posture and responding to destabilizing acts by the 
DPRK or regime collapse in North Korea features prominently 
in their reasoning supporting Japan's pursuit of 
policy-level, bilateral and trilateral security talks with 
the two governments.  Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) 
Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Division Deputy Director Noriaki 
Abe told Embassy Tokyo that the current lack of dialogue 
between the Japanese and ROK governments on Korean Peninsula 
contingencies at the policy, operational, or even academic 
levels has hamstrung efforts to plan effectively for 
evacuating Japanese citizens from South Korea using Japan 
Self Defense Force (JSDF) assets in the event of a crisis on 
the Korean Peninsula.  The Japanese government needs 
information from the ROK on possible noncombatant assembly 
points, facilities to be used for sheltering evacuees in a 
contingency, and airfields and ports to be used for 
evacuating noncombatants. More importantly, it would need 
permission from the ROK government to allow JSDF aircraft and 
vessels to enter South Korea in evacuation scenarios -- 
something Seoul has yet to agree to grant.  Leveraging the 
trilateral discussions with the United States would be a 
useful way to urge the ROK government to be more 
forward-leaning in its bilateral talks with Japan, Abe said. 
 
¶5. (C) National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) 
Professor Narushige Michishita, a former Assistant Councilor 
for National Security and Crisis Management at the Cabinet 
Secretariat, asserted that comprehensive trilateral security 
cooperation among the United States, Japan, and the ROK is 
desirable both in terms of Japanese national security 
interests, as well as the three countries' contribution to 
international security.  Although the three governments have 
maintained trilateral coordination in the Six-Party process, 
as well as in the trilateral policy-planning talks, a 
trilateral dialogue focusing on defense and operational 
issues has been conspicuously missing in recent years.  The 
three countries could, for example, find ways to provide 
trilateral capabilities in regional disaster relief 
exercises, or bring their respective expertise to 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) exercises.  They 
could also begin studying their possible roles and missions 
in a unified Korea scenario, including stabilization efforts, 
disarmament, and law enforcement.  Combining the three 
countries' capabilities would also help address some of the 
JSDF's shortfalls -- in essence, act as a force-multiplier, 
Michishita asserted. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
CURRENT TRACK 1, TRACK 1.5 TALKS SATISFACTORY FOR NOW 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶6. (S) Japanese government officials are anxious to engage in 
robust discussion with their ROK counterparts on issues that 
directly affect Japan's salient security interests, but are 
willing to proceed at a moderate pace (for the time being) in 
order to keep the dialogue alive.  They believe the ROK 
government is beginning, after the Roh administration, to 
warm up to Japan on security issues and do not want to 
jeopardize the still-forming relationship by pushing too 
early for an ambitious agenda.  Ministry of Defense (MOD) 
Strategic Planning Office Director Koichiro Nakajima said 
senior MOD officials are pleased in general with the results 
of the November 2008 senior-level bilateral security talks 
with the ROK in Fukuoka, the reinvigorated Defense Trilateral 
Talks (DTT) among the United States, Japan, and the ROK 
(reftel), the trilateral J-5 strategy talks, and the ongoing 
""track 1.5"" trilateral discussions involving defense 
think-tanks from all three countries.  In particular, 
Japanese participants came away from the 2008 bilateral talks 
in Fukuoka with a greater sense of optimism than they did 
after the previous year's round hosted by the ROK in Jeju. 
 
¶7. (S) Nakajima pointed out, however, that the substance of 
the discussion did not progress much beyond that of the 2007 
round of talks despite the visible improvement in atmosphere. 
 
 The Japanese side will work to move future security forums 
involving the ROK gradually beyond politically-neutral issues 
-- peacekeeping operations (PKO), regional assessments, 
disaster relief, anti-piracy -- and allow all sides to have 
frank exchanges about Korean Peninsula contingency issues. 
While Tokyo realizes that preparing Seoul to engage in such 
discussion will take time, the Japanese government will use 
every opportunity to persuade the South Koreans, Nakajima 
said. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
OVERALL, A SENSE OF IMPROVED JAPAN-ROK RELATIONS 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶8. (S) Nakajima asserted that the improved atmosphere in the 
bilateral security talks reflects an overall improvement in 
bilateral relations since the beginning of the new South 
Korean administration.  Long-standing history and territorial 
issues are, he noted, the only remaining barriers to a closer 
level of cooperation.  If Japan and the ROK move beyond 
history and territorial issues, Nakajima argued, achieving 
closer defense ties between the two governments should not be 
difficult, given the history of cooperation between the Japan 
Self Defense Force (JSDF) and the ROK military during their 
UN PKO missions to East Timor a decade ago.  The two forces' 
participation in the 2008 joint search and rescue exercise 
(SAREX) is another good example of defense cooperation.  The 
key, Nakajima noted, is to institutionalize such cooperation 
beyond military-to-military engagement.  Still, he noted, 
improving the defense and security relationship will take 
time and effort for both governments to make up for the 
near-absence of defense or security talks under the Roh 
Moo-hyun government.  Specifically, it will take time for the 
good will between the governments to work its way through 
their respective bureaucracies, Nakajima noted. 
 
------------------------------------- 
BILATS APPEAR TO BE IMPROVING, BUT... 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (S) MOD Defense Policy Bureau Director General Nobushige 
Takamizawa recently told visiting researchers from the 
Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) to keep 
their expectations modest with respect to the Japan-ROK 
security relationship and trilateral talks with the United 
States.  While trilateral cooperation with the United States 
could help facilitate discussion between the ROK and Japan, 
the three-way dialogue will repeatedly be hampered by the 
ROK's hesitation to pursue meaningful security dialogue. 
Takamizawa acknowledged that South Korea appears to be 
willing to raise its level of participation in the Defense 
Trilateral Talks (DTT) and other trilateral dialogue with the 
United States, but questioned the extent to which the South 
Koreans are prepared to advance the discussion. 
 
-------------------------- 
WHERE TO START: MOD VIEWS 
-------------------------- 
 
10 (S) Takamizawa stressed that planning for Korean Peninsula 
contingencies with the United States and the ROK is a 
long-term goal for the Japanese government.  That said, he 
singled out disaster relief as a good starting point for the 
three countries to explore real areas for cooperation.  The 
key, Takamizawa noted, is to build mutual confidence and 
hammer out common strategic and operational objectives 
through bilateral and trilateral security dialogue, building 
on input from the various track 1.5 discussions.  Focusing on 
trilateral disaster relief and PKO cooperation in the interim 
is a good ""ice breaker"" for Japan and the ROK.  Disaster 
relief operations (DRO) is especially useful as an area of 
cooperation for Japan because the JSDF and civilian agencies 
can bring substantial experience and know-how to the 
discussion, and because the Japanese public supports JSDF 
involvement in DRO.  It also stands the least chance of 
causing political problems for the ROK government, making it 
a more sustainable collaborative effort than any other 
security issue, Takamizawa said. 
 
¶11. (S) Takamizawa stated that MOD expects a number of 
deliverables from trilateral disater relief cooperation: 
information exchange on each country's response time for 
disasters; common understanding among all three parties on 
each government's requirements for, or restrictions on troop 
deployment to disaster-hit areas; identified requirements for 
international cooperation, including equipment, communication 
needs, etc; a draft trilateral plan for responding to 
disasters by all three parties, including roles, missions, 
and capabilities; and information sharing arrangements.  The 
three countries could also share their experiences on 
reconstruction and stabilization and map out possible 
division of labor.  Takamizawa added that Japan stands to 
gain a lot from such discussion, as the ROK military has the 
capacity to support post-conflict reconstruction and 
stabilization operations that the JSDF currently lacks. 
 
----------------------- 
WHERE JAPAN WANTS TO BE 
----------------------- 
 
¶12. (S) Takamizawa pointed out the JSDF is trying to persuade 
the ROK military to participate in a joint exercise for 
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) 
attacks.  MOD considers such cooperation to be a top 
priority, as Japan stands to suffer considerable collateral 
damage if the DPRK were to use CBRN weapons in the event of a 
conflict.  Both sides should discuss CBRN cooperation in 
detail subsequent to bilateral and trilateral discussions on 
disaster relief and PKOs, followed by responding to terrorist 
attacks.  Building on the success of these discussions, it 
may be possible at some point in the future for all three 
countries to have frank discussions on planning for a Korean 
Peninsula contingency.  Although many members of the JSDF 
feel compelled to push the ROK for early discussion on 
contingency planning, MOD prefers to take a phased approach, 
Takamizawa said. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
ROK PARTICIPATION ENTIRELY AT U.S. BEHEST 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶13. (S) South Korean interlocutors, in contrast to our 
Japanese contacts, provide a more somber assessment of the 
state of Japan-ROK bilateral security talks, as well as 
prospects for the U.S.-Japan-ROK defense and security 
dialogue.  ROK Embassy Counselor Kim Tae-jin told Embassy 
Tokyo that ROK government participation in the November 2008 
Defense Trilateral Talks (DTT) held in Washington was 
entirely due to strong U.S. Government pressure.  While the 
ROK's political leaders supported South Korea's participation 
in the November DTT, government agencies did not have a 
unified position at the outset.  Policy coordination took 
considerably longer than usual because of a number of factors 
-- not the least of which is the ROK bureaucracy's 
institutional resistance to engaging the Japanese government 
on contingency planning involving North Korea.  South Korean 
officials widely regard the DTT and other examples of 
trilateral security dialogue involving Japan as ""U.S. 
initiatives"" that present little to no benefit in terms of 
the ROK's national security interests, Kim added. 
 
¶14. (S) Counselor Kim pointed out that President Lee 
Myung-bak personally desires stronger trilateral security 
cooperation with the United States and Japan, but is unable 
in his weakened political position to show an overt display 
of cooperation.  There is, according to Kim, nearly no public 
support for working with Japan on defense issues in South 
Korea.  This, Kim stressed, is why the ROK Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) limits its participation in 
the DTT to the working level.  A forum perceived by the 
public to be an event primarily among defense ministry 
counterparts from the three countries is less sensitive than 
if MOFAT were to take the lead, Kim explained. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
ROK OBLIGING, BUT MANEUVERING THROUGH POLITICAL MINEFIELD 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶15. (S) Counselor Kim stated the ROK government will continue 
to participate in the DTT.  The U.S. desire to advance 
trilateral security cooperation is understandable from 
MOFAT's point of view.   Washington should, however, manage 
its expectations about the DTT, given the unique nature of 
ROK-Japan relations.  Citing the Japanese delegation's draft 
presentation slide that listed a unified Korea and the 
Takeshima/Dokdo territorial dispute as major Japanese 
security challenges that was shown mistakenly during the 
ROK-Japan bilateral session of the November DTT, Kim argued 
that the Japanese side is simply out of touch with the ROK's 
political reality.  ""Confidence building does not happen in a 
vacuum,"" he stressed.  Against such backdrop, few ROK 
officials are willing to advocate on behalf of enhanced 
Japan-ROK bilateral security relations risking their own 
credibility, said Kim. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
FUNDAMENTAL MISINTERPRETATION BY JAPAN 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶16. (C) Dr. Kim Changsu, Visiting Research Fellow at the 
National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) and Senior 
Research Fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis 
(KIDA), told Embassy Tokyo that trilateral security 
cooperation with the United States and Japan fails to 
resonate with many South Koreans for a number of reasons. 
Chief among them, Kim pointed out, is the deep-seated Korean 
distrust toward the Japanese, particularly on military or 
security issues.  More specifically, Koreans across the 
entire spectrum of government, military, and academia either 
fail to see the need to discuss Korean Peninsula 
contingencies with Japan, bilaterally or otherwise, or 
question Japan's possible ulterior motive for being 
interested in what the ROK considers to be one of its most 
closely-guarded secrets -- an issue it is willing to share 
with the United States only in a bilateral alliance context. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
DISTRUST TO THE POINT OF PROTESTING JSDF MILITARY BAND 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶17. (C) Dr. Kim noted that Japanese government officials and 
academics have an overly simplistic view of the South Korean 
political landscape as it relates to Japan and security 
issues.  According to Kim, Japanese assessments that the ROK 
and Japanese governments need merely to ""move beyond"" history 
and territorial issues demonstrate a significant gap in 
understanding between the two countries on the nature of the 
bilateral relationship.  The problem in Korea, Kim argued, is 
both institutional and emotional.  ROK government national 
security agencies, including MOFAT and the Ministry of 
National Defense (MND), have developed over the years a 
tendency to keep at arms length security and defense 
engagement with Japan for fear of public backlash.  Projects 
involving the JSDF are especially unattractive to ROK 
government officials, as they evoke in the Korean public's 
mind memories of colonial oppression and forced conscription 
of Korean men into the Imperial Army during World War II. 
 
¶18. (C) Dr. Kim, explaining the sensitivity and distrust in 
Korea toward Japan, raised the recent protestations by the 
local community in the South Korean port city of Jinhae to 
JSDF participation in the April 3-5 Jinhae World Military 
Band and Color Guard Festival.  The Jinhae City Municipal 
Government homepage received a staggering number of protest 
emails opposing the participation of the JSDF band, crippling 
the network for hours.  If the Korean public is unwilling to 
allow the JSDF band from participating in a music festival, 
there is no way it would tolerate collaboration with the 
Japanese government on Korean Peninsula contingency issues, 
Kim concluded. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
THE UNHELPFUL:  INSUFFICIENT JAPANESE CIV-MIL CONSENSUS 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶19. (C) Lack of consensus between Japanese civilian 
bureaucrats and uniformed JSDF officers on the need for, as 
well as the scope of cooperation with the ROK, presents yet 
another hurdle to effective security dialogue between Japan 
and the ROK.  GRIPS' Michishita noted that many senior JSDF 
officers expressed skepticism when he had urged them during 
his time in the Cabinet Secretariat to be more 
forward-leaning on bilateral military cooperation with the 
ROK.  Many Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) 
officers, in particular, did not believe they would gain much 
from navy-to-navy cooperation with the comparatively 
less-developed ROK Navy.  Others, while generally positive 
toward bilateral cooperation, expressed concerns about 
limited resources and manpower that could be better used on 
other JMSDF endeavors.  Michishita said he had pointed out 
repeatedly that the ROK Navy was rapidly upgrading its 
capabilities and had significantly more personnel than the 
JMSDF, even if it trailed Japan in terms of the number of 
destroyers, frigates, and other maritime assets.  Moreover, 
the ROK Navy, which sought to have a blue-water navy by 2020, 
was eager to engage the JMSDF for their know-how and their 
capabilities.  Michishita added that he had stressed to the 
JMSDF that the potential for interoperability between the two 
forces increased as the ROK Navy continued to acquire 
anti-submarine warfare and Aegis capabilities. 
ZUMWALT