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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 TOKYO 000828 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR S/SRAP, EAP/J, SCA/P, SCA/A 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV EAID EFIN ECON MOPS AF JA
SUBJECT: JAPAN'S RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN 
 
REF: A. A) TOKYO 740 
     ¶B. B) 08 TOKYO 1397 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Jim Zumwalt for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) 
. 
 
¶1. (C)  SUMMARY: Key Japanese politicians and bureaucrats 
recognize that Japan must engage in a meaningful way in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, even while most Japanese see these 
countries as being a long way from Japan. While the public 
might question why it is in Japan's national interest to 
become heavily involved, policymakers believe that Japan has 
an interest in fostering stability to prevent the spread of 
violence and instability in the region.  Moreover, Japan 
continues to view itself a major player on the world stage. 
Japanese elites know Tokyo cannot sit on the sidelines as 
others wrestle with problems facing the international 
community. 
 
¶2. (C) SUMMARY (continued): For these reasons, Japan will 
seek to play a leading, or at least important role, in 
addressing the challenges facing Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
That said, Japan faces bureaucratic and political challenges 
that make it difficult to move forward with even 
uncontroversial policies and decisions impacting Japan's 
foreign relations.  Another major limitation is Japan's 
constitutional prohibition against sending military forces 
abroad in all but circumscribed situations.  Despite these 
obstacles, we believe Japan can be coaxed into playing an 
increasingly significant role in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
---------------------- 
WHY SHOULD JAPAN CARE? 
---------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Why should Japan care what happens in distant and 
messy lands like Afghanistan or Pakistan?  Unlike the 
countries of the Middle East, neither country provides Japan 
with needed resources or significant economic opportunities. 
So while the average Japanese politician or citizen might 
somewhat reluctantly understand why it's important for Japan 
to send forces or provide assistance to a country such as 
Iraq, many do not see the connection between Japan and 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, particularly given current 
difficult economic circumstances. 
 
¶4. (C) Fortunately, some leading politicians and most foreign 
policy bureaucrats do get it.  They recognize what happens in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan affects the broader regions of Asia 
and beyond.  Instability can touch Japan.  Prime Minister 
Taro Aso, while serving as Foreign Minister in 2006, spoke of 
the need for an ""Arc of Freedom and Prosperity"" that would 
traverse the South and Central Asian regions.  Regarding the 
Middle East, then-Foreign Minister Aso insisted that 
maintaining stability in the region was one of Japan's key 
national interests. 
 
¶5. (C) Japan considers itself a major player on the 
international scene.  Obtaining a permanent seat on the 
United Nations Security Council is one of its primary foreign 
policy goals.  Foreign policy experts here realize Japan 
cannot hope to gain and maintain respect if it does not play 
a key role in international events that are of concern to the 
wider community of nations.  A stinging refrain heard from 
allies here in Tokyo is how can Japan expect to sit on the 
Security Council and send citizens of other countries to 
fight and die if it is unwilling to send its own citizens as 
well.  Japanese elites realize Tokyo cannot be seen to be 
sitting on the sidelines while others struggle with 
challenges facing the international community as a whole. 
 
¶6. (C) For these reasons, Japan does and will continue to 
care about what happens in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and it 
will want to play a significant role in addressing these 
challenges.  However, there are bureaucratic, political, and 
constitutional constraints to the role Japan can play, 
despite the best wishes of some of its leaders. 
 
-------------------- 
BUREAUCRATIC HURDLES
-------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Japan agrees the problems of Afghanistan and Pakistan 
are inextricably intertwined.  Bureaucratically, however, the 
government is not set up in a way to foster an approach that 
deals with both countries in a unified way.  At MOFA, 
Afghanistan and Pakistan are situated at the intersection of 
three distinct regional bureaus.  Afghanistan lies at the 
eastern edge of the Middle Eastern and African Affairs 
Bureau's Second Middle East Division (which also is 
preoccupied with Iraq and Iran), while Pakistan is at the 
western frontier of the Southwest Asia Division of the Asian 
and Oceanian Affairs Bureau.  The Central Asian states still 
belong to the European Affairs Bureau. Other MOFA bureaus 
with a major stake include the Foreign Policy Bureau and its 
National Security Division, which manages any deployment of 
military forces, and the International Cooperation Bureau, 
which sets policy for foreign assistance.  To bring some 
centralized order to this situation, MOFA has appointed 
Ambassador Motohide Yoshikawa, reportedly a strong and 
assertive leader, as Japan's Special Representative for 
Afghanistan and Pakistan.  However, he is still winding down 
his previous assignment as Ambassador to Spain, and hence has 
yet to demonstrate his effectiveness. 
 
¶8. (C) Other ministries and organization also have a stake in 
Japan's Af-Pak policy.  For example, the Ministry of Defense 
would be involved in any decision to dispatch military 
personnel.  The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) 
implements Japan's foreign assistance programs and already 
has a modest number of employees in Afghanistan.  The 
Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) has an 
interest in pursuing commercial and trade opportunities in 
Pakistan and, to a lesser extent, Afghanistan.  The Ministry 
of Finance (MOF) can be counted upon to be cautious about 
allocating funds for use abroad, believing past contributions 
to Pakistan were not effectively used.  MOF has urged that it 
would be prudent to wait for Pakistan to demonstrate 
performance under the International Monetary Fund program. 
Overseeing it all is the Cabinet Office, which has its own 
internal political dynamics and spotty relations with the 
ministries and their leaders.  Traditional stove-piping and 
long-standing suspicions and competitions between and even 
within these ministries will hinder smooth policymaking and 
implementation. 
 
--------------------- 
POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS 
--------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Times have changed markedly from when former Prime 
Minister Koizumi could unilaterally decide to send Ground 
Self Defense Force (GSDF) personnel to Iraq.  In contrast to 
Koizumi, who built a commanding majority in both the Upper 
and Lower Houses of the Japanese Diet, Prime Minister Taro 
Aso presides over a ruling coalition on the verge of 
collapse.  His ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) no 
longer has a majority in the Upper House and, although the 
ruling coalition still has a two-thirds majority in the Lower 
House, this super-majority, and possibly even a simple 
majority, could be lost in elections which must take place no 
later than this fall. 
 
¶10. (C) Meanwhile, the minority Democratic Party of Japan 
(DPJ), newly empowered with a majority in the Upper House, is 
playing hardball politics on even the most straightforward 
legislative issues pertaining to Japan's foreign policies. 
The DPJ's goal is to do anything possible to weaken the LDP. 
As a result, even though public opinion and perhaps even a 
majority of DPJ lawmakers favor the continued deployment of 
Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) oilers to the Indian Ocean 
in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, the DPJ has now 
twice vociferously opposed the legislation necessary to keep 
the MSDF ships on station.  In a political environment where 
already even routine decisions to deploy peacekeepers in 
single digits can be excruciatingly slow and drawn out, this 
""broken Diet"" has made it next to impossible for Japan to 
even consider sending military or even civilian personnel to 
Afghanistan. 
 
-------------------------- 
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 
-------------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) While U.S. and allied forces make the ultimate 
sacrifices in Afghanistan, Japan stands noticeably apart. 
This is because the current interpretation of the post-World 
War II constitution, which has never been amended, rules out 
the use of force in all but limited cases where Japan or 
Japanese come under direct attack.  The Japanese do maintain 
extremely capable military forces, known as ""Self Defense 
Forces (SDF)."" 
 
¶12. (C)  Accordingly, decisions to send SDF personnel abroad, 
even in extremely small numbers to assist in stable 
peacekeeping operations, are excruciatingly slow and painful. 
 The ability of former Prime Minister Koizumi to send ground 
forces to Iraq was probably an aberration not to be repeated 
anytime soon; the use of Air Self Defense Forces (ASDF) in 
Kuwait and Iraq was less controversial, but still a stretch. 
And the extremely safe and non-confrontational use of MSDF 
ships to refuel coalition warships has become a political and 
legal hot potato.  Our chances of convincing the Japanese to 
send military forces to Afghanistan are, accordingly, remote. 
 
------------------------- 
ASSISTANCE TO AFGHANISTAN 
------------------------- 
 
¶13. (U) Despite the limitations discussed above, Japan has 
endeavored to play a major role in addressing the problems of 
Afghanistan.  Tokyo has pledged over $2 billion in 
assistance, nearly $1.8 billion of which has been disbursed. 
Japan views its assistance to Afghanistan as based on three 
pillars: enhancing security, supporting the political process 
and reconciliation, and promoting economic and human resource 
development.  Activities embarked upon in pursuit of each are 
outlined below, but recent significant contributions made by 
Japan include the commitment to pay the salaries of all of 
Afghanistan's police officers for six months, the decision to 
assign MOFA diplomats to work with the Lithuanian PRT in 
Chaghcharan, and a recent $300 million contribution for: 
election support ($44 million), anti-terrorism and security 
support ($170 million, including payment of police salaries 
and a contribution to the NATO helicopter trust fund), and 
emergency food support ($86 million.) 
 
¶14. (U) SECURITY ASSISTANCE: Japan was the leading supporter 
of the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) 
and Disarmament of Illegally Armed Groups (DIAG) processes, 
claiming to have disarmed and reintegrated 60,000 
ex-combatants, disbanding 502 illegal militias, and gaining 
control of over 250,000 weapons.  In addition to direct 
support for DDR and DIAG, Japan has also supported police 
reform and counter-narcotics programs by constructing a 
border police center, customs facilities, and by providing 
police training in Japan.  This is in addition to the recent 
assistance with police salaries and the helicopter trust fund 
noted above. 
 
¶15. (U) POLITICAL PROCESS AND RECONCILIATION: Japan has 
hosted a number of major international conferences dealing 
with Afghanistan, including the 2002 Tokyo Conference which 
signaled the start of the reconstruction process.  Others 
include the 2003 DDR conference, the 2006 DIAG I and 2007 
DIAG II conferences, and the 2008 Joint Coordination and 
Monitoring Board (JCMB) meeting.  Japan has provided 
continual support for the election process since 2001, 
including the recent pledge of $44 million for the upcoming 
presidential and provincial elections in 2009. 
 
¶16. (U) ECONOMIC AND HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT: Japan has 
funded the construction of over 650 kilometers of roads and 
claims to be about to complete its long-overdue segment of 
the Ring Road, recently inaugurated the new terminal at the 
Kabul International Airport, and is working on the Master 
Plan for the Kabul Metropolitan City Development project.  It 
has constructed over 500 schools, trained 10,000 teachers and 
provided literacy education for 300,000 adults.  In the next 
three years it plans to construct an additional 200 schools 
and provide training to 20,000 more teachers.  In the health 
sector, Japan has funded over 40 million vaccinations, and 
has constructed 50 health clinics, with 100 more planned in 
the next three years. 
 
¶17. (U) REPLENISHMENT SUPPORT FOR OEF: In addition, Japan 
continues, despite the political difficulties described in 
paragraph 10, to provide at-sea refueling support to OEF 
coalition warships operating in the Indian Ocean. 
 
¶18. (C) SUPPORT FOR PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS: We and 
our international partners in Afghanistan have long urged 
Japan to become more involved with the PRTs.  Ideally, we'd 
like to see them operate one, or at least dispatch personnel 
to PRTs operated by others.  Japan is skittish about sending 
civilian or military personnel into what they consider to be 
dangerous or insecure environments.  So while JICA has 
deployed approximately 50 employees to Afghanistan, the 
Japanese have yet to send anyone to a PRT.  Tokyo has, 
however, sought to align its assistance priorities with the 
goals and projects of the PRTs, and to Qte has helped fund 
48 grass roots projects identified by eleven PRTs.  MOFA 
recently announced that it will send three diplomats to the 
Lithuanian-led PRT in Chaghcharan to act as a civil 
assistance team.  We hope that their successful deployment 
will lead Japan to take a more forward-leaning approach. 
 
----------------------- 
RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN 
----------------------- 
 
¶19. (C) Japan's relations with Pakistan are long-standing, 
but have only recently begun to take on major significance. 
While in the past, Tokyo always viewed Pakistan as one half 
of a hyphenated relQionship with India, in the last two 
years Japan has begun to view these two south Asian countries 
independently.  Recently, mostly to align itself with our 
thinking and policy, the hyphen has returned, only this time 
the other party involved is Afghanistan. 
 
¶20. (C) Japan views Pakistan as a front-line state in the 
struggle against terrorism and strongly believes development 
of a strong democracy and growing economy is key to 
preventing the spread of instability in an already volatile 
region.  Tokyo's approach to Pakistan is best summarized by 
viewing former Foreign Minister Koumura's visit to Islamabad 
in May 2008 (Ref B).  At that time, Koumura made clear 
Japan's view that the stability and development of Pakistan 
are directly linked to the peace and stability of the Asian 
region and of the international community as a whole.  He 
said Japan was committed to providing Pakistan with its 
""utmost support"" to fight terrorism, consolidate democracy 
and achieve sustainable economic growth, and he announced 
that Japan would double the amount of its previous yen loans 
to approximately $480 million.  This assistance was to be 
used to fund power transmission lines, irrigation systems, 
the construction of rural roads, and for election support. 
 
¶21. (C) Unlike its relations with Afghanistan, which have 
focused on reconstruction in light of developments since 
2001, Japan's economic relations with and assistance to 
Pakistan have always taken a much more traditional commercial 
approach.  As described in Ref A, Japan's aid to Pakistan has 
focused on human security and creating a favorable trade and 
investment climate.  In 2007 and early 2008, prospects for 
increased trade with Pakistan seemed to be improving.  But 
recently, perceptions among Japan's business people of a 
deteriorating trade and investment climate in Pakistanare 
undercutting the effect of Japanese aid programs, even while 
business leaders argue for increased aid as a means to 
further development. Nevertheless, Japan continues steadily 
to implement its official development assistance strategy 
toward Pakistan, which includes nearly $1 billion in yen 
loans since 2005, and seeks to underscore its role as a major 
contributor to Pakistan by hosting in Tokyo the April 17 
Pakistan Donors Conference, along with the Friends of 
Democratic Pakistan Ministerial meeting.  Tokyo has hinted it 
will make a very generous contribution to Pakistan at the 
Donors Conference. 
 
---------- 
WHAT NEXT? 
---------- 
 
¶22. (C) Japan is committed to playing a significant and 
positive role with regard to Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
However, it will not, in the short term, be willing or able 
to commit military forces.  Although we have asked Japan to 
deploy military airlift assets, such as C-130's (as they did 
in support of coalition forces in Iraq) or CH-47 heavy lift 
helicopters, it is unlikely Tokyo will do so given both their 
constitutional limitations on the deployment abroad of 
military forces and the current domestic political situation. 
 Nevertheless, we should consider continuing to make it clear 
that Japanese forces would be appreciated, and that their 
contributions, no matter how generous, continue to fall short 
of the very real sacrifices on the ground being made by other 
countries. 
 
¶23. (C) With regard to the deployment of civilian assets, we 
are witnessing a very cautious move to a more realistic 
approach.  JICA President Sadako Ogata constantly reminds 
foreign visitors that JICA has people in Afghanistan, and 
MOFA's decision to send a few diplomatic officers to work in 
a PRT should be recognized, applauded, and encouraged. 
Building on these first steps, we should keep pushing Japan 
to send more qualified people to help in Afghanistan.  The 
prohibition against military action does not preclude support 
for law enforcement and rule of law activities.  We should 
continue to press Japan to support such programs.  In 
addition, other requests for assistance should focus on their 
traditional areas of strength: education, agriculture, human 
resource development, and capacity building. 
 
¶24. (C) In the meantime, Japan will make up for its inability 
or lingering unwillingness to send people by sending money or 
sponsoring international meetings.  We shouldn't be shy about 
requesting their material support, but should do as a 
partner.  Whenever possible, we should enlist the Afghans or 
Pakistanis to request assistance from the Japanese, who 
remain sensitive to the appearance/accusation that they are 
simply doing Washington's bidding or that Japan lacks its 
own, independent foreign policy. 
ZUMWALT