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Viewing cable 09STATE43610, GUIDANCE ON RESPONDING TO REPORT OF POTENTIAL

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09STATE43610 2009-04-29 20:36 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Secretary of State 
VZCZCXYZ0027
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #3610 1192055
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 292036Z APR 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA IMMEDIATE 7318
INFO RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE 4844
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEAORC/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE 0742
RHMFIUU/NRC WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE 3881
RUETIAA/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD IMMEDIATE 2150
RHMCSUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE 6547
 
UNCLAS STATE 043610 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AF ASEC KCRM KNNP MNUC PARM PINR PREL PTER ET XA XW
SUBJECT: GUIDANCE ON RESPONDING TO REPORT OF POTENTIAL 
NUCLEAR MATERIAL IN ADDIS ABABA 
 
REF: A. ADDIS ABABA 000963 
     B. DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE SPOT REPORT (4/23/09) 
     C. STATE 030541 
 
1.  (U) This is an action request for Embassy Addis Ababa. 
Please see paragraph 3. 
 
2.  (SBU) BACKGROUND:  Per REF A, on 23 April 2009, Post 
alerted Washington that it had received an e-mail with 
photographs indicating a potential incident of illegal 
nuclear and/or radioactive material smuggling.  The e-mail 
was received in the PAS mailbox (PASAddis@state.gov) at 
approximately 1519 hours on 23 April 2009.  It had arrived 
from kgashu@yahoo.com, according to REF B.  The photographs 
showed a yellow cylindrical container with a radioactive 
warning sign and a "Made in USSR" marking in English.  REF B 
indicated the RSO will obtain header information from the 
e-mail and request information on the location from which the 
e-mail was sent, via NISS and the Ethiopian Federal Police. 
 
3. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST:  Post is requested to inform the GOE 
that after examining the photos in question, Washington 
believes this is likely a scam but will continue to provide 
support if additional information comes to light.  However, 
even if this is a scam, Washington encourages the GOE to 
prosecute any individuals involved and remove the containers 
from circulation if possible, because such scams drain 
law-enforcement resources and increase demand for such 
materials. Washington encourages Post to take the follow-up 
steps outlined in REF B and disseminate any future 
information to Washington.  Additionally, Post should note 
that PM/ISO/PMAT has not received the e-mail referred to in 
REF A and that the guidance cable listed as REF B in ADDIS 
ABABA 00963 has been replaced by REF C of this cable. 
 
4. Washington appreciates Post's assistance. 
CLINTON