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RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #8609 1072304
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 172244Z APR 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0000
INFO RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0000
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 0000
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0000
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0000
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS

UNCLAS STATE 038609 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
ADDIS AND KAMPALA FOR REFUGEE COORDINATORS 
KHARTOUM FOR REFUGEE OFFICER 
GENEVA FOR RMA 
BRUSSELS FOR POL/PRM 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREF EAID SU
SUBJECT: PRM RECOMMENDATIONS ON UNHCR SOUTHERN SUDAN 
OPERATIONS 
 
REF: A) NAIROBI 308 AND PREVIOUS B) KHARTOUM 306 
 
Sensitive but Unclassified; please protect accordingly. 
 
¶1. (U)  We are now in the fifth year of the organized 
repatriation of southern Sudanese refugees with probably 12 
to 18 months remaining for a concerted push to get all of the 
remaining refugees home in safety and dignity in time to 
participate in the 2011 referendum but before uncertainties 
about the future of Sudan lead many refugees to take a wait 
and see approach.   This cable summarizes PRM recommendations 
made to UNHCR in February 2009 focusing on four key areas of 
concern: balance between repatriation operations and 
reintegration assistance; returns monitoring and protection 
monitoring; refugees in southern Sudan; and contingency 
planning.  These recommendations follow conversations with 
UNHCR in Geneva and Juba, review of relevant UNHCR documents, 
and PRM,s most recent monitoring trip to southern Sudan in 
November/December 2008.  We remain in close contact with 
UNHCR following the recent GOS expulsions of NGOs from Sudan 
in the wake of the ICC announcement of an arrest warrant for 
President Bashir.  While UNHCR reports operations in Darfur, 
Khartoum, Blue Nile State and Eastern Sudan will be 
significantly affected by these expulsions, which include 
UNHCR implementing partners, the impact on UNHCR,s southern 
Sudan operations, outside of the Three Areas, remains to be 
seen.  So far it has been minimal, but significant challenges 
remain in achieving sustainable returns that contribute to 
stabilizing southern Sudan -- for example marshalling 
adequate funding and smooth CPA implementation, the latter of 
which is largely outside of UNHCR,s control. 
 
CONTEXT 
 
¶2. (U)   The number of refugee returnees to southern Sudan 
has been on the increase since repatriation operations began 
following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 
January 2005.  In 2008, UNHCR assisted 62,185 individuals to 
return from Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia and the DRC, the highest 
yearly total thus far.  As of April 4, 2009 the repatriation 
of UNHCR-assisted southern Sudanese refugees has reached a 
total of 314,496.  UNHCR estimates that some 120,000 refugees 
still remain outside of Sudan (primarily in Uganda, Kenya, 
Ethiopia, and Egypt), and has plans to repatriate 54,000 in 
¶2009.  Subsequently, UNHCR plans to draw large-scale 
repatriation operations to a close, as the remaining refugees 
are expected to either spontaneously repatriate or be offered 
alternative arrangements for repatriation or other durable 
solutions.   However, these optimistic plans may be derailed 
by shortfalls in funding and/or unforeseen developments that 
would limit repatriation operations in 2009. 
 
¶4. (U)  From November 15 -- December 4, PRM officers Brennan 
Gilmore, Fruzsina Csaszar, and Inga Heemink conducted a 
monitoring and evaluation trip to review PRM-funded NGO 
programs supporting Sudanese refugees and returnees and the 
broader operations of UNHCR, IOM, and ICRC in southern Sudan. 
  The team accompanied a repatriation convoy of 212 refugees 
from Kakuma Refugee Camp in northern Kenya to Kapoeta, 
Eastern Equatoria State, Sudan and spent three weeks in 
Eastern Equatoria, Central Equatoria, Jonglei, and Upper Nile 
States in Sudan.  (NOTE: These states comprise the highest 
area of refugee return, and thus are the focus for UNHCR 
operations and PRM funding. END NOTE).  In all areas visited, 
the PRM team met with UNHCR staff, implementing partners, and 
local officials, as well as the returnees themselves.  In 
addition to discussions with UNHCR leadership in Juba and in 
field offices throughout Eastern Equatoria, Jonglei, and 
Upper Nile, the team was able to visit reintegration project 
sites, monitor a repatriation convoy, and observe waystation 
activities.  The team was able to thoroughly discuss key 
successes and failures, as well as problems on the horizon. 
 
 
¶5. (U)  Repatriation operations in southern Sudan are 
characterized by several constraints and challenges: the lack 
of roads and transportation infrastructure throughout 
southern Sudan, the seasonal weather pattern of a 4-6 month 
rainy season during which repatriation operations must cease, 
the high costs of maintaining repatriation infrastructure and 
staffing during rainy season, and the logistical challenges 
of scheduling repatriation convoys while ensuring that all 
returns are voluntary and that returnees maintain their 
safety and dignity.  The success of UNHCR,s southern Sudan 
operation thus far has been measured largely by numbers of 
returnees.  In terms of numbers returned, the southern Sudan 
operation has been a resounding success.  Despite all of the 
challenges of conducting a repatriation operation in southern 
Sudan, the UNHCR teams in the region have worked tirelessly 
to conduct an operation that has assisted over 300,000 
refugees to return home.  UNHCR teams in Sudan, Kenya, 
Ethiopia, Uganda, the DRC, and the CAR have ensured that 
Sudanese refugees returned voluntarily, and in safety and 
dignity. 
 
KEY FINDINGS ON UNHCR 
 
 
¶6. (U) PRM recommendations to UNHCR focused on four key 
issues: the balance between repatriation operations and 
reintegration assistance; returns monitoring and protection 
monitoring; refugees in southern Sudan; and contingency 
planning. 
 
 
BALANCE BETWEEN REPATRIATION OPERATIONS AND REINTEGRATION 
ASSISTANCE 
 
¶7.  (U)  As the assisted repatriation operation to southern 
Sudan winds down and eventually ends, there is a need to 
shift focus on not just the number of returns, but also on 
the quality of returns, in terms of the protection challenges 
facing those who have returned.  UNHCR offices throughout 
southern Sudan have identified the lack of basic services 
(and thus, returnees' access to such services) as an 
important protection challenge facing returnees, and as the 
key reason for secondary displacement.  In light of UNHCR,s 
commitment to provide refugees with durable solutions, the 
long-term success of repatriation largely depends on 
returnees, ability to reintegrate into their communities. 
This is a particular challenge in southern Sudan, given the 
profound lack of development and still nascent government. 
 
¶8. (SBU)  During all of the meetings with UNHCR staff 
throughout southern Sudan, PRM heard about the challenge of 
balancing staff time and resources between resource-intensive 
repatriation operations and returnees, boundless need for 
reintegration assistance.  UNHCR support for reintegration 
activities has been severely constrained by the pressure to 
maintain a high level of repatriation operations, which 
leaves reintegration activities under-resourced.  One staff 
member remarked that during repatriation season, almost all 
staff are "sucked into the black hole that is repat."  Staff 
members noted that almost all unearmarked funding in the 
southern Sudan budget is directed towards repatriation 
operations; and several staff members suggested that PRM take 
this into account in its earmark of funding for return and 
reintegration activities in order to ensure that such 
activities would be planned and implemented.  PRM recognizes 
the importance of providing dependable, unearmarked support 
to UNHCR,s southern Sudan budget appeal.  We believe that 
unearmarked funding will allow the most flexibility for an 
operation already facing many constraints, but will also 
press for a program that does not under-capitalize the 
reintegration part of the operation. 
 
¶9. (U) UNHCR planned to cease major assisted repatriation 
operations by the end of CY2009 and to focus more on 
reintegration assistance.  PRM supports this shift in 
emphasis, recognizing that the timeline may shift into 2010 
due to funding, security, and logistical constraints that may 
keep UNHCR from achieving its 2009 repatriation target.  PRM 
has emphasized with both UNHCR/Geneva and Juba the need to 
devise a strategy for 2010 that will highlight returnees, 
most important needs and focus on sectors and geographic 
areas where UNHCR has the most value-added and a comparative 
advantage over other national and international actors 
working on relief and development.  PRM has offered 
assistance in developing such a plan, including providing 
information on USG activities or liaising with other donors 
and OCHA, to help inform UNHCR southern Sudan,s 
reintegration strategy. 
 
 
RETURNS MONITORING AND PROTECTION MONITORING 
 
¶10. (U)   Returns monitoring is a difficult enterprise in 
southern Sudan, given the vast geographic area to which 
refugees are returning, the different modes of return, (most 
returns are spontaneous), the fact that communities are often 
receiving both returning refugees and IDPs, and the 
logistical challenges caused by a lack of transportation 
infrastructure and weather patterns.  PRM recommended that 
UNHCR staff collaborate more with other actors to leverage 
information and to gain the most comprehensive understanding 
of returnees, protections needs.  In particular, PRM 
recommended that UNHCR work closely with IOM and its network 
of Southern Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission 
enumerators to bolster its coverage of returnee areas.  While 
the methodologies and aims of UNHCR and IOM vary, a shared 
database on local community and returnee needs could promote 
information sharing.  UNHCR,s work on creating a Refugee 
Returns Management Database is a step in the right direction. 
 We have encouraged further collaboration with the databases 
of IOM and other organizations collecting information on the 
needs of returning refugees and IDPs. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) A key constraint on UNHCR southern Sudan,s 
returns monitoring protection functions is the dearth of 
protection staff.  PRM,s monitoring team noted this 
challenge in 2007 and subsequently funded a Protection JPO 
position for the UNHCR Juba office to bolster protection 
staffing.  PRM has learned that this JPO has made a valuable 
contribution to UNHCR,s work; however, he has been pulled 
into repatriation operations and has not been focused on 
protection issues, as originally intended by the PRM support 
for the position.   We understand the need to have "all hands 
on deck" during the intensive repatriation season; however, 
we are very concerned that pulling the majority of staff into 
working on repatriation operations prevents UNHCR from 
fulfilling its other objectives in terms of protection 
monitoring and response to protection concerns.   As 
organized returns wind down and as repatriation operations 
give way to more of a focus on protection monitoring and 
reintegration assistance, PRM has urged UNHCR to ensure that 
there is a commensurate shift of staffing towards these 
objectives by emphasizing protection staffing in its 
strategic plan on focused reintegration activities. 
 
 
REFUGEES IN SOUTHERN SUDAN 
 
¶12. (U)  Over 8,000 Ethiopian Anuak refugees have resided in 
multiple locations in Central Equatoria, Jonglei, and Upper 
Nile States since 2003.  This relatively long-term refugee 
population has received only sporadic assistance given the 
remoteness of the area, the insecurity of travel during the 
civil war, and the general inclination to not create more 
refugee camps.   UNHCR has planned a new assessment of Anuak 
refugees around Pochalla with the goals of developing a plan 
of regular assistance and seeking durable solutions.  PRM 
encouraged UNHCR to ensure, as part of its core mandate, that 
Anuak and other refugees in Sudan are not overlooked in light 
of other pressing concerns. 
 
¶13. (U) As of April 14, 2009 over 17,000 Congolese refugees 
have fled to southern Sudan from LRA attacks in northeastern 
DRC.  As UNHCR continues to respond to the increasing influx 
of Congolese refugees into Western and Central Equatoria, PRM 
encouraged timely outreach to donors to ensure that UNHCR and 
NGO response capacity is bolstered with appropriate funding 
appeals. 
 
¶14. (U)  PRM also encouraged UNHCR to continue to pursue with 
the GOSS and the GNU the establishment of a system of status 
determination for refugees in southern Sudan.  UNHCR has 
identified competing claims by the Government of National 
Unity and Government of South Sudan to refugee status 
determination authority as the primary obstacle.   (Comment. 
This competition between the two governmental authorities has 
also been evident in the return of southern Sudanese 
refugees, with the longtime GOS Commission for Refugees 
asserting its continued control over all refugee and returnee 
issues.  We may not see a cooperative resolution to this 
issue until the 2011 vote.  End comment.) 
 
 
CONTINGENCY PLANNING 
 
¶15. (SBU)  With  implementation of the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement entering the  critical last phases, PRM has 
encouraged UNHCR to develop a detailed regional contingency 
plan that could be implemented in the event of renewed 
North-South conflict and resulting mass population movements. 
 Our own U.S. Government contingency plans for a new refugee 
emergency would be very focused on UNHCR,s plans and 
capacities.  In consultations with UNHCR staff in Kakuma Camp 
in Kenya, the PRM team understood that long-term planning for 
the camp included rehabilitation of vacant areas and 
maintaining these areas for a potential new influx.  Of 
course the current discussions on how to handle the 
overcrowding in the Dadaab Camps is relevant also to plans 
for the Kakuma Camp (see Ref A).  We have asked UNHCR to 
share similar plans for Ethiopia, Uganda, DRC, and CAR as 
well as contingency infrastructure plans/capabilities in the 
region (trucks, way stations, etc.).   UNHCR clearly has its 
hands very full already with current return and emergency 
response operations in southern Sudan. Contingency planning 
would not be intended to signal any lack of confidence in the 
desirability of continued voluntary returns; it would be 
prudent in light of the volatility of the Sudan situation of 
ethnic and political conflict in the South as well as the 
upheaval in humanitarian operations caused by the NGO 
expulsions. 
CLINTON