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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 12 STATE 033306 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM KACT KNNP MARR MNUC PTER EZ US RS
CH, 
SUBJECT: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, FACT SHEETS ON 
PRESIDENTIAL SPEECH ON NONPROLIFERATION AND SECURITY 
ISSUES 
 
¶1.  These materials have been approved by the National 
Security Council for use by Posts in response to press 
and host government queries regarding President Obama's 
April 5 speech on nonproliferation in Prague. 
 
¶2. Posts are authorized to use the points and fact 
sheets below in addressing questions that may arise 
after the April 5 nonproliferation speech.  Please note 
that background information is solely for Posts' 
information and should not/not be used with press. 
 
¶3. Questions and Answers follow in paragraphs 3-18, fact 
sheets on several of these issues are located in 
paragraphs 19-21. 
 
¶3. NATO Enlargement: 
 
Question:  What is the administration's position on the 
future enlargement of NATO; should it continue?  What 
are the limits of "Europe"? 
 
-- We just affirmed at the NATO Summit that NATO's 
door remains open.  The United States remains 
committed to NATO enlargement.  We welcome the 
accession of Albania and Croatia. 
 
-- Current and future aspirants must demonstrate a 
commitment to NATO's values and meet the Alliance's 
performance-based standards before becoming members; 
there are no shortcuts to the process. 
 
Background: NATO's performance-based enlargement process 
has been an historic success in strengthening the 
Alliance, promoting peace and security, and advancing 
freedom and democracy in Central and Eastern Europe.  At 
the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit, Allies welcomed Albania and 
Croatia as NATO's newest members, increasing the total 
numbers to twenty-eight Allies.  At the same time, many 
Allies are starting to evince an anti-enlargement 
sentiment.  The countries currently seeking NATO 
membership are Bosnia-Herzegovina, Georgia, Macedonia, 
Montenegro, and Ukraine.  Although Allies were prepared 
to invite Macedonia to join NATO at the 2008 Bucharest 
Summit, Greece blocked the invitation over the ongoing 
dispute over Macedonia's name. Allies agreed that 
Macedonia would join NATO as soon as the name issue was 
resolved.  Allies did not grant Georgia's and Ukraine's 
requests to start the Membership Action Plan (MAP) 
process at Bucharest; however, Allies agreed at the 2008 
NATO Summit in Bucharest that Ukraine and Georgia "will 
become members of NATO."  NATO Foreign Ministers decided 
in December 2008 that the NATO-Ukraine and NATO-Georgia 
Commissions should take forward the necessary work that 
those countries will need to undertake to prepare for 
NATO membership. 
 
¶4. NATO's Mission in Afghanistan (Role of Czech 
Republic) 
 
Question:  How does the U.S. assess the Czech 
contribution in Afghanistan? 
 
-- The Czech Republic has made vital contributions and 
sacrifices in Afghanistan. 
 
-- The Czech Republic's leadership of the Provincial 
Reconstruction Team in Logar Province is evidence of 
its commitment to Alliance goals in Afghanistan and 
its valuable role in fulfilling those goals. 
 
-- Both at the March 31 International Conference on 
Afghanistan in The Hague and at the April 3-4 NATO 
Summit, the U.S. and the Czech Republic affirmed a 
shared strategy in Afghanistan. 
 
-- The Czech Republic, as current President of the 
European Union, has also taken on a strong leadership 
role and moved to strengthen the EU's efforts in 
providing observers for the upcoming Afghan elections, 
supporting the rule of law and police development, and 
providing development assistance. 
 
If raised:  Should the Czech Republic be doing more? 
 
-- Every Ally must make its own decisions on the 
 
STATE 00033306  002 OF 012 
 
SUBJECT: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, FACT SHEETS ON 
PRESIDENTIAL SPEECH ON NONPROLIFERATION AND SECURI 
resources it can commit.  The Czech Republic plays a 
vital role in Logar Province that directly benefits 
the Afghan population. 
 
Background:  In March 2008, the Czechs established a new 
Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Logar Province 
in U.S.-led Regional Command-East (RC-E).  In addition 
to the civilian personnel at the PRT, there are 580 
Czech troops in Afghanistan (13 Mar ISAF placemat).  The 
Czechs have donated six helicopters, refurbished with 
NATO funds, to the Afghan National Army.  In March 2009, 
RC-E Deputy Commanding General in charge of support for 
troops Brigadier General James McConville told the Czech 
press their contribution to PRT Logar was adequate and 
appropriate.  Czech military personnel have suffered 
three deaths in Afghanistan.  Parliament has authorized 
the Czech military to maintain troops in Afghanistan 
through the end of 2009.  The fall of the Czech 
government last month makes any additional Czech 
contributions to Afghanistan in the near future 
unlikely.  The Czech Republic sets an example for larger 
Allies in maintaining approximately four percent of its 
total forces on deployment at any given time. 
 
¶5. NATO-Russia Council 
 
Question:  What goals and expectations do you have 
regarding NATO-Russia re-engagement, as called for by 
NATO Foreign Ministers? 
 
-- We are determined to use the NATO-Russia 
relationship to enhance European security by engaging 
in candid political dialogue, both where we agree and 
disagree, and through focused cooperation in areas of 
common interest, such as Afghanistan and counter- 
terrorism. 
 
-- We encourage Russia and NATO Allies to work 
together to transform this relationship into a real 
partnership that can achieve concrete results.  Real 
cooperation between NATO and Russia can contribute 
significantly to security in Europe and indeed 
globally. 
 
Background:  In 2002, NATO and Russia established the 
NATO-Russia Council (NRC) - a forum designed for 
consultation, consensus-building, and cooperation.  It 
was conceived as a greatly enhanced successor to the 
NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, set up under the 
1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act to assuage Russian 
concerns about the first post-Cold War round of NATO 
enlargement.  But the NRC has not lived up to its 
potential.  Most projects barely developed or were 
politicized.  Russian opposition to NATO membership for 
Georgia and Ukraine, and to U.S. missile defense plans, 
coupled with Russia's "suspension" of the CFE Treaty 
(i.e, decision not to perform its obligations under the 
treaty), further reduced common ground.  Russia's 
military action in Georgia in August 2008 led Allies to 
suspend formal high-level meetings of the NRC.  On March 
5, NATO Foreign Ministers agreed to formally resume the 
NRC, including at the Ministerial level, after the April 
Summit.  Allies seek to use the NRC as a forum for 
dialogue, where we agree and disagree, and for 
cooperation in areas of common interest.  Still, Allies 
are divided regarding Russia's intentions and the value 
of cooperation.  We hope to use the NATO Summit to find 
a balance for NATO-Russia that advances positive 
engagement where interests overlap, while defending our 
principles. 
 
¶6. START and Follow-on Agreement 
 
Question: Can you comment on the Joint Statement issued 
by Presidents Obama and Medvedev regarding the 
negotiation of a START follow-on agreement? 
 
-- The Presidents agreed that bilateral negotiations 
would be initiated with the intention of reaching a 
new, comprehensive, legally binding agreement on 
reducing and limiting strategic offensive arms to 
replace the START Treaty, which is set to expire on 
December 5, 2009. 
 
-- The Presidents have instructed that the subject of 
the new agreement be the reduction and limitation of 
strategic offensive arms, that the U.S. and Russia 
seek to record in the new agreement levels of 
reductions that will be lower than those in existing 
arms control agreements, and that the new agreement 
include effective verification measures drawn from the 
experience of the Parties in implementing START. 
 
STATE 00033306  003 OF 012 
 
SUBJECT: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, FACT SHEETS ON 
PRESIDENTIAL SPEECH ON NONPROLIFERATION AND SECURI 
-- In addition, the Presidents stated that the new 
agreement should mutually enhance the security of the 
Parties, and predictability and stability in strategic 
offensive forces. 
 
-- The Presidents further charged their negotiators to 
report, by July, on their progress in working out a 
new agreement. 
 
Question:  Is there sufficient time available to 
negotiate a new follow-on agreement before the START 
Treaty expires in December? 
 
-- Negotiating a new agreement before December will be 
a challenge; the Administration is committed to the 
effort to ensure that an agreement that serves U.S. 
security interests and enhances stability is achieved 
by then. 
 
Question:  There have been press reports that the 
Administration may consider going as low as 1000 nuclear 
warheads.  Is this true? 
 
-- The Obama Administration is committed to seeking 
deep, verifiable reductions in all U.S. and Russian 
strategic nuclear weapons.  As a first step, the 
Administration is committed to seeking a legally 
binding agreement to replace the current START Treaty. 
 
-- As long as nuclear weapons exist in the world, the 
United States must maintain a strong deterrent in 
support of U.S. national security and that of our 
friends and allies. 
 
Question:  When will negotiations begin? 
 
-- The Presidents have directed that the talks begin 
immediately.  The U.S. negotiating team will be headed 
by the Assistant Secretary of State for Verification, 
Compliance and Implementation. 
 
Background:  Media coverage of the meeting between 
Presidents Obama and Medvedev in London, and the joint 
statement by the Presidents, have raised interest world- 
wide regarding the efforts by the United States and 
Russia to negotiate a START follow-on agreement.  There 
has also been widespread speculation regarding the level 
of reductions that would be achieved in the new treaty. 
Thus far the U.S. and Russia have discussed broad policy 
objectives that would guide the negotiations.  The 
negotiations will deal with the specific elements of an 
agreement, including the level of reductions. 
 
¶7. Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) 
 
Question:  Please elaborate on plans to ratify the CTBT. 
 
--The United States recognizes the importance of the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty as a 
nonproliferation and disarmament measure. 
 
--We believe that it is in the U.S. interest to ratify 
the Treaty.  The Administration will work closely with 
the U.S. Senate to win its advice and consent to 
ratification of the CTBT. 
 
Background:  The United States and the Russian 
Federation both signed the CTBT on September 24, 1996. 
While the Russian Federation ratified the CTBT on June 
30, 2000, the U.S. Senate declined to give its consent 
by a vote 48 in favor of ratification and 51 against in 
¶1999.  The United States and the Russian Federation are 
two of the 44 countries required to ratify the Treaty in 
order for it to enter into force.  For CTBT to enter 
into force, the United States, China, Egypt, Indonesia, 
Iran, and Israel must ratify it and India, Pakistan, and 
the DPRK must both sign and ratify it.  Vice President 
Biden will guide the Administration effort to pursue 
ratification of the CTBT. 
 
¶8. Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) 
 
Question:  For the past decade, the Conference on 
Disarmament has been unable to begin work on negotiating 
a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty.  One obstacle to this 
has been U.S. insistence on an FMCT without 
international verification provisions.  Will the United 
States support the negotiation of a verifiable Fissile 
Material Cutoff Treaty in the Conference on Disarmament? 
 
-- The negotiation of a verifiable FMCT is the top 
 
STATE 00033306  004 OF 012 
 
 
-- The United States hopes that its renewed 
flexibility on this issue will enable negotiations to 
start soon in Geneva. 
 
-- The United States looks forward to working with the 
Russian Federation and other CD members to overcome 
any obstacles preventing the commencement of FMCT 
negotiations in the CD. 
 
Background: A Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) 
would ban the production of fissile material for use in 
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.  The 
Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament (CD) briefly held 
negotiations on an FMCT in 1998, with the objective of 
producing a verifiable treaty.  However, the CD was 
unable to agree to resume work in the years following. 
In 2004, the United States, after an internal review, 
announced its conclusion that an effectively verifiable 
FMCT was not achievable.  In 2006, the United States 
proposed the negotiation of an FMCT without 
international verification provisions, and tabled a 
draft FMCT text and a draft negotiating mandate. 
Although the principal reason for the continued failure 
of the CD to move forward on FMCT negotiations may be 
the belief by some states that they need to continue 
fissile material production for weapons programs, some 
other states use the U.S. position against including 
international verification provisions in an FMCT as a 
supposed reason for their opposition.  During her 
confirmation hearings, the Secretary of State said that 
the United States will work to revive negotiations on an 
effectively verifiable FMCT. 
 
 
¶9. Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 
Question:  What importance do you attach to the 2010 
Review Conference, and what steps will you take in order 
to avoid a repeat of the failure of the 2005 Review 
Conference? 
 
-- The United States places the utmost importance on 
the NPT, which is the cornerstone of the nuclear 
nonproliferation regime.  The review process affords 
Parties the opportunity to examine the operation of 
the Treaty to help ensure that its purposes and 
provisions are being realized. 
 
--We hope that the 2010 RevCon will demonstrate that 
the Treaty will continue to be an effective legal and 
political barrier to nuclear proliferation.  We will 
strive for a recommitment by Parties to the objectives 
of the NPT and to their basic shared interest in 
preventing proliferation. 
 
-- We will also seek a Conference that helps set a new 
course in the direction of the greater fulfillment of 
the vital goals of the Treaty - stemming 
proliferation, working toward a nuclear-free world, 
and sharing the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy. 
 
Background:  Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) 
Parties meet to review the operation of the Treaty every 
five years.  These meetings are viewed as important 
reflections of the strength of the NPT and the 
nonproliferation regime in general.  The last such 
meeting in 2005 was filled with acrimony over key issues 
such as disarmament, non-compliance, and 
nonproliferation in the Middle East and failed to reach 
agreement on a consensus document.  Increasing attention 
is being given to the 2010 Review Conference as a key 
milestone in the process of repairing and strengthening 
the regime. 
 
¶10. Nuclear Fuel Cycle (International Fuel Bank) 
 
Question: Has the U.S. already taken steps toward 
creation of an international fuel bank? 
 
-- The United States believes that providing 
reliable access to nuclear fuel is a way to allow 
countries to benefit from the peaceful uses of 
nuclear energy without increasing the risks of 
nuclear proliferation through the spread of 
enrichment and reprocessing technologies. 
 
-- The United States has already been working 
through the IAEA and other multilateral forums 
toward this end and a number of complimentary 
proposals have been developed. 
 
 
STATE 00033306  005 OF 012 
 
SUBJECT: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, FACT SHEETS ON 
PRESIDENTIAL SPEECH ON NONPROLIFERATION AND SECURI 
-- One near term goal is to have the IAEA Board of 
Governors begin debate this June on concrete plans 
for providing reliable access to nuclear fuel, 
including one for a Russian fuel bank in Angarsk 
and one for implementation of an IAEA operated fuel 
bank as proposed by the Nuclear Threat Initiative. 
We hope that mechanisms can be approved in 
September. 
 
Background:  The United States has worked cooperatively 
with a number of western countries on developing 
proposals for reliable access to nuclear fuel (RANF) as 
a means of providing countries a viable alternative to 
developing sensitive nuclear technologies.  We were part 
of a six country concept in 2006 (also involving France, 
Germany, the Netherlands, Russia and the UK) that 
proposed to establish a mechanism at the IAEA that could 
be used in the event that commercial supply arrangements 
are interrupted for reasons other than nonproliferation 
obligations, and cannot be restored through normal 
commercial processes.  The U.S. is establishing a 
national fuel reserve with uranium downblended from 
excess defense material.  We expect the June meeting of 
the IAEA's Board of Governors to consider a Russian 
proposal to establish a reserve of low-enriched uranium 
(LEU) to be held at Angarsk and released at the 
direction of the IAEA.  We also support the Nuclear 
Threat Initiative's proposal to match funds for the 
establishment of an IAEA fuel bank. President Obama 
voted for a $50 million appropriation to DOE for the 
U.S. contribution to such a bank when he was in the 
Senate.  Now that the IAEA has received pledges for over 
$150 million, we expect the June Board meeting to 
consider specific mechanisms to implement an IAEA fuel 
bank. 
 
¶11. North Korea 
 
Question:  What is our response to reports that North 
Korea will launch a TD-2 missile? 
 
-- We have long expressed our concerns regarding North 
Korea's ballistic missile programs. 
 
-- North Korea's development, deployment, and 
proliferation of ballistic missiles, missile-related 
materials, equipment, and technologies pose a serious 
threat to the region and to the international community. 
 
-- We are concerned about North Korea's stated intention 
to launch a missile.  The President has discussed this 
issue with leaders during his visit to Europe. 
 
-- Such a launch would be provocative and a violation of 
United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1718, 
which requires that North Korea suspend all activities 
related to its ballistic missile program and that it 
abandon its ballistic missile program in a complete, 
verifiable and irreversible manner. 
 
-- If North Korea were to go forward with this launch, 
the U.N. Security Council and the international 
community would have to respond appropriately. 
 
-- We call on the DPRK to refrain from provocative 
actions, and to cease immediately the development and 
proliferation of ballistic missiles, as required by 
UNSCR 1718. 
 
Q:  What is our response to reports that North Korea 
launched a TD-2 missile? 
 
[PLEASE USE GUIDANCE PROVIDED IN POST-LAUNCH STATE ALDAC 
CABLE.] 
 
Q:  How does this launch affect the Six Party Talks? 
-- We call on North Korea to continue to uphold its 
commitments under the Six-Party Talks and to work with 
the other parties to implement the September 19, 2005 
Joint Statement. 
 
-- Our goal remains the verifiable denuclearization of 
the Korean peninsula. 
 
Background:  North Korea has announced its intention to 
launch an "experimental communications satellite" 
between April 4-8, 2009.  The United States believes 
that this action would violate UNSCR 1718, which 
obligates the DPRK to suspend all ballistic missile- 
related activities and re-establish its pre-existing 
commitments to a moratorium on missile launching. 
 
 
STATE 00033306  006 OF 012 
 
¶12. Iran 
 
Question:  What is your new policy on Iran? 
 
-- As the President stated in his March 20 remarks 
during Nowruz to the Iranian people and leadership, we 
are committed to diplomacy that addresses the full range 
of issues, and to pursuing constructive ties among the 
United States, Iran and the international community. 
 
-- We are engaging our friends and partners to chart an 
effective path, notably last week in London by the 
President and his top advisors. 
 
-- We are committed to diplomacy to engage the Islamic 
Republic in a constructive, honest dialogue to resolve 
our differences. 
 
--But this does not mean that Iran's violations of its 
international nuclear obligations cease to have 
consequences. 
 
-- There are five UN Security Council resolutions that 
reflect the international community's continuing serious 
concerns about Iran's nuclear program. 
 
-- We have publicly stated that we want Iran to take its 
rightful place in the community of nations and we mean 
that.  Iran has rights, but with rights come 
responsibilities. 
 
-- We are prepared to take real steps toward a very 
different and positive future.  But Iran must take steps 
too.  We hope Iran does not miss an opportunity. 
 
Background:  Iran continues to pursue a nuclear weapons 
capability through both uranium enrichment and a heavy 
water reactor.  The UN Security Council has adopted five 
resolutions (1696, 1737, 1747, 1803, and 1835), three of 
which include legally binding sanctions.  The IAEA has 
reported as recently as March 2009 that Iran has not 
cooperated to resolve the outstanding questions, 
including those about past activities on weaponization. 
 
¶13. UNSCR 1540 
 
Question:  What is the United States doing to support 
UNSCR 1540 implementation? 
 
-- UNSCR 1540 is a vital element in global efforts to 
prevent the proliferation of WMD and to keep these 
horrific weapons out of the hands of terrorists. 
 
-- Implementation of UNSCR 1540 by all UN Member 
States will help ensure that no state or non-state 
actor is a source or beneficiary of WMD proliferation. 
 
-- Both U.S. and Russia intend to give new impetus to 
the implementation of UNSCR 1540.  As permanent Member 
States of the UN Security Council, both our countries 
work actively to promote and assist with UNSCR 1540 
implementation. 
 
Background:  UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) 
established an obligation for all UN Member States to 
take and enforce effective measures to establish 
domestic controls to prevent WMD proliferation and their 
means of delivery.  The UN's 1540 Committee works to 
facilitate states' compliance with the Resolution and to 
report back to the Security Council on progress on its 
implementation.  The U.S. works within and in 
coordination with the 1540 Committee, sponsoring many 
1540 workshops, training events, and assistance programs 
designed to help all states strengthen their 
capabilities to prevent WMD proliferation.  Russia also 
sits on the 1540 Committee.  Plans are underway for all 
UN Member States to participate in a Comprehensive 
Review of UNSCR 1540 implementation at the end of 2009. 
 
¶14. G8 Global Partnership 
 
Question: What is the U.S. doing to support 
implementation of the G-8 Global Partnership, including 
efforts to expand the geographic scope beyond 
Russia/FSU? 
 
-- We have made great progress in reducing the threat 
posed by proliferation and terrorism through the G-8 
Global Partnership. 
 
-- The threat is global.  We want to make tangible 
progress to expand the scope of the G-8 Global 
 
STATE 00033306  007 OF 012 
 
 
-- We also want to make progress in securing new GP 
Partners. 
 
Background:  The G-8 Global Partnership against the 
Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP) 
was created in 2002 at the G-8 Summit in Kananaskis, 
Canada, to improve international security by preventing 
WMD proliferation and terrorism. Envisioned as a $20 
billion commitment over 10 years - with the U.S. 
committing $10 billion of the total pledge - concrete 
projects were initially funded in Russia and the former 
Soviet Union (FSU).  The GP now consists of all G-8 
nations plus 13 additional nations and the European 
Union.  While pledged GP activities continue in 
Russia/FSU, the U.S. has worked since 2004 to expand GP 
assistance beyond Russia/FSU to address emerging WMD 
threats. 
 
¶15. Enhancing Nuclear Security/Material Reduction 
 
 
Question: What is the content of the new initiative, how 
will the goal me achieves and are more resources going 
to be committed. 
 
--The United States has been making progress in 
securing nuclear materials in Russia and in other 
countries, but more can and must be done and more 
quickly. 
 
--We will expand our partnership with other countries, 
increase the capabilities of the IAEA, and hold a 
Global Nuclear Security Summit within the next year. 
 
--We will examine existing programs and look for ways 
to accelerate our efforts and increase efficiency. 
 
Background:  The President has said that the threat of 
nuclear terrorism is the greatest threat facing the 
American people and has announced an ambitious goal of 
securing sensitive nuclear materials around the world in 
four years.  He has asked the Vice President to lead the 
administration's efforts to achieve this goal. 
 
¶16. Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism 
 
 
Question:  How does the U.S. envision the Global 
Initiative being strengthened in 2009-2010, and what 
role does the U.S. envision Russia, as co-chair to the 
Global Initiative, to play in strengthening the Global 
Initiative? 
 
-- In keeping with priorities agreed on in 2008 among 
partners, the U.S. envisions an active partner nation 
focus on denying terrorist safe havens, preventing 
terrorist financing, and strengthening nuclear 
detection and forensics during the 2009-2010 period. 
 
-- The U.S. and Russia also co-chair the Exercise 
Planning Group, which promotes use of exercises to 
test capabilities and enhance overall preparedness 
through a multi-year exercise program. 
 
Background:   The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear 
Terrorism, which is co-chaired by the U.S. and Russian 
Federation, is recognized as a key component of U.S.- 
Russian strategic nuclear security relations both within 
the USG and internationally, and is an important symbol 
of commitment within the Global Initiative community. 
Working together, the U.S. and Russia have mobilized 
over 70 nations to improve national and regional 
capabilities to combat nuclear terrorism.  The U.S. and 
Russia often conduct joint demarches to encourage Global 
Initiative partners to host or participate in Global 
Initiative events, thus strengthening cooperation and 
collaboration among partner nations in building and 
exercising capabilities to combat the global threat of 
nuclear terrorism.  The Netherlands will host the June 
2009 Plenary Meeting, where senior level officials will 
discuss past Global Initiative activity successes and 
determine future objectives for the Global Initiative. 
 
¶17. Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) 
 
 
Question:  What are President Obama's views on the PSI? 
 
--The President strongly supports the PSI.  The 
 
STATE 00033306  008 OF 012 
 
SUBJECT: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, FACT SHEETS ON 
PRESIDENTIAL SPEECH ON NONPROLIFERATION AND SECURI 
Administration's goal is to strengthen and expand the 
PSI, ensuring that it remains an effective tool in 
helping responsible governments cooperate to stop WMD 
proliferation. 
 
Background:  The PSI is an informal and voluntary effort 
by countries (currently 94) that have committed to 
cooperate in halting transfers of WMD, their delivery 
systems, and related materials to and from states and 
non-state actors of proliferation concern.  The 
Administration wants to ensure the effectiveness and 
sustainability of the PSI.  Efforts are underway to 
broaden participation by all PSI endorsing states in PSI 
capacity-building activities (exercises, workshops, 
training, experts' meetings, etc.).  We are also 
continuing outreach to encourage additional states to 
endorse the PSI. 
 
¶18. Missile Defense Cooperation 
 
Question:  What are the current U.S. plans for missile 
defense deployments in Europe? 
 
-- The Administration is currently conducting a 
missile defense policy review.  We will continue to 
consult closely with the Czech and Polish governments, 
and our other NATO allies, on U.S. plans. 
 
-- As the United States and our allies together pursue 
the issue of missile defense in Europe, we will take 
into account a number of factors:  whether the system 
works, whether it is cost effective, and the nature of 
the threat from Iran. 
 
-- If, by working with our allies, Russia, and other 
countries, we succeed in eliminating the threat, then 
the driving force behind a missile defense 
construction in Europe will be removed. 
 
-- We remain ready to consult with our NATO allies, 
and with Russia, to see if we can develop new 
cooperative approaches to missile defense which 
protect all of us. 
 
Question:  What effect will the March 26 resignation of 
the Czech government have on the missile defense 
agreement with the Czech Republic? 
 
-- It is premature to comment on the impact to our 
bilateral missile defense cooperation.  We will work 
with any Czech government to continue to strengthen 
the security of Europe against new threats. 
 
Background:  The Administration will support MD, but 
ensure that its development is pragmatic and cost 
effective.  Iran is steadily developing and testing 
ballistic missiles of increasingly greater ranges, 
payloads, and sophistication.  Senior U.S. officials 
have said that if the Iranian threat is eliminated, then 
the driving force behind the U.S. MD deployments to 
Europe will be removed.  Senior Administration officials 
also have said that the United States hopes to continue 
to work closely with NATO and Russia on MD in a 
cooperative and transparent manner, and to develop and 
deploy MD assets capable of defending the United States, 
NATO, and Russia against 21st century threats. 
 
¶19. Fact Sheet:  START and Follow-on Agreement 
 
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) 
The START Treaty was signed by the United States and the 
Soviet Union in Moscow on July 31, 1991.  Five months 
later, the Soviet Union dissolved and four independent 
states with strategic nuclear weapons on their territory 
came into existence -- Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and 
Ukraine.  On May 23, 1992, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, 
and Ukraine assumed the obligations of the former Soviet 
Union under the START Treaty as successor states of the 
former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.  Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, and Ukraine also committed in the Lisbon 
Protocol and its associated documents to accede to the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear 
weapon states. 
Central Limits: START required reductions in strategic 
offensive arms to be carried out in three phases over 
seven years from the date the Treaty entered into force. 
All Treaty Parties met the December 5, 2001, 
implementation deadline.  The central limits include: 
--1,600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (ICBMs, 
SLBMs, and heavy bombers) 
--6,000 accountable warheads on ICBMs, SLBMs, and 
heavy bombers 
 
STATE 00033306  009 OF 012 
 
SUBJECT: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, FACT SHEETS ON 
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--4,900 warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs 
--1,540 warheads on 154 heavy ICBMs 
--1,100 warheads on mobile ICBMs 
--Ballistic missile throw-weight limited to 3,600 
metric tons on each side 
Counting Rules:  U.S. heavy bombers may carry no more 
than 20 long range air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) 
each.  The first 150 of these bombers count as carrying 
only 10 ALCMs each.  Russian heavy bombers may carry no 
more than 16 ALCMs each.  The first 180 of these bombers 
count as carrying only eight ALCMs each.  Each ALCM- 
equipped heavy bombers in excess of 150 for the U.S. and 
180 for Russia would count as actually equipped.  Heavy 
bombers equipped only with bombs or short-range attack 
missiles (SRAMs) are counted as carrying one warhead 
each. 
Verification:  START contains detailed, mutually- 
reinforcing verification provisions that were intended 
to supplement National Technical Means, including: data 
exchanges and notifications on strategic systems, 
facilities, and flight tests; exchanges of telemetry 
data from missile flight tests; restrictions on the 
encryption of telemetry data; twelve types of on-site 
inspections and exhibitions; and continuous monitoring 
at mobile ICBM final assembly plants. 
Implementation:  The Joint Compliance and Inspection 
Commission (JCIC) was established by START to oversee 
the Treaty's implementation.  The JCIC has met more than 
30 times and has completed numerous agreements on 
detailed procedures for specific implementation 
activities, including resolving questions arising from 
the initial data exchanges and exhibitions of strategic 
offensive arms. 
Duration:  START is scheduled to expire on December 5, 
2009, unless superseded by another arms reduction 
agreement, or extended by agreement of the Parties. 
Follow-on Agreement 
On April 1, Presidents Obama and Medvedev agreed in 
London that bilateral negotiations would be initiated 
with the intention of reaching a new, comprehensive, 
legally binding agreement on reducing and limiting 
strategic offensive arms to replace the START Treaty by 
the end of 2009. 
 
The Presidents have instructed that the subject of the 
new agreement be the reduction and limitation of 
strategic offensive arms, that the U.S. and Russia seek 
to record in the new agreement levels of reductions that 
will be lower than those in existing arms control 
agreements, and that the new agreement include effective 
verification measures drawn from the experience of the 
Parties in implementing START. 
 
In addition, the Presidents stated that the new 
agreement should mutually enhance the security of the 
Parties, and predictability and stability in strategic 
offensive forces. 
 
The Presidents further charged their negotiators to 
report, by July, on their progress in working out a new 
agreement and have directed that the talks begin 
immediately. 
 
The U.S. negotiating team will be headed by the 
Assistant Secretary of State for Verification, 
Compliance, and Implementation. 
 
¶20. Fact Sheet: Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty 
(CTBT) 
 
President Obama has stated that his Administration will 
aggressively pursue U.S. ratification of the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), after a 
thorough review of the technical, military and 
diplomatic issues surrounding the treaty. 
 
The CTBT was submitted to the U.S. Senate for advice and 
consent to ratification on September 23, 1997 along with 
an article-by-article analysis, an assessment of its 
verifiability, and other required supporting 
documentation.  In 1999, the U.S. Senate declined to 
give its advice and consent to the CTBT by a vote of 48 
favoring ratification to 51 against.  The CTBT remains 
pending before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
and can be taken up by the Committee at any time. 
 
Over the decade since the Senate last considered the 
CTBT, new developments have occurred in both monitoring 
technology and verification techniques, as well as 
assessments of the ability of the United States to 
maintain the safety and reliability of its nuclear 
stockpile without nuclear testing.  The Administration 
 
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will conduct a full review of these developments before 
it decides how best to pursue ratification of the CTBT. 
The CTBT was negotiated in the Geneva Conference on 
Disarmament (CD) between January 1994 and August 1996. 
The United Nations General Assembly voted on September 
10, 1996, to adopt the Treaty by a tally of 158 in 
favor, 3 opposed, and 5 abstentions.  Since September 
24, 1996, the Treaty has been open to all states for 
signature and ratification before its entry into force. 
One hundred eighty (180) nations have now signed it, and 
148 have ratified it.  Of the 44 nations whose 
ratifications are specifically required by the CTBT for 
its entry into force, 41 have signed and 35 have 
ratified.  Any nation can accede to the Treaty at any 
time after its entry into force, enabling its 
participation to be universal. 
CTBT's Central Features 
Basic obligations.  The CTBT would ban any nuclear 
weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion. 
Organization.  The Treaty establishes an organization ? 
the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization 
(CTBTO) -- to ensure implementation of the Treaty's 
provisions, including the provisions for international 
verification measures.  The organization includes a 
Conference of States Parties, an Executive Council, and 
a Technical Secretariat, which includes the 
International Data Centre. 
Structure.  The Treaty includes two Annexes, a Protocol, 
and two Annexes to the Protocol, all of which form 
integral parts of the Treaty.  Annex 1 to the Treaty 
assigns each state to one of six geographical regions 
for the purpose of determining Executive Council 
composition; Annex 2 contains the criteria used to 
identify the states required to have deposited their 
instruments of ratification before the Treaty may enter 
into force, as well as a list of those states. The 
Protocol consists of three parts: Part I details on the 
International Monitoring System (IMS); Part II on On- 
Site Inspections (OSI); and Part III on Confidence 
Building Measures.  Annex 1 to the Protocol details the 
location of treaty monitoring assets associated with the 
IMS; and Annex 2 details parameters for screening 
events. 
Verification and inspections.  The Treaty's verification 
regime consists of  an International Monitoring System 
composed of seismological, radionuclide, hydroacoustic, 
and infrasound monitoring; consultation and 
clarification; on-site inspections; and confidence- 
building measures.  The use of national technical means, 
vital for the Treaty's verification regime, is 
explicitly provided for.  Requests for on-site 
inspections must be approved by at least 30 affirmative 
votes of the members of the Treaty's 51-member Executive 
Council, which must act within 96 hours of receiving a 
request for an inspection.  At the present time, 273 of 
the 337 monitoring facilities comprising the IMS have 
been built, and 246 have been certified as meeting all 
requirements. 
Treaty compliance and sanctions.  The Treaty provides 
for measures to redress a situation of concern, to 
ensure compliance with the Treaty (including the ability 
to recommend sanctions), and for the settlement of 
disputes.  If the Conference of States Parties or the 
Executive Council determines that a case is of 
particular gravity, it can bring the issue to the 
attention of the United Nations. 
Amendments.  Any State Party to the Treaty may propose 
an amendment to the Treaty, the Protocol, or the Annexes 
to the Protocol.  Amendments are considered by an 
Amendment Conference and are adopted by a positive vote 
of a majority of the States Parties with no State Party 
casting a negative vote.  Amendments enter into force 
for all States parties after deposit of the instruments 
of ratification  or acceptance by all those States 
parties casting a positive vote at the Amendment 
Conference. 
Entry into force.  The CTBT will enter into force 180 
days after the date of deposit of the instruments of 
ratification by all States listed in Annex 2 to the 
Treaty.  Annex 2 lists the 44 states that are members of 
the Conference on Disarmament (CD) as of June 18, 1996, 
with nuclear power and/or research reactors.  If the 
Treaty has not entered into force three years after the 
date of the anniversary of its opening for signature 
(i.e., three years after September 24, 1996), a 
conference of the States which already have deposited 
their instruments of ratification may convene annually 
to consider and decide by consensus what measures 
consistent with international law may be undertaken to 
accelerate the ratification process in order to 
facilitate the Treaty's early entry into force. 
Review.  Ten years after entry into force, a Conference 
 
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of the States Parties will be held to review the 
operation and effectiveness of the CTBT unless a 
majority of the States Parties decides otherwise. 
Duration.  The CTBT is of unlimited duration.  Each 
State Party has the right to withdraw from the CTBT if 
it decides that extraordinary events related to its 
subject matter of the CTBT have jeopardized its supreme 
interests. 
Depositary.  The Secretary General of the United Nations 
is the Depositary for this Treaty and receives 
signatures, instruments of ratification and instruments 
of accession. 
CTBTO Preparatory Commission 
The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization 
(CTBTO) Preparatory Commission is based in Vienna, 
Austria, and is responsible for carrying out the 
necessary preparations for the effective implementation 
of the CTBT and for preparing for the first session of 
the Conference of the States Parties to the CTBT.  All 
countries which have signed the CTBT are considered to 
be members of the Preparatory Commission.  In addition 
to these members, the Commission includes a Provisional 
Technical Secretariat, which has the following duties: 
(1) it is responsible for the overall installation, 
operations, and maintenance of the IMS; (2) it operates 
the International Data Centre, which receives data from 
IMS stations and produces monitoring data products; (3) 
it supports the on-site inspection function; and (4) it 
provides other support to the members of the Commission. 
Information about the Preparatory Commission can be 
found on its website www.ctbto.org. 
¶21. Fact Sheet:  Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty 
 
The United States has not produced highly enriched 
uranium for nuclear weapons since 1964 and halted the 
production of plutonium for nuclear weapons in 1988. 
The United States strongly believes that achieving a 
legally binding ban on the production of fissile 
material for use in nuclear weapons is an important 
goal.  A Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) would ban 
the production of fissile material for use in nuclear 
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. 
 
During the 1990's, many saw an FMCT as the next logical 
step on nuclear disarmament after the Comprehensive 
Nuclear Test Ban-Treaty, which was completed in the 
Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva in 1996.  After 
considerable effort, the CD began negotiations on an 
FMCT toward the end of its 1998 session.  In 1999, the 
CD proved unable to reach agreement for continuing FMCT 
negotiations, a condition that has persisted to the 
present time. 
 
In late 2002, the Bush Administration issued its 
"National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass 
Destruction," which affirmed U.S. support for the 
"negotiation of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) 
that advances U.S. security interests."  On July 29, 
2004, then-U.S. Ambassador to the CD Jackie Wolcott 
Sanders delivered a statement to the CD reporting that a 
U.S. policy review had concluded that an effectively 
verifiable FMCT was not achievable.  During late 
August/early September 2004, U.S. experts traveled to 
Geneva to brief CD delegations on the reasoning behind 
these conclusions, and to emphasize that an FMCT having 
no international verification provisions would be 
preferable to one with less than effective verification. 
 
On May 19, 2006, the U.S. tabled at the CD a draft text 
of an FMCT, as well as a draft mandate for FMCT 
negotiations which omitted any requirement that an FMCT 
resulting from the negotiations be "effectively 
verifiable.  Prior to tabling these texts, the United 
States had consulted with key CD member governments to 
preview the U.S. proposals. 
 
Subsequently, the U.S. continued to press the case for 
its draft text as a basis for negotiations in the CD, 
stressing that the proposed mandate did not preclude 
others from raising the issue of verification and 
expressing a willingness to further explain its 
position.  However, the insistence by a small number of 
CD members on linking FMCT negotiations with other, 
unrelated issues which do not enjoy a consensus in 
Geneva continues to stymie action in the CD on FMCT. 
 
President Obama has stated his administration's support 
for international negotiations for a verifiable treaty 
to end the production of fissile materials for nuclear 
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.  He also has 
stressed the importance of cutting off the building 
blocks needed for nuclear weapons, stating, "if we are 
 
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serious about stopping the spread of these weapons, then 
we should complete a treaty to end the production of 
materials to create them." 
 
¶22. Should questions arise regarding the Nuclear Posture 
Review: 
 
-       As mandated by the 2008 National Defense 
Authorization Act, the Department of Defense is 
preparing to conduct the Nuclear Posture Review 
which is due to Congress concurrent with the 
Quadrennial Defense Review in January 2010. 
-       The Department is in the early stages of organizing 
for the NPR, which will address the United States' 
nuclear deterrence strategy and policy, including 
the role of nuclear forces in U.S. national 
security strategy as well as the requirements and 
objectives for the United States to maintain a 
safe, reliable, and credible nuclear deterrence 
posture. 
-       As required by the Congress, the review will be an 
interagency effort with Department of State and 
Department of Energy participation. 
-       DoD will consult closely with Congress and allies 
as the review process unfolds. 
 
¶23. Minimize considered. 
CLINTON