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RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 6564

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 09 STATE 032299 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: RS US PARM KACT KNNP MARR MNUC PTER
SUBJECT: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON U.S.-RUSSIA SECURITY 
ISSUES 
 
¶1.  The text below has been approved by the National 
Security Council for use by Posts in response to press 
and host government queries regarding the April 1 meeting 
between President Obama and Russian President Medvedev. 
Please note that background information should be used 
only to inform posts and should not be used with press. 
 
¶2. NONPROLIFERATION GOALS 
 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Background:  Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Parties meet to review the 
operation of the Treaty every five years.  These meetings 
are viewed as important reflections of the strength of 
the NPT and the nonproliferation regime in general.  The 
last such meeting in 2005 was filled with acrimony over 
key issues such as disarmament, non-compliance, and 
nonproliferation in the Middle East and failed to reach 
agreement on a consensus document.  Increasing attention 
is being given to the 2010 Review Conference as a key 
milestone in the process of repairing and strengthening 
the regime. 
 
Question:  What importance do you attach to the 2010 
Review Conference, and what steps will you take in order 
to avoid a repeat of the failure of the 2005 Review 
Conference? 
 
-- The United States places the utmost importance on the 
NPT, which is the cornerstone of the nuclear 
nonproliferation regime.  The review process affords 
Parties the opportunity to examine the operation of the 
Treaty to help ensure that its purposes and provisions 
are 
being realized. 
 
-- We hope that the 2010 RevCon will demonstrate that the 
Treaty will continue to be an effective legal and 
political barrier to nuclear proliferation.  We will 
strive for a recommitment by Parties to the objectives of 
the NPT and to their basic shared interest in preventing 
proliferation. 
 
-- We will also seek a Conference that helps set a new 
course in the direction of the greater fulfillment of the 
vital goals of the Treaty - stemming proliferation, 
working toward a nuclear weapons-free world, and sharing 
the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy. 
 
 
¶B. DPRK 
 
Background:  North Korea has announced its intention to 
launch an "experimental communications satellite" between 
April 4-8, 2009.  The United States believes that this 
action would violate UNSCR 1718, which obligates the 
DPRK to suspend all ballistic missile-related 
activities and re-establish its pre-existing commitments 
to a moratorium on missile launching.  On March 27, 
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksey Borodavkin 
publicly urged North Korea to "refrain from this launch," 
and stressed that "there is no need to increase 
tensions."  However, in discussions with us and other 
Six-Party members Russia has maintained that a peaceful 
space launch is not expressly forbidden by UNSCR 1718. 
 
Question:  What are the United States and Russia doing to 
prevent a North Korean missile launch? 
 
-- The U.S. is working with our partners, including 
Russia, to encourage North Korea to refrain from all 
provocative acts.  We appreciate the actions Russia has 
taken to date urging North Korea to refrain from 
increasing tensions by conducting a missile launch. 
 
-- Both the U.S. and Russia agree that any launch by the 
DPRK of a Taepo-Dong 2 (TD-2) or other similar rocket 
would be a provocative act and would be damaging to peace 
and stability in the region. 
 
 
-- The DPRK should refrain from such activities and focus 
on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a 
peaceful manner through the Six-Party Talks. 
 
-- Administration will continue to work with Russia, as 
well as with our other partners, to resume the Six-Party 
Talks as soon as possible and will seek to coordinate our 
 
STATE 00032299  002 OF 009 
 
 
efforts to hold North Korea to its commitment to 
verifiably denuclearize. 
 
¶C. Iran 
 
Background:  As a member of the P5+1, Russia is of 
critical importance in the future direction of our 
efforts 
vis-a-vis Iran's nuclear program.  Russia has supported, 
all five resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council 
(1696, 1737, 1747, 1803, and 1835) and proposed the last 
resolution as a way of demonstrating the continued unity 
of the international community in confronting Iranian 
nuclear policy.  Russia will be very interested in the 
U.S. Administration's policy on Iran and will continue to 
be included in our decision-making process. 
 
Question:  What is your new policy on Iran and how will 
Russia fit in? 
 
-- United States policy on Iran is still under review, 
but 
as the President stated in his March 20 remarks during 
Nowruz to the Iranian people and leadership, we are 
committed to diplomacy that addresses the full range of 
issues, and to pursuing constructive ties among the 
United 
States, Iran and the international community. 
 
-- The Russian Government will be a key partner in this 
effort, in the multilateral P5 plus 1 process, 
bilaterally 
working with the United States, and through its 
relationship with Iran. President Obama and his 
Administration look forward to working with President 
Medvedev to help resolve this long-standing challenge to 
international security. 
 
-- We are committed to direct diplomacy, but this does 
not mean that Iran's violations of its international 
nuclear obligations cease to have consequences. 
 
--      There are five UN Security Council resolutions that 
reflect the international community's continuing serious 
concerns about Iran's nuclear program. 
 
-- We have publicly stated that we want Iran to take its 
rightful place in the community of nations and we mean 
that.  Iran has rights, but with rights come 
responsibilities. 
 
-- We are prepared to take real steps toward a very 
different and positive future.  But Iran must take steps 
too.  We hope Iran does not miss an opportunity. 
 
¶D. UNSCR 1540 
 
Background:  UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) 
established an obligation for all UN Member States to 
develop and enforce effective measures to establish 
domestic controls to prevent WMD proliferation and their 
means of delivery.  The UN's 1540 Committee works to 
facilitate states' compliance with the Resolution and to 
report back to the Security Council on progress on its 
implementation.  The U.S. works within and in 
coordination with the 1540 Committee, sponsoring many 
1540 workshops, training events, and assistance programs 
designed to help all states strengthen their capabilities 
to prevent WMD proliferation.  Russia also sits on the 
1540 Committee.  Plans are underway for all UN Member 
States to participate in a Comprehensive Review of UNSCR 
1540 implementation at the end of 2009. 
 
Question:  What are the U.S. and Russia doing to support 
UNSCR 1540 implementation? 
 
-- UNSCR 1540 is a vital element in global efforts to 
prevent the proliferation of WMD and to keep these 
horrific weapons out of the hands of terrorists. 
 
-- Implementation of UNSCR 1540 by all UN Member States 
will help ensure that no state or non-state actor is a 
source or beneficiary of WMD proliferation. 
 
- The U.S. and Russia intend to give new impetus to the 
implementation of UNSCR 1540.  As permanent Member States 
of the UN Security Council, both our countries work 
actively to promote and assist with UNSCR 1540 
implementation. 
 
¶E. Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Background: 
The PSI is an informal and voluntary effort by countries 
 
STATE 00032299  003 OF 009 
 
 
(currently 94) that have committed to cooperate in 
halting transfers of WMD, their delivery systems, and 
related materials to and from states and non-state actors 
of proliferation concern.  The Administration wants to 
ensure the effectiveness and sustainability of the PSI. 
Efforts are underway to broaden participation by all PSI- 
endorsing states in PSI capacity-building activities 
(exercises, workshops, training, experts' meetings, 
etc.).  We are also continuing outreach to encourage 
additional states to endorse the PSI.  Russia is a 
participant in the PSI Operational Experts Group, which 
meets regularly to plan PSI activities and examine 
interdiction challenges. 
 
Question:  What are President Obama's views on the PSI? 
Does Russia share those views? 
 
--The President strongly supports the PSI.  The 
Administration's goal is to strengthen and expand the 
PSI, ensuring that it remains an effective tool in 
helping responsible governments cooperate to stop WMD 
proliferation. 
 
-- Russia is an active participant in the PSI, including 
in the PSI Operational Experts Group, which meets 
regularly to plan PSI activities and examine interdiction 
challenges. 
 
¶F. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) 
 
Background:  The United States and the Russian Federation 
both signed the CTBT on September 24, 1996.  While the 
Russian Federation ratified the CTBT on June 30, 2000, 
the 
U.S. Senate declined to give its advice and consent by a 
vote of 48 in favor of ratification and 51 against in 
¶1999.  The United States and the Russian Federation are 
two of the 44 countries required to ratify the Treaty in 
order for it to enter into force.  For CTBT to enter into 
force, the 
United States, China, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, and Israel 
must ratify it and India, Pakistan, and the DPRK must 
both 
sign and ratify it.  In the Secretary's confirmation 
hearing, she indicated that the Obama Administration 
would 
work toward ratification of the Treaty. 
 
Question:  Both the Russian Federation and the United 
States are countries whose ratifications are required for 
the CTBT to enter into force.  The Russian Federation 
ratified the CTBT in 2000. What plans does the United 
States have to follow suit? 
 
-- The United States recognizes the importance of the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty as a 
nonproliferation and disarmament measure. 
 
-- We believe that it is in the U.S. interest to ratify 
the Treaty.  The Administration will work closely with 
the 
U.S. Senate to win its advice and consent to ratification 
of the CTBT. 
 
¶G. Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) 
 
Background: A Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) would 
ban the production of fissile material for use in nuclear 
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.  The Geneva- 
based Conference on Disarmament (CD) briefly held 
negotiations on an FMCT in 1998, with the objective of 
producing a verifiable treaty.  However, the CD was 
unable 
to agree to resume work in the years following.  In 2004, 
the United States, after an internal review, announced 
its 
conclusion that an effectively verifiable FMCT was not 
achievable.  In 2006, the United States proposed the 
negotiation of an FMCT without international verification 
provisions, and tabled a draft FMCT text and a draft 
negotiating mandate.  Although the principal reason for 
the continued failure of the CD to move forward on FMCT 
negotiations may be the belief by some states that they 
need to continue fissile material production for weapons 
programs, some other states use the U.S. position against 
including international verification provisions in an 
FMCT 
as a supposed reason for their opposition.  During her 
confirmation hearings, the Secretary of State said that 
the United States will work to revive negotiations on an 
effectively verifiable FMCT. 
 
 
STATE 00032299  004 OF 009 
 
 
Question:  For the past decade, the Conference on 
Disarmament has been unable to begin work on negotiating 
a 
Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty.  One obstacle to this has 
been U.S. insistence on an FMCT without international 
verification provisions.  Will the United States support 
the negotiation of a verifiable Fissile Material Cutoff 
Treaty in the Conference on Disarmament? 
 
-- The negotiation of a verifiable FMCT is the top U.S. 
priority at the Conference on Disarmament (CD). 
 
-- The United States hopes that its renewed flexibility 
on 
this issue will enable negotiations to start soon in 
Geneva. 
 
-- The United States looks forward to working with the 
Russian Federation and other CD members to overcome any 
obstacles preventing the commencement of FMCT 
negotiations 
in the CD. 
 
¶H. Enhancing Nuclear Security/Material Reduction 
 
Background:  We are working to develop a joint statement 
on nuclear security with Russia for presidential 
announcement this summer.  We hope to include nuclear 
materials security, nuclear security upgrades, HEU 
minimization and completion of Agreements on Plutonium 
Disposition and Material Consolidation and Conversion 
(MCC). 
 
Question:  Did you make any progress on efforts to 
improve 
the security of nuclear material in Russia? 
 
-- The U.S. and Russia share a vital interest in 
protecting nuclear materials, and we have made progress 
in this area. 
 
-- The U.S. and Russia have worked together for many 
years 
on nuclear security.  Most recently, under the U.S.- 
Russian Bratislava Nuclear Security Initiative, at the 
end of 2008 all Bratislava nuclear security scope work 
had been completed. 
 
-- As we deepen our partnership in this area, we will 
announce specific next steps we can take together to 
improve nuclear security in Russia and worldwide. 
 
¶I. Nuclear Fuel Cycle 
 
Background:  The United States and Russia have worked 
cooperatively on developing proposals for reliable access 
to nuclear fuel (RANF) as a means of providing countries 
a 
viable alternative to developing sensitive nuclear 
technologies.  We were both part of a six country concept 
in 2006 (also involving France, Germany, the Netherlands 
and the UK) that proposed to establish a mechanism at the 
IAEA that could be used in the event that commercial 
supply arrangements are interrupted for reasons other 
than 
nonproliferation obligations, and cannot be restored 
through normal commercial processes.  Both countries have 
proposed to establish fuel bank mechanisms to support 
supply assurances.  The U.S. is establishing a national 
fuel reserve with uranium downblended from excess defense 
material.  Russia intends to establish a reserve of low 
enriched uranium (LEU) to be held at Angarsk and released 
at the direction of the IAEA; specifics are to be 
presented to the June meeting of the IAEA's Board of 
Governors.  The Russians established in September 2007 
the legal basis for an International Uranium Enrichment 
Center at the Angarsk enrichment plant, selling shares 
and services to participating countries, including 
Kazakhstan, Armenia and Ukraine (although these countries 
would not be involved in plant operations nor have access 
to the enrichment technology itself).  The objective of 
providing nuclear fuel services so that states have a 
reliable supply was referenced in the U.S.-Russia Joint 
Declaration of July 3, 2007 and both countries work 
together on this topic in the Global Nuclear Energy 
Partnership (GNEP). 
 
How are Russia and the United States working together to 
avoid the spread of sensitive fuel cycle technologies? 
 
-- The United States and Russia agree that providing 
reliable access to nuclear fuel is a way to allow 
 
STATE 00032299  005 OF 009 
 
 
countries to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy without increasing the risks of nuclear 
proliferation through the spread of enrichment and 
reprocessing technologies. 
 
-- Our countries have developed complementary programs 
and 
are working through the IAEA and other multilateral 
forums 
toward this end. 
 
-- We share the goal of having the IAEA Board of 
Governors 
begin debate this June on concrete plans for providing 
reliable access to nuclear fuel, including one for a 
Russian fuel bank in Angarsk, and hope that mechanisms 
can 
be approved in September. 
 
¶J. Civil Nuclear Cooperation 
 
Background:  The U.S.-Russia Agreement for peaceful 
nuclear cooperation ("123" Agreement) would, once in 
force,  provide a legal framework to facilitate U.S.- 
Russian nuclear commerce.  It was signed in Moscow on May 
6, 2008 and transmitted to Congress for a mandatory 90- 
day review on May 13, 2008.  Congressional consideration 
of the Agreement was effectively halted in September when 
President Bush determined, in light of the Russia-Georgia 
conflict, that a prior Presidential determination 
regarding the agreement was no longer effective, and 
therefore a statutory requirement necessary for the 
agreement to become effective was no longer satisfied. 
Possible re-submission to Congress is currently under 
review.  We are still considering timing since we want to 
make certain that resubmission succeeds. 
 
Question: Does the Administration intend to re-submit the 
U.S.-Russia Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement ("123" 
Agreement) for Congressional consideration? 
 
-- The Administration seeks to cooperate with Russia on 
issues that are in our mutual interest, including 
scientific cooperation, civil nuclear cooperation and 
efforts to halt and reverse nuclear proliferation. 
 
-- The proposed 123 Agreement, signed at Moscow May 6, 
2008, can be an asset to our nonproliferation efforts and 
beneficial to U.S. industry. 
 
-- The timing of any movement on the Russian 123 will 
take into account 
our 
broader relationship with Russia, including Russia's 
policy with respect to Iran. 
 
¶3. ARMS REDUCTION 
 
¶A. START and Follow-on Agreement 
 
Background:  Media coverage of the meeting between 
Presidents Obama and Medvedev in London, and the joint 
statement by the Presidents, have raised interest world- 
wide regarding the efforts by the United States and 
Russia to negotiate a START follow-on agreement.  There 
has also been widespread speculation regarding the level 
of reductions that would be achieved in the new treaty. 
Thus far the U.S. and Russia have discussed broad policy 
objectives that would guide the negotiations.  The 
negotiations will deal with the specific elements of an 
agreement, including the level of reductions. 
 
Question: Can you comment on the Joint Statement issued 
by 
Presidents Obama and Medvedev regarding the negotiation 
of 
a START follow-on agreement? 
 
-- The Presidents agreed that bilateral negotiations 
would 
be initiated with the objective of reaching a new, 
comprehensive, legally binding agreement on reducing and 
limiting strategic offensive arms to replace the START 
Treaty, which is set to expire on December 5, 2009. 
 
-- The Presidents have instructed that the subject of the 
new agreement be the reduction and limitation of 
strategic 
offensive arms, that the U.S. and Russia seek to record 
in 
the new agreement levels of reductions that will be lower 
than those in existing arms control agreements, and that 
 
STATE 00032299  006 OF 009 
 
 
the new agreement include effective verification measures 
drawn from the experience of the Parties in implementing 
START. 
 
-- In addition, the Presidents stated that the new 
agreement should mutually enhance the security of the 
Parties, and predictability and stability in strategic 
offensive forces. 
 
-- The Presidents further charged their negotiators to 
report, by July, on their progress in working out a new 
agreement. 
 
Question:  Is there sufficient time available to 
negotiate 
a new follow-on agreement before the START Treaty expires 
in December? 
 
-- Negotiating a new agreement before December will be a 
challenge.  The Administration is committed to the effort 
to ensure that an agreement that serves U.S. security 
interests and enhances stability is achieved by then. 
 
Question:  There have been press reports that the 
Administration may consider going as low as 1000 nuclear 
warheads.  Is this true? 
 
- The Obama Administration is committed to seeking 
deep, verifiable reductions in all U.S. and Russian 
strategic nuclear weapons.  As a first step, the 
Administration is committed to seeking a legally binding 
agreement to replace the current START Treaty. 
 
- As long as nuclear weapons exist in the world, the 
United States must maintain a strong deterrent in support 
of U.S. national security and that of our friends and 
allies.  The Department of Defense is about to initiate a 
Nuclear Posture Review in accordance with the 2008 
National Defense Authorization Act that will assess U.S. 
deterrence needs and recommend strategy, policy and force 
levels for the coming decade. 
 
Question:  When will negotiations begin? 
 
- The Presidents have directed that the talks begin 
immediately.  The U.S. negotiating team will be headed by 
the Assistant Secretary of State for Verification, 
Compliance and Implementation, Ms. Rose Gottemoeller. 
 
¶4. DIALOGUE ON EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY 
 
Background:  In June 2008, President Medvedev called for 
a 
Legally binding treaty that would restructure Europe's 
security architecture.  In subsequent comments, Russia 
has 
called for a high-level meeting to discuss its proposals, 
but Russian officials have given few details of Russia's 
concept.  Although Moscow insists it does not seek to 
undermine NATO or replace the CFE Treaty, Russian 
authorities have not explained how its ideas relate to 
core European security institutions, such as NATO and 
OSCE, or agreements on European security, or how Russia's 
ideas address continuing failures of implementation of 
agreed commitments (primarily by Russia itself).  We 
believe that any new framework must build upon existing 
principles, agreements, and institutions, not seek to 
replace them.  Our focus should be to improve 
implementation of existing commitments.  In this regard, 
Russia's decision not to perform its CFE obligations (we 
have rejected Russia's claimed right to "suspend" 
performance) is particularly significant and must be 
addressed in parallel with broader discussions on Euro- 
Atlantic security.  The OSCE, with its comprehensive 
concept of security and its inclusive membership, is the 
most appropriate forum for discussions about ways to 
improve Euro-Atlantic security, but we are also open to 
talking with the Russians about their ideas in other 
appropriate fora, such as the NATO-Russia Council.  We 
would consider a high-level OSCE-wide meeting on Euro- 
Atlantic security at the appropriate time, but only when 
there is substance to justify such a meeting. 
 
Question:  What is the U.S. response to Russian calls for 
discussions about a new security architecture for Europe? 
 
-- We welcome discussion of ways to improve Euro-Atlantic 
security and believe the OSCE, with its inclusive 
membership, is the right place for such a discussion. 
 
-- Any such discussion should be based on the core 
principles and values in the Helsinki Final Act, the 
 
STATE 00032299  007 OF 009 
 
 
Charter of Paris, and the 1999 Charter for European 
Security.  It needs to build on OSCE's 
comprehensive concept of security, which includes human 
and economic dimensions, as well as political-military 
aspects. 
 
-- The aim should be to enhance the effectiveness of 
existing Euro-Atlantic institutions and agreements, not 
replace them with new ones. 
 
If raised:  What about a Europe-wide Summit? 
 
--      It would not make sense to commit to that sort 
of undertaking unless we have the substance to justify 
it.  Progress on a range of issues - Euro-Atlantic 
security, the CFE Treaty, other issues - would be 
important. 
 
¶A.  NATO-Russia Council 
 
Background:  In 2002, NATO and Russia established the 
NATO-Russia Council (NRC) - a forum designed for 
consultation, consensus-building, and cooperation.  It 
was 
conceived as a greatly enhanced successor to the NATO- 
Russia Permanent Joint Council, set up under the 1997 
NATO-Russia Founding Act to assuage Russian concerns 
about 
the first post-Cold War round of NATO enlargement.  But 
the NRC never lived up to its potential.  Most projects 
barely developed or were politicized.  Russian opposition 
to NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine, and to U.S. 
missile defense plans, coupled with Russia's decision not 
to meet its obligations under the CFE Treaty, further 
reduced common ground.  Russia's military action in 
Georgia in August 2008 led Allies to suspend formal high- 
level meetings of the NRC.  On March 5, NATO Foreign 
Ministers agreed to formally resume the NRC, including at 
the Ministerial level, after the April Summit.  Allies 
seek to use the NRC as a forum for dialogue, where we 
agree and disagree, and for cooperation in areas of 
common interest.  Still, Allies are divided regarding 
Russia's intentions and the value of cooperation.  We 
hope to use the NATO Summit to find a balance for NATO- 
Russia that advances positive engagement where interests 
overlap, while remaining realistic about Russia's 
intentions and defending our principles. 
 
Question:  What goals and expectations do you have 
regarding NATO-Russia re-engagement, as called for by 
NATO 
Foreign Ministers? 
 
--      We are determined to use the NATO-Russia 
relationship to enhance European security by engaging in 
candid political dialogue, both where we agree and 
disagree, and through focused cooperation in areas of 
common interest, such as Afghanistan and 
counter-terrorism. 
 
--      We encourage Russia and NATO Allies to work 
together to transform this relationship into a real 
partnership that can achieve concrete results.  Real 
cooperation between NATO and Russia can contribute 
significantly to security in Europe and indeed globally. 
 
 
¶B. Russia-Georgia/Geneva Process 
 
Background:  The Geneva discussions on Georgia, called 
for 
in point six of the August 12, 2008 ceasefire agreement 
between Russia and Georgia, have been convened four times 
since October 15, 2008.  The talks are co-chaired by the 
European Union, the United Nations, and the OSCE.  In 
addition to plenary meetings that include the three 
co-chairs, the U.S., Georgia, and Russia, the discussions 
also take place within two working groups: one on 
security 
and stability, and the other on the return of internally 
displaced persons and refugees and humanitarian issues. 
The working groups include plenary members as well as 
representatives from Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  At the 
last round of Geneva discussions on February 17-18, 2009, 
the participants of the Security/Stability Working Group 
reached an agreement calling for the convocation of two 
Incident Response and Prevention Mechanisms to discuss 
security issues in the former conflict areas.  However, 
since the last round of talks the de facto authorities in 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia have refused to name 
representatives to these Mechanisms, while Russia has 
refused to convene another round of talks prior to June. 
 
STATE 00032299  008 OF 009 
 
 
Question:  What is the status of the Geneva talks on 
Georgia? 
 
-- We urge the Abkhaz and South Ossetian participants of 
the Geneva discussions to immediately name 
representatives 
to the agreed Incident Response and Prevention 
Mechanisms and call on Russia to encourage them to do so. 
There can be no excuse for further delay in 
implementing this agreement.  Immediate implementation of 
this agreement is critical as it will help stabilize the 
situation on the ground. 
 
-- We call for another round of Geneva discussions as 
soon 
as possible (April) to discuss the mandates of the UN and 
OSCE, as well as the failure of the parties to implement 
the Incident Response and Prevention Mechanisms.  We seek 
a peaceful and lasting solution, and agree on the 
importance of ceasefire commitments and the Geneva 
process to bringing stability to region. 
 
Question:  Do better relations with Russia mean that the 
United States will back off its support for Georgia and 
Ukraine, including on NATO enlargement? 
 
-- Our efforts to reset relations with Russia will not 
come at the expense of our relations with Georgia and 
Ukraine or at the price of these countries' sovereignty 
and territorial integrity. 
 
-- As the Vice President stated in his Munich Speech, 
there are some issues on which we disagree with Russia. 
For instance, we will never recognize Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia as independent states; never acknowledge a 
Russian 
sphere of influence; and always support the right of all 
sovereign states to choose their partners and alliances. 
 
-- We support the territorial integrity of Georgia, and 
indeed, one of the founding principles of the NATO-Russia 
Council is support for the territorial integrity of 
sovereign states.  We continue to call on Russia to live 
up to its ceasefire commitments. 
 
--Good relations between the United States and Georgia 
and 
Ukraine and good relations between the United States and 
Russia are not mutually exclusive.  We need to move away 
from this kind of zero-sum thinking.  The United States 
can have cooperative and productive relations with Russia 
as well as with Georgia and Ukraine and with our allies 
in 
Europe. 
 
¶5.  MISSILE DEFENSE COOPERATION 
 
Background:  The Administration will support MD, but 
ensure that its development is pragmatic and cost 
effective.  Iran is steadily developing and testing 
ballistic missiles of increasingly greater ranges, 
payloads, and sophistication.  Senior U.S. officials have 
said that if the Iranian threat is eliminated, then the 
driving force behind the U.S. MD deployments to Europe 
will be removed.  Senior Administration officials also 
have said that the United States hopes to continue to 
work 
closely with NATO and Russia on MD in a cooperative and 
transparent manner, and to develop and deploy MD assets 
capable of defending the United States, NATO, and Russia. 
They have also committed to close consultations with 
Poland and the Czech Republic. 
 
 
Question:  What are the current U.S. plans for missile 
defense deployments in Europe? 
 
-- The Administration is conducting a missile defense 
policy review.  We will continue to consult closely with 
the Czech and Polish governments, and our other NATO 
allies, on U.S. plans. 
 
-- As the United States and our allies together pursue 
the 
issue of missile defense in Europe, we will take into 
account a number of factors:  whether the system works, 
whether it is cost effective, and the nature of the 
threat 
from Iran. 
 
-- If, by working with our allies, Russia, and other 
 
STATE 00032299  009 OF 009 
 
 
countries, we succeed in eliminating the threat, then the 
driving force behind a missile defense construction in 
Europe will be removed. 
 
-- We remain ready to consult with our NATO allies, and 
with Russia, to see if we can develop new cooperative 
approaches to missile defense that protects all of us. 
 
Question:  What effect will the March 26 resignation of 
the Czech government have on the missile defense 
agreement 
with the Czech Republic? 
 
-- It is premature to comment on the impact to our 
bilateral missile defense cooperation.  We will work with 
any Czech government to continue to strengthen the 
security of Europe in new ways against new threats. 
 
¶6. COUNTERING NUCLEAR TERRORISM 
 
¶A. Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism 
 
Background:   The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear 
Terrorism, which is co-chaired by the U.S. and Russian 
Federation, is recognized as a key component of 
U.S./Russian strategic nuclear security relations both 
within the USG and internationally.   Working together, 
the U.S. and Russia have mobilized over 70 nations to 
improve national and regional capabilities to combat 
nuclear terrorism.  The U.S. and  Russia often conduct 
joint demarches to encourage Global Initiative partners 
to host or participate in Global Initiative events, thus 
strengthening cooperation and collaboration among partner 
nations in building and exercising capabilities to combat 
the global threat of nuclear terrorism.  The Netherlands 
will host the June 2009 Plenary Meeting, where senior 
level officials will discuss past Global Initiative 
activity successes and determine future objectives for 
the Global Initiative. 
 
Question:  How does the U.S. envision the Global 
Initiative being strengthened in 2009-2010, and what 
role does the U.S. envision Russia, as co-chair to the 
Global Initiative, to play in strengthening the Global 
Initiative? 
 
--In keeping with priorities agreed on in 2008 among 
partners, the U.S. envisions an active partner 
nation 
focus on denying terrorist safe havens, preventing 
terrorist financing, and strengthening nuclear 
detection and forensics capabilities during the 
2009-2010 period. 
 
--The U.S. and Russia also co-chair the Exercise 
Planning Group, which promotes use of exercises to 
test capabilities and enhance overall preparedness 
through a multi-year exercise program. 
 
¶7. ARCHITECTURE OF BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP: 
 
Background:  We are exploring a more structured 
dialogue with the Russians that goes beyond the more 
personalized contacts that characterized the Bush 
Administration engagement with former President 
Putin. 
Such a dialogue might approach the institutional 
relationship we had under the Gore-Chernomyrdin 
Commission.  However, we have yet to determine the 
parameters of this institutional architecture. 
 
Question:  You have spoken of a new architecture for 
the bilateral relationship.  What would that look 
like? 
 
We are looking at a number of options to 
institutionalize our relationship. 
 
¶8. Minimize considered. 
CLINTON