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Viewing cable 09SEOUL660, SEOUL - PRESS BULLETIN; April 23, 2009

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09SEOUL660 2009-04-23 07:40 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Seoul
VZCZCXRO7061
OO RUEHGH
DE RUEHUL #0660/01 1130740
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 230740Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4124
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC 8474
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//DDI/OEA//
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA//
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-Z//
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 9624
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 5758
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 5851
RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 0616
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 4280
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 3283
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 6480
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0896
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 2234
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1303
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1917
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 SEOUL 000660 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR ECON KPAO KS US
SUBJECT: SEOUL - PRESS BULLETIN; April 23, 2009 
 
TOP HEADLINES 
------------- 
 
 
Chosun Ilbo 
ROK Company in Kaesong: "If N. Korea Wants Its Workers to Receive as 
Much Wages as Their Chinese Counterparts, It Should Open Up Like 
China Did" 
 
JoongAng Ilbo, Segye Ilbo, Seoul Shinmun, All TVs 
Former President Roh Given Questionnaire in Bribery Scandal 
 
Dong-a Ilbo 
N. Korea Wishes to Maintain Dialogue with ROK 
 
Hankook Ilbo 
Seoul to Review N. Korea's Demands and Make Counter-Proposal on 
Kaesong Industrial Complex 
 
Hankyoreh Shinmun 
Two Key Officials of Lee Myung-bak Administration Allegedly 
Intervened in Appointing POSCO CEO 
 
 
DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS 
--------------------- 
 
The ROKG yesterday decided to pursue additional government-level 
talks with North Korea to discuss the operation of the joint Kaesong 
Industrial Complex. (All) It is doubtful, however, whether such any 
ROKG efforts will improve icy relations with the communist state. 
(Chosun) 
 
According to ROKG sources and North Korea's notice presented at the 
April 21 inter-Korean meeting released yesterday, Pyongyang 
apparently wishes to maintain dialogue with Seoul. North Korea 
proposed to set the date of the next meeting "as soon as possible" 
and indirectly expressed its willingness to maintain the complex. 
(Chosun, JoongAng, Dong-a) 
 
In a related development, a key Blue House official said yesterday: 
"The (April 21) meeting provided a momentum for inter-Korean 
dialogue. We will analyze North Korea's intentions, but believe that 
the North doesn't want to ruin inter-Korean ties." (Chosun, Dong-a, 
Hankook, Hankyoreh, Segye, Seoul) 
 
Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan, during yesterday's parliamentary 
session, expressed Seoul's intention to take the issue of the ROK 
worker being detained in the North to the UN. The ROK has not been 
granted access to the worker since his arrest on March 30 for 
allegedly criticizing the North's political system and encouraging a 
female North Korean worker to defect. (Chosun, JoongAng, Hankook, 
Segye, Seoul) 
 
A senior U.S. Administration official recently notified the ROKG 
that the U.S. would welcome Seoul's decision to fully join the 
U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which is aimed at 
preventing the transfer of weapons of mass destruction. The U.S. 
Administration also clarified its position that the joint Kaesong 
Industrial Complex should be kept open, since it does not want the 
last remaining inter-Korean channel of exchange to close down. 
(Chosun) 
 
A National Assembly committee yesterday passed a motion ratifying 
the KORUS FTA despite protests from opposition parties. The ruling 
GNP plans to put the motion to a vote at the Assembly's plenary 
session following the planned U.S.-ROK summit in June. (All) 
 
USFK Commander Gen. Walter Sharp, in a speech yesterday, said that 
the U.S. and ROK militaries are prepared for instability in North 
Korea.  He mentioned Operation Plan (OpPlan) 5029, which specifies 
the type of military action that would be used to counter 
 
SEOUL 00000660  002 OF 007 
 
 
instability in the North, such as a regime change or mass outflow of 
North Korean refugees. (JoongAng, Dong-a, Hankook, Hankyoreh, Seoul, 
VoiceofPeople) 
 
 
MEDIA ANALYSIS 
-------------- 
 
-North Korea 
------------ 
Aftermath of Inter-Korean Talks Regarding the Kaesong Industrial 
Complex 
 
Citing ROKG sources and North Korea's notice presented at the April 
21 inter-Korean meeting released yesterday, most ROK media reported 
that Pyongyang apparently wishes to maintain a dialogue with Seoul. 
 
 
According to media reports, North Korea said during the meeting that 
it wanted to meet with the ROK again within a week, while urging the 
ROK to set the date of the next meeting "as soon as possible." 
Conservative Dong-a Ilbo's front-page article cited the North's 
notice, which indirectly expressed its willingness to maintain the 
joint industrial complex. 
 
The ROK media also gave attention to Seoul's decision yesterday to 
pursue additional government-level talks with North Korea to discuss 
the operation of the joint Industrial complex.  A key Blue House 
official was widely quoted:  "The (April 21) meeting provided a 
momentum for inter-Korean dialogue.  We will analyze North Korea's 
intentions, but believe that the North doesn't want to ruin 
inter-Korean ties." 
 
Conservative Chosun Ilbo commented that it is doubtful whether such 
any ROKG efforts will improve icy relations with the communist 
state.   Right-of-center JoongAng Ilbo editorialized: "If North 
Korea's motivation is based on the purely economic interest of 
withdrawing benefits, we could persuade them on the grounds that 
they are being shortsighted.  However, the problem is that the North 
is taking a political approach by passing the buck to the South for 
worsening inter-Korean relations.  Given that politics takes 
priority over other matters in the North Korean system, it may be 
difficult to reach a compromise regarding the North's demands." 
Conservative Dong-a Ilbo's editorial argued: "It may be important 
for Seoul to try to maintain the momentum of dialogue amid strained 
ties with the North.  What is more important, however, is for Seoul 
to accurately read Pyongyang's intentions and deal with them wisely. 
 Considering the string of measures and demands made by Pyongyang 
following President Lee Myung-bak`s inauguration, we wonder if the 
North has been hatching a plot to close the industrial complex in 
the judgment that the complex no longer serves its interests. 
Pyongyang`s demand is seen as threatening the ROK with either 
continuing the complex by paying hefty prices or shutting it down on 
its own."  Moderate Hankook Ilbo's editorial stressed the importance 
of keeping the momentum of inter-Korean dialogue alive, and 
left-leaning Hankyoreh Shinmun headlined its editorial: "North 
Korea's Demands Excessive, but Should Be Used to Turn Around the 
Situation." 
 
-Obama's Overtures toward "Rogue States" 
--------------------------------------- 
Chosun Ilbo's Senior Reporter Kang In-sun observed in a commentary: 
"(North Korean leader) Kim Jong-il rudely rejected President Obama's 
outstretched hands.  He may have calculated that the move may 
enhance the North's leverage in negotiations.  However, some in the 
Obama Administration are aware of, yet choose to endure, this 
erratic North Korean behavior. ... North Korea is giving the U.S. 
more foreign policy options, rather than increasing its bargaining 
power." 
 
 
OPINIONS/EDITORIALS 
------------------- 
 
 
SEOUL 00000660  003 OF 007 
 
 
"SEVEN-MINUTE RUN" IN THE OBAMA ERA 
(Chosun Ilbo, April 23, 2009, Page 33) 
 
By Assistant Political Editor Kang In-sun 
 
North Korean leader Kim Jong-il rudely rejected President Obama's 
outstretched hands. 
 
He may have calculated that the move may enhance the North's 
leverage in negotiations. 
 
If Bush's foreign policy was to "tighten the noose" around headache 
countries, Obama's foreign policy is to "loosen the noose."  If 
every single step in Bush's foreign policy reflected Washington's 
hypersensitivity to security in the wake of the September 11 
terrorist attacks, Obama's foreign policy starts from reflection on 
uncertainties caused by Bush's foreign policy.  Thanks to Bush, 
Obama scored points without difficulty.  Obama did not need to 
present new ideas.  He won acclaim simply by saying, "I will be 
different from Bush." 
 
Obama's (style of) diplomacy was first seen in his approaches toward 
countries hostile to the U.S.  While Bush warned the three "Axis of 
Evil" members -- Iraq, Iran and North Korea -- that if they 
continued to make trouble, he would "get them", Obama took a soft 
approach, saying, "Let's have a dialogue."  He proposed settling old 
scores and sitting down at the table for talks. 
 
Obama sent a sign of reconciliation to Cuba, a nation which is 
geographically close to the U.S. and has many personal exchanges 
with the U.S. but was out of U.S. favor for a long time.  The U.S. 
eased its 50-year-old blockade policy against Cuba and allowed 
Americans to visit or send money to the nation.  Cuba reminds us of 
Dictator Castro -- cigar and sugar canes -- but it reminds Americans 
of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962.  When U.S. senior citizens were 
asked, "When were you worried the most about a war?" most of them 
chose the "Cuban missile crisis."  Since the Soviet Union's missiles 
were deployed to Cuba, which is almost like the U.S.'s backyard, 
Americans felt that they would be on the brink of war. 
 
It may not sound believable now but at that time, when the Cold War 
between the U.S. and the Soviet Union was at its height, nuclear war 
posed a clear and present threat.  A U.S. columnist wrote that when 
he was in elementary school, he was told to determine how long it 
took him to run from school to home.  It was to find out whether 
children could arrive home in seven minutes, the time period between 
the detection of a Soviet Union's incoming nuclear attack to the 
actual start of the attack.  The columnist said that children who 
could not make it to their houses within seven minutes burst out 
crying. 
 
In that era, Cuba was the nation that almost dragged the U.S. into a 
nuclear war.  Obama rolled his sleeves up to settle the 50-year-old 
scores. 
 
The younger generation still has a vivid sense of hostility toward 
Iran. This is due to the hostage crisis in Iran in 1979.  When 
Iranian revolutionaries took 52 U.S. diplomats hostage in the U.S. 
Embassy in Tehran for 444 days, the U.S. failed to rescue the 
hostages and suffered an insult (to national pride.)  This incident 
dealt a severe blow to then-President Carter, who had already lost 
popularity and, as a result, he lost the presidential election that 
year.  Afterwards, U.S.-Iranian relations irreversibly 
deteriorated. 
 
Now, Iran is willing to talk with the U.S.  At a recent U.N. 
anti-racism conference, Iranian President Ahmadinejad, who has often 
made unexpected derogatory remarks against Israel, said that Iran is 
ready to forget the past to begin a new era. 
 
Also, Venezuelan President Chavez, the strongest anti-American 
leader, grabbed Obama's outstretched hand at the Summit of the 
Americas. 
 
 
SEOUL 00000660  004 OF 007 
 
 
North Korea is the only country left.  Last month, North Korea 
ignored Special Representative for North Korea Policy Bosworth's 
proposal to visit North Korea and, in return, launched a long-range 
rocket.  North Korea has followed a stereotypical path of putting 
pressure on the U.S. and straining inter-Korean relations.  It 
appears that when North Korea struck back at the U.S., it was 
saying, "North Korea will demonstrate its long-range missile 
capability first and then talk later."  North Korea may have 
calculated that this would make it possible to negotiate under more 
favorable conditions.  North Korea may be misguided in thinking that 
by escalating tensions, the tide would turn in its favor. 
 
However, few people in the Obama Administration will wait forever 
for North Korea (to change its behavior) because they know that 
North Korea's behavior is unpredictable.  The international 
community is keeping watch on North Korea which has responded 
harshly to both Bush's hard line and Obama's conciliatory gesture. 
In fact, (by taking these actions,) North Korea has given the U.S. 
more diplomatic options instead of increasing North Korea's own 
bargaining power. 
 
 
IT IS WASHINGTON'S TURN TO MOVE ON KORUS FTA 
(Dong-a Ilbo, April 23, 2009, Page 31) 
 
The National Assembly Committee on Unification, Foreign Affairs and 
Trade passed a bill ratifying the ROK-U.S. Free Trade Agreement 
(FTA) yesterday despite opposition from the minority party lawmakers 
yesterday, 22 months after the ROK and the U.S. officially signed 
the agreement on June 30, 2007.  This is rather fortunate, 
considering that some opposition lawmakers who opposed the 
submission of the bill to the Committee armed themselves with 
hammers and occupied the Standing Committee's conference room and 
the National Assembly floor last December.  The ruling Grand 
National Party plans to send the bill to the floor during a June 
extra session of the National Assembly after observing the results 
of the U.S.-ROK summit set for June 16 in the U.S. 
 
Now, the attitudes of the U.S. government and Congress are key. 
Even before stepping into office, the Obama Administration took a 
skeptical view of ratifying the FTA this year, claiming that the 
auto provisions of the FTA were "unfair."  However, there is now a 
glimmer of hope since Presidents Obama and Lee Myung-bak agreed to 
cooperate on the FTA issue on the sidelines of the London G-20 
summit earlier this month.  During the June summit, they should take 
a big step toward the effectuation of the deal. 
 
The ROK and the U.S. already share the view that if the U.S.-ROK FTA 
comes into effect, it will greatly help the two nations overcome the 
economic crisis by expanding bilateral trade and increasing job 
opportunities.  It will also boost the U.S.-ROK alliance's joint 
response to North Korea's threats, which intensified after the 
missile launch.  For the two months remaining before the U.S.-ROK 
summit, the ROKG should do its utmost to fully promote the necessity 
of the U.S.-ROK FTA to the U.S. so that Congressional efforts to 
approve the pact may gain momentum.  This is the time for the ROKG 
to use all diplomatic channels to their fullest. 
 
It is true that some groups in the U.S. are opposed to the 
ratification of the FTA because of the auto provisions and the beef 
issue.  However, we can seek a win-win solution for both sides 
through mutual understanding while leaving the existing FTA intact. 
Moreover, the FTA contains most of the provisions long-demanded from 
the U.S. auto industry.  U.S. vehicles do not sell well in the 
wide-open ROK market is because of their low competitiveness.  Once 
the U.S.-ROK FTA takes effect, the U.S. will only scrap tariffs on 
ROK cars with engines smaller than 3,000 cc, but the ROK will lift 
tariffs on additional U.S. vehicles, thereby giving U.S. cars much 
easier access to the ROK market. 
 
Although U.S. beef producers demand that the ROK should import beef 
irrespective of the age of the cow, the ROK is currently importing 
beef from "cattle younger than 30 months," although Japan only 
imports beef from "cattle younger than 20 months."  Even if the ROK 
 
SEOUL 00000660  005 OF 007 
 
 
fully opens its beef market, the market share of beef imports from 
cattle older than 30 months will be negligible.  Now it is the U.S. 
government and Congress' turn to respond to the approval of the FTA 
bill by the National Assembly Committee on Unification, Foreign 
Affairs and Trade. 
 
 
CONTROVERSIES ON THE KORUS FTA SHOULD BE REMOVED 
(Hankook  Ilbo, April 23, 2009, Page 35) 
 
The National Assembly Committee on Unification, Foreign Affairs and 
Trade passed a motion to ratify the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement 
(KORUS FTA).  In protest, opposition lawmakers attempted to block 
the passage of the trade agreement.  However, the motion passed 
without incident, two years after the U.S. and ROK governments 
signed the agreement in April 2007.  The KORUS FTA issue rocked the 
Lee Myung-bak government which had just taken office, creating a 
severe divide in public opinion.  Also, a decision to import U.S. 
beef earlier than scheduled, which triggered the 'Mad Cow Disease 
Scandal' last year, dealt a further blow to the Lee Myung-bak 
government. 
 
What matters now is when a plenary session of the National Assembly 
will ratify the free trade pact.  The government and political and 
academic fields have been bitterly at odds over when to ratify the 
pact.  Some argued for ratifying the KORUS FTA prior to U.S. 
ratification, while others insisted on ratifying the trade deal at 
the same time as the U.S. Congress because of the possibility of 
renegotiation.  It was good that the ruling party delayed a final 
vote until the end of U.S.-ROK summit scheduled for June.  The ROK 
needs to gather the opinions of the opposition party and farmers to 
compensate industries harmed (by the FTA) such as agriculture, 
livestock, and fisheries, and devise ways to enhance the 
competitiveness of each industry.  The ROK should consider that the 
U.S. will unveil its detailed position after the ROK-U.S. summit. 
It makes sense for the ROK to pressure the U.S. through prior 
ratification.  However, it is uncertain whether the ROK can overcome 
the U.S. Congress' negative views on the KORUS FTA (even if it 
pushes for early ratification). 
 
The ROKG should coordinate with U.S. trade authorities before the 
bilateral summit and put an end to questions about (the possibility 
of) renegotiation and additional negotiation on the automotive 
sector, which was brought up by some members of the U.S. Congress 
and administration.  Unless the two countries clarify their 
positions, 'candle light vigils' may again occur.  President Obama, 
who criticized the KORUS FTA as unfair during his campaign, moved 
positively to cooperate on the FTA's progress during his meeting 
with President Lee Myung-bak at the G20 summit this month. 
 
The ROK should make sure that the KORUS FTA will pass a final vote 
since it could add momentum to strengthening the U.S.-ROK - alliance 
and expanding the export market.  The ROK also should make 
significant progress through consultations prior to the U.S.-ROK 
summit to create an atmosphere favorable to ratification in both 
countries.  The ROKG should carefully listen to opinions from the 
opposition party and farmers to avoid dividing public opinion. 
 
 
N. KOREA AS A HOSTAGE TAKER 
(Dong-a Ilbo, April 23, 2009, Page 31) 
 
North Korea has demanded that ROK companies raise wages for North 
Korean workers in the industrial complex in Kaesong to 70-75 U.S. 
dollars a month and for the ROK to pay rent for land four years 
ahead of time.  Pyongyang also unilaterally demanded that Seoul sign 
a new land lease though they had agreed that ROK companies use the 
land for 50 years.  It was suggested as a demand for renegotiation 
but virtually constituted a unilateral notice.  While again claiming 
that Seoul's participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative 
would constitute a declaration of war, the North also unexpectedly 
linked the issue with the inter-Korean industrial complex in 
Kaesong.  The North also failed to mention the Hyundai Asan employee 
who has been detained for 25 days. 
 
SEOUL 00000660  006 OF 007 
 
 
 
The Seoul delegation hurriedly headed to Kaesong in the early 
morning to try to use the encounter as a means towards official 
bilateral talks.  As the North delayed holding the meeting for as 
long as 11 hours, however, the actual meeting only lasted for 22 
minutes, which was truly embarrassing.  The Seoul delegation did not 
even have a chance to see the Hyundai Asan employee who was detained 
in the building where the meeting was held.  Still, the presidential 
office in Seoul tried to give meaning to the talks, saying, "We can 
construe the occasion as a momentum for dialogue."  ROK Unification 
Minister Hyun In-taek remained low key in making his post-meeting 
comments, saying, "We will carefully consider the proposal for 
renegotiation." 
 
It may be important for Seoul to try to maintain the momentum of 
dialogue amid strained ties with the North.  What is more important, 
however, is for Seoul to accurately read Pyongyang's intentions and 
wisely deal with them.   Considering the string of measures and 
demands made by Pyongyang following President Lee Myung-bak`s 
inauguration, we wonder if the North has been hatching a plot to 
close the industrial complex in the judgment that the complex no 
longer serves its interests.  Pyongyang`s demand is seen as 
threatening the ROK with either continuing the complex by paying 
hefty prices or shutting it down on its own. 
The move could also be Pyongyang's ploy to hand over the risks to 
the ROK, as it will have to take responsibility, make compensation, 
and face intense criticism if the North unilaterally shuts down the 
complex. 
 
The Kaesong complex was glorified as a symbol of inter-Korean 
compromise and a beachhead for inter-Korean economic exchange under 
the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun Administrations.  The complex, 
however, is now being used by North Korea as a hostage against the 
ROK.  Seoul must carefully examine the utility of the complex in 
light of inter-Korean relations and the economic impact from a 
fundamental perspective.  It needs to send to the North a clear 
signal that it can give up the complex if Pyongyang makes excessive 
demands. 
 
Attempted wheeling and dealing to demand more money by taking an ROK 
staff member hostage is nothing other than kidnapping.  Seoul should 
never give the impression that it is at the North's disposal.  It 
should make it clear that it cannot hold renegotiations with 
Pyongyang in any circumstances as long as an ROK staff is taken 
hostage.  Seoul said its participation in the Proliferation Security 
Initiative has nothing to do with its relations with Pyongyang, but 
it has postponed its participation three times due to the North, 
which is a mistake.  The ROK must now repeat the hopeless behavior 
of putting itself at the North's disposal again because of the 
industrial complex. 
 
(This is a translation provided by the newspaper, and it is 
identical to the Korean version.) 
 
 
NORTH KOREA'S DEMANDS EXCESSIVE, BUT SHOULD BE USED TO TURN AROUND 
THE SITUATION 
(Hankyoreh Shinmun, April 23, 2009, Page 23) 
 
In the first official inter-Korean meeting since the start of the 
administration of President Lee Myung-bak, North Korea proposed 
renegotiating all of the special measures it had granted regarding 
the Kaesong Industrial Park.  While it is somewhat unexpected to 
have North Korea focusing on business matters at a time when 
relations are so poor, we cannot assume its motive is entirely about 
its "cash intake."  Indeed, since it has opened a channel for 
possible dialogue, it is now time for South Korea to offer a prudent 
and profoundly different kind of response. 
 
North Korea is going too far, both in form and content.  Not only is 
it saying it wants to change the land lease at will, but it also 
demands to renegotiate details about usage fees which would result 
in a major increase in burden for South Korean companies operating 
there.  The demand that wages for North Korean workers are raised, 
 
SEOUL 00000660  007 OF 007 
 
 
too, goes against the agreement's limits on annual wage increases. 
It is nonsensical for North Korea to unilaterally notify South Korea 
of its intentions and to act in an arbitrary manner that may 
threaten Kaesong's stability. 
 
Just what North Korea's real motive is remains unclear.  It might 
want to change the existing (contract) framework under the view that 
it has given South Korean companies more benefits than it has given 
to companies from China and Vietnam.  However, it may also want to 
close down the project in a manner that passes the responsibility to 
South Korea, after it makes the conditions in the Kaesong Industrial 
Complex unattractive for businesses.  A broader political 
interpretation could infer that North Korea wants to put a special 
emphasis on negotiations with the U.S. while "delivering a 
curveball" to South Korea.  It is notable how North Korea says it 
cannot maintain the special privileges conferred in the Kaesong 
contracts at a time when relations have soured as a result of what 
they consider to be South Korea's "hostile policy," openly revealing 
its displeasure with inter-Korean relations. 
 
Whatever its intentions are, there does not appear to be any reason 
for South Korea's government and companies to refuse to confer 
together.  If this is about purely business matters, they can find 
some reasonable points of compromise through dialogue, and even if 
not, perhaps (they can) clarify points of contention during the 
course of negotiations.  It will only hurt the Kaesong project if 
they proceed to take things slowly, trying to assess North Korea's 
intentions without engaging in direct talks. 
 
The government should go even farther, however, and use this as an 
opportunity to improve inter-Korea relations.  Although one would 
like to see a separation between government and business matters, 
the Kaesong Industrial Park project is a matter that is inseparable 
from inter-Korean relations.  Relations have to be stabilized for 
Kaeseong to be able to continue.  In some respects, it is also 
serves as a safety valve, one that prevents inter-Korea relations 
from taking a turn for the worse.  Once a framework for dialogue is 
in place, Seoul could then of course expand the agenda and talk 
about other matters. 
 
It goes without saying that both North Korea and South Korea have to 
make an effort if dialogue is going to proceed in a smooth manner. 
The most urgent matter is that North Korea has detained a South 
Korean man, a Hyundai Asan employee, for more than three weeks and 
has not yet granted South Korea access.  It is inevitable that 
Pyongyang is going to have to reveal its true intentions regarding 
resolving the situation.  South Korea, for its part, is going to 
have to be clear about its decision to fully participate in the 
U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), something that 
North Korea clearly opposes.  South Korea will have to withdraw its 
plan to fully join the PSI. 
 
Both sides are to blame for the souring of inter-Korean relations 
but, instead of playing the blame game, it is time to turn things 
around.  The Seoul government, in particular, needs to lead the way 
in improving relations and use a consistent strategy in making the 
most of this opportunity. 
 
(This is a translation provided by the newspaper, and it is 
identical to the Korean version.) 
 
 
STEPHENS