VZCZCXRO2213
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHRO #0481 1191513
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 291513Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1999
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHFL/AMCONSUL FLORENCE IMMEDIATE 3599
RUEHMIL/AMCONSUL MILAN IMMEDIATE 0011
RUEHNP/AMCONSUL NAPLES IMMEDIATE 3789
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 000481 
 
SIPDIS 
VILNIUS PASS TO MINSK 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/01/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV BO IT
SUBJECT: LUKASHENA IN ROME, BERLUSCONI PROMISES VISIT TO 
MINSK 
 
REF: VATICAN 62 
 
Classified By: J. Liam Wasley, Acting Political Minister Counselor, for 
 reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary. Belarus President Aleksandr Lukashenka 
visited Rome April 27 to meet with Pope Benedict XVI (reftel) 
and PM Berlusconi.  The MFA claimed that Berlusconi had made 
the decision to break Lukashenka's isolation in the hopes of 
exploiting potential opportunities for a thaw in EU-Belarus 
relations created by the suspension of EU measures against 
the Lukashenka regime and the upcoming Eastern Partnership 
Summit in Prague to press for political reform in Belarus. 
The MFA insisted that FM Frattini, who attended the dinner, 
would raise the question of continuing political oppression 
and lack of progress on human and civil rights reform and 
circulated an editorial by Frattini to that effect in advance 
of the meeting.  By all indications, however, neither the PM 
nor the FM pressed Lukashenka on human rights.  Instead, 
Berlusconi promised to visit Minsk in the fall and encouraged 
Lukashenka to personally represent Belarus at the Eastern 
Partnership summit in Prague.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (C) During a visit to the Vatican on April 27, the GOB 
requested a meeting with Italian President Napolitano and PM 
Berlusconi.  Napolitano demurred but PM Berlusconi invited 
Lukashenka to dine with him and FM Frattini in what was 
dubbed an ""informal dinner"". Prior to the dinner, the MFA 
declined to give details about the proposed agenda for the 
meeting but insisted that human rights and continuing 
political oppression would be an important part of the 
discussion.  Lukashenka told the press afterward, however, 
that neither Berlusconi nor Frattini pressed him on reforms. 
Instead, according to Lukashenka, Berlusconi said he would 
visit Minsk in the fall and encouraged Lukashenka to 
personally participate in the Eastern Partnership Summit in 
Prague.  The Political Counselor of the Belarus Embassy 
confirmed that Berlusconi accepted Lukashenka's invitation to 
Belarus and the PM hoped Lukashenka would represent Belarus 
in Prague.  He added that Frattini asked generally about 
political reforms, to which Lukashenka noted that he was 
making great progress on liberalizing the political and 
social conditions in Belarus. 
 
¶3. (C) The GOI had hoped to downplay the visit, but an 
attentive press, an inquisitive Rome-based diplomatic corps, 
and a talkative Belarussian President kept the issue alive 
all week.  At the same time the Italian press noted that 
Berlusconi had unilaterally broken the US-EU isolation of 
""Europe's last dictator"", Lukashenka was praising Berlusconi 
for his strong leadership and announcing Berlusconi's pledge 
to visit Minsk in the fall.  The GOI reacted chaotically. 
The MFA rebuffed a request from the Czech Embassy, acting in 
its capacity as EU President, for an briefing to EU embassies 
in Rome and instead circulated an editorial by FM Frattini 
claiming that he would press Lukashenka on human rights 
issues (informal translation emailed to EUR/WE).  The 
Director of the MFA's Russian and Eastern European Department 
told embassies that neither she nor the Director General for 
Europe (A/S equivalent) had or would get a readout of the 
dinner and directed inquiries to the PM's diplomatic 
advisors. The PM's deputy diplomatic advisor told poloff 
confidentially that Berlusconi had acted on bad advice in 
agreeing to the meeting but did so out of humanitarian 
concern over the status of approximately 30 pending adoptions 
of Belarussian children by Italian families. 
 
¶4. (C) Comment.  Berlusconi's decision to help Lukashenka 
break his isolation was made without consultation with either 
the MFA or the EU.  While the MFA tried to spin the meeting 
as a positive development in the quest to ease political 
oppression in Belarus, Lukashenka came away with the 
impression that his behavior is no longer a concern for the 
EU.  For his part, Berlusconi reinforced that he prefers to 
avoid friction in his relationships with foreign leaders even 
if it requires him to overlook troubling truths. 
DIBBLE 
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