VZCZCXYZ0005
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHRB #0326/01 1041712
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 141712Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9988
INFO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 2519
RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI PRIORITY 0035
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA PRIORITY 0034
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY 0130
RUEHOU/AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU PRIORITY 0585
RUEHYN/AMEMBASSY SANAA PRIORITY 1245
RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS RABAT 000326 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR H, NEA/RA AND NEA/MAG 
OUAGADOUGOU PLS PASS CODEL SMITH 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OREP EFIN PGOV PREL KDEM MO
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR CODEL SMITH 
 
REF: STATE 032964 (NOTAL) 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  Representative Smith, we warmly welcome 
you and your delegation to Morocco.  Morocco has been an 
exemplary partner in the struggle against terrorism, and it 
serves as a regional model for economic change and democratic 
reform.  Our military and political cooperation is growing, 
and as a result, Morocco has been designated as a "Major 
non-NATO Ally."  The Kingdom of Morocco, one of our strongest 
allies in the Broader Middle East and North Africa (BMENA), 
is a country "on the move", in the throes, albeit unevenly, 
of change and reform.  Morocco has undertaken recent steps to 
strengthen its abilities to combat terrorist financing and 
money laundering.  Economic growth has averaged about five 
percent per year and investment, tourism and remittances have 
boomed in recent years, although the global financial crisis 
threatens these important sources of income.  Slums are 
coming down, and, according to official statistics, so is 
unemployment.  Freedom of the press has expanded to a level 
not seen here ever before and beyond the rest of the region, 
but there are still some restrictions, and those who 
challenge them can suffer heavy fines, libel judgments and 
more rarely, jail.  Political freedoms have grown as well, 
although they remain constrained by a system with roots going 
back hundreds of years.  Morocco's top priority in foreign 
relations is international support for its position on the 
Western Sahara territorial dispute and for North African 
integration.  End Summary. 
 
----------------------- 
Mission Strategic Goals 
----------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Mission strategic goals are, in order, economic 
growth and reform, countering terror, promoting U.S.-Moroccan 
partnership, enhancing democracy and governance, and 
resolving regional conflicts while maintaining close 
strategic cooperation.  Military-to-military engagements 
contribute to progress for at least four of these goals. 
With regard to economic growth and reform, we believe 
expanding Morocco,s economic base will do much to address 
popular dissatisfaction.  With regard to countering and 
combating terrorism, U.S. military engagement is focused on 
professional training and education programs.  The continued 
and expanded robust interaction between our two militaries is 
an important example of institution building that is a 
centerpiece of our relationship.  Finally, with regard to 
regional stability, the reinforcement of the Moroccan 
military helps to maintain the regional balance of power. 
Close ties with Morocco facilitate U.S. regional objectives 
not only in Africa but in the Middle East. 
 
---------------- 
Counterterrorism 
---------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) The terrorism threat in Morocco emanates mainly 
from small grassroots radical Islamic cells, which have shown 
some capacity to attack.  Security forces disrupted six 
terrorist and foreign fighter cells in 2008, arresting 105. 
Morocco,s increasingly tourist-oriented economy has 
increased the GOM,s concerns about the threat of terrorism. 
The GOM's implementation of a comprehensive counterterrorism 
strategy emphasizing vigilant security measures, 
counter-radicalization policies, and robust international 
cooperation has been largely successful in containing the 
threat to date.  Economic disruption, whether from attacks or 
the global economic crisis, remains the principal threat to 
stability here, but most observers believe Morocco can manage 
it ways through such troubles. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Under King Mohammed VI, as "Commander of the 
Faithful", Morocco has standardized religious doctrine, 
consolidated control over religious schools, and sent 
specially trained imams to Europe to preach moderate messages 
to the Moroccan diaspora.  The vast majority of Morocco's 
population rejects Salafist and Wahhabist approaches to Islam 
and so does not support terrorist groups. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Military Reform and Modernization 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Military Reform: The Moroccan Royal Armed Forces 
are modernizing but remain burdened by corruption, 
inefficient bureaucracy, and political marginalization.  The 
U.S. enjoys a robust military relationship, as evidenced by 
increased U.S.-Moroccan military training exercises and 
Morocco's purchase of sophisticated weapons from the U.S., to 
include 24 F-16s and 24 T-6s in the last year.  These point 
to a likely future reform of military doctrine, along with 
greater prospects for positive engagement with the U.S. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) The Moroccan military has undertaken a sweeping 
effort to modernize a military force that fields 
predominantly Korean and Vietnam War era equipment.  While 
the F-16 and T-6 sales form the vast bulk of the dollar 
figure for this modernization, the total Foreign Military 
Sales and Foreign Military Financing portfolio totals some 
120 cases in excess of USD 3 billion.  The list of pending or 
prospective sales includes 200 M1A1 main battle tanks, CH-47D 
and SH-60 rotary wing aircraft, Gulfstream and Beechcraft 
operational/Distinguished Visitor (DV) support aircraft, 
Hawk, Chaparral, and Stinger anti-aircraft systems, and 
solicitations for surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft 
and unmanned aerial vehicles.  Morocco is the second largest 
recipient of excess defense articles (EDA) from the U.S. 
These sales and transfers are necessary to permit the 
Moroccan military to both hold its position as a regional 
power and be able to interoperate and participate as a 
coalition partner.  They further serve to solidify the 
robust U.S./Moroccan military partnership, although there are 
competitors that can dramatically underbid U.S. offerings, 
and Morocco does not limit itself to U.S. equipment. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
Modernization Can Drive Regional Leadership 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU) The Royal Moroccan Armed Forces enjoys a 
well-deserved status as a regional leader in training, 
humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping.  With regard to 
training, Morocco has provided technical and operational 
training to more than 300 officers and 1,400 non-commissioned 
officers, primarily from francophone sub-Saharan Africa over 
the last 25 years, with much of that occurring in the last 
three years.  Morocco has further provided humanitarian 
assistance to 13 countries in the same time frame, especially 
in the areas of airlift and cloud-seeding operations. 
Finally, Morocco has robust experience in the realm of 
peacekeeping operations dating back to the 1960s.  It has 
signed on to Operation Active Endeavor.  Morocco also 
partnered with NATO in peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and 
with the United Nations (UN) in Angola, Cambodia, Haiti and 
Somalia in the past.  Morocco currently has peacekeepers in 
the NATO-led mission in Kosovo and the UN-led missions in 
Cote d,Ivoire and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
 
------------------------------ 
Support for Longer Term Issues 
------------------------------ 
 
¶8.  (SBU) The Embassy is currently engaged in negotiations 
with the GOM on a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and an 
Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA).  Inspector 
General of the Armed Forces General (CHOD) Bennani recently 
indicated that both documents are nearly ready for signature. 
 Unfounded rumors of prospective U.S. basing in connection 
with Africa Command have been publicly controversial. 
 
--------------- 
External Issues 
--------------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU) In October, Morocco signed an Advanced Status 
Agreement with the European Union, which promises to give 
Morocco free market access to the European Economic Area when 
finally implemented.  It also provides for greater 
coordination on other issues.  Morocco also participates in 
French President Sarkozy's nascent Mediterranean Union. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Border Troubles with Algeria:  The Moroccan 
relationship with Algeria is difficult, and the border 
between the two countries was closed by Algeria and remains 
closed.  While the King and other GOM officials have publicly 
proposed opening the border and upgrading bilateral relations 
between the two countries, their entreaties have been 
repeatedly rebuffed.  The GOA has linked progress on the 
border to the Western Sahara issue. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Western Sahara:  Moroccan foreign policy is 
dominated by defending and seeking international recognition 
of its sovereignty claims over Western Sahara.  The issue 
remains the most visible source of tension with Algeria, 
which has historically supported the POLISARIO's quest 
efforts for independence by way of a UN-sponsored referendum. 
 The issue led Morocco to leave the African Union and has 
been an obstacle to regional integration through the Arab 
Maghreb Union.  In April 2007, Morocco proposed a new 
autonomy plan for Western Sahara, and a series of 
UN-sponsored negotiations with the POLISARIO began in 
Manhasset, New York.  The Moroccan proposal, deemed "serious 
and credible" by the USG, would provide Sahrawis, the 
indigenous people of Western Sahara, autonomy in 
administering local affairs while respecting Moroccan 
sovereignty over the territory.  There have been four rounds 
of talks but none since March 2008.  After the April 2008 
renewal of the mandate of the UN peacekeeping mission, the 
USG announced it considered independence for the territory 
"not realistic." 
 
--------------- 
Internal Issues 
--------------- 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Current Government:  Prime Minister Abbas El 
Fassi's government, formed after the September 2007 
legislative elections, is built on a minority coalition. 
There has been periodic speculation that it might not last 
for the full five-year mandate of Parliament.  El Fassi's 
government, filled with young technocrats from within and 
outside his Istiqlal party, has performed better than many 
expected.  El Fassi has participated extensively in 
international events and diplomacy.  Internal democracy is 
growing within political parties.  A political formation 
founded by Fouad Ali El Himma, an intimate of the King, has 
evolved into a new Party of Authenticity and Modernity (PAM) 
by grouping several smaller parties.  It has now constituted 
the largest political bloc in Parliament and could be 
prepared to lead should the current coalition falter.  We see 
no prospect, however, for a significant shift in Morocco's 
foreign and security policies.  Neither Parliament nor the 
Prime Minister has much say in these issues, which are 
managed by the Throne directly with concerned ministries. 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Parliamentary Reform:  Morocco's political parties 
and the bicameral parliament are weak and structurally 
hamstrung from taking legislative initiatives or strongly 
articulating dissent.  The Parliament provides no effective 
check on the monarchy or government.  Changing the 
Constitution would be necessary in order to change the power 
imbalance and institute formal democracy.  Nonetheless, both 
parties and Parliament have made some technical improvements, 
largely thanks to USG-funded programs from the National 
democratic Institute (NDI) and the State University of New 
York (SUNY), which have modestly improved the body's 
administrative capacity.  These include establishment of a 
budget analysis office, a verbatim transcription service, and 
a consistent forum for training and debate among 
parliamentary members and staff. 
 
¶14.  (SBU) Parliamentary Reform Continued:  Although the 
September 2007 parliamentary elections were the most 
transparent in the country's history, record low 
participation (i.e., 37 percent of registered voters) 
reflects the lack of voter confidence in the institution. 
The State Department's Middle East Partnership Initiative 
(MEPI) funded the National Democratic Institute (NDI) to run 
the first ever international observation.  MEPI is now 
funding an ambitious training program for women running for 
municipal councils in June. 
 
¶15.  (SBU) Human Rights and Reform:  King Mohammed VI has 
embarked on an ambitious and continuous program of human 
rights reforms that includes the Arab world's first truth 
commission, a revised family code and growing governmental 
transparency and accountability.  Nonetheless, 2008 saw some 
incidents of concern related to freedoms of expression and 
press.  Although Morocco is a regional reform leader, the 
reforms are still not deeply rooted in law nor the 
Constitution and could be rolled back.  Continued support and 
encouragement from partners like the United States and Europe 
is essential. 
 
¶16.  (SBU) Religious Freedom:  The Moroccan Constitution 
provides for the freedom to practice one's religion, although 
Islam is the official state religion.  The GOM prohibits the 
distribution of non-Muslim religious materials, bans all 
proselytizing, but tolerates several small religious 
minorities.  It also occasionally restricts Islamic 
organizations whose activities have exceeded the bounds of 
"acceptable religious practice" and become political in 
nature), lately targeting Shi,a Islamic adherents.  Morocco 
is protective of the tiny remnant of its once substantial 
Jewish minority. 
 
------------------------------- 
Economics, Trade and Assistance 
------------------------------- 
 
¶17.  (SBU) Economics and Trade:  Economic growth has 
accelerated in recent years, averaging above five percent. 
While capital account restrictions have sheltered Morocco 
from the international financial crisis, the recession in 
Europe will affect exports.  An excellent agricultural 
harvest should lessen the downturn and keep growth near five 
percent this year.  Since implementation of our Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) on January 1, 2006, bilateral commerce has 
more than doubled.  U.S. firms are increasing their 
investment in Morocco, seeing new markets develop as a result 
of the FTA.  USAID, the Department of Commerce's Commercial 
Law Development Program and the U.S. Trade and Development 
Agency conduct capacity building and technical assistance 
projects to assist Morocco to create an open and transparent 
trading environment and fully develop its trading potential. 
However, significant export growth to U.S. and other markets 
will also depend on Morocco's ability to capture a larger 
share of value added in its export products.  Targeted USAID 
and MEPI assistance programs aim at improving Morocco's 
ability to produce and market its exports in key sectors. 
 
¶18.  (SBU) U.S. Assistance:  We are focusing our assistance 
to Morocco on youth and women, targeting four priorities: 
economic growth, counterterrorism, democracy and governance, 
and supporting quality education.  U.S. assistance includes 
Millennium Challenge Corporation, Peace Corps, USAID and MEPI 
 
activities. 
 
¶19.  (U) The Millennium Challenge Corporation signed a 
five-year, USD 697.5 million Millennium Challenge Account 
Compact with Morocco in 2007 to reduce poverty and increase 
economic growth.  The five-year clock started ticking on 
September 15, 2008, with the Entry into Force of the Compact. 
 The Compact will support five major projects selected for 
their potential to reduce poverty, increase productivity and 
improve employment in high potential sectors of Morocco's 
economy.  These projects include:  Fruit Tree Productivity, 
Small Scale Fisheries, Crafts, Financial Services and 
Enterprise Support. 
 
 
***************************************** 
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website; 
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Moro cco 
***************************************** 
 
Jackson