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C O N F I D E N T I A L QUITO 000233 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: TWENTY YEARS 
TAGS: SNAR PTER PREL PGOV KCRM EC CO
SUBJECT: POLICE UNIT INVESTIGATED WHILE CHAUVIN CASE INCHES 
FORWARD 
 
REF: A. QUITO 227 
     ¶B. QUITO 177 
     ¶C. QUITO...



id: 200475
date: 4/2/2009 22:27
refid: 09QUITO233
origin: Embassy Quito
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 09QUITO103|09QUITO153|09QUITO177|09QUITO227
header:
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----------------- header ends ----------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L QUITO 000233 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: TWENTY YEARS 
TAGS: SNAR PTER PREL PGOV KCRM EC CO
SUBJECT: POLICE UNIT INVESTIGATED WHILE CHAUVIN CASE INCHES 
FORWARD 
 
REF: A. QUITO 227 
     ¶B. QUITO 177 
     ¶C. QUITO 153 
     ¶D. QUITO 103 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Heather M. Hodges for Reasons 1.4 (b&d) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Ecuador's "narco-politics" scandal is 
playing out in perverse ways.  The good guys ) key personnel 
of a specialized police unit that was responsible for most of 
the GOE's success against narco-traffickers ) are under 
investigation by the GOE for returning USG computers and fear 
FARC reprisals.  Government Minister Jalkh has taken a few 
steps to restore the integrity of the unit, but its future 
effectiveness remains highly in doubt.  Meanwhile, the case 
against one of the bad guys ) former Under Secretary 
Chauvin, whose ties to FARC narco-trafficking were uncovered 
by the police unit ) is at least inching forward due to the 
courage of the prosecutor.  But President Correa is 
threatening reprisals against the prosecutor and intends to 
bring another bad guy, Chauvin ally and former minister 
Gustavo Larrea, back into the cabinet.  END SUMMARY. 
 
GOVERNMENT MINISTER INTERVENES IN ADMINISTRATION OF SPECIAL 
POLICE UNIT 
 
¶2.  (C) After two very bad months, the Special Police 
Investigative Unit (UIES), formerly supported by the USG, 
experienced a mixed bag of changes over the past two weeks. 
This is the unit that uncovered former Government Under 
Secretary Ignacio Chauvin's alleged ties to narcotraffickers 
(Ref C) and carried out many other operations critical to the 
success of Ecuador's fight against narcoterrorism.  However, 
the UIES lost its leadership and key personnel on February 4 
when Police Commander Jaime Hurtado transferred them out of 
the unit (Ref D), replacing the unit chief with Major Rafael 
Perez.  Due to his failure to pass a polygraph test and the 
GOE's refusal to vet Perez and other personnel for the elite 
unit, the USG was forced to end its support, which the press 
reports amounted to approximately $2 million annually and 
essentially financed its operations. 
 
¶3.  (C) One positive development was Minister of Government 
and Police Gustavo Jalkh's request on March 25 that Police 
Commander Hurtado remove Perez as UIES Chief because he did 
not have the "profile appropriate to manage a special police 
unit," explaining that it should be led by an officer with 
the rank of at least colonel.  Two days later, Hurtado 
announced that the unit would be led by Colonel Juan Carlos 
Rueda, who was trained in tactics under the Group of 
Intervention and Rescue, served as the Chief of the Judicial 
Police of Guayas province, and most recently worked in the 
Commission of Police Reforms.  Rueda is someone we think we 
may be able to work with. 
 
¶4.  (C) In another constructive move, Minister Jalkh on March 
24 criticized transfers ordered by Hurtado in early February 
and requested that all transfers be suspended for 60 days, 
saying that "constant transfers of police personnel have 
provoked a lack of continuity in the work they perform, which 
has had an effect on the efficiency of their work." 
 
¶5.  (C) On the negative side of the ledger, however, Minister 
Jalkh announced plans for the unit to report directly to the 
General Directorate of Intelligence (which will report to the 
Presidency).  The impact of other decisions is less clear: 
Jalkh said the unit would be funded by national resources and 
"countries that want to support the work of this group 
against organized crime," and include the use of Ecuadorian 
polygraph testing in the recruitment of personnel.  Hurtado 
decided to change the name of the unit to the Fight Against 
Organized Crime Unit. 
 
FORMER UIES CHIEF SUBJECT TO INVESTIGATION AND THREATS 
 
¶6.  (C) Major Manuel Silva, who had served as the UIES Chief 
until February 4, responded on March 24 to accusations of 
improper conduct, specifically regarding the controversial 
"handover of sensitive information" to the U.S. Embassy upon 
the unit's return of Embassy-donated computers and equipment. 
 He stated that Police Commander Hurtado had authorized the 
return of all the equipment.  (Note.  The information 
contained in the computers has been jointly shared and 
collaborated upon between the unit and the Embassy for 
several years.  End Note.) 
 
¶7.  (C) Major Silva filed a formal complaint on March 24 with 
the Prosecutor General's office, urging it to investigate the 
alleged burning of critical documents in the UIES unit 
ordered by Major Perez.  According to Silva, Perez ordered 
the burning of the documents with the intent of alleging 
their "disappearance" in order to implicate Silva further. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) In early February, the newly appointed UIES chief 
Major Perez had accused former UIES chief Major Silva and 
three other former UIES officials with the rank of captain of 
delivering the computers to the U.S. Embassy.  Following 
review and a decision by a Council of Generals, the case 
against Silva and the three captains was handed to the 
Ministry of Government and Police on February 16.  Based on a 
subsequent report from Minister Jalkh and Minister of 
Internal and External Security Miguel Carvajal, a prosecutor 
of the Miscellaneous Crimes Unit opened a case on March 18 to 
investigate Silva and the UIES unit.  Meanwhile, the 
Legislative Commission accepted a request by the Popular 
Democratic Movement to conduct its own investigation of the 
UIES unit. 
 
¶9.  (C) Attorneys for the captains have complained that the 
investigation has violated their defendants' rights and that 
the review process by the Council of Generals was unjust and 
did not allow for an appeal and was not transparent.  Family 
and friends of Major Perez protested in front of the 
Ecuadorian National Police headquarters on March 31 demanding 
that the case against Silva be transparent and fair. 
 
¶10.  (C) As a consequence of the very public nature of the 
transfer and investigation of former UIES chief Silva and 
others in the unit, including the daily appearance of Silva's 
name and photo in the press, Silva and the others have had 
their personal security put at risk as potential FARC 
targets.  Silva is currently in hiding and has been promised 
security by the GOE, but his family reportedly has not yet 
been contacted to coordinate this protection. 
 
WHO HAS THE CASE? 
 
¶11.  (C) Guayas province Prosecutor Antonio Gagliardo decided 
March 24 to allow cases to proceed against Chauvin and 25 
others implicated in the UIES's Border Hurricane operation 
against narcotraffickers.  This allowed the cases to advance 
to the next stage in the judicial process, namely a court 
hearing.  Gagliardo held back three cases for further review. 
 Counternarcotics Prosecutor Jorge Solorzano had filed 
charges against all 29 on March 9. 
 
¶12.  (C) Attempts to change the judge and jurisdiction in the 
Chauvin case failed.  A Guayas province judge had earlier 
reviewed a complaint filed by one of the defendants regarding 
the jurisdiction of the case and announced that the original 
judge Zoila Alvarado would no longer hear the case, and that 
it would be transferred to Esmeraldas.  However, the Guayas 
district court returned the case to Judge Alvarado on March 
13, so she still has jurisdiction, at least for now. 
 
IS LARREA COMING BACK? 
 
¶13.  (C) A Political Control and Oversight Committee of the 
interim Legislative Commission, responding to a call by Julio 
Logrono of former president Lucio Gutierrez' Patriotic 
Society Party (PSP), decided to carry out an investigation 
into former minister Gustavo Larrea's authorization of or 
consent to Ignacio Chauvin's seven admitted meetings with the 
FARC.  The committee began its ten day review on March 31. 
The investigation will stretch well past the April 26 
elections. 
 
¶14.  (C) Defending Larrea, President Correa announced during 
his March 14 weekly radio/TV address that he would request 
that the Prosecutor General investigate Prosecutor Solorzano, 
"because what he has done is just a show.  As a result, what 
they have done is accuse Chauvin of being an accomplice, as 
well as Gustavo (Larrea), but haven't found anything." 
Correa then added that he intended to reintegrate former 
Security Minister Larrea back into his cabinet.  To date, 
however, he has not appointed Larrea to any cabinet position. 
 
¶15.  (C) Responding to statements by PSP and the Commission 
questioning Larrea's ties to the FARC, Larrea held a press 
conference on March 26.  He stressed that the Correa 
government's efforts in the northern border region were 
unprecedented and that there was a campaign to link the GOE 
to the FARC.  He refuted any allegations of his own ties to 
the FARC.  Larrea accused expelled diplomat Mark Sullivan of 
being the point-man of a structured USG system of 
intelligence for the region and the CIA of participating in a 
plot against the Correa government. 
 
¶16.  (C) Larrea's appointment (if it happened) would be his 
third rise to Correa's cabinet, having served first as 
Minister of Government and Police and then as Coordinating 
Minister of Internal and External Security.  However, 
Correa's recent comments in defense of Larrea are likely just 
an attempt to persuade voters that the GOE is clean and to 
appease Larrea supporters. 
 
COMMENT 
 
¶17.  (C) Despite a couple of steps forward, effective 
prosecution and sentencing of those accused of 
narcotrafficking as a result of the UIES's Border Hurricane 
operation will likely be stymied by Ecuador's ineffective 
legal system.  Meanwhile, the ability of Ecuador's police to 
combat and investigate other narcotrafficking cases is 
suffering, at least in the short term.  For example, due to a 
lack of training and experience, Ecuadorian polygraphing will 
not likely be carried out in an effective or reliable manner. 
 Even more problematic is the fact that the UIES and other 
special investigation units will now be managed by political 
appointees in the General Directorate of Intelligence.  In an 
environment of slow-moving investigations and increasing 
political control, the door is open for the Correa government 
to shape the outcomes and divert public attention away from 
any suggestion of GOE narco ties. 
 
HODGES 

=======================CABLE ENDS============================